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ABSTRACT
This thesis deals with the concept of compliance.
Its main argument is that the concept of formal
compliance has shortcomings and therefore needs to be
complemented with a concept of empirical compliance. At
the heart of the concept of compliance is the
relationship between rules and social practices. This
relationship is conceptualized as involving a "gap", in
the case of formal non - compliance, or as indicating the
fulfilment of legal requirements in the case of formal
compliance. Instead, as the concept of empirical
compliance shows, rules and social practices can be
linked through a process of integration. This changes our
understanding of a concept of law. Formal concepts of law
which are based on formal legal rules have to be modified
in order to understand empirical compliance. An empirical
concept of law which is based both on enforement
officers' and the regulated companies' definitions of
what is considered as normative in everyday practices has
to be adopted. I discuss commercial aims, technology,
information ani the formal law as normative contexts
which shape a notion of empirical law. The thesis adopts
a social construction approach by exploring how actors in
the field establish and manipulate the various normative
constraints	 under	 which	 they	 work.
The research explores empirical compliance in the
area of waste management regulation in the U.I(. and
Germany. It draws on qualitative data on the
implementation of waste management regulation in the
everyday practices of handling waste at two waste
treatment plants and the day to day enforcement
activities of two waste regulation authorities. The
thesis focusses on the behaviour of staff on the lowest
level of the organizational hierarchy in both the waste
treatment plants and the waste regulation authorities.
The main research techniques employed were observation
and participant observation over a three months period
with each of the four organizations involved in the
research.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1. The topic and themes of the thesis
This thesis deals with legal compliance. In
particular it explores the question how compliance is
achieved in practice. The concept of compliance at first
sight does not seem to merit further inquiry. We can
think of compliance as 'fulfilling legal requirements'.
To think of compliance as 'fulfilling legal
requirements', however, refers to an abstract level of
understanding compliance. What counts in practice as
fulfilling legal requirements? What do the regulated do
in the context of 'compliance' situations and how might
this influence what we can understand as a concept of
compliance?
These questions have not received much attention in
the literature. If issues surrounding compliance have
been discussed then often non-compliance was the object
of inquiry. Non-compliance has been considered as
interesting and relevant in the literature, for example,
from a perspective of social control. How can we make law
more effective' and achieve greater social control? In
this thesis the focus is neither on a pre-given concept
of compliance, nor non-compliance, but I will explore the
social processes that operate in the context of the
achievement of both compliance and non-compliance.
The particular approach of this research to
understanding compliance is to look at how compliance is
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or is not achieved in the field rather than to deal with
compliance abstractly. To understand compliance in
practice requires an exploration of the relationships
between the regulated, the regulators and legal
requirements. In the literature, particularly on non-
compliance, the relationship between the social practices
of the regulated and legal requirements has often been
perceived as one where there are 'gaps'. One of the
issues I will explore in this thesis is whether the
relationship between the social practices of the
regulated and legal requirements cannot be understood in
a less static way. Can there be an integration of the
regulated companies' social practices with the legal
requirements demanded of them?
1.2. The legal framework of waste management regulation
in the U.K. and Germany
This thesis discusses compliance with some aspects
of waste management regulation. In this section I want to
describe the main features of the regulatory framework
because in the subsequent chapters, reference will be
made to these legal previsions and the role they play in
practice.
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12.l. U.K.
Waste management regulation
While I conducted my field work in the U.K., the
main statute applying to waste management regulation was
the Control of Pollution Act (COPA) 1974. Some of the
provisions under the Environmental Protection Act (EPA)
1990 had come into force towards the end of my field
work, for example, the duty of care provisions under
section 34 EPA 1990. But the new system of licensing
under section 35 EPA 1990 was not in force.
The need for licen.ces for the disposal of controlled
waste
Under COPA 1974, the unlicensed disposal of
'controlled' waste - household, industrial and commercial
waste (section 30 (1)) - is prohibited (section 3(1) COPA
1974). Most of the wastes which were handled at the U.K.
waste treatment plant where I did field work were
industrial wastes.
The procedure for obtaining a waste disposal licence
Section 5 COPA 1974 spells out the procedure for
applying for a waste disposal licence. A disposal licence
can only be issued for land for which planning permission
for waste disposal has been granted by the planning
authority (section 5 (2)). Where a valid planning
permission is in force, the waste disposal authority
(WDA) should grant the application for a waste disposal
3
licence. The application should only be rejected if this
is necessary for the purpose of preventing the pollution
of water or danger to public health (section 5 (3)).
Licence conditions and modifications
Tinder section 6 (2) COPA 1974, the WDA has powers
to impose conditions on the licence. WDAs can serve
notices on operators that modify licence conditions
which, in the opinion of the authority, are desirable and
unlikely to require unreasonable expenditure by the
licence holder (section 7 (1) (a) (i) COPA 1974). Also
the licence holder can request the modification of
licence conditions (section 7 (1) (a) (ii) COPA 1974).
Guidance through Waste Management Papers (WMPs)
The Department of the Environment (DoE) issues
guidance in the form of WMPS which put flesh on the bones
of the statutory provisions. For example, WMP no.4 (1990,
"The Licensing of Waste Facilities", London, HMSO)
addresses the procedure for licensing facilities. It
spells out that working plans, which are detailed
descriptions of how the operator intends to run his/her
site, should be submitted with the application for a
waste disposal licence (para. 2.3.- 2.9) . WMP no.4 also
provides model site licence conditions and makes
recommendations for the site inspection frequency for
waste control officers.
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The WMP no.4 was drawn up by Her Majesty's
Inspectorate for Pollution Control (HNIP), as part of the
DoE. HMIP was assisted by a group, composed of senior
waste control officers from WDAs, staff from waste
management companies and representatives of professional
associations such as the Chemical Industries Association
and professional bodies such as the Institute of Waste
Management (representing waste control officers) and the
National Association of Waste Disposal Contractors
(representing waste management operators) . There are
further t'JMPs which provide more technical guidance for
example on the engineering of landfill sites or the
control of landfill gas.
Enforcement powers and offences
Power to serve notices: In the event of non-
compliance with site licence conditions the WDA can issue
a notice on the licence holder requesting him to comply
with them (section 9 (4))
Licence revocation: WDAs have a duty to revoke a
licence where it appears to them that the continuation of
activities to'which the licence relates would cause the
pollution of water or danger to public health or would be
seriously detrimental to the amenities of the locality
affected by the activities. Such a duty to revoke the
licence only exists where the pollution, danger or
detriment cannot be avoided by modifying the licence
conditions (Section 7 (4))
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Supervision of sites: WDAs have to supervise waste
disposal sites to ensure that the activities to which the
licence relates do not cause pollution of water or danger
to public health or become seriously detrimental to the
amenities of the locality (section 9 (1) (a)) . Also
supervision should ensure that operators comply with
licence conditions (section 9 (1) (b).
Offences: The unlicensed disposal of cOntrolled
waste or the disposal of waste in breach of licence
conditions constitutes a criminal offence (section 3 (2)
COPA 1974).
Appeals: In case of a rejection, modification or
revocation of a disposal licence or disagreement with the
licence conditions, the licence applicant or holder can
appeal against the decision of the WDA to the Secretary
of State (section 10 (1) COPA 1974)
Regulations
Section 17 of COPA 1974 gives powers to the
Secretary of State to make provisions for controlled
waste which is difficult or dangerous to dispose of.
These wastes are called special wastes and are more
precisely defined in the regulations made under section
17 COPA 1974 (para. 2(1) of the Control of Pollution
(Special Waste) Regulations 1980, SI 1980 No. 1709)
One criterion for special waste is that it contains
or consists of substances listed in a schedule and. is
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"dangerous to life". The section 17 procedure is a paper
procedure which controls the movement of special wastes
from waste producers to a final disposal site. Under
para. 4 of the regulations, the producer of special waste
is under a duty to prepare 6 copies of a consignment note
before the waste is removed from the premises. One copy
of this consignment note has to be sent by the producer
to the WDA in whose area the waste is to be disposed, The
copy of the consignment note must be furnished to the WDA
not more than one month and not less than three clear
days before the removal of the waste (para. 4 (3)).
Another copy of the consignment note will go to the WDA
of the area where the waste was produced in case this is
different from the WDA where the waste will be disposed
(para 4(6)). Also the carrier transporting the waste will
carry copies of the consignment note. When the waste
arrives at the final disposal site the disposer has to
complete the final part of the consignment note and send
a copy of this to the WDA where the waste was produced.
This will close the 'circle'. The WDA of the waste
producer will then know that the waste has arrived at its
final destination and has not been diverted, during
transport, for example, to an unlicensed site. One copy
of the consignment note is kept at the final waste
disposal site.
Exceptions from the general section 17 provisions
Para. 9 provides powers for WDAs to make special
arrangements for frequent transports of special waste
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streams of similar composition from one waste producer to
one disposal site. These are simplified procedures which
are also known in the industry as "season tickets".
Producers only have to notify the WDA once of the
movement of wastes. Subsequent movements are then covered
for a certain period of time by section 17 note. The
WDA where I conducted field work operated such a
simplified procedure for regular movements of special
wastes. Failure to comply with the provisions of the
section 17 regulations constitutes a criminal offence
(para. 16).
Water pollution control regulation
Since I carried out field work at waste
treatment plants, legal regulations concerning the
discharge of effluent into the public sewer were also
relevant. There is a general prohibition against placing
substances into public sewers if they are 'prohibited
substances' or could interfere with the sewage system
(section 111 WIA 1991) . But trade effluent can be
discharged into a public sewer if a sewerage undertaker's
consent authorizes this (section 118 (1) of the Water
Industry Act (WIA) 1991). The sewerage undertaker can
impose conditions on the consent (section 121 WIA 1991).
These conditions can restrict the concentration of
particular substances in the effluent, for example heavy
metals. Often and in the case of the U.K. waste treatment
plant where I conducted my field work, the sewerage
undertaker is part of the privatized water companies.
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Offences
Under section 118 (5) WIA 1991 the occupier of the
premises from which trade effluent is discharged without
a consent is guilty of a criminal offence. Contravention
of the conditions of a consent constitutes a criminal
offence (section 121 (5)) WIA 1991.
1.2.2. Germany
Basic aspects of waste management regulation in
Germany and the U.K. are quite similar, also because this
is an area which has been harmonized through the EC Waste
Framework Directive 1975 (75/442), as amended by
Directive 91/156. When I conducted the field work, the
main provisions affecting waste management plants in
Germany were contained in the Waste Disposal Act 1986
("Jthfallgesetz" (AbfG)) . Similar to section 3 (1) COPA
waste can only be treated, stored or disposed of in
facilities in Germany which have been licensed for this
purpose ( 4 (1) phrase 1 AbfG).
The German federal Parliament can pass statutes on
waste management regulation. The different "Lander" can
only 1egislat on those issues which have not yet been
regulated by the federal statute (article 74 no. 24
German Basic Law). The legal framework for waste
management regulation in the different "Lander" varies.
In the following section, I will focus only on basic
aspects of waste management regulation which are the same
in the different "Lander". The federal government has
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powers to pass legal regulations which are addressed to
the waste regulation authorities and set standards for
the	 disposal	 of	 waste	 (in	 German:
"Verwaltungsvorschriften" ( 4 (5) AbfG)). 2mong other
issues these regulations cover technical aspects of waste
disposal. In content they are partly comparable to the
NPs in the U.K.
Licensing
§ 7 (1) 2JDfG makes provisions for the licensing of
waste management p'ants. The building, operation and a
material change of a waste management plant have to be
licensed by the relevant authority through a procedure
called	 plan	 determination	 (in	 German:
n planfeststellungsverfahren !! ).	 This	 procedure	 is
specified through general German administrative law ( §
72 ff. Administration Procedures Statute (in German:
"Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz" (VwVfG)). In contrast to
U.K. law, the planning permission for the waste
managenent facility is part of a German waste management
licence issued under § 7 (1). Under this section there is
only one integrated licensing procedure which deals both
with planning and waste regulation aspects.
Under § 7 (2) a less elaborate procedure for the
licensing of waste management plants can be applied, the
so-called	 authorization	 procedure	 (in	 German:
"Genehmigungsverfahren"). This procedure is used for
waste management facilities which are considered as less
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significant in comparison to plants which are licensed
under § 7 (1). The statute lists criteria that define in
which cases the less complex licensing procedure can be
applied ( 7 (2) AbfG).
Conditions
The German RP. has powers to impose conditions on the
waste management licence, as far as this is necessary for
ensuring the welfare of the public ( 8 (1)) . It is the
normal case that conditions are imposed. § 8 (1) provides
for the possibility of adding new conditions or modifying
existing ones after the licence has been issued.
The PA has powers to supervise the disposal of waste
( 11 (1) IthfG) . § 11 (2) gives special powers to the R7.
in connection with wastes which cannot be disposed of
together with waste arising in households. These powers
relate in particular to the provision of information by
waste holders about such wastes.
Offences
It	 is	 a	 regulatory	 offence	 (in	 German:
'Ordnungswidrigkeit") to treat, store or dispose of waste
in an unlicensed facility ( 18 AbfG). In Germany, the
Penal Code ("Strafgesetzbuch" (StGB)) provides for
environmental criminal offences. For example, it is a
criminal offence if somebody treats, stores or disposes
of waste without permission outside a licensed waste
disposal facility ( 326 (1) Nr. 3 StGB). In order to
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corrtrnit this offence the waste has to fulfil certain
criteria. For example, it has to be capable of
deteriorating the quality of a water course, the air or
the soil according to its nature, quantity or composition
of polluting substances. Regulations
Disposal certificates - "ENs": The federal
government has powers to pass regulations ( 4 (5) AbfG).
One of those regulations is the "Abfall- und
ReststoffUberwachungsverordnung" (bfRestUberwV) (3rd of
April 1990; BGBL III 2129-15-6) . This regulation was
relevant for the handling of waste at the German waste
management plant where I conducted field work. The
regulation applies to waste producers, waste carriers and
waste disposers ( 1 (1) PbfRestUberwV).
If a waste producer is covered by the provisions in
§ (2) or (3) NDtG then he has to prove to the RA. that the
proposed disposal path for his waste is permissible
(para. 8 lthfResttrberwV). These wastes are partly
comparable to the U.K. special wastes. The waste holder
proves through a paper procedure that the proposed
disposal path for his waste is permissible. When
proposing how to dispose of the waste the waste holder
has to consider in particular the possibility of
recycling ( 8 (1) MfRestUberwV) * The paper form on
which the disposal path of 'special wastes' is authorized
is called the disposal certificate
	 ("Entsorgungs-
nachweis" ("EN")) . The "EN" comprises three parts.
Firstly the "responsible declaration" ("verantwortliche
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Erklarung) of the waste producer, the acceptance
declaration ("Annahmeerklarung") of the waste disposer
and the disposal authorization ("Entsorgungsbesttigung")
of the waste regulation authority in the area of the
final waste disposal plant ( 8 (2) AbfRestUberwV).
The waste producer has to fill in the "responsible
declaration" of the flEN!I ( 9 (1) AbfRestUberwV) . Then he
has to send the "EN" to the final waste disposer ( 9
(2)). The final waste disposer has to fill in the
acceptance declaration of the EN form ( 9 (3)). Then the
final waste disposer will send the "EN" to his BA ( 9(4)
2\bfRestUberwV). The BA has discretion either to approve
or reject the disposal path ( 9 (5), § 9 (7) . The waste
carrier has to have a copy of the "EN" with him during
the transport of the waste ( 9 (9) AbfRestUberwV).
Exceptions
§ 10 AbfRestUberwV provides for an exception from
the general procedure of the "EN". Under this exception
"EN", the so-called "Sainmel-EN", can be used for
several loads. In this case several waste loads are mixed
together, if they can be classified under the same waste
description and are disposed of through the same disposal
path. The mixed waste load has to conform to the
parameters specified in the "EN". The individual waste
loads, which are to be disposed of through a "Sainmel EN",
each have to remain below a certain limit. This is 1.1
cubic metres in the case of solid wastes and 3 cubic
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metres in the case of liquid waste ( 10 (1) Nr.4
AbfRestUberwV) . In the case of "Sammel ENs", the waste
carrier has to fill in the "responsible declaration",
part of the "EN" ( 11 AbfResttYberwV).
Transport certificates
The transport certificates in Germany (in German:
"Begleitschein") ( 14 AbfRestUberwV) are similiar to the
U.K. section 17 notes. These are used as evidence for the
actual disposal of wastes which require particular
supervision ("besonders UberwachungsbedUrftige Abfälle").
There are 6 copies of the transport certificate. In
contrast to the section 17 note in the U.K., however,
there has to be n. prior notification of the waste
regulation authority. No more than 10 days after the
acceptance of the wastes from the waste carrier the final
waste disposer has to send 2 copies of the transport
certificate to his waste regulation authority as proof of
disposal ( 16 (2) AbfRestUberwV) . Then the waste
regulation authority of the final waste disposer will
send one copy of the transport certificate to the waste
regulation authority in the area of the waste producer.
The 'circle' is then complete.
Offences
It is a regulatory offence not to fill out, or not
completely fill out, or fill out wrongly,a disposal or
transport certificate ( 27 AbfRestUberWV)
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Technical guidance for special wastes ("TA Abfall")
The "TA Abfall" (12. Närz 1991, GMBL, S. 139, ber.
S. 469) addresses the PA, not necessarily third parties
like waste management operators. The "TA Abfall" applies
to wastes defined under § 2 (2) AbfG. These are wastes
which require special supervision and are partly
comparable to the U.K. special wastes. The "TA .Abfall" is
important because - inter alia - it provides a catalogue
which connects waste streams, identified through waste
descriptions, to particular types of waste disposal
facilities. Hence, when waste disposers apply via the
"EN" for a particular disposal path, then the German PA
should refer to this catalogue for comparing the
proposed disposal path with the recommendations of the
"TA Abfall".
Water pollution control regulation
The German waste treatment plant discharged effluent
into the public sewer at the end of the treatment
process.	 This discharge is controlled by legal
provisions.	 The German	 federal Water Law 1986
("Wasserhaushaitsgesetz" (WHG)) puts the onus on the
"Lander" to regulate indirect discharges
("Indirekteinleitung") such as the treatment plant's
discharge into the public sewer. The "Lander" passed the
duty of detailed regulation mostly on to the districts
("Koinmune")	 (see	 for	 example	 §	 52	 Hessisches
Wassergesetz). The German waste treatment plant had a
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discharge consent ("Einleitegenehmigung") which, very
similar to the UK. consent, sets limits for the
discharge of some substances in the effluent.
13. The actors
In the following section I want to give the reader a
mental picture of the German and U.K. waste treatment
plants and their activities. This description of the
locality will provide a framework for the activities at
the plants described in the main body of the thesis. I
will give a written description of the plants because for
confidentiality reasons I can not provide a drawing of
them in an appendix to this thesis.
The U.K. waste treatment plant
The U.K. waste treatment plant dealt with liquid
wastes, mainly from industrial processes such as metal
plating or painting. The waste was brought into the plant
by tankers. Near to the entrance of the concreted yard of
the plant was a site Office in which the paper
documentation accompanying the waste loads was dealt
with. Tankers would be weighed on a large weigh-bridge
when arriving at the site and when leaving. After the
initial weighing, tankers would drive onto the yard to
the discharge points for the liquid waste. A sample of
the tanker's waste might be taken there. Behind the
discharge points (the "grids"), the filter presses, pumps
and some pipework were housed in a large building. Behind
this building were numerous tanks of various sizes in the
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bunded tankfarm. In these tanks the wastes would be
stored, mixed and treated. There was also a chemical
laboratory on site, a portacabin office for the transport
unit and the sales staff, as well as a mess room for the
employees working on the yard.
The German waste management plant
At the German waste management plant, the waste
treatment plant was only one aspect of the operations.
Part of the plant was also a transfer station where
liquid and solid industrial wastes were temporarily
stored and then passed on to final waste disposers. As at
the U.K. waste treatment plant, there was a chemical
laboratory, a site office for the handling of the paper
documentation of incoming waste loads and a weigh-bridge.
There was also a separate office block in which the "EN"
paper procedure was handled. The waste treatment plant
was smaller than the U.K. plant and its tankfarm was
housed in one building.
The waste regulation authorities
At the time of my field work, the county councils
were mainly responsible for waste disposal regulation in
the U.K. In th? metropolitan areas, the district council
was responsible, though in some areas a joint body had
been set up. I mainly had contact during the field work
with the lowest level of staff in the U.K. waste
regulation authority who would regularly visit, supervise
and licence sites. These field officers had managers such
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as team leaders who would spend a greater proportion of
their time than the field officers in the office on
management tasks. In Germany, it varies in the different
0Länder" which level in the administrative hierarchy is
responsible for waste disposal regulation. As in the U.K.
BA, I observed in the German BA the work of the lowest
level of staff who supervised and licenced sites.
1.4. The study, an outline of the thesis
The thesis is divided.into 5 parts. Part I consists
of the literature and methodology chapter (chapter 2 and
3) . This part will discuss what the issues are that I
will be exploring in the main part of the thesis. lh are
they interesting and relevant? ff did I carry out
research on those issues?
Parts II and III comprise the main body of the
thesis. In these two parts I will report the empirical
data which I collected during my field work. Part II
includes 4 chapters (chapters 4,5,6 and 7). Chapters 4,5
and 6 deal with the question in what contexts compliance
occurs. How do' contexts affect compliance? Chapter 4
deals with commercial contexts and compliance. Chapter 5
explores what role technology plays in the achievement of
compliance and chapter 6 discusses whether work group
norms are relevant for understanding compliance. Chapter
7 deals with strategies for managing various standards
for compliance in the context of waste management.
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Part III deals with data on direct interaction
between the regulated and the regulators. It includes 4
chapters (chapter 8,940 and 11). Chapter 8 deals with
the negotiation of standards for compliance during site
licensing and in the field. Chapter 9 discusses the
question how standards are adapted. It also attempts to
explain some aspects of negotiation. Chapter 10 explores
what role information plays in the forming of perceptions
about compliance at waste management sites. Chapter 11
discusses how operators manipulate information and
perceptions about waste management sites.
Part IV consists of 2 chapters (chapter 12 and 13)
Chapter 12 and 13 are the analysis chapters. Chapter 12
discusses formal and empirical concepts of compliance and
law. Chapter 13 explores the subjective and cultural
dimensions of a concept of compliance and discusses the
implications of my research findings for debates on
discretion and the indeterminacy of rules.
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTS OF COMPLIANCE IN THE LITERATURE
2.1. IntroductLon
This chapter has three purposes. First, the chapter
aims to locate the thesis within a body of research by
discussing literature on the concept of compliance.
Secondly, on the basis of this literature review, I will
explain what particular approach I have taken in my
thesis for investigating the concept of compliance.
Thirdly, the chapter will raise themes and questions
which arise out of a discussion of the literature and
which need to be addressed when thinking about
compliance.
The chapter is divided into three main parts. In
the first part I will deal with the question why I chose
not to study discretion or enforcement or white collar
crime but why I studied compliance. Why is compliance
interesting and into what debates can knowledge about the
nature of compliance feed ? The second part of the
chapter will deal with different theoretical and
methodological approaches to discussing compliance. In
the third part of the chapter, I will look in more detail
at issues raised when exploring compliance. In
particular, I will discuss the relationship between rules
and social practices and the tension between structure
and agency in shaping this relationship.
The structure of the chapter reflects the approach
I will take in discussing compliance. First of all, it is
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important to understand why I described the research
topic as compliance. Defining the subject matter as
compliance, rather than as other topics, raises different
questions for research than other topics. Secondly, the
issue of compliance raises epistemological questions
about how we can gain knowledge about the law. It is
important to consider such issues before looking at more
detailed questions raised by a concept of compliance
because different concepts of compliance proceed from
different epistemological assumptions. Also, it is
important to tackle these premises directly because often
they have not been made explicit in the literature. After
the discussion of different approaches to compliance, I
will deal with detailed points in relation to compliance.
Hence, the structure of the chapter will indicate that
what a concept of compliance entails is the outcome of
the research and cannot be defined a - priori.
22_W1ay rcmplinc?
2.2..l,. Why i ccmp1inc rThvnt?
Questions about the relationship between rules and
social practices - and compliance is a key-issue in this
relationship - inform a range of socio-legal discussions,
for example about the impact of law, the social origins
of law and the institutional dimensions of law.
Compliance also feeds into theoretical debates about the
nature of law and social order. Perspectives on the
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nature of compliance tend to be associated with various
ideological beliefs about how social order is achieved.
For example, in the political philosophy of liberalism,
the formal law plays an important role in achieving
social order (Fine, 1984:20). In some accounts of modern
society, bureaucracy is perceived as a corner stone in
achieving social order (Weber, 1978, vol. 2, chapter XI)
But detailed empirical studies on the relationship
between rules and social practices might question these
images of the importance of formal law or the power of
the bureaucracy. Can formal social order as exercised in
bureaucratic structures be undermined through informal
small-scale social orders within those bureaucracies ? In
Marxist perspectives on social order, economic conditions
are considered as paramount in determining social action
(Fine, 1984:110) . Can small-scale social orders subvert
economic imperatives in companies?
Thinking about the nature of compliance can feed
not only into certain aspects of "grand theory" but also
into other concepts such as power and information. To
know how compliance is achieved or what it means to
different actors can help to understand the dynamics of
power. The nature of compliance can also shed light on a
concept of information. Different actors might have
different perceptions of compliance. Their views might be
based on different interpretations of information. This
stresses the subjective aspects of information.
Information might tell us more about the process through
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which it is generated rather than what it purports to
describe.
In short, exploring the nature of compliance
raises theoretical and conceptual questions. However,
this still leaves open the question: why was compliance
chosen rather than white collar crime or deviance or
discretion?
2.2.2. Blatd fiElci of study
Compliance was chosen to allow for a broader
approach to rules and social practices. Th main focus in
deviance, non-compliance or white-collar crime is on the
lack of compliance (see also Adler/Asquith, 1981:2), This
focus takes for granted a concept of law and forecloses
analysis of the nature of law. To inquire into how rules
and social practices are defined is to take a step back.
So, the question becomes how are distinctions between
compliance and non-compliance achieved. Compliance and
non-compliance cannot be considered as unproblematic
concepts and as preordained. An exclusive focus on
enforcement and on what official legal actors such as
enforcement officers do would be too narrow to explore
the nature of compliance. Also, it is important to
consider, what the regulated do in day-to-day routine
practices. Hence, this study is not an attempt to
replicate an enforcement study (see e.g. Hawkins, 1984)
in a new setting such as waste management regulation in
the U.K. and Germany.
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It could be argued that my research question could
have been adequately conceptualized through the notion of
discretion. Some research which has discussed the
relationship between rules and social practices has
chosen discretion as its focus (Hawkins, 1992:v) . In my
view there are three aspects in the concept of discretion
that make it less useful for conceptualizing my research
problem about the nature of compliance. First, discretion
seems to be more concerned with "top - down" rather than
"bottom - up't perspectives. Secondly, it emphasizes
agency. Thirdly, it considers a notion of law as
preordained.
"Top - down" and "bottom - up" perspectives
In some perspectives, discretion is the power of
legal actors to mould the interrelationship between rules
and social practices (Bell, 1992:95, Goodin, 1986;
Adler/Asquith, 1981:2; Bankowski/Nelken, 1981:ch. 12;
Davis, 1969:4) . In my view this represents a "top down"
perspective because discretion is perceived as the power
of official legal actors to decide if and how the rules
apply. In my study of compliance I wanted to avoid this
assumption. I wanted to frame the research question in
such a way as to include the possibility that compliance
is defined by the powerless, and by actors in regulated
organizations, allowing for the situation that compliance
could be constructed from the "bottom - up" rather than
the "top - down".
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An emphasis on agency
Not all perspectives on discretion are "top -
down". Some have a modified "top - down" approach. One
modification is where some writers take into account
"unofficial discretion". Sometimes enforcement officers
simply assumed discretion where according to the law they
had none (Hawkins, 1992:11, Young, 1981:33, 34) . But this
approach still assumes that the relationship between
rules and social practices is shaped by actors.
Discretion is linked to power in the sense of ability to
act (e.g. Bell, 1992:93) . This neglects structural
aspects - unrelated to immediate agency - such as
technical structures which might determine the
relationship between rules and social practices and which
are unrelated to immediate agency.
Law as pre - given
In contrast to the concept of discretion,
compliance has the potential to address more fundamental
issues in the relationship between rules and social
practices. Discretion is concerned with procedures for
applying legal rules. For example, how much do
enforcement officers consider themselves constrained by
legal standards laid down in discharge consents when
enforcing water pollution legislation in the field?
(Hawkins, 1984:78, 79) . How are legal rules implemented
25
in social welfare agencies (Smith, 1981)? How are the
provisions applied for a compensation fund for
handicapped children who have been damaged by the
thalidomide drug app (Bradshaw, 1981)? How are legal
rules from the supplementary benefits scheme implemented
(Prosser, 1981)? In contrast, compliance is concerned
with procedures which are used to define the contents of
law. By evaluating if the requirements of the law have
been met, that is by evaluating if behaviour of the
regulated constitutes compliance or non - compliance, the
contents and nature of law is addressed. Hence, the
concept of compliance is better suited to deal with
issues such as the nature of law than the concept of
discretion.
2.3. Approaches to compliance
As noted above, for much of the literature which
addresses compliance the concept itself is taken for
granted and hence is not the main focus of inquiry. Thus,
one of the purposes of this section is to make explicit
what are often only implicit assumptions about the
concept of compliance. As we shall see, an important
issue for unravelling the different concepts of
compliance in the literature is to understand the
particular approach taken by authors. As a result,
epistemological questions about what can be considered as
knowledge about compliance become relevant.
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In the following, section I will draw on
literature on discretion and rules, on white collar crime
and literature on the implementation and enforcement of
law in order to examine critically and in more detail
what light they shed on discussions of compliance and
what questions they raise for further research. I will
look at literature both from Germany and the U.K. and
some literature from the U.S. Given that compliance
itself is rarely tackled directly, let us start witI the
question of how we can generate knowledge about the
nature of compliance.
2.3.1. How is knowledge about compliance generated?
The most fundamental issue for characterizing
different approaches revolves around the question: how
can we generate knowledge about compliance? Some research
takes compliance for granted, as some unexplained notion
of Tt fufilling legal requirements" (see for example
Ayres/Braithwaite, 1992:20). Empirical data are collected
in order to measure the occurrence or lack of occurrence
of compliance (DiMento, 1986; Sutton/Wild, 1980); to find
out	 reasons
	
for	 non-compliance
(Dawson/Williaiu/Clinton/Bamford, 1988;
Shover/Clelland/Lynxwiler, 1982; Palmer/Bartlett, 1977;
Stove/Brown, 1975); or to discuss strategies for
achieving compliance (Genn, 1993; Braithwaite, 1985;
Frank,	 1984; Braithwaite/Geis,	 1982;	 Stone,	 1981)
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that the
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concept of compliance is unproblematic and that there
exists one authoritative version of what compliance is.
Some accounts have addressed briefly aspects of the
nature of compliance (e.g. Hawkins, 1984, ch. 6).
Compliance is considered here as having symbolic
significance and evaluations of compliance by enforcement
officers take into account the attitude of the regulated
(Hawkins, 1984:109) . In other perspectives legal texts
are treated as sources for defining legal requirements
with which there is or is not "compliance":
"Where the legal standard is fairly precise,
then little room will be left for more than
'evaluation' and this fits well into the notion
of 'weak discretion' (Bell, 1992:99)".
According to this statement, precision or vagueness - and
hence discretion - is determined a-priori, by looking at
the legal standard, rather than by research in the field.
But can we really determine in the abstract if a standard
is precise or not? In practice, will the standard appear
differently to the enforcement officer and the company
which is subject to regulation? The limitations of
legal texts in explaining what becomes defined as law
have been recognized (Hawkins, 1992:11) Such limitations
also seem to exist in the area of waste management
regulation. In both the U,K. and Germany, waste
management regulation contains conflicting aims such as
environmental protection and ensuring the economic
viability of individual waste management companies. Waste
management regulation in Part II of EPA 1990 or the
"Bundesiinmissionsschutzgesetz 1990" or the "Abfallgesetz
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1986" are only "enabling" acts which leave the concrete
and detailed provisions of the law to be defined by
secondary legislation and those who apply the law in
enforcement agencies. In short: waste management
regulation has characteristics which make it difficult to
deduce from legal texts how legal obligations are applied
in practice.
Studies which recognise the limits of legal
standards in determining discretion have taken into
account how enforcement officers defined legal
obligations and ultimately compliance (Hawkins, 1984;
Bardach/Kagan; 1982; Ullmann, 1982; Mayntz, 1978). But
there is also still the role that the regulated may play
in defining compliance. Focusing on the regulators
assumes that they are more important than the iegulated
for defining the law in practice. An emphasis on how
official legal actors handle legal doctrine assumes
institutional definitions of law. Yet for much of the
literature the regulated organization has often remained
a "black box". Taking into account how the regulated
define the law also allows a broader range of social
practices that might have an impact on definitions of law
in the field, to be taken into account. Organizational
factors from both the regulators and the regulated can be
considered.
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"Good" and "bad apples"
There is also a problem in the literature with
the basis upon which perceptions of the regulated rest.
Some of the literature has made clear-cut distinctions
between the regulated who "comply" and those who do not
"comply", for example by using the notion of "good" and
"bad apples" (Scholz, 1984b:184; Bardach/Kagan, 1982:92)
But how do we know if a company is a "good" or "bad
apple"? Can we obtain reliable and clear data to make
this assessment? How much information do the regulators
obtain about the regulated? What counts as data? Some
literature suggested that it is difficult to obtain
complete or accurate information about a company (Yeager,
1991:270) . Enforcement officers only see certain aspects
of the operation of the regulated (Kagan, 1984:45). A
North-merican lawyer has stated that:
99% of the audited sources were found to have
submitted reports which were not full and
complete. Clearly the assumption that source
reports constitute a reliable data base is
invalid" (Macbeth, 1978:13)
Some authors have conceded that it might be
difficult to get the distinction between "good" and "bad
apples" always right (Scholz/Kagan, 1984:79). But, this
too assumes that in principle "good" and "bad apples"
exist as two separate categories.
The notion of "good" and "bad apples" has also
been attacked from a different angle. It has been argued
that it neglects structural reasons for non - compliance
which can be located in the structural framework of
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capitalism. In this framework companies have only limited
resources to internalize externalities such as pollution
or injuries to their workers (Pearce/Tombs, 1991:415,
418). But in my view this is an immanent critique which
leaves intact the idea that in principle a distinction
between "good" and "bad apples" can be made. The
criticism extends only to how different researchers have
perceived the distribution of "good" and "bad apples"
(Pearce/Tombs, 1990:425, 426; Pearce/Tombs, 1991:420)
Problems with the concept of information
The idea that it is difficult to obtain reliable
data about the behaviour of the regulated might be taken
one step further. It is not just that the regulators
depend on the regulated organisations for information but
the whole concept of information might be problematic.
What social processes underlie the construction of
"information" 7 How do power and conflicting interests
manifest themselves in definitions and descriptions of
events at regulated companies? Do different work roles
influence definitions of compliance? At waste management
plants do the chemists' view on compliance differ from
those of the sales staff? Do the regulated companies
exercise control over the information they pass on to
regulators? Do they present a particular version of
events to the regulators? Can we obtain "hard
information" consisting of technical data which is not
open to subjective interpretation in the area of
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environmental regulation? Is there just one objective
view of what happens in a company ? Can actors £nside a
company and those outside the company, such as
regulators, have conflicting views on what is the most
appropriate perception of a company? Whose criteria are
relevant for defining "good" or "bad apples"?
Some of these questions, for example, concerning
what impact different roles have on perceptions of
compliance, have been debated in the literature. Quinney
(1963:148) . in his study of prescription violations by
pharmacists found that there were different job
orientations among the pharmacists. On the one hand there
were business - oriented pharmacists; but on the other,
there were pharmacists who saw their job more closely
related to the physician's profession and its values.
Quinney linked the fact that the "business" pharmacists
had higher prescription violations than the other
pharmacists to these two differential norm systems
(Quinney, 1963:185). But in other literature which looked
at the regulated organization the relevance of different
roles and attitudes of the regulated has not been greatly
explored. Braithwaite (1984:348 and chapter 3) refers in
his study on crime in the pharmaceuticals industry to the
chemical laboratories in which drugs are tested for side-
effects. But he does not discuss what the attitude of the
chemists were, what they understood as compliance or
crime, and how this compared with the attitude of other
groups of staff in the organization. Where the literature
has dealt with contrasting perceptions of compliance in
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different parts of an organization it has been in the
regulatory organization. In regulatory agencies senior
employees' conceptions of compliance were sometimes
different from those of field staff (Rüther, 1992:154;
Hawkins, 1984:181) . This raises the question: what
influences the understanding of compliance or non-
compliance? What social processes affect what counts as
information about compliance? There might not be a single
concept, but different images of compliance. The
important implication from this is that it is necessary
to go into the field and consider small-scale eactors
which influence what attitudes and interests become
realized in specific settings. There is little point in
considering the relationship between social practices and
law in the abstract without considering the values and
perceptions of those who construct this relationship in
the field.
The social construction of compliance
Those accounts in the literature which have adopted
a social construction perspective have problematized the
concept of compliance. They do not take the concept of
compliance as pre-given but investigate how a notion of
compliance is achieved. In other words being a "good" or
a "bad apple" might only be a perception, not an
objective truth (Krislov, 1972: 339) . Hence, the analysis
in some of the studies which contain classifications of
the regulated such as "good" and "bad apples", "amoral
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calculators", "political citizens", "the organizationally
incompetent" (Bardach/Kagan, 1982) need to be
complemented by different perspectives gained through the
collection of small-scale data among the regulated.
One of the fundamental assumptions of a social
construction approach of course is to perceive reality as
socially constructed (Berger/Luckmann, 1967:7). Hence, it
is necessary to draw on empirical data in order to
unravel the processes by which any body of 'knowledge'
comes to be socially established as 'reality'
(Berger/Luckmann, 1967:15) . In this "social construction"
perspective empirical data do not provide access to the
"truth" but are important for tracing how different and
relative notions of social reality become established.
Hence, the notion of social reality is not taken for
granted but problematized and investigated.
Although "social construction" perspectives draw on
modernist thinkers such as Durkheim, Marx, Weber and Mead
(Berger/Luckmann, 1967:27), they are not positivist and
social construction approaches move away from modernist
perspectives. Social construction perspectives share
three characteristics with postmodernist perspectives.
First, although social construction perspectives do not
go as far as postulating the death of the subject (Hall,
1992:281; Graham/Doherty/Malek, 1992:14), they recognize
the multiplicity of different perspectives of social
reality held by different subjects (Berger/Luckmann,
1967:26) . Secondly, social construction perspectives
perceive the limits of "grand theories" in explaining the
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world. Instead, they can support exploring small-scale
processes through which actors construct their world
(Graham/Doherty/Malek, 1992:23). Berger and Luckmann
(1967:49, 85, 110,96) investigate processes such as
"scopes	 and	 modes	 of	 institutionalization",
"sedimentation	 and	 tradition",	 "legitimation"	 and
"language". Thirdly, according to postmodernist
perspectives there is no such thing as valid or invalid
knowledge (McLennan, 1992:336; Haldane, 1992:179)
While Berger and Luckmann's approach still
contains a criterion of valid knowledge, i.e., that the
processes through which social reality becomes
established have to be unravelled, it also contains a
relativist element. Actors construct their world which is
valid to them. Meaning for individuals is constructed
through their situational, small-scale worlds rather than
determinist structures in society.
Postmodernist ideas have also been important in
influencing approaches to legal analysis. In
postmodernism, the text has become the object of study.
Hence, the task becomes the deconstruction "of the free
play of différance in the discourses that inhabit the
writing" (Graham/Doherty/Malek, 1992:5). In discourse
analysis, the language of the law is perceived as an
important indicator of the "social and historical genesis
and motivation of the legal text as instrument of social
regulation and discipline" (Goodrich, 1987:ix).
Particularly important in Goodrich's work is the notion
of unravelling law as a language of power (Nelken,
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1996:10; Goodrich, 1987:ix, 123) . Other accounts
emphasize less the idea that legal texts exercise social
control in the process of creating meaning. In those
accounts legal narrative is simply seen as the
transformation of events and sentiments into stories
which impart meaning (Papke, 1991:4).
Discourse analysis is of limited use in exploring
issues of empirical compliance because it focuses on an
analysis of formal legal texts such as cases (see for
example Goodrich, 1996; Goodrich, 1987:201-203). The law
is defined as "tradition", "precedent" and "immemorial
usage" (Goodrich, 1990:vii) . Social practices are mostly
studied by reference to formal legal materials using
techniques of socio - linguistics rather than through an
empirical investigation of behaviour in relation to law
(Goodrich; l990:vii) . A few studies focused less on
formal legal materials but have applied socio-linguistic
and semiotic analysis to organizational decision-making
in the face of disasters such as leaks of radioactive
material from Sellafield (Manning, 1992) or how the
police handle calls from the public (Manning, 1988).
Thus, discourse analysis is mainly applied to written
texts and spoken words. An important source of my data,
however, was participant observation which does not lend
itself well to discourse analysis. I had to rely on
participant observation because in a work context people
did not always have the time or inclination, particularly
in relation to sensitive matters such as not fulfilling
site licence requirements,	 to talk about their
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activities. Hence, while discourse analysis of law is
interested in a "challenge from within" (Goodrich,
1987:7), I ain interested in an exploration of law through
empirical sociological methods. It has even been argued
that postmodernist perspectives are incompatible with a
notion of social science. Postmodernism undermines any
truth claims, so how can it claim for itself to be true,
and, moreover, what is the relevance of a particular
account if all is relative (Haldane, 1992; Graham,
1992:209, 211)? Though some themes of postmodernism are
clearly relevant for investigating society it may be that
to carry out social science inquiries, elements of
modernist methodologies are essential (Graham, 1992:211).
Hence, the focus and methods of discourse analysis
of law do not accommodate my research question. There are
similiar themes though, in discourse analysis and
questions about empirical compliance. Goodrich (1987:5)
rejects a notion of legal practice as "specialised, non-
rhetorical, activities removed from the everyday
commitments and discourses of social and political
practice and conflict". My research question about the
social construction of compliance also aims, with
different methods and on the basis of a different concept
of law from Goodrich's, to explore the relationship
between legal and social practices in everyday routines
of waste management regu1aion at plants and in
regulatory authorities.
Goodrich's interest in analyzing law as discourse
also extends to ' exploring the ideological context in
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which the rhetoric of law is to be located (Goodrich,
1987:208) . He (1987:208) considers ideology "as a
programme or strategy in relation to the terms of social
life" which can be located in law as discursive
practices. My research question also deals with ideology
as the relationship between material conditions of
existence and belief systems (Eagleton, 1994:6). In
chapters 4 to 11 of the thesis I will examine how
conditions of the existence of waste management plants,
such as their technology and commercial aims, influence
beliefs about what legal requirements are and what
constitutes compliance with them. My approach, however,
as to how ideology can be studied is different from that
of Goodrich. I do not consider formal legal texts as
predominantly the most important source for studying
ideology but in my view behaviour in relation to law is
also significant and is an important manifestation of
ideological beliefs. I did not consider formal legal
texts as the source to explore ideology because I did not
want to start this research with an a-priori notion of
law that defines law mainly ifl terms of formal legal
sources. The question thus arises: what methodological
approach goes with the "social construction" perspective
adopted for this thesis?
Berger and Luckmann (1967:22) state that they
consider their sociology of knowledge as a contribution
to sociological theory, and not to the methodology of
sociology. In my view "grounded theory" approaches
(Glaser/StrauB, 1967) fit in well with the ideas of
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social construction. Glaser and StrauI (1967) argued that
the main division in empirical sociology is not between
qualitative and quantitative data but between an emphasis
either on the generation or the testing of theory in
research (Glaser/Strau1, 1967:17). According to them,
empirical data should not just be used for verifying,
modifying or rejecting aspects of "grand social theory"
but empirical data could be used in a more creative way
to generate small-scale "grounded theory" out of data
(Glaser/StrauZ, 1967:7). This process reflects a "bottom
- up" rather than "top - down" perspective (Worsley,
1992:81) . The way in which social scientists develop
"grounded theory" is similar to the process through which
actors construct their social reality through their
everyday experiences. Thus, research based on a social
construction perspective does not claim superior status
or direct access to an unquestioned notion of social
reality but provides one specific account that draws on
the perceptions of particular actors in a specific
setting.
Hierarchy: implications for concepts of compliance and
social order
A further characteristic of social construction
approaches of compliance is to abandon hierarchical
notions of social order. In contrast to this, some of the
German	 implementation	 literature	 works	 with	 a
hierarchical notion of	 law (MUller, 1980; Knoepfel,
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1979;	 Bohnert/Klitzsch,	 1980;	 Windhoff-Heritier,
1980:220) . For example, Mayntz (1980:10) does not
completely abandon the idea of a hierarchical
relationship between the formal legal programme and its
implementation. She states that empirical data show a
lack of direction from the central level "despite a
formal relationship of hierarchical dependency" (emphasis
added) between the legal programme of the federal
government and implementation action of regulatory
authorities. This research, however, qualifies the notion
of a hierarchical link by recognizing that the
determination of the contents of the programme is not
finished at the stage of passing legislation or
approving political programmes. Instead, during the
implementation phase, the contents of a political
programme becomes further defined (Mayntz, 1980:10;
Knoepfel, 1979:40; Hegenbarth, 1980:132)
The formal law as a starting point for analysis
Concepts of compliance which use the notion of the
" gap " and which draw on formal legal materials imply
hierarchical notions of social order. Some concepts
invoke the notion of "deviancy" when they talked about
the "gap" between the aims of a programme and its
realization (Mayntz, 1980:236; Knoepfel, 1979:63). Hence,
this research still uses the formal legal programme as
the main benchmark for evaluating the success or failure
of the implementation process:
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"Generally it can be said that the actual
freedom of decision-making by the
administrators increases in proportion to the
margin of interpretation that legal concepts
provide for (emphasis added) and in proportion
to the complexity of the factual situation.
Their freedom of decision-making decreases in
proportion to the likelihood or possibility of
being inspected by third parties" (Hegenbarth,
1980:136).
How we define the original legal framework has an impact
on how we explain "compliance". If our notion of the
legal programme is not based on formal law then the goal
posts for compliance also shift.
In "top-down" perspectives formal definitions of
the law are accepted as starting points. Phenomena are
defined by reference to the legal system. For example,
discretion is explained as that space for making
decisions which is unrestricted by the law:
"The ideal type of a 'rule' is an
authoritative, mandatory, binding, specific and
precise direction to a judge which instructs
him how to decide a case or resolve a legal
issue. Discretion describes those cases as to
which a judge, who has consulted all relevant
legal materials, is left free by the law to
decide one way or another"	 (Greenawalt,
1975:365)
Some literature abandons "legal paradigm" perspectives
and employs sociologically informed perspectives. Such
accounts step outside the perceptions and assumptions of
the law and utilize an external perspective. These
approaches are interested in using data about the social
context in which law operates to reconceptualize legal
concepts. An example of this perspective is a
"naturalist" perspective on discretion (Feldman, 1992;
Lempert, 1992; Emerson/Paley, 1992; Manning, 1992).
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Baumgartner 1992:13O) talks about the "myth't of
discretion. She challenges the concept of discretion and
replaces it with a view in which general and unchanging
sociological laws determine behaviour.
Other research does not completely abandon legal
frameworks for explaining social phenomena but still
refers to them:
"The power to negotiate, which is central to
compliance systems, is one which exists by
implication only but one made possible because
the law is not made concrete or specific
(emphasis added). Regulatory law is permeated
with uncertainty" (Hawkins, 1984:22)
Negotiation is explained by reference to the legal
framework rather than other explanatory frameworks such
as political or economic power or patterns of interaction
between the regulated and the regulators irrespective of
the law. Thus, the question arises to what extent do we
need to examine frameworks other than legal frameworks?
Do we need to transform our ideas of what a legal
framework is?
Another concept of compliance which draws on
hierarchical notions of social order is based on
empirical aata which were mainly collected among the
powerful in organizations. This follows a tendency of
social scientists to study "the language and perspectives
of elites" when studying social order for example through
examining stratified conflict (Baumgartner, 1984:339).
Some studies on compliance have focused on collecting
data among managers in organizations (see for example
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Grabosky/Braithwaite, 1986:1,2; Clinard; 1983; Mayntz,
1978)
Some concepts of compliance in the literature draw
on an alternative perception of social order. This
allowes for the possibility that social order is
constructed from the "bottom - up". Hence, "bottom - up"
perspectives stress the point that the content of legal
programmes is constructed in the field at the lowest
level in organizational hierarchies. They require the
more absolute rejection of the notion of an abstractly
determined formal legal programme than some of the German
implementation research. A study that goes some way to
abandoning "legal paradigm perspectives" argues that the
concept of the "programme" should be redefined
(Knoepfel/Weidner, 1980) . It distinguishes between the
core of a programme ("Programmkern") and the outer layers
of a programme ("äu1ere Programmschalen"). In their view,
the actual implementation practices should be considered
as part of a redefined version of the "programme"
(Knoepfel/Weidner, 1980:93, 101) . Baumgartner (1984)
looks at various strategies used to reduce the amount of
social control that "superiors" exercise over those
subject to them. Such strategies were covert retaliation,
non-cooperation, appeals for support, public shaming,
flight, distress and self-injury. Similarly, Young (1981)
and Smith (1981:47) have pointed out that, to understand
the implementation of social work policies, it is
important to take into account not just discretion
exercised by professional staff such as social workers
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but also the discretion exercised by clerical and
administrative staff.
To abandon exclusively "top - down" perspectives
has implications for how questions about compliance are
framed. At what level do we have to consider the
relevance of economic, social and political frameworks
for the social construction of compliance? According to
"bottom - up" perspectives, the question is how do
frameworks become constructed rather than starting from
frameworks as pre-given. The research in this thesis will
look at how economic and political frameworks become
constructed on a small-scale level and how they affect
compliance. For example, how do perceptions of economic
aims at the levels of different work groups, such as
chemists and sales staff, have an impact on what is
understood as compliance? What are the political
relationships between different work groups at the
plants? I have described in this section different
approaches to compliance. This, however, still leaves
open the question of how a social construction approach
works in practice. Through what techniques is compliance
socially constructed?
Techniques of the social construction of compliance
The literature discussed some techniques of the
social construction of compliance, such as labelling.
Labelling theory recognizes that being a criminal is a
perception	 not	 an	 objective	 truth
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(Inverarity/Lauderdale/Feld, 1983:5; Göppinger, 1980:
47). Patterned interaction between the regulated and the
regulators had an impact on who became perceived as
criminal or as compliant. Labelling theory looked at the
social processes through which people become cast as
deviants (Becker, 1963) . Some of these ideas can be
transferred to the context of organizational crime. It
has been argued in the literature that in the area of
North-American environmental law, "violations breed
violations", because detailed reporting requirements that
are triggered by violations produce further violations
(Anderson, 1980:1467) This mirrors a central idea in
labelling theory according to which people who are cast
as deviants become stigmatized (Goppinger, 1980:47). This
in turn is considered to promote further "criminal"
behaviour (Pfeiffer/Scheerer, 1979:49). But it has been
argued that stigma works differently in the areas of
business and individual crime because business actors
actively participate in the construction of stigma
through image management (McBarnet, 1991:323; Denzin,
1978). For example, NcBarnet and Whelan (1991:848) looked
at "creative compliance" in the area of corporate
finance. The concept of "creative compliance" illustrates
how "powerful economic interests" can use the law in
order to avoid the "spirit of the law" while still being
able to formally comply with legal requirements.
The interesting point about the notion of "stigma
management" is that it allows more than just economic or
social "factors" to be taken into account when
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considering what influences compliance. It opens up
research questions about interpersonal aspects in the
relationship between the regulated and the regulators.
For example, the trust and confidence of the regulatory
authority in the regulated might be the only protection
against enforcement actions where the regulatory
authority would constantly find violations for which it
could prosecute (Anderson, 1980:1467). This raises the
question of how confidence and trust influenced what
became evaluated as compliance or non-compliance in the
setting which I researched? What does this tell us about
the ability of actors to shape definitions of compliance
independently of structures? How important are aspects of
the personality of actors in comparison to financial
resources? Where do trust and confidence which draw on
emotional and not just cognitive processes leave "top -
down" approaches to understanding compliance?
One implication of the idea of stigma management
is that negotiation is an important aspect of the
interrelationship between the regulated and the
regulators (Baldwin, 1990:324; Winter, 1985; Hawkins,
1984; Ullmann, 1982:19, Bohne, 1980; Hucke/MUhler/Wassen;
1980; Downing 1979:372; Mayntz, 1978:40). This raises the
question of how important negotiation was as a technique
of the social construction of compliance in the setting
which I researched? What is the theoretical significance
of negotiation? Negotiation as a form of interaction
between the regulated and the regulators can undermine
images of social reality that the law conveys. We may,
46
for example, have to rethink the notion of legitimacy.
The legitimacy of the acts of the regulatory authority
might not rest so much on the formal authority of
administrative law but on the mutual consent of the
regulated and the regulatory authority to these acts
(Bohne, 1980:38). While German administrative law conveys
the idea that the orders of the regulatory authority
("Verwaltungsakte") are imposed on the regulated,
empirical studies have shown that these orders are often
negotiated (Mayntz, 1978:40). The question thus arises:
to what extent these techniques of the social
construction of compliance are similar or different in
diverse countries. What is the relevance of different
legal systems or cultures for explaining social
practices? Let us now turn to comparative issues on
compliance.
24. Comparative issues on compliance
Why a comparison?
A comparative approach to exploring the concept of
compliance enables us to address a question which is at
the core of this thesis. How important is the "living
law" for understanding the nature of compliance and
ultimately the nature of law? Can there be similiarities
in the "living law" while there might be differences in
the formal legal framework? What impact did the legal
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frameworks in the U.K. and Germany have on the
relationship between rules and social practices?
Why did I choose to conduct a comparative study in
the U.K. and Germany? The two countries are sufficiently
alike to conduct a comparison. In both countries a system
of liberal parliamentary democracy and capitalist economy
operates. Also, the legal contexts are similar enough to
conduct a comparison. In 1975 the EC Framework Directive
on Waste (75/442, O.J. L194/23) created a basic system
for waste management regulation. While there is enough
congruence between the two countries to conduct a
comparison there are also sufficient differences to raise
interesting comparative questions. For example, what
relevance, if any, for understanding the relationship
between rules and social practices, has the fact that
Britain has a common law system, whi1 Germany works with
a civil law system.
There are further differences between the U.K. and
Germany that might have an impact on how the relationship
between rules and social practices is perceived. At the
time I conducted the field work in the U.K., it was
perceived that there were sufficient disposal capacities.
In fact the U.K. imported waste for disposal (ENDS Report
no. 231, 1994:34, no. 233, 1994:28). In contrast to this,
in Germany there was a considerable shortage of waste
disposal facilities (Bernstorff, 1993:10) . How did this
difference in the market of waste disposal services
affect how compliance was constructed on the ground with
site licence conditions which restricted how much waste
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can be taken into a plant ? Furthermore there are
differences in perceptions about the way the public
administration,	 which	 is	 responsible	 for	 the
implementation of waste management regulation, is
organized in the U.K. and Germany. The German
administration is perceived as influenced by a
bureaucratic culture which dates back to the Prussian
administration and is governed by a complex and dense web
of developed administrative and constitutional law
(Siedentopf, 1986:68). Has this any relevance for how
compliance becomes constructed on the ground? More
generally, environmental protection legislation is
sometimes perceived as more advanced in Germany. In
Germany, the regulatory authority has powers under the
"EN" procedure to direct waste to be disposed in
particular types of plants according to environmental
considerations (see chapter 1). Powers for U.K.
authorities under the section 17-special waste procedure
(see chapter 1) are more limited. What does an
exploration of a concept of compliance tell us about the
perception that the German regulatory authority has more
powers than the British regulatory authority?
The approach to the comparison
If we start from the idea that reality is socially
constructed (Berger/Luckmann, 1967:7) then the focus for
the comparison become techniques of social construction
rather than pre-given concepts. Often comparisons are
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invoked to compare and contrast a well-defined issue such
as legal provisions (Zweigert/Kotz, 1987) or a policy
(Vogel, 1986) or the occurrence of discretion in
different legal systems (Davis, 1976) . The comparative
question here, however, is what does the behaviour of the
regulators and regulatory authorities tell us about the
nature of compliance ? Thus, for this comparison
theoretical concepts derived from social science and not
legal	 frameworks	 provide	 the	 starting-point
(King/Garapon, 1987:472). In any case, comparative
research points to the limits to using formal
administrative law as the starting point for research
(Whelan, 1982; Kahn-Freud, 1974) and particularly in a
regulatory context. Whelan (1982) and Kahn-Freud (1974)
have pointed to the limits of a legalistic approach to
comparative labour law which is too optimistic about the
possibilities for translating formal legal provisions
from one country to another. It has been stressed that
there is a move away from a "command style" of making and
implementing policy (Böhret, 1986:39). Instead, policies
are not imposed, but negotiated with a range of interest
groups. Public policy making becomes privatized. One of
the reasons for this privatization process is that the
administration is increasingly dependent on private
interest groups for information on complex areas of
regulation (Habermas, 1976:62; referred to in:
Rjchardson/Gustafsson/Jordan; 1982:10). Thus, a focus on
formal administrative law as a reference point for
analysis might be misleading.
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Hence, the aim of this comparison is to explore
how the "living law" is socially constructed in two
specific settings in the U.K. and Germany. Are
differences in the formal law (see chapter 1) reflected
in the "living law"? Can an understanding of the "living
law" modify our ideas of how much importance should be
attributed to the formal law and change our notion of
what "law" is? Hence, it is important for the
comparatist:
"to refuse to take experience as given and to
try to see how experience is conditioned, how
it is shaped, how patterns of consciousness
evolve" (Legrand, 1995:263).
Not to take concepts as pre-given in turn puts more
emphasis on the role that the researcher plays in
constructing accounts of comparative law. These accounts
cannot be neutral comments. Instead the researcher's
involvement with and her changing perception of her own
and the foreign legal culture will influence how accounts
of comparative law are constructed (Legrand, 1995:262).
The purpose of the comparison is to examine the
relationship between social practices and law in two
different countries. Using comparative data helps to
avoid making general statements about compliance on the
basis of data that are grounded only in the legal and
cultural framework of one country.
In the more traditional approach to comparative
law, formal legal concepts in different legal systems are
compared (see for example Zweigert/Kotz, 1987). In this
approach law is considered as pre-given and hence the
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focus is on the "law in the books". This has been
criticized by Laurence Friedman (quoted in Legratid,
1995:262)
"traditional comparative law turns a blind eye
to everything but surfaces".
What is normative or legal for social actors might not be
encompassed in a formal definition of law because the
cultural dimension of law is neglected (Legrand,
1995:262). For example, Zweigert and Kötz (1987) compare
the Germanic and Romanistic legal families with the
Anglo-Saxon legal family. These legal families are
defined with reference to formal law (Zweigert/Kotz,
1987:70) Cultural aspects are not completely neglected,
but they tend to be invoked in such a general way that
they can not explain the occurrence of specific legal
obligations. They (1987 :71) recognize that differences
between the Anglo-Saxon and the 3ermanic and Romanistic
legal families have decreased more and more but they
nevertheless explain the differences between them in the
following way:
"If we may generalize, the European is given to
making plans, to regulating things in advance,
and therefore, in terms of law, to drawing up
rules and systematising them. He approaches
life with fixed ideas, and operates
deductively. The Englishman improvises never
making a decision until he has to. As Maitland
said: he is an empiricist. Only experience
counts for him; theorizing has little appeal;
and so he is not given to abstract rules of
law. Convinced, perhaps from living by the sea,
that life will controvert the best laid plans,
the Englishman is content with case-law as
opposed	 to	 enactments"	 (Zweigert/Kotz,
1987:71)
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Characteristics of national styles of regulation
A focus on formal law has also raised problems for
research that attempted to identify characteristics of
national styles of regulation. In this literature
"legalistic" and "pragmatic styles" of administrative
behaviour are identified. The German administrative
system is described as "formalistic" in contrast to the
"pragmatic" and "flexible" style of the U.K. system
(Siedentopf/Hauschild, 1990; Siedentopf/Ziller; 1988,
vol. 1; Meny, 1985:180). According to the "legalistic"
style, the administration adheres strongly to the formal
law. Situationally-specific decision-making would be
considered in this style as a conflict with the principle
of the subordination of the administration to law. In
contrast to this, the "pragmatic style" is characterized
as providing discretion for the administration and
involving informal behaviour of the administration and a
co-operative relationship between the regulated and the
regulators. Germany is considered to follow a "legalistic
style" while the U.K. is regarded as pursuing a
"pragmatic style" (Siedentopf/Hauschild, 1990:453). But
do empirical data on routine enforcement behaviour
support this distinction between the style of behaviour
of the German and the U.K. administration?
A similar way of characterizing national styles of
regulation is adopted by Vogel (1986). In his study he
describes national styles of regulation referring also to
environmental regulation. He characterizes the U.S.
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system as formalistic, legalistic and more reliant on
punitive strategies (Vogel, 1986:21) . In contrast to
this, the British system of pollution control is
described as flexible, pragmatic and reliant on
compromise and negotiation rather than sanctions (Vogel,
1986:21, 70) . Vogel arrives at these characterisations
through reference to the formal law. For example, the
point about the flexibility of the U.K. system of
pollution control is backed up by a discussion of the
then existing concept of "best practicable means". It
provides a considerable amount of discretion for
regulators to set standards for a specific plant and
hence to adapt standards to the technological and
financial ability of industry to comply with them (Vogel,
1986:22,81). In contrast to this, U.S. standards are
described as technology - forcing (Vogel, 1986:22). Vogel
states that in practice during the implementation of
standards in the U.S., there has been deviation from
these standards. Deadlines for achieving standards have
been put back and there has been negotiation between the
regulated and the regulators (Vogel, 1986:146, 168). But
this recognition of a difference between formal
characterisations of regulatory styles and practical
implementation does not lead Vogel to change his
descriptions of policy styles in the U.S. and the U.K.
This raises the question of how important it is to look
at lower levels of implementation in order to provide an
adequate description of a national style of regulation.
Characterisations of
	 national styles of	 enforcement
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such as Vogel's anticipate the social dynamics of
implementation by drawing conclusions from formal legal
material about how implementation works in practice. But
there might be problems with this. It is argued in the
German context that more formal law does not lead to more
formal regulation in practice but can have the opposite
effect. More formal law can lead to an overload of
administrative agencies and at the end increases the
"enforcement gap" which can lead to less regulation on
the ground (Bohne, 1984:373). Legal frameworks have
influenced analysis in other ways also. The fact that
there is more formal law in relation to which a "gap" can
be constructed seems to have led to a stronger emphasis
on "gap analysis" in the German literature.
"Gap" analysis in German literature
The essence of "gap" analysis is to perceive rules
and social practices as distinct, self-contained concepts
which are separated from each other through the "gap"
(see for example Pearce/Tombs, 1990; Hopkins/Parnell,
1984:180; Hucke, 1980:83; Bohnert/Klitzsch, 1980:200;
Winter, 1975:28; v. Weick, 1973:147). "Gap" analysis
focuses on non-compliance. Some research employs strong
forms of "gap" analysis whilst other research employs
weaker versions. An example of strong "gap" analysis is
Yeager (1991:13, chapter 7) who distinguishes between
"publicly stated purposes" of the legislation and its
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"implementation". Mayntz (1980:236) defines the following
as the aim of implementation research:
"It is at the centre of scientific interest to
find reasons for the existing discrepancies
between norm and reality, between the aim of a
political programme and its actual effects" (my
translation)
In this perspective the norm is pre-given. Some
researchers, however, have pointed out that insight into
implementation requires an understanding of how norms of
behaviour are attained (Spittler, 1970:205; Evan,
1962:183). Particularly in the area of environmental
regulation, where the regulated and the regulators may
have conflicting views on what the law entails, it is
important not to take the meaning of norms as pre-given.
"Gap" analysis assumes that the formal law has autonomous
normative power. But the "reality" of the norm might not
be a deviation from the "law" but the result of the
implementation of a different notion of law (Lenk,
1980:255). Furthermore "gap" analysis raises the question
of what happens in the "gap"? Are there social norms that
set standards for behaviour and that have more normative
appeal than the formal law?
It seems that the German literature has been
influenced by the fact that there is more developed
formal administrative law in Germany than in the U.K.
with which actual enforcement practice can be contrasted.
There is a more developed system of formal law on two
levels. First, there are principles from the written
constitution that govern the relationship between state
and citizen in enforcement situations. There is the
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notion of the "Rechtsstaat" and the subordination of the
administration to law and statute ("die Bindung der
Verwaltung an Recht und Gesetz" according to article 20
(3) German Basic Law) (Bohne, 1980:74). This formally
sets limits to the discretion that the German
administration can exercise. Administrative action always
has to be authorized by statute and has to follow general
legal principles. Sometimes, German regulatory
authorities negotiated with regulated companies all the
important details in informal talks before the start of
the official licensing procedure (Bohne, 1980:29). This
would in effect undermine legally guaranteed rights of
participation for third parties because the regulatory
authority had coimnitted itself already beforehand to a
certain position on the site licence in negotiations with
the operator. This practice could infringe article 20 (3)
of the German Basic Law (Bohne, 1980:74). Furthermore
some accounts of the implementation of German
environmental law have revealed that some operators were
allowed by regulatory authorities to fail to comply while
others were made to comply (Heine/Meinberg, 1988:94, 97,
161; Schönke/Schroder, 1988, § 324 if. Vorbem. Rz. 2).
This could be in conflict with the equal treatment
principle which is enshrined in article 3 (1) of the
German Basic Law ("Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz") (Bohne,
1983:207)
	
Secondly,	 there is a developed system of
administrative law which, through the Administrative
Procedure	 Act	 1976	 ("Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz"),
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provides for general principles of administrative law and
which complements specific environmental law such as
waste management regulation. Duties imposed on the
regulated by the regulatory authority on the regulated
have to be sufficiently specific in order to be valid (
37 (1) VwVfG). Thus, both areas of norms, constitutional
principles and administrative law provisions provided a
back-drop against which it might have been easier than in
the U.K. to conclude that there was a "gap" in relation
to the implementation of legal provisions. As Michael
Hill argues (quoted in Vogel, 1986:77):
"The British system... minimizes that
disrespect for administrative action which
arises where political 'goals' and practical
implementation achievements are markedly out of
line".
In the U.K., at least from a legal point of view,
discretion in administrative behaviour might be
considered as less problematic. Hawkins' study (1984) on
the implementation of water pollution legislation in the
U.K. does not consider the question of whether discretion
exercised by enforcement officers in the field is in
conflict with legal principles. But this is a question
that some German authors, such as Bohne (1984; 1980:37)
find important to raise.
So, what relevance does administrative law have in
the relationship between the regulated and the
regulators? Does law revert to being merely a resource in
negotiations or a framework in whose shadow the regulated
and the regulators bargain (Mnookin/Kornhauser, 1979)?
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Conclusion
The focus of this thesis is to examine the nature
of compliance by looking at the relationship between
social practices and law. The main referent for the
comparison is not an unquestioned and pre-given notion of
the law and legal frameworks in the U.K. and Germany, but
the purpose of the comparison instead is to explore if
there are differences in the techniques of the social
construction of meaning of law in these two countries, in
the particular settings which I researched. How do
perceptions of the "living law" compare to the
characterisation of administrative styles in some of the
literature? How useful is the formal legal framework as a
reference point for describing the behaviour of the
regulated?
So far, I have discussed literature on
compliance. Some of it has worked with an unexplained
notion of compliance as fulfilling legal requirements.
This contains implicit assumptions about compliance. Some
of these premises relate to methodological issues. How do
we know about compliance? To what extent can we rely on
legal texts and enforcement officers' definitions of
legal requirements? What role do the regulated play in
defining legal requirements? To what extent are these
methodological choices about appropriate sources for
defining law influenced by a hierarchical notion of
social order that might be open to challenge? These
questions assume particular poignancy in a comparative
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context because comparative literature has often taken
formal legal frameworks as its starting point. In the
following section I will discuss further substantive
aspects of a concept of compliance such as how can we
understand the concepts of rules and social practices and
how are links between rules and social practices created?
2.5. Issues in a concept of compliance
2.5.1. The relationship between rules and social
practices
Introduction
To recap, compliance deals with the relationship
between rules and social practices and in this thesis, a
"social construction" approach to investigating
compliance is taken. As a result, an a-priori definition
of legal rules cannot be given. One aim of the research
is to find out how actors in the field construct what
they understand to be the contents of legal and other
rules. Social practices refer to the behaviour of actors
in the field and are broadly defined. They do not just
encompass behaviour that is consciously directed at
following or not following rules, but also include
behaviour which primarily does not relate to legal rules.
In this sense, it is broader than the term "law in
action". The issue of what we can understand by the term
rules and social practices is complicated by the fact
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that the two concepts cannot be considered in isolation
but are intertwined. If we reject positivist notions of
law, then social practices become relevant for defining
law. Thus, one of the crucial issues that emerges in
discussing compliance is the question to what extent law
and social practices can be considered as separate
categories or to what extent they can be equated? This
illustrates that understanding the concept of compliance
will shed light on the nature of law. In the following
section I will discuss the different ways in which the
relationship between rules and social practices has been
conceptualized in various views of compliance. Let us
look first at views which perceive law and social
practices as separate categories.
2.5.1.1. Law and social practices as separate categories
Law as pre - given
The way in which some of the literature perceives
law and social practices as separate categories, is
illustrated by how the notion of discretion is used.
Discretion is perceived as mediating the transformation
of law into social practices:
"Discretion is inevitable because the
translation of rule into action, the process by
which abstraction becomes actuality, involves
people in interpretation and choice" (Hawkins,
1992 :11)
Hence, the very notion of discretion as mediating between
rules and social practices affirms them as separate
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categories. They are, however, also perceived as closely
related in the sense that "the use of rules involves
discretion, while the use of discretion involves rules"
(Hawkins, 1992:12). But legal rules are perceived as a
separate category by being distinguished from "social and
organizational rules" which are considered as important
for understanding how discretion is exercised (Hawkins,
1992:12). A further example of a conceptualization of
rules and social practices as separate categories, is the
perception of discretion as the "hole in the doughnut".
According to Dworkin (1977:31, referred to in Hawkins,
1992:14) discretion takes its meaning from a context of
rules and exists only "as an area left open by a
surrounding belt of restriction". This conception has
been criticized for portraying a wrong image of legal
rules in perceiving them as clear standards which can
provide the bencbmark for defining discretion. Standards,
however, are often vague, abstract or conflicting
(Galligan, referred to in Hawkins,l992:14).
Law and social practices as part of a hierarchical
relationship
Sometimes the account of rules and social
practices as separate categories involves the perception
of a hierarchical relationship between them. The
expectation is that the law, as a separate category,
contributes to shaping social reality by virtue of its
formal authority. In these accounts the formal authority
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is not constituted by social practices but is pre-given
and autonomous. Hence, law is not one among a range of
other normative orders but is considered as the strongest
form of a normative order. For example, enforcement
officers are perceived as working on the basis of a
"legal mandate" (Hawkins, 1984:23). What the law defines
as the task of the enforcement officer is pre - given and
the formal law is a source of authority:
"The purpose of this collection is to use the
contributions and ideas of both the law and the
social sciences to explore some of the central
issues involved in the use of discretion by
legal actors - those individuals who work in
the legal system or in legal bureaucracies,
making decisions in the exercise of n.
authority Lonferred on them by law (emphasis
added)" (Hawkins, 1992:v).
Indeterminacy of legal rules
The theoretical literature on indeterminacy in
legal rules has problematized the concept of law, in
particular in regard to determining what extent we can
clearly define the contents of legal rules. Critical
legal studies literature on indeterminacy spans a wide
range of different accounts (Bix, 1996:184) but a key-
theme in the literature is both a moral and analytical
concern with uncertainty in legal decision-making, in
particular in the judicial settlement of legal disputes
(Boyle, 1992:xx). Literature on the indeterminacy of
legal rules has analyzed reasons for indeterminacy such
as language. The question arises: what other factors,
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apart from language, have to be taken into account when
examining why there is uncertainty in the meaning of
legal rules. What role do social practices play? Do
critical legal studies accounts go far enough in
problematizing a concept of law? To what extent do they
still operate with a-priori notions of law? Do some
critical legal studies accounts perceive law as existing
in the autonomous and self-referential world of the
"legal system"? By contrast, some accounts have found
ways of linking rules and social practices. One of them
uses the notion of "legal ideology" in order to construct
a closer relationship between rules and social practices.
Legal ideology: a mediating link between rules and social
practices?
According to Cotterrell (1992:270), enforcement
practices shape legal ideology. But the notion of "legal
ideology" might not create a sufficiently strong link
between rules and social practices. According to
Cotterrell, the distinction that has developed between
"real crime" and "regulatory crime" has influenced
beliefs about law in the sense that regulatory crime is
considered as less serious and less deserving of
sanctions. He refers to the fact that usually only a
small number of the regulated are perceived as "black
sheep" or "rotten apples" in legal ideologies (1992:270)
It is interesting and important to refer to the dimension
of legal ideology which creates a link between rules and
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social practices. For example, the ideological belief
that business offenders are less deserving of sanctions
has influenced to what extent the law is actually
enforced. But this does not really tell us much about the
relationship between rules and social practices. The
crucial issue still is - and Cotterrell does not really
deal with it: hQ specific links between rules and social
practices, for example in relation to the sanctioning of
business offenders, are created in the real world. What
are the techniques through which this is achieved?
Furthermore, Cotterrell (1992:246)
distinguishes legal ideology from law. Law is defined by
reference to institutional doctrine. He recognizes the
impact of social practices on rules: "enforcement
practices determine the effective meaning of the law for
the regulated" (Cotterrell, 1992:270) . But his approach
still seems to be more closely related to a view of law
as a separate concept with its distinct characteristics
such as formal authority. He focuses on enforcement
practices, i.e., on actions of official legal regulators,
rather than the social practices of the regulated. He
states that "enforcement practices represent an
accommodation between different normative systems
(emphasis added)" and uses the concept of the "living
law" (Ehrlich, 1962) as distinct from the formal law.
Thus, while Cotterell's notion of legal ideology goes
some way towards perceiving rules and social practices as
related categories, it might not go far enough.
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2.5.1.2. Equating law and social practices
Other literature has gone further and viewed law
and social practices as similar concepts. Criticism of
Dworkin's notion of discretion as the "hole in the
doughnut" makes it clear how law and social practices can
be perceived as more similar concepts. In this
perspective, discretion is not so much perceived as the
space between rules and social practices. Instead, on the
one hand, discretion becomes closely linked to the notion
of rules because discretion also involves the setting of
standards (Galligan, 1986:3). On the other hand,
discretion becomes closely linked to social practices
because the exercise of discretion is influenced by
social and organizational factors (Hawkins, 1992:12).
Social practices can become normative.
This idea is taken one step further by Baumgartner
(1992) who argues that social practices are more
normative than legal rules. According to Baumgartner,
social practices connected with intimacy, respectability
and status defeat the purposes of some legal rules in the
criminal justice system which are designed to ensure
equality before the law (Baumgartner, 1992 :117). Her
argument is particularly strong because it draws on data
from a range of societies across the world, not just
those in the West.
By stressing the fact that discretion also involves
the setting of standards, a distinction between the
concepts of rules and social practices starts to break
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down. As a consequence, pre-ordained concepts of law have
to be abandoned. This has important implications for
research questions. The issue is not the hypothetical
testing of which pre-given or abstractly deduced
definitions of law and social practices are more
convincing, but, the generation of empirically informed
theory: how in a specific setting definitions of law and
social practices are achieved and how law is constructed
through social practices. Hence, the focus on the
relationship between social practices and law informs the
nature of law. It is crucial to note that in this
perspective compliance is more about a concept of law
rather than compliance with law.
Considering law and social practices as similar
concepts rather than self-contained categories then
raises new research questions such as what are the
techniques through which social practices become the "law
in action"? Research that has looked at negotiation
between the regulated and the regulators has found that
negotiation can become a way of "bridging" law and social
practices. There can be various aspects to this. First,
through negotiation between the regulated and the
regulators standards might be agreed (Hawkins, 1984:127;
Mayntz, 1978:37). Secondly, through negotiation standards
can be adapted to what the regulated can comply with
(DiMento, 1986:28). Thirdly, judgements about what
constitutes fulfilling legal requirements can be
negotiated (Yeager, 1991:15; Hawkins, 1984:127).
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It could be argued that the idea of equating law
and social practices is tautological. By defining the two
terms with reference to each other they would be
meaningless. As part of "a thoroughgoing legal pluralism"
law could be distinguished "from other social norms only
in vague terms" (Silbey, 1991:820). It might, however, be
possible to identify specific links in the relationship
between rules and social practices. First, it might still
make sense to talk of law as a separate category but what
becomes defined as the legal norm might have its grigins
in social practices. The way legal standards in waste
management licences are defined could be an example of
this. Licences are written by referring to "working
plans" which are descriptions of what the regulated do in
practice in operating the plant. Secondly, law might
become "displaced". This means that the regulated do not
follow the "formal law" but they follow social practices
which replace the legal norm. Thirdly, social practices
might modify the law. The concepts of social practices
and law would become intertwined because social practices
in the field might not completely displace the formal law
but change only certain aspects of it. For example, the
regulated might comply with the requirement of testing
incoming waste loads. They might, however, restrict these
tests to certain loads because they follow the social
practice that they know the contents of regular loads
from experience.
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Conclusion
In this section I looked at a key issue in trying
to understand the concept of compliance. This concerns
the relationship between rules and social practices. In
the literature this relationship has been imagined in
different ways. Two positions can be identified. On the
one hand there are accounts which perceive the law and
social practices as separate and distinct categories. On
the other hand there are accounts which perceive law and
social practices as less distinct and more as similar
concepts. The crucial issue about the relationship
between rules and social practices is that it ultimately
tells us something about the nature of law. In order to
understand the nature of law it is necessary to inquire
into the techniques which can be used in the field for
creating links between rules and social practices. For
example, how much is it up to actors in the field to
actively construct links between rules and social
practices and to what extent is the relationship between
rules and social practices determined by structures?
2.5.2.. Structure and agency in the relationship between
rules and social practices
A further important issue in order to understand
the nature of compliance is the role of structure and
agency in the relationship between rules and social
practices. Various different types of structures have
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been referred to, such as the economic structures of
capitalism (see for example Carson, 1981; Grymer, 1979),
the structures of formal organizations and a structural
power differential between the regulated and the
regulators. Barnett (1981) describes the structural
relationship between corporate crime and Pmerican
corporate capitalism in the context of white collar crime
in the area of product-safety, enviromental, antitrust
and labour law regulation. Pearce and Tombs (1991, 1990)
consider the economic imperatives of the capitalist
economy as determining what the regulated do in relation
to health and safety regulation. Gross (1978) perceives
non - compliance as built into the structure of
organizations. According to him, organizations are
inherently criminogenic because they have to deal with
the inevitable divergence between means available to the
organization and the ends it tries to achieve (Gross,
1978:56) . Some of the White Collar Crime literature
employs a structural notion of power which sees power as
an intrinsic property of either the regulated or the
regulators. Business actors were sometimes perceived as
more powerful and able to influence how enforcement
agencies responded to them (Barnett, 1981; Bowen,
1978:130, cited in: Clinard/Yeager, 1980:212;
Hucke/Bohne, 1979). But such a structural notion of power
might not capture the full complexities of the
relationship between the regulated and the regulators.
Could Denzin's statement on organizational dynamics also
be applied to interorganizational relations?
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"Power, control, coercion and deception are
central commodities that are negotiated over
in those arenas that make up the organization"
(Denzin, 1978:90)
On the other hand there is research which puts more
emphasis on the agency of actors in shaping the
relationship between social practices and rules. One
example of this perspective is the work on discretion
which uses the concept of decision-making for describing
the relationship between rules and social practices
(Hawkins, 1992:v) . In this perspective the actors take
decisions that shape the relationship between rules and
social practices. For example Bell (1992:99), states that
discretion involves the active setting of standards.
Feldman uses the notion of decision-making to discuss the
social limits to discretion. She is concerned with
different approaches to decision-making. She refers to
factors such as formal training, informal socialization
and routines which influence how actors exercise
discretion (Feldman, 1992:172). Also Emerson and Paley
(1992:231) emphasize agency in discussing discretion.
They consider the interpretative work done by actors in
the field as important:
"Yet context has often been conceptualized in
ways that inhibit such broader analyses of
discretionary decision- making. Viewing context
as objective, fixed variables standing outside
of and influencing or determining particular
decision outcomes has just this effect. Many
researchers adopt such a perspective by
equating context with 'factors' that correlate
with decision outcomes but that do not refer to
acts or conditions providing the legitimate
focus of decision-making . [...] Here context
refers not to variables defined by particular
traits but to the processes whereby particular
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traits are invoked or made relevant to specific
decisions" (Emerson/Paley, 1992 : 232)
Hence, Emerson and Paley move away from the idea
that structures determine discretion and they invoke
instead a notion of processes which allows more scope for
agency than structures.
The invocation of law
Agency is also stressed in Cotterrell's (1992:247)
notion of the "invocation of law". The idea that we can
understand how the law gains meaning by focusing on the
formal invocation of law has influenced some research on
compliance. Several studies base their conclusions about
the relationship between law and social practices on the
examination only of situations in which the law became
formally invoked. The emphasis is often on studying the
behaviour of enforcement officials who actively invoke
the law rather than the routine practices of the
regulated (Hawkins, 1984; Bardach/Kagan, 1982; Mayntz,
1978; Hutter; 1988:84; Ullmann, 1982) . In other accounts
the basis for considerations of compliance were court
cases (DiMento, 1986) or incidents which had come to the
attention of enforcement agencies and were turned into
scandals (Geis, 1978; Cullen/Naakestad/Cavender, 1984;
Vandivier, 1978). But the question is if this focus on
situations in which the law becomes formally invoked is
too narrow. Also, the concept of the invocation of law
perceives law and social practices as more separate than
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the idea of interpretive work binding the law to social
practices as suggested by Emerson and Paley (1992).
Structures can become relevant in two ways for
creating meaning of the law. First, structures can simply
become relevant in restraining agency. But in this view
law still mainly gains meaning through actors' agency.
Secondly, structures can restrain agency completely. In
this view meaning of the law becomes embedded in
structures. This latter notion of structures has not
been explored much in the literature.
How much importance should be attributed to the
ideas of structure and agency in the specific setting in
which I looked at the nature of compliance? If agency
plays a role, this in turn raises the question: who are
the relevant actors? Is it sufficient just to refer to
official legal actors such as enforcement officers or do
we also have to take into account those who are sithject
to legal regulation? Discretion has often been studied in
the context of bureaucratic settings (Prosser, 1981;
Noble, 1981; Bradshaw, 1981). I looked at the nature of
compliance in a technological setting. This raises the
question of what role does technology play in
understanding the nature of compliance? Can it restrict
agency? What role do interorganizational relationships
play in creating meaning of the law?
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The role of interorganizational relationships in the
creation of meaning of the law
In the literature on legal compliance there is not
much information about activities within the organization
in relation to the implementation of legal requirements.
The regulated organization often remains a "black box".
More emphasis has been put on the interrelationship
between the regulated organization and the regulators. In
particular under the heading of "regulatory capture" it
has been discussed how interaction between the regulated
and the regulators can defeat regulatory objectives
(Mileski, 1971; Bernstein, 1955)
There are four points I want to raise in order to
illustrate the problematic nature of the concept of
"regulatory capture". First, how do we know if a
regulatory authority has been "captured"? Vogel
(1986:169) states that a co-operative enforcement style
in the British system of pollution control cannot be seen
as an indicator of "capture". The reason for this is that
in the U.S., although the enforcement style there is
formally less co-operative and conciliatory, economic
interests have nevertheless influenced regulation.
Secondly, sometimes accounts of "regulatory
capture" operate with a static notion of power and the
organization. One of the shortcomings of the literature
on "regulatory capture" is that it focuses on the
organization as a whole. What happens "inside" the
organization such as conflicts between different parts of
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the organization is not greatly considered. Furthermore,
literature on "regulatory capture" often perceives the
regulated organization as more powerful (Barnett, 1981:4;
Brown, 1978:130, cited in: Clinard/Yeager, 1980:212;
Hucke/Bohne, 1979). This implies a static notion of power
in which either the regulated or the regulators are
perceived as more powerful. But power might not be an
intrinsic property of one of the parties in the
regulatory situation. A range of small-scale factors and
circumstances might influence how power is distributed.
According to this view, it would be important to look at
microsociological accounts of the dynamics of power, the
way it is negotiated and brokered between regulators and
the regulated in day-to-day enforcement.
Thirdly, the concept of "regulatory capture" seems
to imply that we can identify a state of "normal",
"uncaptured" behaviour. "Captured behaviour" is defined
as the behaviour of a regulatory authority which does not
achieve enforcement objectives or where enforcement
objectives become watered down so as to suit the
interests of the regulated (Bernstein, 1955). Hence,
implicit in the notion of regulatory capture seems to be
the same problem that occurs in positivist definitions of
compliance. This is the idea that it is possible to work
with a pre-given concept of what enforcement objectives
or legal requirements are. The concept of "captured
behaviour" also raises the same problem as the notion of
"deviance". In order to make sense of the concept we need
to have some idea of what "uncaptured behaviour" or
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"compliance" looks like. So, the problem with the concept
of "regulatory capture" is not its descriptive power but
its implicit explanation. While the regulated might be
able to influence the interpretation of legal
requirements in their favour this still leaves open the
question if this constitutes "deviance", or is it part of
an inevitable and routine aspect of how the law gains
meaning?
Fourthly, similar to the previous point, it has
been argued that low prosecution rates and co-operative
styles of enforcement involving negotiation cannot be
seen as evidence of "capture". The notion of "capture"
does not adequately take into account a wider moral
consensus which exerts a powerful influence upon what is
otherwise an enforcement situation characterized by
ambiguity (Hawkins, 1984:207)
Hence, the question that arises out of the
literature on "regulatory capture" in relation to my
thesis is not "does the data confirm that the regulated
can influence the regulators in their own interests?".
Instead, the question is what does "regulatory capture"
tell us about the relationship between rules and social
practices? Is "regulatory capture" in the setting in
which I investigated compliance a "normal" part of how
law gains meaning? If so, what does this tell us about
compliance and the nature of law?
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2.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed various aspects of
compliance. I defined the research question as compliance
because this provides a way of exploring issues
surrounding the nature of law. Discussing compliance
feeds into a range of theoretical and conceptual debates
about the nature of power and information, and the role
of the formal and the "living law" in creating social
order. Different approaches to exploring compliance can
be found in the literature. Some approaches follow a
"social construction perspective", others did not really
inquire into the social processes which underlie the
achievement of labels of compliance and non-compliance.
The "social construction perspective" allows for the
exploration of a different concept of legal requirements
when analyzing the relationship between rules and social
practices as part of a concept of compliance. Law can be
explored not in terms of pre-given legal frameworks but
as constructed "from the bottom-up" through social
practices. Finally, a range of substantive issues are
raised if we inquire more closely into the relationship
between rules and social practices. What is the
significance of agency and structure in achieving
compliance or non-compliance? What specific links can we
identify from field observations between rules and social
practices?
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter I will describe how I conducted my
research project and provide reasons for the methodology
adopted. This chapter does not describe just the tools
for the collection of the data but shall report the
research process through which this project developed. I
will discuss the "how" and "why" of my research under
five main headings. Firstly, I will describe the reasons
for the selection of the topic for this thesis. I will
discuss some of the factors that led to the development
of a topic after I had been in the field for some time.
Secondly, I will describe the scope of this research and
its limits. Thirdly, I will discuss the conceptual
framework which guides this research. This explains the
purpose of the research, the nature of the research
question and the subsequent choice of research methods.
Fourthly, I will describe in detail how I gained access
to data and how I collected them. In the final and fifth
part of this chapter I want to refer to some aspects of
my research role in the field. This will illustrate that
the researcher as a person is part of the data creation
and collection process. Hence, the term "capta" rather
than "data" might be more appropriate (Worsley, 1992:20).
3.2. Reasons for selecting the topic
3.2.1. Some real life considerations
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When I established contact with actors in the field,
i.e. the waste management industry and waste management
regulators, an opportunity arose to spend some time at a
U.K. waste treatment plant and observe the day-to-day
handling of waste. I had read the site licence for the
facility. When I was at the plant, however, I realized
that what appeared to me as non-compliance was not
necessarily picked upon by waste enforcement officers
when they came for a visit to the site. Also, I became
interested in the question how site licence provisions
did or did not have an impact on the day-to-day handling
of waste. The following issues emerged: ' Thow are
judgements that behaviour of the regulated constitutes
compliance achieved in practice and how do the regulated
achieve compliance ?" What can we understand by empirical
compliance?
From my initial field observations the idea arose
that compliance is socially constructed. This meant that
the question what is empirical compliance could not be
answered in the abstract, but the social organization of
the context of compliance had to be taken into account.
3.2.2. Approaches to the study of compliance in the
literature
After I had preliminarily defined as a topic the
question "what is legal compliance in practice?" i
conducted the literature review. The question what j,
compliance had not received much attention. There also
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seemed to be shortcomings in the treatment of legal
compliance in the literature (see chapter 2). What
implications did this have for my research design?
At what level are explanations of compliance pitched?
Macro- and microsociological perspectives
Introduction
In the following section I will describe different
approaches to the study of compliance and how their
underlying assumptions influenced what was understood as
compliance. A major issue for understanding different
concepts of compliance and non-compliance is to be aware
of the ways knowledge about compliance is generated.
Also, research and political issues, which are sometimes
linked, are relevant here. The study of concepts of legal
compliance can not be seen in isolation from belief
systems about law and social reality.
Macro- and microsociological perspectives
The notion that compliance with law is socially
constructed was explored in studies which employed a
microsociological	 rather than a macrosociological
perspective. These studies explored the particular
strategies and attitudes of enforcement officers as well
as views of the regulated in regulatory situations (see
for example: Hutter, 1988; Hawkins, 1984)..
In contrast to this, macrosociological perspectives
referred to structures in society in order to explain the
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concept of compliance, for example the nature of the
capitalist economy (Winter, 1985; Barnett, 1981) . Some
Marxist perceptions of "White Collar Crime" look at the
general relationship between labour, capital and the
state	 (see	 for	 example:	 Pearce/Tombs,	 1990;
Evers/Rodriguez-Lores, 1980).
Macro - and microsociological accounts need not be
mutually exclusive. Some studies combined both
perspectives (see for example: Nelken, 1985; Carson,
1980; Denzin, 1978:87). According to those accounts micro
structures contain the structures of society (Denzin,
1978a: viii) . As Carson (1980:170) notes:
"To be sure the fluctuating fortunes of
interest groups and the clash of normative
conflicts may be fascinating and relevant
features of the interactional sequences through
which ambiguity emerges and is sustained in
this context, but its basic substance, I
believe, is rooted deeper in the social order
as a totality".
In this view, neither macro - nor microsociological
accounts alone can provide a complete picture of
compliance. While it is useful to link microsociological
data to theories of society, there still have been few
microsociological accounts of legal compliance. Therefore
such accounts can make a valuable contribution to
existing research in the area of legal compliance.
External and internal perspectives on compliance
Some of the literature used perspectives which were
more external to the actors' own understandings of
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compliance situations, while other accounts tried to
reflect the actors' perceptions of compliance situations.
An example for external perspectives are explanations
that referred to economic concepts (see for example
Richardson/Ogus/Burrows, 1983). Some researchers who took
as their starting point that fundamental structures of
the capitalist economy determine business behaviour, saw
no value in going out into the field and collecting small
- scale data. For example, Winter (1975:31) used as his
main analytical framework "incongruous legal and
political structures" for explaining the non-compliance
of German companies with effluent discharge regulations.
An analysis of compliance which relies on external
perspectives has a number of problems. It runs the danger
of expressing the preconceived notions of the researcher
or making the specific social phenomenon under
investigation fit into general social theory instead of
bringing out the particular and surprising aspects of
social reality (Sutton/Wild, 1980:314)
Furthermore, some of the literature which attempted
to explain non-compliance by reference to economic
structures has a potentially artificial and static view
of the regulated organization. The business organization
appeared as a rational actor who adjusts behaviour
according to the profit motive (Kramer, 1982:81; Barnett,
1981:5). But there might not be a single unified
organization (Braithwaite, 1985:135). Instead there might
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be conflicts and coalitions between different parts of an
organisation (Bardach/Kagan, 1982:81)
Also, in any case, an abstract notion, such as the
"profit motive" might be too general to be useful in
practice. Long-term and short-term views on profit might
suggest different courses of action for a company in
respect of compliance. Different companies may take
different views. Large companies might benefit from
requirements for compliance with legal regulation because
this might drive smaller businesses out of the market.
Moreover, economic explanations of compliance behaviour
seemed to suggest that compliance and non-compliance
occur consciously. But non-compliance might be an
unintended side-effect of corporate behaviour and not be
purposely calculated. For example, compliance might not
be the outcome of an intention to comply with legal rules
but may be the consequence of pursuing the commercially
most viable course of action.
"Legal spectacles" views of compliance
Another example of an external perspective of
compliance is to view compliance through "legal
spectacles". This involves taking images of the law as
descriptions of social reality. For example, the formal
wording of offences in relation to waste management
implies a "snapshot" view of compliance by assuming that
a judgement about a firm's compliance can be made at any
one moment. It does not take into account that there
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might be a time dimension to compliance. Compliance is
assumed to be static rather than dynamic.
A too narrow conception of compliance is also
expressed in "binary" notions of compliance or non-
compliance (Hawkins, 1986:1175). According to "binary"
notions of compliance, degrees of "compliance" and
negotiation over compliance are not recognized. "Legal
spectacles" views might influence how the research
problem is defined. This is particularly evident in some
of the German literature on the lack of enforcement
("Vollzugsdefizit") (see for example: Knoepfel, 1979;
Roth, 1977) . The focus on a lack of enforcement reflects
the perspective of regulators. It also demonstrates a
particular perception of compliance. The concept as such
is not problematized but the concern is focussed on how
to change enforcement practices so as to obtain full
compliance.
One reason for this might be the fact that the term
"lack of enforcement" was first coined by a German
parliamentary committee which examined the implementation
of environmental laws and whose task it is to hold the
administration accountable (Ullmann, 1982:15). This body
was not concerned with inquiring into the nature of a
concept of compliance but its remit was to get a
perception of the extent of compliance and non -
compliance and to make proposals for the effective
realization of the goals of environmental law. These
policy concerns have also been shared by some social
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scientists. As Wollmann (1979) argues academic research
on the implementation of law is often interested in the
development of policy and social reform (see for example
RUther, 1991; Kramer, 1982:77) . Quite a few of the lack
of enforcement studies in Germany were carried out in the
1970's when the federal SPD government tried to introduce
political reform programmes that involved legislative
measures (Wollmann, 1979:18) . Some social scientists
supported these reforms. They were interested in the
implementation of law and in compliance with it, since
they were concerned with the broader question of how law
could assist progressive social change in society
(Wollmann, 1980:20) . They were interested in questions
such as "how can we achieve compliance" and not "how is
compliance socially constructed"; "how can we control
non-compliance"? and not "what makes non-compliance
functional"?
Social control
A further shortcoming of the "legal spectacles"
perspective is that it equates regulation with social
control. Official statements by governments for example
about the purpose of law are sometimes accepted at face
value as determining the contents and aims of political
programmes and their statutory expressions (Rottleuthner,
1982:144). Researchers who take this approach might have
neglected the possibility that regulated organizations
may use the law partly for their own purposes.
Consequently, regulatory law would not just fulfil aims
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of social control but might also be actively used by the
regulated. During the process of implementation legal
regulation might acquire meaning in organizational life
that differs from what the regulated intended.
Some of the literature has recognized that there
might be degrees of compliance (Krislov, 1972:339). Also
compliance might be an ongoing activity
(Dawson/William/Clinton/Bamford, 1982:70). As Bardach and
Kagan noted:
H E...] because compliance usually is not a
matter of a one-time expenditure (such as the
installation of fire doors and additional
sprinklers to meet the fire code) but a matter
of ongoing supervision and management"
(Bardach/Kagan, 1982:63).
Further limits of "legal spectacles" views: a focus on
rules?
Research into compliance that starts with the images
conveyed by legal rules or regulatory interests might be
too narrow. For example, perspectives on compliance that
focus abstractly on rules and ordered patterns of
behaviour (see as an example for this: Hogan/Henley,
1972:87) may have neglected the dynamics of compliance in
regulated organizations which might not follow rule
patterns.
For example, Braithwaite's view of compliance
replicated the legal system in the regulated
organization. He used the notions of legal rules and case
law to conceptualize compliance problems in the regulated
86
organization. He referred to the problem that Standard
Operating Procedures in companies were often not complied
with (Braithwaite, 1984: 349):
"[...] executives are forever encountering new
environmental circumstances for which the
corporate rule book (my emphasis) offers little
guidance" (Braithwaite, 1984:350).
Braithwaite cited an executive who told him that
what matters are not rule books but the company's case
1a. If an ethical dilemma occurred the person would be
asked to write it down. Then the problem could be passed
on to somebody who knew the "corporation's case law" on
it (Braithwaite, 1984:350). Braithwaite perceived the
limits of "corporate rule books" but argues in favour of
"corporate case law" which would enable the BA to be more
effective. He took on board his interview respondent's
conceptualization of the compliance problem. Similarly,
Braithwaite's idea of "enforced self-regulation" assumed
that aspects of the legal system just have to be
transferred into the regulated organization in order to
solve compliance problems.
"Under enforced self-regulation each company
would write its own rules. Once these rules had
been ratified by the government, a violation of
them would be an offence. The company would be
required to establish an internal compliance
group to monitor observance of the rules and
recommend disciplinary action against
violators" (Braithwaite, 1982:1503).
But internal compliance groups might suffer the same
fate as lawyers in corporations. Stone (1978:253) argued
that lawyers will be partly excluded from information on
non-compliance, they will only hear the "good news" and
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they will not be involved in decision making about
production, although this might be relevant for
compliance.
In my view, the fact that Braithwaite conducted
interviews with managers might have influenced the
development of this notion of "rules" and "case law" in
the organisation. Staff working lower down in the
organization might conceptualize compliance problems
differently. They might have first hand experience of
chaos and accidents "on the ground" rather than think of
their social reality as one which can be adequately
described through concepts like "rule books" and "case
law".
Conceptualizations of compliance problems which
replicated the legal system in the regulated organization
were circular because they took the whole imagery of the
law and a legal system as both the starting point and the
analytical conclusion for describing the process of the
implementation of law. They played down the possibility
that behaviour in regulated organizations might not
follow rules and principles but may occur according to
situational and ad hoc logic. The "legal spectacles" view
might be misleading in the sort of images of social
reality it portrays. It might overestimate the ability of
rules to create social order. There might be limits of
rules, also in the guidance of enforcement activity. As
Scholz argued (1984a:151)
88
"Although rules are indeed important in the
regulation of well-understood systems, their
application to poorly understood and
misspecified problems in dynamic settings is
likely to produce capricious and undesired
results".
Furthermore the "legal spectacles" focus on ordered
patterns of behaviour in the implementation process might
neglect other relevant factors like a concept of culture
(DiNento, 1986:160; Clinard/Yeager; 1980:299;
Clark/Boyum/Krislov/Shaefer, 1972: 24)
A notion of culture
Some authors have recognized the importance of
culture for understanding the implementation of law:
"Stone has referred to the 'culture of a
corporation' which is an entire constellation
of attitudes and forces, some of which
contribute to illegal behaviour. Those factors
contributing to illegal behaviour include: a
desire for profits, expansion, power, desire
for security [...], the fear of failure f...J,
group loyalty identification [...J, feelings of
omniscience (...], organizational diffusion of
responsibility [...], corporate ethnocentrism
(Stone,	 1975:236;	 cited	 in
Clinard/Yeager, 1980:59).
Intangible factors, which do not necessarily work on
a cognitive level like attitudes of staff in a regulated
organization, their feelings, the atmosphere in an
organization and its self-image, might all have an
influence on how compliance is or is not achieved. Also,
Sutherland argued that deviant behaviour can be learned
(Sutherland, 1983: 240) . The individual is socialized
into criminal behaviour by his/her association with
persons who define the appropriate attitudes and
reactions to legal rules
	 (Sutherland quoted in:
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Clark/Boyum/Krislov/Shaefer, 1972:24) . To take into
account culture requires to be aware of the fact that
there are formal and informal aspects of an organization
(Mayntz, 1958)
Research methods
Not just political aspects and "legal spectacles"
perspectives can influence how compliance is understood
but also the choice of research methods can have an
impact on what we understand as compliance. The research
methods used in a study can determine whether
explanations of compliance are based on internal or
external perspectives. A lot of studies of "White Collar
Crime" rely on interviews and/or documentary analysis
(see for example Yeager, 1991:12/13; DiNento, 1986:
35,36; Vaughan, 1983:xiii; Ullmann, 1982; Clinard/Yeager,
1980: 111; Mayntz, 1978:14,17).
There are only few studies that actually report day-
to-day activities of regulators and the regulated by
using techniques of participant observation and
observation (see for example Hawkins, 1984; Hutter,
1988). Quite a few studies lacked small-scale data on the
day-to-day behaviour of what happens inside an
organization in the context of compliance. Thus
understandings of compliance were based on secondary
accounts such as interviews and written documents, which
are more removed from what the actors actually do. Also,
considerable reliance on written accounts might skew the
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research data towards formal procedures to the detriment
of informal aspects of behaviour in the regulated
organization. For example, the choice of research methods
might influence if we understand non-compliance as
distinct acts or part of business practices.
"Non-compliance" as distinct acts or part of business
practices?
As Wright and ,Smith (1982:29) argued, some
researchers described non-compliance as a distinct aspect
of organizational behaviour which can be clearly
distinguished from legal behaviour. Other researchers
argued that non-compliance is embedded in a range of
business practices (see for example: Wright/Smith,
1982:24)
But how non-compliance is described might depend on
empirical knowledge. Difficulties in obtaining first hand
empirical data on non-compliance might contribute to
perceiving "White Collar Crime" as distinct illegal acts
rather than as integrated into business practices.
Secondary accounts of "White Collar Crime" will rely on
what has become officially defined as specific and
clearly identified criminal acts. Empirical
investigations of non-compliance based on observation
might be more likely to look at non-compliance as
connected to and enmeshed in legal business activities.
How would one observe just the illegal aspects of the
behaviour of the regulated? Perceiving illegal business
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practices as distinct acts might preempt an analysis of
them as being in breach not only of legal but also of
business norms, But the relationship between legal and
business norms might be crucial for understanding non-
compliance and thus might need to be explicitly
addressed.
Conclusion and implications for the research design
Some of the literature adopted partial or particular
views on compliance which are to some extent the result
of the methods adopted in the studies. The use of
macrosociological rather than microsociological data, the
application of "legal spectacles" perspectives and policy
concerns can contribute to the creation of particular
perspectives on compliance. There are shortcomings in
these concepts in that they ignored other aspects of
compliance. In order to be able to take other aspects of
compliance into account it was important to collect
small-scale empirical data, at the lower levels both
among the regulated and the regulators and to try to
understand legal compliance "from within". This approach
would facilitate an exploration of questions such as how
does the law gain meaning?, what are the techniques
through which meaning of the law is constructed? This
would help to open up questions about empirical
compliance. Some of the literature might have closed off
questions for example by assuming that some environmental
law is "ineffective".
92
After I had carried out the literature review I
designed the research project as described in the
following sections of this chapter. I then went back into
the field to carry out the bulk of the field work. Thus
the design for this research project developed both out
of first field work experiences and out of a literature
review. As a result the project was grounded from the
beginning in what appeared relevant and problematic on
the basis of empirical data.
3.3. The scope and limits of the research
3.3.1. Why "green" compliance?
Compliance has been the object of inquiry in various
fields, including social regulation - health and safety
and environmental regulation (for example: Genn, 1993;
Dawson/William/Clinton/Bamford, 1988; Carson, 1981) - and
economic regulation (for example NcBarnet/Whelan, 1991).
Why did I look at compliance in the context of
environmental regulation?
I had a general interest in environmental issues
before I started this project. Furthermore, particularly
in the German literature, there has been documentation of
the lack of enforcement of environmental law. Indeed, the
perceived failure of environmental legal regulation
contributed to the development of alternative forms of
regulation. At the German and EC levels, civil liability
provisions have been passed or proposed (for example the
German "Umwelthaftungsgesetz 1990" and the proposed EC
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directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste
(1991 OJ C 192). Hence it seemed intriguing to try to
understand what "lack of enforcement" means in practice
and how a "lack of enforcement" can persist.
3.3.2. Why waste management regulation?
There have been less empirical data reported in the
literature about waste management regulation than in
other areas such as water or air pollution regulation
(see for example: Böhm, 1989; Hawkins, 1984; Brittan,
1984; Winter, 1975 on water, Mayntz, 1978 on water and
air; Downing, 1979 on air). Furthermore it made sense to
use data from both the U.K. and Germany because the legal
framework is sufficiently similar. There are clear
regulatory provisions in the form of licences for waste
management sites. Also, the regulation of waste
management sites through licences has been mainly
harmonized in Germany and the U.K. through the EC
framework directive 75/442 (OJ 1975, L194/4) as amended
by directive 91/156 (OJ 1991, L 78/32).
3.3.3. Limits of the research
My field work concentrated on two waste management
facilities and two waste regulation authorities, one of
each in the U.K. and Germany. Though I visited many
plants and some waste regulation authorities during the
pilot work before the project was focussed on compliance
most of the data presented here come from the two waste
treatment plants	 and the two waste regulation
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authorities. The scope of the research was constrained in
particular by time restrictions and access
considerations.
Time restrictions
Time restrictions meant that I could not spend more
than three months with each of the four organizations. I
spent in total about twelve months in the field. This
does not include the time which I spent in the field,
conducting interviews with waste managers and visiting
sites, before I started to define compliance as the
research topic.
It appeared, particularly during the time I spent in
the two waste regulation authorities, that three months
were sufficient to get an understanding of how
enforcement officers carried out their job and how they
perceived the issue of compliance. Towards the end of my
time with the RAs I kept hearing repeat stories. Similar
situations would come up time and again and waste
enforcement officers' comments about situations seemed to
me familiar. It was difficult to make any further
advances in discovering leads and hunches I had not
perceived before. In my view three months was roughly the
time needed to "slice off" the first layer of data and
understanding about the PAs' and plants' activities. It
appeared to me that it would have required considerably
more additional time to get beyond the data and
understanding I could get during the first three months
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in the field. Also a longer stay in the field might have
required a different research role for me where I would
have become more of a participant than just an observer,
in order to be able to maintain cooperation from the
subjects of the research for further data collection.
Type of company restrictions
I did not get access to waste management companies
which are perceived in the industry as "cowboy"
operators. These operators might have been particularly
concerned about a research project looking at compliance.
Both the German and the U.K. waste management companies,
to which I got access, were companies who had a
professional self-image. The data which I collected about
the context in which compliance happened at the plants
might be quite different from the observations I would
have made at a "cowboy" operator's site. Further issues
in connection with access negotiations are discussed in
detail in section 3.4. of this chapter.
Since an opportunity arose to conduct field work at
a waste treatment plant I collected data among waste
treatment plants rather than landfill sites or
incineration plants. Some of my observations, for example
about "bucket chemistry", are specific to this particular
type of waste management facility and are not necessarily
applicable to other types of waste management facilities.
Organizational level restrictions
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I collected data among the lowest level of staff in
the regulated organization and the waste regulation
authorities who had responsibility for the implementation
of legal provisions. This meant that at the waste
management plants I observed the work of the site
chemists who were responsible in day-to-day activities
for the implementation of the site licence. The site
licence prescribes the range of waste streams which a
site is allowed to take in and how waste should be
handled. Also the site chemists at the waste treatment
plants are responsible for the implementation of the
discharge consent during the day-to-day handling of
wastes. In the Rs I observed how enforcement officers
carried out day-to-day enforcement activities.
Given the fact that I collected data at the lower
levels of the organizations my data on compliance in
practice are specific to that level. On the one hand,
this is a strength of the research because lower levels
of organizations have been neglected in the literature.
On the other hand, this is a limitation of the research.
For example, I have no data about the relationship
between the site manager and the site chemists at the
waste treatment plants. This relationship might, however,
be important for understanding decisions made by the site
chemist on what wastes to take in and how to handle
wastes. Furthermore, the site managers were part of an
organizational hierarchy in which their decisions about
running a site might be influenced by their managers.
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Also in the waste regulation authorities I did not
consider how staff higher-up in the hierarchy of the
waste regulation authorities influenced how field
officers carried out their work. In particular I did not
look at the separate, though important, issue of how the
political accountability of the RAs to local councils
influences their enforcement behaviour (for a discussion
of this issue in Germany see: Winter, 1975).
3.4. Conceptual framework
Introduction
Before I describe in more detail how I collected
data I want to discuss the theoretical assumptions which
underlie the research design for this project. If we
perceive data as linked to theory and method within a
research design (Burgess, 1982:209) then data are not
"out there" in social reality waiting to be picked up by
the researcher (Turner, 1988:114) but are part of the
accounts of social reality which are constructed by
research. In order to claim that these constructs
(Bryman, 1988:52) are social science it is necessary to
describe and justify how they have been achieved.
3.4.1. Approach towards the research issues
"Grounded theory"
My project follows Glaser's and Strau2s (1967)
"grounded theory" approach. Glaser and Straul3 argued that
the main division in empirical sociology is not between
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qualitative and quantitative data but between an emphasis
either on the generation or the testing of theory in
research (Glaser/Strau1, 1967:17). Glaser and Straul3
stated that empirical data should not just be used for
verifying, modifying or rejecting aspects of "grand
social theory" but that empirical data could be used in a
more creative way to generate small-scale, "grounded"
theory (Glaser/Straul3, 1967:7).
Hence some of the criticism levelled against
empirical research projects, that they are "empiricist"
(see for example Pearce/Tombs, 1990), might be misplaced.
Research based on empirical data which follows a grounded
theory approach is not a-theoretical, as the charge of
empiricism implies, but works with a different type and
different level of theory (Glaser/Straul3, 1967:32) . This
is middle-range theory which can be specific to a
particular type of social phenomenon. For example, Glaser
and Straul3 investigated the social processes surrounding
the death of people of different social status in a
hospital. One of the opportunities of this is that it can
enable the development of "grounded theory" for areas of
social life which so far have not received detailed
attention from "grand social theory" (Glaser/Straul3,
1967:11)
In my view one of the strengths of "grounded theory"
is that it arises from empirical data. Hence grounded
theory approaches avoid the situation where "grand social
theory" is imposed on data or the interpretation of data
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is made to fit a theory. "Grounded theory" provides the
opportunity to develop theory which remains faithful to
the complexities of social life as described through
qualitative empirical data. This seems to be of
particular value in the area of legal research where some
shortcomings of research - as argued in section 3.2.-
seem to be due to the application of legal images to
social phenomena.
Inductive stance
This research project follows an inductive stance.
The main research question "how is compliance achieved in
practice?" was refined by following hunches and leads as
they arose during the field work. I had no prespecified
hypotheses for the research which I wanted to test
through empirical data. Instead the research was designed
to be exploratory aiming to shed light on how compliance
is achieved in practice and thus to raise questions as
well as address them.
Interactionist perspective
For collecting qualitative data I adopted an
interactionist approach. I was interested in the question
of how the law gains meaning in interaction among the
regulated, and in interaction between the regulated and
the regulators in day-to-day situations of the
implementation of the law. In the literature the
relationship between the regulators and the regulated
seemed to have been more often approached through
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macrosociological approaches, involving for example the
use of structural notions of power (see chapter 2). Thus,
I was interested to get a more small-scale picture of the
mundane, day-to-day relationship between the regulated
and the regulators.
Why qualitative data?
My research question asked how legal compliance is
achieved in practice. This question referred to the
social processes surrounding evaluations made by actors
in the field about what is compliance or non-compliance.
This type of question called for the collection of
qualitative rather than quantitative data (Bryman,
1988:140). I did not ask "how much", "how many" or "how
often" questions. I did not seek to test a hypothesis in
order to make predictions about behaviour and hence did
not need to collect quantitative data.
3.4.2. Research methods
I conducted field work involving observation,
participant observation, some interviews and some
analysis of documentary analysis. Before the topic and a
design for this research was devised I had made contact
with people in the field and had conducted some
interviews with site managers in the industry and waste
control officers. These interviews were semi-structured
and covered issues relating to waste management
regulation. After having been an observer and participant
observer at the U.K. waste treatment plant it appeared to
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me that interviews would only provide limited data about
my research question. Given the fact that compliance with
legal provisions would be part of their work
responsibilities, managers of sites were sometimes
concerned to portray activities at sites in a favourable
light. Given my topic, it seemed difficult to get
authentic and "deep" data through interviews. As Denicolo
(1993) states, the gap between behaviour and interview
data can be large. Hence, observation seemed to be the
best technique for data collection. It is a research
technique which is independent of the subject's
willingness to report. Where people might not be inclined
or may not have the time during the work day to be
interviewed, observation requires less active cooperation
from the research subjects (Denicolo, 1993). But during
further field work data collection techniques had to be
adapted to the particular circumstances encountered.
Flexibility in the use of research techniques
During the period of field work at the U.K. waste
treatment plant it appeared to me that it was easier to
"blend into the setting" by not just watching in the
laboratory how the chemists were doing their work but by
"helping" with some work where I could. This meant that I
took samples of waste brought from tankers in buckets and
filter them, clean lab equipment etc. and become some of
the time a participant observer. The environment of the
waste management plants, involving the technology of the
plant, the chemistry of the treatment process and the
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waste streams were completely new to me. Thus, it was
necessary to conduct informal "interviews as
conversations" (Burgess, 1982:107) with the staff at the
plants in order to understand what they were doing and
how they perceived situations. These interviews -
connected to observations of what staff did - seemed to
be a lot more illuminative than interviews without back-
up from further data sources.
Also, I looked at a certain amount of documentary
sources. These were files on the supervision and the
licensing of sites, site licences and some policy
statements in the waste regulation authorities. At the
U.K. waste management plant I looked at its written
procedures for handling waste, its site licence, the
discharge consent, and written records used for daily
work such as the "incoming waste recording book" and a
few memos. At the German waste management plant I looked
at the site licence, the discharge consent, its internal
lists for the acceptance of waste, as well as quite a few
of the legal documents on which the disposal path of
waste streams is documented, the so-called TrENshT.
During my time with the German waste regulation
authority it became clear that the German waste control
officers spent considerably less time in the field than
their U.K. counterparts. My main technique during my time
with the U.K. waste control officers was to accompany
them on their field visits and observe and listen to
their interaction with employees from regulated waste
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management sites. I had to change to some extent my
methods in the German waste regulation authority. The
German waste control officers spent more time than their
U.K. colleagues in the office for example working through
files. During that time I would myself study files in
which the supervision and licensing of sites had been
recorded.
Data from more than one country
I collected empirical data from more than one
country in order to broaden discussions on compliance and
to avoid having to generalise on the basis of only one
national regulatory system. Data from more than one
country helped to get some idea of what might be aspects
of a concept of empirical compliance that are relevant in
different national settings and what might be aspects
that are specific to national styles of regulation.
3.5. Data collection in detail
1.5.1. Access: clearing hurdles and a process of
cooperation
Access to the waste management plants
Gaining access to the organizations with which I
conducted the research was not straightforward and took
some time. The first stint of observation with the U.K.
waste treatment plant arose as the result of an
opportunity to do so, rather than as the result of a
planned inquiry	 (see also Buchanan/Boddy/McCalman,
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1988:55). I had met a director of the company who was
running the plant at a conference on environmental law. I
explained to him that I was interested in how waste
management regulation works in practice at waste
management sites. I also submitted a written description
of the research, in which I stated that organizations
which participated in the research would not be
identified in the final research report. He arranged for
me to visit the site and eventually I stayed on at the
site for three months.
In fact the confidentiality undertaking I gave to
the organizations involved meant that I could not report
some field data from which it would have been possible to
identify the organizations. Also, in this chapter I
described access negotiations only in a very general way,
not using the waste control officers exact job title but
referring only to general terms such as "senior officer".
I changed all the names of persons mentioned in this
research.
In order to obtain access to a German waste
treatment plant I contacted about twelve plants by
letter. I stated the purpose of the research as an
interest in the handling of waste regulation in practice.
Most of the firms contacted declined to participate in
the research but three firms said they would be prepared
to discuss the matter in more detail. I finally had a
meeting with the manager of a waste treatment plant with
which I had a prior contact point. I had visited a
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conference on waste management regulation in Germany the
year before. During afternoon sessions of the conference
delegates were taken to various waste management
facilities. I contacted the treatment plant which I had
visited during the conference, stating in my letter that
I had previously been at the plant within the framework
of the conference. This might have supported my
expression of interest in waste management regulation and
given me some credibility as a researcher. During the
meeting I discussed the contents of my research in
further detail with the managing director of the
treatment plant. He agreed to my request to stay at the
plant for about three months.
Access to the waste regulation authorities
In order to gain access to a U.K. waste regulation
authority I contacted the head of the waste control
section. (The waste regulation authorities were called
waste disposal authorities under COPA 1974 when I carried
out my field work but I refer to them here as waste
regulation authorities because I only studied their waste
control functions). The head of the waste control section
granted me an interview and arranged for me to go on a
couple of site visits with waste enforcement officers.
When I expressed my wish to observe enforcement officers'
work over a longer period of time I never received a
clear "no" as an answer but contact with the head of the
section just petered out. Letters further explaining my
request went unanswered.
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While I conducted field work at the U.K. waste
treatment plant enforcement officers visiting the site
had suggested to me that I might be interested in getting
some understanding of their role in waste management
regulation. An enforcement officer gave me the name of
the head of the section to contact. I wrote a letter to
him and was put in contact with a senior officer. The
officer granted me access to accompany waste enforcement
officers on visits to sites, but said that I had to
obtain separately the sites' permission for my presence
during inspection visits. Fortunately, none of the sites
refused me access. The R did not give me access to all
sites which were visited by enforcement officers. But I
had access to a good cross - range of sites. Among some
of the sites to which I accompanied enforcement officers
were also sites which were considered by the BA as
"problem" sites, i.e. where enforcement officers had
encountered difficulties in enforcing legal regulation. I
also had access to a range of different types of sites,
such as landfill sites, treatment plants and transfer
stations.
After I had accompanied the U.K. waste control
officers to a couple of visits I was told by the officer,
who had granted me access, that two of the more senior
officers were not quite sure about my stay with the BA
and wanted to discuss this with me. They were concerned
that I might criticize the BA in my research report. I
went to a meeting with the two senior officers where I
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clarified my research and answered questions about it,
saying that my interest was not in judging what the RP
did but in understanding hr they went about their work.
It also appeared that I had failed to express clearly to
the other officer during the earlier access negotiations
that I wanted to stay with the waste disposal authority
for a longer time, i.e. for three months. I agreed during
this meeting to show the senior officers a copy of my
finished research report.
In order to gain access to the German waste
regulation authority I relied on a personal contact. This
lead to a meeting with a leader of the German waste
regulation authority during which he granted me access.
He then put me in contact with the heads of those
departments which were relevant for my research.
Similar to the situation in the U.K. waste
regulation authority, it turned out that I had only taken
the first access hurdle and that access was a continuing
issue. The head of the first section with which I spent
time wanted to know what it was I was doing and asked me
to give a presentation to the department. I tried to show
during the presentation my interest in my research topic
and waste management in general which seemed to allay
concerns. When I went to the second section of the German
waste regulation authority, which supervised and licenced
waste incineration plants, I had to give another brief
explanation of my research to a team meeting. I had also
asked permission to attend a meeting on the licensing of
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a waste incineration plant which I was granted. During
the meeting I took notes. I was later asked by the waste
control officer who had chaired the meeting to show to
her my notes. Some of this sensitivity to my presence as
a researcher probably can be explained by the fact that
this was one of the meetings in which operators and the
RA had preliminary negotiations over the license
application. In some of the literature (Bohne, 1984:352)
and particularly in public debates these preliminary
meetings have been criticized as involving too close a
relationship between the regulated and the RA and for
excluding the public and interested pressure groups.
Difficulties in maintaining access cane up once
again when I joined the group of German waste control
officers who were supervising waste incineration plants.
The question arose where I could sit in this section of
the German RA. I asked to sit on a desk in one of the
waste control officer's offices in order to facilitate
personal contact with waste control officers and to be
able to observe life in the office and to hear
conversations. I was told that the only place where I
could sit was a completely separate office at the end of
the corridor where all I could have done was to read
through files. Finally one waste control officer allowed
me to sit at a small files table in her office.
To gain access in this project therefore required
not just to clear initial hurdles of formal access at the
beginning but access was a continuous issue throughout
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the field work (see also Buchanan/Boddy/McCalman,
1988:59). Issues such as seating arrangements could be
subtle ways of restricting access where for example one
section of the RA. might not have wanted to support the
access decision made by a more senior officer.
3.5.2. What data were obtained?
During the stay at the waste treatment plants I
observed the day-to-day working of the staff at the
plants who were responsible for the implementation of
legal provisions and the work of those staff who assisted
in the carrying out of these provisions. I spent the
working day with the staff during their day-time working
hours. I observed their work, mainly in the laboratory of
the U.K. treatment plant and I shared their meal breaks
with them. In the German treatment plant I also observed
the work of staff working in the office on a legal
procedure for assigning waste streams to particular waste
plants and the work of staff in the treatment plant which
was separate from the chemical laboratory. Hence the
research was more focussed on particular issues than a
general ethnography of life at the plants or the waste
regulation authorities.
In the waste regulation authorities I observed the
enforcement of legal provisions in the field in the
interaction between the regulated and the regulators and
I explored to some extent the licensing of waste
management facilities. In the U.K. waste regulation
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authority I accompanied enforcement officers on their
visits to sites. I also accompanied German waste
enforcement officers on visits to sites but in the German
BA a larger part of observation than in the U.K. BA was
connected to life in the office, involving meetings with
operators and meetings of teams of waste control
officers.
I did not collect data on the formal legal process
connected to the criminal prosecution of what had become
officially classified as an offence. Since I was
interested in the question of how evaluations of
compliance or non-compliance are achieved I was not
interested in those aspects of the criminal justice
process which come into play once a decision that
something constitutes an offence has been made.
3.5.3. How were the data recorded?
I recorded my field observations and the contents of
conversations in the field as soon as possible after the
events. Most of the time this meant writing field notes
at the end of the working day at home. Sometimes I made
brief notes during the day which I wrote up fully later
in the evening. I seldom took notes openly at the U.K.
waste management plant because I felt this would have
appeared as threatening and would have interfered with
the situation even more than my presence did. At the
German waste management plant I recorded more openly
notes during the day, particularly in the laboratory,
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since I got the impression that after some time this did
not impede rapport.
In the RAs when I was in the office I took notes
since I was extracting information from files anyway and
while doing so I would also record conversations or
observations that came up. When I accompanied enforcement
officers on visits to sites I created a record of the
visit later in the evening.
I feel that this method was adequate for recording
data since any issues that appeared unclear when later
creating a record I could pick up on and ask questions
about during the next day. Being with each of the
organizations for about three months meant that I had the
possibility of gaining an impression of what the staff
were doing over some time. Hence I hope that possible
errors or misconceptions in individual records were
corrected through gaining an overall picture during quite
a long time.
The records of data I created were descriptions of
observations and conversations I had witnessed or
conducted during the day in connection with what appeared
to be relevant for legal compliance. In order to help my
memory recall I wrote the field notes in chronological
order for a day. After the writing-up of the data I read
through the notes again and tried to find categories into
which various pieces of data could be aggregated. If
these categories seemed to be relevant and adequate for
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describing data I used these as headings for writing-up
notes for subsequent days. For example, I would write-up
notes under headings, such as "agreements negotiated in
the field between waste management plants and waste
control officers" and then note several examples under
this category.
How were the data analyzed?
I did not use any particularly formalized procedure
for the analysis of the data but thinking about the data
and trying to make sense of them was a continuous process
(see: Glaser/Straul3, 1967:43; Bryman, 1988:68). This
started when I was in the field and continued during
further organisation of the data around themes and
categories once I left the field and wrote-up data for
the research report. In the next section I will discuss
my role as a researcher in the field in more detail. How
did my research role influence the data which I
collected?
3.6. Negotiating a research role at the waste management
plants and the waste regulation authorities
3.6.1. Validity of data
It has been argued that the interview and the
participant observation situation are social encounters
where the researcher herself contributes to the creation
of a social setting which becomes later recorded as
research data (Denicolo, 1993; Dalton, 1964:74) . Hence,
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not only did I "contaminate" research data through my
presence but I contributed to generating situations which
otherwise might not have occurred.
In my opinion, however, there were limits to the
extent to which I affected the researched setting. For
example, at the U.K. waste treatment plant the laboratory
technician explained to me during my first days at the
plant how they were handling wastes. He showed me how
they would test incoming waste, for example for
compatibility with loads already in the plant. After some
time I realized, however, that this was not necessarily
how the waste was handled in practice. Sometimes testing
procedures were not as elaborate as initially explained
but shortened. Hence, it seemed that the presentational
data which I encountered at the beginning of my time in
the field gave way to behaviour of the staff which was
closer to their "normal" behaviour. After some time my
presence in the laboratory seemed to have less of an
impact on behaviour of the staff.
3.6.2. Interaction instead of "fly on the wall"
Sometimes observation is also described as the "fly
on the wall" approach to the collection of data. During
my research, however, I found that this would have been
an impossible approach for me to take. I was not a "fly
on the wall" and being in the particular research setting
interaction was needed in order to create a research role
for	 myself	 (see	 also:	 Bulmer,	 1988:151;
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HaImnersley/Atkinson, 1983:14) . The staff whose work I
observed were sometimes interested and. sometimes
Suspicious of the contents and purpose of my research.
For example, would I relate my observations to the
management? The only way to deal with these concerns was
to talk to the staff, to interact. To gain their trust in
the field was probably dependent on them having an
opportunity to get to know me as a person and to ask me
questions.
Furthermore spending a work day together with the
staff, who had to deal sometimes with intense pressures
of work, meant that I could not be just "part of the
furniture" in the corner of the laboratory. Instead I was
a conversation partner during times of boredom at work or
be a person still separate enough from the setting to be
told grievances about the work, colleagues and
management.
Moreover, there was a further aspect of the field
setting that prevented me from being a "fly on the wall".
I found that some of the situations at the plants and
waste regulation authorities made it difficult for me to
feel completely detached from what was happening in the
setting. Some conditions led me into an emotional
involvement in the research setting. Some of the work of
the staff at the plants and waste control officers was
dangerous. For example, during one site visit a German
waste control officer detected waste in a container. The
officer started to inspect drums stored in the container.
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Some of the drums, according to their labels, contained
solvents. Some drums were unlabelled. In order to inspect
the drums at the rear end of the container the officer
had to walk into the container. An employee from the site
who showed the officer around stood outside in front of
the opening of the container. He was smoking while
watching the officer. This put the enforcement officer in
the container at considerable risk of a fire accident
through the ignition of solvent fumes. The enforcement
officer got very angry about this. Though this was an
extreme situation the example illustrates that I
witnessed incidents and situations at sites which led to
an emotional not just cognitive involvement with the
setting. Emotional involvement was on the one hand a way
to share some of the experiences and feelings of people
in the research setting and hence could facilitate
understanding of and insight in the data (see also
Gouldner, 1954:259). I was concerned, however, that
overinvolvement could lead to the loss of critical
distance and partly induce a judgeinental rather than
neutral or inquiring state of mind (see also Jarvie,
referred to in: Clarke, 1975:105) . Involvement in the
research setting became also relevant in another way. The
research project was the first time I had closer contact
with the waste management industry and waste regulation
authorities. This situation required to negotiate a role
as stranger in the field.
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3J3. Negotiating the role of stranger in the field
As pointed out above in the section on interviews in
the field, getting explanations about what was happening,
particularly at the plants at the beginning, was quite
important. It turned out at the U.K. waste treatment
plant that a young laboratory technician became what has
been described in the research methods literature as an
informant (see for example: Tremblay, 1982:98). I got to
know him through being most of the time in the chemical
laboratory. At the beginning he explained to me some of
the procedures for handling waste, some technical aspects
of waste treatment and the pumps and pipes at the plant.
He also helped to introduce me into the setting.
For example, during the first days I dreaded going
during lunchtime into the small messroom where the staff
from the plant would be having lunch. This was an all-
male "Sun" reading environment. What would I say when I
entered the room? "Hi, my name is Bettina, I am a
postgraduate student at Warwick University, how are you?"
This probably was unlikely to be a good opening! Should I
just slip in and mutter "hello"? I was quite relieved
when one morning the laboratory technician announced to
me that he was going for his tea break to the messroora
and asked if I would like to come with him. Accompanying
him to the messroom made it much easier for me to enter
this setting.
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I felt that being a woman, my younger age and being
German in- the setting of the U.K. waste treatment plant
might have helped rather than hindered my research role.
It meant on the one hand that there were limits to my
"fading" into the social setting. On the other hand it
provided a justification for asking lots, and what
probably sometimes appeared as silly, questions. Being
very obviously a stranger in the field it was easier to
remain strange, to keep some distance from the setting
and retain a researcher role rather than become too well
integrated. Also my gender and younger age might have
contributed to being perceived as less threatening in the
field. I was not an "important", established male
academic. Some staff who had forgotten or who had never
been clearly told what I was doing at the plant assumed
for example that I was a chemistry undergraduate on a
sandwich course.
Values and perceptions
I started this research project with a
critical perception of waste handling which did not
conform to high environmental standards. I probably would
have supported a notion of "strict or strong" regulatory
law to control activities that have environmental
impacts. While I am still concerned about these issues my
ideas on how to achieve environmental standards changed
during the course of the research. Watching for example
the chemists carry out their job I gained an appreciation
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of the pressures under which waste is being handled. A
more critical perception, if any, would have to be
directed at the organizational and economic framework in
which waste handling occurs. For example, I suspect that
the U.K. treatment plant was trying to survive in a
competitive environment during a recession. In Germany
there is the possibility that waste control officers can
be prosecuted under criminal environmental law as the
main offender or accessory to an environmental crime. One
potential use of this provision is to encourage R1s to
bring more criminal prosecutions and discourage waste
control officers tolerating situations at sites that
effectively constitute of fences (Schönke-Schröder, 1988,
Vorbem. § 324 if., Rz. 38,39,40,41).
Before I did the field work with the German RA. I
would have supported these criminal law provisions.
During my time in the German RA, however, I changed my
view. The individual enforcement officer is the wrong
target for trying to influence prosecution behaviour. The
threat of criminal prosecution as accessory to
environmental offences is rather draconian. Instead it
might be more relevant to explore what positive
incentives does the organization provide for taking out
prosecutions, what support systems are there from layers
higher up in the organizational hierarchy for
prosecutions? Thus, the long involvement with the
organizations which participated in this research changed
some of my perceptions in a way that an encounter during
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an interview would probably not have done. Hence, the
field work was a two way process where not only I
collected data about the organizations' activities but
involvement in the organizations' activities also changed
some of my perceptions.
1.7. Conclusion
In this chapter I described and provided reasons for
the way I conducted this research project. The research
question "what is legal compliance in practice?" was
informed through initial observations in the field. Thus,
this project is based on a research question which is
"grounded" in empirical data. Also, the literature review
showed that a project that would look at the social
construction of notions of compliance could be a
contribution to existing understandings of compliance.
Since I was interested in small-scale social processes in
practice any theory for this project had to be "grounded"
in the empirical data rather than applied from grand
social theory. This conceptual approach towards the
research provides the framework for all of the subsequent
presentation and discussion of data.
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Part II: CONTEXTS OF COMPLIANCE AND STRATEGIES FOR
MANAGING COMPLIANCE
Outline of Part II
Compliance and non-compliance do not exist in the
abstract. They occur in relation to standards. In my
view,the literature which has worked with a notion of
'formal compliance' has neglected to probe the question
of what standards for compliance are in practice and how
they are achieved. In part II, I will explore how the
contexts, such as information, technology and commercial
aims, in which compliance occurs, have an impact on what
is understood as standards for compliance and how
standards for compliance can be manipulated in practice.
I will now report empirical data on these issues which I
collected during field work with the waste regulation
authorities and the waste management plants.
CHAPTER 4: COMMERCIAL CONTEXTS AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter I will explore how the commercial
context in which waste was handled at the waste
management plants affected the way legal requirements
were implemented in practice. Would commercial aims work
against the implementation of site licence provisions?
How did the commercial context influence what was
understood as legal requirements in practice? In the
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first section of the chapter I will deal with the waste
testing procedures at the U.K. and German waste
management plants. In the second section of the chapter,
I will discuss the load rejection procedure and in the
third section ,I will refer to the relationship between
some other procedures and their commercial contexts.
Finally,I will look at service relationships between
different actors in the waste management chain and how
they affected the implementation of legal provisions in
practice.
4.2. Procedures
In the literature, commercial aims of regulated
companies are often portrayed as a factor working against
formal	 compliance	 with	 'legal	 requirements'
(Pearce/Tombs, 1990:425; Braithwaite, 1984:292;
Clinard/Yeager, 1980:214; 274; Conklin, 1977:41; Geis,
1967:147). In this chapter,I will show that the
relationship between commercial issues and ].,egal
requirements is more complex. How do commercial values
and 'legal requirements' interrelate in practice? Can
procedures for handling waste establish standards,
through which diverse requirements are accommodated?
The working plan
According to the senior chemist at the U.K. waste
treatment plant, when procedures were laid down, they
were set up in such a way that they could take into
account commercial aims. Most of the procedures that were
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to operate at the treatment plant were to be compiled in
a working plan that was to be attached to the site
licence. According to the chemist, the previous site
management had never formally compiled a proper working
plan and the BA continually asked the waste management
company for it. The senior chemist told me that finally
the BA threatened that they would write the working plan.
In the chemist's view , , this would have been an
incentive for the plant to write its own plan because the
PA would not take into account commercial issues when
setting up procedures. Hence, procedures at the U.K.
waste treatment plant were not developed in order just
to translate legal requirements from the site licence
into practical behaviour at the plant but they were also
supposed to take into account other aims of the facility,
for example, that the operations would be commercially
viable and could be carried out at competitive prices.
It is important to be aware of the procedures at the
U.K. waste treatment plant in order to understand how the
waste was handled. These procedures involved the pre -
testing of loads, sample testing, load rejection, the
section 17 note procedure, and some procedures under the
health and safety at work legislation, such as the
"permit to work" procedure. Some procedures were directly
imposed through the site licence. Other procedures,
according to the foreman, were set up by the plant also
to translate site licence provisions into daily work
routines. At the German waste treatment plant there were
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less clearly defined and explicit procedures for handling
waste. In contrast to the U.K. plant,there was no manual
which listed in written form all the procedures that were
supposed to operate at the plant. The procedures for the
testing and the rejection of incoming waste loads were
particularly important for the implementation of site
licence requirements, both in the U.K. and Germany.
Therefore I will focus on these two procedures in the
following section.
4.2.1 The procedure for testing incoming waste loads
According to both the German and the U.K. site
licences, waste loads brought into the plant should be
tested on arrival by checking conformity with waste
acceptance criteria. The site licence of the U.K. waste
treatment plant required:
"Condition 2: The types and quantities of waste
accepted daily at the facility shall not exceed
those specified in Schedule B attached to this
licence.
Condition 3: Notwithstanding Schedule B, wastes
accepted at the facility shall be only those
which by previous sampling and analysis from
each source have been shown to be capable of
treatment to the satisfaction of the WDA.
Results of these tests shall be made available
to the WDA on request".
Condition 20: A laboratory shall be provided at
the facility and wastes shall be checked upon
arrival at the facility to ensure that they are
capable of treatment and compatible with
existing materials in store. A record of the
results of these checks shall be kept and made
available to a representative of the WDA on
request".
The testing of incoming waste loads should have ensured
that those which were not allowed under the site licence
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were screened out. The fact that testing was important in
order to achieve this, is illustrated by the following
account. According to the chemists at the U.K. waste
treatment plant, some hauliers tried 'to slip in things'.
The laboratory technician told me that a company had
tried to bring in food wastes which could not be taken
according to the site licence. He explained:
'They come in at around lunch time when there
is a shift change and they will say: 'but the
chemist from the earlier shift approved it'.
Situations such as these were the theoretical
justification for having procedures which were aimed at
only allowing wastes into the plant in accordance with
the site licence.
Commercial contexts and the operation of the testing of
loads procedure in practice
Customer relations and "turn around time"
When I was at the U.K. treatment plant I observed
that incoming loads were sometimes only tested through
employees using their sense of smell and through a visual
examination. Sometimes, loads were not tested at all.
Occasionally waste testing procedures were thus
considerably simplified or not carried out at all. In my
view, one of the reasons for this was the commercial
context in which waste was handled at the waste
management plants. Waste management is part of a service
sector	 industry.	 Building	 and maintaining	 good
relationships with customers is an important aspect of
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the business activity. The foreman of the U.K. waste
treatment plant told me that tankers should have a
reasonable "turn around" time at the plant. Thus, testing
procedures should not take too long. According to the
foreman, during the time that tankers had to wait idly on
the yard, they would not earn money for the haulier. In
order to be a popular waste treatment site for hauliers,
a tanker should not spend a long time on the yard while
being tested.
Also, according to the staff at the German waste
treatment plant, the "turn around time" of vehicles
carrying solid waste was to be kept low. Skips arriving
with solid waste loads were inspected visually.
Usually, only if it was suspected that problematic
substances might be in the load, for example a high
concentration of chlorinated solvents, would samples be
taken and submitted to the laboratory for detailed
analysis.
According to the standard testing procedure for
liquid waste loads coming into the German treatment
plant, the amount of chlorine should be measured in waste
loads. The testing of the chlorine took about half an
hour. Waste loads were accepted into the plant before the
results for this test had been obtained. The test results
were later entered on the analysis forms, after the load
had been discharged into the plant. The German laboratory
technicians explained to me that the tanker should not
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wait for a long time on the yard while the result of the
tests were being obtained.
Also, according to the standard testing forms used
in the German laboratory a chemical analysis of incoming
liquid waste loads should be carried out before and after
treatment. "After treatment" means after the chemical
treatment steps that are carried out in the treatment
plant were simulated in the laboratory on a small scale.
As in the U.K. waste treatment plant these "after
treatment" tests were not always carried out. There are
further ways in which testing procedures could be
simplified. This could be the use of quick testing
equipment and making exceptions for some waste loads from
the testing procedures. Let us look at quick testing
equipment first.
Using quick testing equipment
According to the site chemists at the U.K. plant, in
order to save time while the tanker was waiting on the
yard for test results, they used quick tests. As the name
indicates, these Merck dip kit tests merely required -
dipping test strips into filtered samples of waste loads.
The test result could be read from the test strip
according to its colouring. In the view of the chemists,
these Merck dip kit tests were partly inaccurate but
their main advantage was that they were quick to use.
The degree to which quick testing was considered
important is illustrated by the fact that even when a new
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laboratory was installed at the U.K. waste treatment
plant the Merck dip kit tests were still used for testing
incoming waste loads. The new laboratory had also
improved analysis facilities. It provided the possibility
of carrying out more accurate tests on analysis machines
such as the gas chromatograph or the atomic absorption
unit. According to the chemists, tests using those
analysis machines for incoming waste loads would take too
long. The more elaborate analysis equipment was only used
for the initial assessment of loads. Before taking in a
waste stream for treatment the plant would initially
consider if a customer's waste stream could in fact be
treated at the plant.
Similarly, at the German waste management plant,
quick or limited testing was preferred for some waste
loads. In a memo the supervisor of the German waste
treatment plant had proposed to the plant management that
for the analysis of known waste loads, efforts could be
reduced by up to 50% by only applying quick chemical
testing, such as Merck dip kit tests. The supervisor
argued that this would have the beneficial effect that
waste loads which had never been handled before could be
processed quicker through the more elaborate tests in the
chemical laboratory. Analysis facilities would not be
hampered by routine testing. Now, let us look at another
way of simplifying testing procedures. This consisted of
making exceptions for some waste loads with regard to the
testing procedures.
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Exceptions to the testing of incoming waste loads: small
waste loads
The staff on the yard of the German waste management
plant allowed in practice for some exceptions to the
general testing of incoming waste loads. The smaller
barrels containing liquid wastes which were to be stored
in the tanks in order, finally, to be passed on to a
waste incineration plant, were not tested by the chemical
laboratory. Only samples from the tankers with large
amounts of liquid waste were analysed by the chemical
laboratory. The idea behind this was that smaller waste
loads would not affect the waste mixture very much since
they were diluted by being mixed with the rest of the
fluids in the tanks.
At the German waste management plant, regular
testing of incoming liquid waste loads for the treatment
plant was carried out. It seemed that the main reason for
this was that the laboratory was separate from the
treatment plant. The staff in the German laboratory did
not share the treatment plant's view on reduced testing
and thus carried out more extensive tests.
The staff at the plants would not just give
conunercial pressures as reasons for simplified testing
procedures but also provided other justifications for
rationalizing their ways of handling waste. In the
following section, I want to describe some of those
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strategies. It is important to mention these strategies
in order to explain the shortened testing procedures.
Knowledge of wastes from experience as a basis to
simplify testing requirements
A frequently made point by staff at the German and
U.K. waste treatment plants was that testing procedures
could be simplified because the staff would know from
experience what the outcome of the tests would be. For
example, in relation to chlorine testing at the German
waste treatment plant mentioned above, the laboratory
technician argued that the chlorine parameter was not
important since the treatment plant was able to treat
substances in the incoming waste loads down to the levels
permitted in the discharge licence. Also, according to a
German laboratory technician, some of her colleagues had
been working in the lab for some time and thus knew the
wastes from experience. They would know the results
without the "after treatment" tests, which were mentioned
above, and if the waste could be treated by the plant or
not.
Reliance on experience was used as an explanation
both at the German and the U.K. waste treatment plants
for behaviour which deviated from procedures. The
observance of bureaucratic rules could be sometimes
dispensed with because experience would guide employees
towards the appropriate action needed. One of the
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employees who worked on the yard of the U.K. treatment
plant said:
'Some of the drivers have been so long in the
business that they know how to do things and
where to discharge. They know their waste loads
from the way they smell. They will know if
anything is wrong or different with the load
and then tell the lab'.
One of the chemists at the U.K. treatment plant told
me that they would use their experience to test some
incoming waste samples. The smell and the appearance of a
waste sample from a regular load could indicate if it was
different from what it usually appeared. According to the
chemists, experience was an important aspect of doing
their job. A technician at a landfill site, which was
operated by the same company that ran the waste treatment
plant, said that he sometimes consulted a chemist when
deciding if to take contaminated soil into the site. But
he stressed that:
'it is experience that matters when making
these decisions'.
Also, experience could replace more abstract and
organized ways of understanding the technical operations
at the plant. There were drawings of the complicated
pipework at the U.K. waste treatment plant that should
have told the chemists where different lines beween tanks
were located. According to the chemists, these drawincs
were useless. They told me that the y therefore had to
learn about the operations by 'experience'.
At the German plant, employees in the office, those
on the yard and the lab staff stressed that experience
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mattered when handling wastes. Since wastes are complex,
diverse mixtures, knowledge about wastes is difficult to
obtain from books and can only be gained through
experience in handling wastes. For example, according to
the staff at the waste treatment plant, the oil pre-
treatment process had to be carried out by those with
prior experience of this work. There are no clear
guidelines that would determine how much of the chemical
reagent has to be used.
Thus, in order to understand the working practices
of the staff at the waste treatment plants, it is
important to have some idea of what might be termed their
cultural knowledge of the setting they were working in.
By cultural knowledge of the plant, I mean being familiar
with the plant, understanding how it operates and
attitudes towards rules and procedures for its operation
that arise from the staff's experience and everyday
knowledge of working there. Cultural knowledge of the
waste treatment plant and not just the observance of
procedures were important in the daily handling of waste.
Thus, experience could partly explain deviance from
procedures. This shows that a rule - based concept of
formal compliance or non-compliance is too reductionist
to capture the complexities of the working practices on
the sites. Deviation from testing procedures might be
exolained as adherence to alternative social orders, such
as those incoroorated in workina oractices. These are
constituted of cultural understandinas such as the
132
experience of how to deal with incoming waste loads.
Apart from these cultural factors that are relevant to
understanding how procedures were handled in practice, it
is also important to note that there were limits to
commercial pressures with regard to the testing of loads.
Some of these were limits that did not arise from the
supervision of the plant's activities by the RA but were
rooted in other aims pursued by the plants. The plants
want to make more money so they spend less time testing
the waste but nevertheless there are limits to their
financial motivations.
Limits to the influence of financial concerns
The previous site manager of the U.K. waste
treatment site had written a memo to the chemists about
the testing of incoming waste loads. According to this,
the site manager had noted that the "turn around time",
i.e. the time a tanker spent at the waste treatment
plant, was less than 15 minutes. The manager pointed out
that this could hardly be enough time to allow for an
appropriate testing of the sample since it would take
nearly 20 minutes just to discharge a 20,000 gallon
tanker. The memo asked the chemists to observe proper
testing procedures in the future.
At the German waste treatment plant the testing of
incoming waste loads was important for the staff because
it was necessary for the calculation of the price charged
for the treatment. The price for the treatment of the
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waste load in question was to some extent based on its
particular composition. For example, it was more
expensive to treat a waste load which contained
problematic substances like cyanide or a high percentage
of nitrates. As a result of this, it was in the German
plant's own coirunercial interests to obtain sufficient
information about waste loads through the testing of
them.
Thus, testing requirements were not dismissed at
either the German or the U.K. plant, but were considered
to some extent important. There were limits to the impact
that commercial considerations had on the actual testing
procedure used. These limits could be based on other
commercial requirements such as the need to gain
information about loads for the application of the
pricing system at the German plant. Hence, there were no
unified commercial aims, which, by definition, would
mitigate against the elaborate testing of incoming waste
loads. Instead, different commercial requirements could
call for different behaviour in relation to the testing
of incoming waste loads. Compliance with the testing
procedures at the German waste management plant might not
be the result of the normative appeal of the legal
provisions but of the importance of the commercial aim of
operating a particular pricing system. Did these
financial considerations also influence other procedures
at the plant? Let us look at the procedure for the
rejection of waste loads.
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4.2.2. Commercial contexts and the procedure for
rejecting waste loads
Introduction
The site licences for the German and the U.K. waste
treatment plants spelled out what kind of wastes could be
taken into those sites. Also, the discharge consent set
limits for the discharge of certain substances via the
plant effluent into the public sewer. When deciding if a
waste load could be taken into the plant, these legal
constraints resulting from the site licence and the
discharge consent had to be taken into account.
Furthermore, the U.K. treatment plant had drawn up a
written load rejection procedure. It stated that waste
loads arriving at the plant "which do not conform with
the description provided or which are otherwise
unacceptable" should be rejected. How was this load
rejection procedure handled in practice?
Load rejection as the last resort
While I was at the U.K. and the German waste
treatment plants, the economic recession resulted in the
reduction of the amount of waste coming in. I could see
from the booking-in book for previous years that the
amount of waste coming into the U.K. plant was
substantially reduced in comparison to previous years.
Some waste producers had gone out of business and the
reduced output of some producers was reflected in the
smaller amount of waste remaining to be treated. Both the
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German and the U.K. treatment plants were working below
their capacity. Load rejection was only sparingly
exercised both at the U.K. and the German waste
management plants. According to an employee at the German
plant, who had organized the booking-in of waste loads
and who was familiar with information about rejected
loads, very few loads would be rejected. Also, while I
was in the chemical laboratory, at the German waste
management plant, during the initial assessment for
deciding if a waste stream could be taken into the plant,
I observed there were seldom any rejections. More loads
seemed to be rejected at the U.K. waste management plant
than at the German plant. This might also be explained by
the fact that the U.K. plant would take in some "first
loads". This meant that it would sometimes accept
bookings for waste loads for which it had not in fact
assessed a sample of the waste stream in order to see if
it could in fact take the waste. The likelihood that a
waste stream was not suitable for the plant, and that it
had to be rejected, was greater for the type of loads
which were not known previously to the plant. Overall, in
both the German and the U.K. plants, there seemed to be
an emphasis on taking loads into the plants and not
rejecting them. According to the staff at the U.K. waste
treatment plant, maintaining good relations with
customers was a commercial pressure that had an important
influence on how the load rejection procedure was handled
in practice. In what ways could such commercial pressures
affect the handling of the load rejection procedure?
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Regular customers
The staff at the U.K. treatment plant considered
that the rejection of waste loads could potentially
jeopardize relationships with their customers. According
to the senior chemist, it was particularly difficult to
reject waste loads from regular customers. Because they
brought in waste loads frequently, regular customers were
commercially important for the plant. To annoy customers
by rejecting a load could pose the threat that the
customer would take his/her business to a different
treatment plant. While I was in the laboratory of the
U.K. plant, I sometimes overheard telephone conversations
when customers were informed by the chemist that a load
had been rejected, and the customers occasionally seemed
to be angry about this.
'Finding a home' for rejected waste loads
When waste loads had to be rejected, the staff at the
U.K. treatment plant would attempt to 'find a home' for a
rejected load, rather than just send the tanker back to
the waste producer. This was also an attempt to maintain
good customer relations in cases where loads had to be
rejected. In what other ways did the chemists try to take
commercial considerations into account when making
decisions about the rejection of waste loads?
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Taking in wastes which are only 'slightly above' the site
licence limits
Another way to accoimuodate customer satisfaction in
the handling of the load rejection procedure in practice
was to allow waste loads into the site which were only
'slightly above' the site licence limits. One day a waste
producer visited the U.K. treatment plant on a "duty of
care" visit. These visits could help to fulfil new legal
duties placed on waste producers to dispose of their
wastes in accordance with the requirements of section 34
(1) EPA 1990. The visitors were also shown the lab and
the chemist explained:
'So, we test the samples in here to see if they
can be taken in within the site licence. We see
if there is some possibility of taking wastes
in when they are just slightly above the site
licence'.
This statement by the chemist illustrates that on
the one hand he wanted to show to the waste producer that
legal regulations like site licence requirements would be
adhered to. But, on the other hand, the chemist also
indicated that waste producers would be accommodated in
the sense that their waste loads would not be rejected if
they were just 'slightly' above the site licence. There
was no objective definition of what 'slightly' above the
site licence entailed but this was left up to the
individual and subjective judgement of the chemists.
Sometimes loads were j.ust above the site licence
limits in a way that was considered sufficiently
insignificant by the staff and which would not in their
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view warrant a load rejection. Some waste loads had on
top of them a layer of 'tramp oil' which could not be
treated at the plant. The chemist would ask the tanker
driver to discharge the load in such a way that the oil
layer would remain in the tanker. The chemist explained
to me:
'You can't turn away a tanker for that [the
tramp oil on top]'.
Also one of the technicians from a landfill site, which
was also operated by the U.K. waste management company,
said:
'If it [the waste load] is borderline I might
admit it'.
One day a customer asked the technician from the
landfill site if the site could take an acid with a ph-
value below six. The technician told the customer that
the site was not licensed for such acids. The technician
added that he would get in touch with the RA. to see if
he could get permission to take in that acid, since it
was only a 'one-off' load. A further way to broaden
criteria for the rejection of waste loads in practice was
to develop alternative standards.
Taking in waste loads which do not conform to the
description provided but can be treated by the plant:
alternative standards
In some cases alternative standards for rejecting
waste loads were developed. According to the written
version of the load rejection procedure at the U.K.
treatment plant, waste loads "which do not conform to the
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description provided or are otherwise unacceptable"
should be rejected. Wastes which did not conform to their
description but which could be treated by the plant and
could be taken in under the requirements of the site
licence were, however, usually taken.
This was also the case at the German waste treatment
plant. Its site licence required that loads should
conform to the description of the waste stream previously
submitted to the plant. Conformity between the arriving
load and the previous description was, however, usually
not checked by the chemists or the staff on the yard. It
was only tested if the plant could in fact accommodate
the particular load arriving.
Sometimes at both the German and the U.K. plants, even
loads which the plants were not equipped to manage, would
be taken in. The sheet with the waste acceptance criteria
for the German waste treatment plant specified that only
waste loads that could be treated should be taken into
the treatment plant. On one occasion, however, an acid
containing cyanide was accepted into the plant, although
according to the staff in the treatment plant it was not
quite clear how it could be treated. In fact it proved
difficult to treat and some time and effort was spent on
dealing with this case.
140
Flexible criteria for load rejection: 'too oily waste
loads'
Under its site licence, the U.K. treatment plant was
allowed to take in waste loads described as 'fuel oil and
greases'. According to the site licence, however, the
plant was only allowed to take in wastes which it could
treat with its technology. The U.K. plant did not have an
oil trap to separate oil out before the treatment
process. There was only an oil trap for the treated
effluent that was to go to the sewer, so that before
discharge to the sewer some oil could be held back. Too
much oil in a waste load could cover the cloth filter
presses with an oily film and thus make them inoperative.
Therefore only loads that did not contain "too much oil"
could be accepted. It was up to the chemists to define on
the basis of their knowledge of what the plant technology
could cope with what constituted "too much oil" in a
waste load.
When waste loads arrived at the plant their oil
contents was not determined through the taking of a
sample in the laboratory. The oil content was usually
estimated through a visual examination of the sample.
There did not seem to be a clear line between those loads
that could be taken into the plant and those which could
not on the basis of the oil content. Thus, the chemists
at the U.K. waste treatment plant seemed to have
considerable discretion in deciding about the rejection
of loads. One day one of the chemists rejected a load of
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drum washings. He told me that there were too many
solvents in the load. He added that the other chemist
might have taken the load in. Also, one morning a waste
load was delivered to the U.K. plant. The lab technician
said:
'This might be another reject'.
In the end the load was not rejected but the technician
told the driver of the tanker:
'Next time we will reject it'.
Similarly, in the diary of the U.K. landfill site,
quite a few entries stated that waste loads were taken in
which would be rejected next time. Hence the criteria in
practice for rejecting loads were handled in a flexible
and partly inconsistent way. They allowed for discretion
in taking commercial considerations into account when
deciding if waste loads should be taken or not.
Gaining maximum commercial advantage from not rejecting
loads
If difficult loads, which were 'borderline', were
not rejected but taken, then the U.K. waste treatment
plant could ask a high disposal price for such a load.
Hence, there could be a commercial incentive to not
reject loads which might be difficult to treat. One
evening the senior chemist and myself were in the
laboratory of the U.K. treatment plant. On a table waste
samples were stored which the sales staff wanted to bring
into the plant. These samples were to be tested for
treatability. The chemist picked up two glass jars
142
containing waste samples. He smelled the samples and
said:
'This is crap. I am going to reject those'.
The chemist then walked to the site manager's office.
About ten minutes later he came back and said:
'We are going to take them. If Rapid Haulage
wants to bring in crap then they have to pay
for it. If we have handling difficulties with
those then they will have to pay for it. So it
is not gonna be £ 18 per ton put £ 35 per ton'.
This shows that in practice there did not seem to be
a clear-cut dividing line between waste loads which
should be accepted and those which should be rejected. It
also illustrates that the U.K. plant tried to gain the
maximum commercial return from 'borderline' loads. Also
at the German waste management plant, efforts were made
not to reject waste loads.
First and second analyses at the German waste management
plant
If a first analysis of the waste showed it could not be
taken according to the parameters of a final disposer
then the office would sometimes try to obtain a second
analysis. In case where the waste stream had quite a
heterogeneous composition, a second analysis of a
different sample of the same waste stream might show
conformity with a final disposer's acceptance parameters.
Thus the waste would be taken.
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Conclusion
Procedures for the handling of waste could help to
translate site licence requirements into practice in a
flexible way. Procedures could help to integrate
commercial aims with other aims of the plant, such as the
implementation of legal requirements. Procedures in
practice provided a considerable amount of flexibility
which allowed commercial considerations to be taken into
account. For example, the load rejection procedure as
operated in practice included elements of customer
consideration. The commercial context had an impact on
the handling of procedures in the areas of the testing
and the rejection of waste loads both at the German and
the U.K. plants. In the perception of the staff at the
German and U.K. plants, commercial considerations were an
integral concern in their jobs. Not in all cases,
however, were financial concerns, a restraint on the
implementation of site licence requirements. In some
situations financial concerns could promote the
implementation of site licence requirements. For example
compliance with testing procedures in the German waste
management plant was also important for the operation of
the pricing system. Thus, compliance in practice with
legal requirements might in effect signify compliance
with commercial aims.
144
4.3. Commercial contexts and other legal requirements
In the previous sections I have looked at the
question how of how commercial aims can influence the
handling of procedures for the testing and rejection of
waste loads at the waste treatment plants. Are there
other situations at the waste management plants where
commercial aims can be integrated into the implementation
of legal requirements?
The booking-in procedure
At the U.K. waste treatment plant, a booking-in
procedure was meant to operate. This procedure partly
implemented requirements from the site licence
(conditions 2 and 4). There had been confusion at the
U.K. waste treatment plant about who should take bookings
of incoming waste loads. Finally, in a memo, the site
manger spelled out in a memo the responsibilities for
different members of staff. The manager referred to
commercial not legal reasons for the need to observe the
booking-in procedure. He argued that if the booking-in
procedure was not observed, then waste loads might have
to be turned away. Thus, for the staff at the U.K. plant,
accommodating commercial aims was to be an important
aspect of the booking-in procedure.
Requirements for keeping records
According	 to	 the	 chemists,	 record	 keeping
requirements which the RA had asked them to implement,
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could also be used for their own purposes, such as a more
efficient management of the site. For load rejections, a
form with some details about reasons for this decision
had to be filled out. According to the site chemist, one
copy of this was forwarded to the site manager. This had
the positive effect that if the site manager had to deal
with customer irquiries about load rejections, he was
informed about the reasons for the load rejection.
According to one of the chemists, before the forms were
used, the site manager sometimes did not know a great
deal about particular load rejections. This caused
problems when he had to deal with customers. Also,
according to the staff, requests by the Rk that the plant
should update more frequently information provided to
them, could be in the commercial interests of the plant.
This will be explained in the following section.
Updating information provided by the RA
The RA. had required the U.K. waste treatment plant
to provide more frequent updates of the analyses of waste
streams taken in by the waste treatment plant. According
to the chemists, this information would be stored on a
new computer system. This would show the chemists how
waste streams changed over a certain period of time.
Prices for the waste treatment could thus be reviewed.
Since prices were based - inter alia - on the amount of
problematic substances in the waste stream such as heavy
metals, more frequent updates on the composition of waste
streams provided an opportunity for the plant to detect
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factors such as an increase in contaminants that would
justify a higher price. Hence, the requirement from the
BA to provide more information could help the plant to
avoid charging QUtdated prices and thus keep competitive.
Also some waste streams could change so much that they
should be classified as a new waste stream and be
assigned a new number in the plant's classification
system. A further example of a regulatory requirement
that could work to the advantage of a regulated company
were the provisions for the new chemical laboratory.
Increased standards for waste testing facilities
Under site licence provisions, the U.K. waste
treatment plant was required to install adequate
laboratory facilities. This meant that eventually the
plant had to upgrade its laboratory facilities. While I
was at the plant a new and improved laboratory was set
up. This was perceived by the chemists as a step which
worked in the favour of the plant, though according to
them the new laboratory did cost a considerable amount of
money. The chemist explained to me that the improved
analysis equipment in the laboratory would allow testing
for lower levels of substances in waste streams. This
would be a commercial advantage for the plant because a
broader range of wastes and more complex, and hence more
profitable, wastes could then be taken in. For example,
they would be able to analyze pesticides. Currently the
plant was not licensed for pesticides. If they could
analyze them, however, they could ask the BA to amend the
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licence accordingly. According to the chemist, the BA had
thus far argued that they could not make a decision on
the request from the plant to take in more difficult
wastes. Unless the plant was able to tell them precisely
what was in those waste loads the RA would not decide.
These examples show that commercial aims might not
be necessarily in conflict with legal requirements but
that the regulated in some situations are able to comply
with both legal and commercial requirements. In some
situations it might be commercial aims that provide an
incentive to fulfil legal requirements rather than legal
requirements just having normative appeal. For example,
the senior chemist at the U.K. waste treatment plant told
me that the filter cake which they produced at the end of
the treatment process was covered by the "special waste"
definition under para. 2 (1) of the Control of Pollution
(Special Waste) Regulations 1980, SI 1980 No. 1709. The
BA had not asked the waste treatment plant to consign
this filter cake which went to a landfill site on a
section 17 note although the plant did not implement the
section 17 note procedure for the filter cake.
In the end the plant planned to consign the filter
cake on section 17 notes. The incentive for this seemed
to have been the fact that the filter cake was to be
brought to a new landfill site which was cheaper. This
new site required the treatment plant to provide an
analysis of the filter cake. Hence, it seemed to be the
commercial incentive to bring the filter cake to a
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cheaper landfill site, that finally made the treatment
plant analyze it, as required under the section 17
procedure. Thus incentives for implementing legal
requirements were not abstract and preordained but could
arise in particular circumstances in the field and be
based on commercial aims.
Furthermore what would be considered as "normative"
in practice could also depend on how conflicts between
different legal provisions were resolved. For example, at
the U.K. treatment plant, it was discussed who should
take samples from the waste tankers, when waste loads
were checked upon arrival. According to the chemists, one
could argue on the one hand that staff from the waste
treatment plant should take the sample because this would
exclude the possibility that the tanker driver would
tamper at the plant with it in order for it to be
approved. On the other hand, considerations for the
safety of the people at the yard, could be better
guaranteed if the tanker driver took the sample. He would
usually know his vehicle and the kind of load he was
carrying and therefore would be best suited to take
appropriate precaution. At the U.K. plant it was usually
the tanker driver himself who took the sample. The
chemists preferred this. As one chemist put it:
'It is safer if the driver takes the sample
because most of the time the driver will have
loaded the tanker as well. We had a case where
the yard man took a sample from a tanker, the
inlet valve of which had not been closed. The
tanker travelled under vacuum so during the
trip nothing happened because the tanker kept
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sucking in air. When the tanker arrived here
and the yard man opened the outlet valve to
take a sample a whole load came gushing out.
Fortunately it was a neutral sludge and not an
acid'.
Although in some situations as in the two examples
illustrated above, procedures at the U.K. plant allowed
both legal and commercial considerations to be taken into
account, this was not always the case. In some situations
commercial aims could be in conflict with legal
requirements.
Limits to the integration of commercial issues into
procedures for the handling of wastes
Mixing wastes
Under the German "TA Sonderabfall" regulations there
is a general prohibition on the mixing of wastes, with
some exceptions (para. 4.2.). The prohibition on the
mixing of wastes was not always implemented in practice
at the German waste management plant. According to the
supervisor there, sometimes waste acids would be mixed
with alkalines, in order to treat the alkalines. This was
not covered by the exceptions in the "TA Sonderabfall".
Hence, in this situation no accommodation of commercial
aims with legal requirements was achieved but there was
conflict between actual practice and formal legal
requirements. There was a further case in which wastes
would be mixed despite the prohibition on the mixing of
wastes. According to the supervisor of the German
treatment plant, some acids contained oil. Such a load
would be cheaper to treat if more oil could be added to
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it. Then it could be processed through the oil pre-
treatment plant rather than through the chemical
treatment plant. A cheaper treatment price would make it
more likely that the plant would get the job. Thus, the
mixing of wastes could assist in the strategic management
of the composition of waste loads in order to realize
commercial aims of the treatment plant. Also, conmiercial
pressures, according to a German waste control officer,
could induce operators to start their operations before
they were allowed officially to do so. This will be
explained in the next section.
Commercial issues and the implementation of planning
conditions in Germany
The waste control officer explained to me that
operators were not allowed to operate their process
before he had come to visit the site to check if the
planning conditions in the waste management licence had
been fulfilled. Only after this visit and his formal
approval ("Bauendbesichtigung"), was the operator
authorized to start the waste management process. The
waste control officer explained to me that quite often
when he went to sites for these formal visits the
operator had already started to operate the process in
order to start earning returns on his investment. Hence,
this example illustrates that in some situations
commercial concerns would not be integrated into
behaviour	 addressed	 at	 fulfilling	 formal	 legal
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requirements but conurtercial concerns could override
formal legal rules.
4.4. Service relationships and lega:L requirements
Introduction
In the following section I will deal with the
question of how service relationships between plants and
waste producers and plants and waste hauliers might
influence what is understood as legal requirements and
compliance with them in practice. In the section on the
load rejection procedure I already touched upon this
theme of the relationship between the regulated and their
customers. In this section I want to deal with service
relationships in the context of legal procedures such as
the section 17 procedure in the U.K. and the "EN"
procedure in Germany.
Filling in legal forms as a service provision
The attitude of the U.K. PA
According to para.4 of the U.K. Special Waste
Regulations 1980 waste producers should fill in the waste
description in the section 1'7 note. On the advice sheet
it provided for waste producers and waste hauliers the
U.K. PA said:
"Producers please note: You are responsible for
the contents of this documentation. You should
not delegate its completion to carriers or
disposers".
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The U.K. RA might not have welcomed the practice of
waste hauliers filling in section 17 notes for waste
producers because it might diminish the quality of
descriptions of waste. In the U.K.., waste hauliers are
often part of the same company which also provides the
final disposal outlets for them. Thus waste hauliers or
disposers might take into account what wastes they are
allowed to take into their company's site when providing
a description of the waste producer's waste.
A U.K. waste control officer told me she welcomed
that in future, section 17 forms would only be available
from the RA, so that waste disposal operators could no
longer print their own section 17 forms. Then it would be
less easy for waste management operators to fill in
section 17 forms for waste producers.
The U.K. BA, however, provided exemptions from the
general requirement that waste producers should fill in
the section 17 notes. In a folder with standard letters
from the BA to operators I found a letter which said
that, according to a senior officer, the BA agreed with
the practice of waste disposal contractors filling in
section 17 notes for the waste producer, as long as the
waste producer would finally sign the note. In certain
cases further exemptions could be considered. Contractors
could sign the section 17 note for the waste producer as
long as the producer would still recognize that he was
responsible in law for the accuracy of the information.
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How were these procedures handled in practice by the
plants?
Observations from the German and the U.K. waste treatment
plant
The U.K. waste management company who operated the
treatment plant also ran a transport depot which dealt
with a range of wastes, including solid special wastes.
Both at the German waste management plant and the U.K.
transport depot it was regarded as part of the service
for waste producers to handle the paper procedure of the
"EN" and the section 17 note. The legal regulations
envisaged, though, that the waste producer would fill in
some parts of the "EN" and the section 17 form (para 4.1.
Special Waste Regulations 1980; § 9(1) lthfRestUberwV).
But it was in fact the staff at the waste management
plants who did this for the customer.
The staff at the German waste management plant
argued that they were filling in the forms for the waste
holder because waste holders were not able to fill in the
forms properly. This seemed to be supported by my
observations. A great deal of time and effort was spent
on correcting mistakes and gathering necessary
information that had not been supplied by the waste
producer on the "EN" form. Part of the service provided
by the customer was not just to fill in the "EN" forms
but also to get the "EN" authorized by the RP. This
involved the management of relationships with the R.
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Liaising with the RA as part of the waste disposal
service
Sometimes the waste management plant wanted to
dispose of the waste in a waste management facility which
was different from what the guide-lines in the "TA
Sonderabfall" recommended. Then arguments were devised to
convince the PA of the case for a different disposal
facility. Through their experience of submitting "ENs"
regularly to the PA, the staff at the German waste
management plant had learned which kind of arguments the
authority was likely to accept and which they would
reject. Sometimes the PA handed "EN" forms back to the
waste management plant with requests for corrections.
These corrections would provide further clues for ways
how to fill in the forms successfully. Thus, part of the
service offered by the plant to the waste holder was to
get the "EN" approved by the PA. For example, in a letter
to the German waste management plant a waste producer
asked:
'to obtain authorization from the PA for an
increase in the annual amount of waste
disposed' [by this waste producer].
The "ENs" provided an authorization for a particular
disposal path only for a specified amount of waste. An
increase in the amount of waste to be disposed had to be
separately authorized by the PA.
The authorization of larger amounts of waste for
disposal was relevant for the interpretation of the legal
requirements of the "TA Sonderabfall". According to para.
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4.1. of the "TA Sonderabfall", the amount of waste that
should be disposed should be minimized and the amount of
waste for recycling should be increased. Convincing the
BA of an interpretation of the legal regulations that
suited the plants' customers was part of the service to
the waste holders provided by the German plant. A further
illustration of how service relationships with customers
could influence the way in which the "EN" procedure was
handled is special deals between customers and the German
waste management plant.
Special deals with customers of the German waste
management plant
According to one of the employees in the German
waste management plant who handled the "EN" procedure,
the managing director of the plant had agreed with some
important customers that they should have a broader range
of final waste disposal options. This was an improved
service to the customer. It could remedy problems that
would arise, if, for example, a waste load was not in
conformity with the acceptance parameters of the final
waste disposer to which it was supposed to go. If the
waste could not be brought to the final disposal outlet
as authorized under one "EN" then, in case a second "EN"
had been authorized, the waste could be brought to a
different final disposal outlet. Hence, commercial
interests of the waste disposal plant could be integrated
with legal requirements by having a second "EN" ready.
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This avoided having to break the acceptance parameters of
the first "EN" form.
Under the "EN" procedure, a chemical analysis of the
waste has to be given to the PA to have a different final
waste disposer approved. According to the office
employee, she started to phone up the customers to ask
them to supply further samples of their waste streams in
order to be able to provide an analysis of the waste
sample under the "EN" procedure. According to her she was
told by customers on the phone that the managing director
had taken the view that no further tests were required
and that the analyses from the previous "EN" for the
different disposal outlets could be used. But normally
for different disposal outlets distinct types of chemical
analyses were required. For example, a chemical analysis
to assess a waste's suitability for landfill would test a
different range of parameters than an analysis that would
test a waste's suitability for incineration. The "no
further chemical analysis" deal meant that no additional
costs for the analysis of the samples would arise for the
customers. The office employee expressed her disagreement
with these special arrangements. One of the lab
technicians who listened to the account replied:
'Yes, I know about this, too and then the
customer tells you how your own organization
works. This really is an impossible situation'.
Thus, the chemists from the lab of the German waste
management plant did not necessarily support some of the
commercial arrangements which could give customers
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considerable influence over the way analysis procedures
were handled. Also, occasionally notes would be attached
to "ENs" which said that due to a deal with the waste
haulier the German waste management plant had waived the
requirement for a chemical analysis of the waste stream.
Sometimes the haulier would spell out that he would only
accept analytical costs below a certain amount. But also
on a daily basis, apart from special arrangements, it
appeared that staff at the treatment plants considered
the provision of a service to customers as part of their
task.
Liaising with customers
The supervisor of the German waste treatment plant
had suggested to the management that the treatment plant
should also be responsible for the booking in of waste
loads into the treatment plant. This would enable the
treatment plant to better serve customers' wishes.
Currently the booking-in of waste loads for the treatment
plant was carried out by an employee in the office,
separate from the treatment plant, at the German waste
management plant.
Some commercial tasks were also part of the
chemists' work at the U.K. waste treatment plant. For
example, the chemists were sometimes involved in the
marketing of waste treatment services. This meant that
the senior chemist would visit potential customers to
advise on their production process design. Alterations to
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the process could change the composition of the waste
stream. As a result of this, the U.K. treatment plant
might be able to take in the waste stream for disposal.
The commercial context of the relationship between
different actors in the waste management chain could make
the implementation of legal requirements more difficult.
In order to implement the legal requirements of the U.K.
plant's site licence, such as the prohibition against
mixing incompatible waste loads, it was important that
the chemists had sufficient information about waste
loads. The commercial context of the relationship between
the hauliers and the waste treatment plant had an impact
on how much information the chemists would get about
waste loads. Normally in the booking-in procedure, the
name of the waste producer would be given. But some
hauliers would refuse to give the name of the waste
producer because they were afraid that the transport
division of the treatment plant would approach the waste
producer and take the haulage job from the current
carrier. The chemists and the technician complained that
not being given the name of the waste producer would mean
a loss of information about the waste loads. Though in a
nuniber of cases legal provisions were not enforced
against different actors in the waste management chain,
in some situations provisions were enforced. Service
relationships could influence what was understood as
legal requirements in practice and compliance with them.
A further aspect of this was the enforcement or non -
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enforcement of legal regulations among different actors
in the waste management chain.
Enforcement of legal provisions among different actors in
the waste management chain?
Introduction
The chemists at the U.K. waste treatment plant
seemed to think that other actors' lack of implementation
of legal requirements had 'nothing to do with them'. If,
for example, loads were wrongly described by hauliers or
if hauliers moved waste without section 17 notes, then
the chemists would not be too concerned as long as they
could take the waste load into the treatment plant.
According to the U.K. RA this attitude was not quite
acceptable. In the view of some waste control officers
the plant was responsible for the wastes until they were
discharged to the sewer or transported away as filter
cake. Further examples of the lack of enforcement of
legal provisions by other actors in the waste management
chain were some health and safety provisions.
Health and safety provisions
Under health and safety provisions, waste loads
should be accompanied by data sheets that give
information about the physical and chemical properties of
the waste so that employees who come into contact with
these substances can take adequate safety precautions
(section 6 (3) (c) (d) Health and Safety at Work Act
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1974) . The sales representatives sometimes supplied forms
with the waste sample and these indicated: "Always
provide data sheets". Most of the loads coming into the
U.K. waste treatment plant did not have these data
sheets. Also, it appeared that sometimes business
relationships would be maintained with customers who
might not observe legal provisions or even constitute
problems for the plants.
Doing business with "cowboy" hauliers
Both the U.K. and the German waste treatment plant
continued to do business with hauliers whom they
perceived as "cowboy" hauliers. This was despite the fact
that the operating practices of these hauliers sometimes
even posed problems for the working of the waste
treatment plants themselves. For example, one customer of
the German waste treatment was a haulier who frequently
described incorrectly loads he brought into the plant.
Also, the U.K. waste treatment plant continued to do
business with someone the chemists described as a
"cowboy" haulier. Most of the loads which were rejected
at the plant came from this haulier. According to the
chemists he tried 'to slip things into the plant'.
Although unsuitable loads could cause problems for the
working of the plant the coimnercial interest to take
loads into the plant seemed to override this.
According to staff from the laboratory at the German
waste management plant, some hauliers would cheat in
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connection with the legal provisions of "SainmelENs"
Under § 10 AbfRestUberwV 1990 the "Sanunel-EN" allowed a
limited amount of a mixture of waste loads to be
transported together. But this procedure could be
extended to larger amounts of waste if the transfer notes
were written out for three days. All the waste was in
fact, however, delivered during one day. Thus, from the
records of the transfer notes it would appear that waste
on this "Samrnel-EN" was delivered on three separate days
while in reality a larger waste load was delivered on one
day, contrary to the formal legal provisions on the
"Sanunel-EN". Hence, formal records would not necessarily
accurately reflect what happened in practice.
What is more, the following incident illustrates
that the German waste management plant did not
automatically enforce legal provisions against waste
holders. A waste producer had applied to the waste
management plant for waste disposal. One of the employees
in the office queried the waste code the producer had
attached to his waste. The employee voiced to her
colleagues her suspicion that the waste producer might
have consciously chosen a waste code that was not quite
appropriate for the waste in order to circumvent the
legal guidance according to which this waste should have
gone into a particular waste disposal plant. The
supervisor of the group replied:
'So what? This is the customers' business.
Let's see if the RA will object [to this
application] '.
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Also, the German plant had accepted from a haulier a
load where the producer had mixed oily wastes and
interceptor wastes. These wastes were similar as far as
their chemical composition was concerned. But to mix them
was a breach of the prohibition on the mixing of wastes
under para. 4.2. of the "TA Sonderabfall" regulations. By
mixing them, the producer was able to make these wastes
appear as one waste load and thus have only one "EN"
procedure for them. The BA finally found out about this.
One of the employees from the group who handled the "EN"
procedure at the plant told the waste producer that the
plant saw no problem with this mixing of wastes but that
the PA did not agree with it.
Limits to the lack of enforcement of legal regulations
among different actors in the waste management chain
One day the staff in the office who handled the "EN"
procedure discussed the following incident. A customer
had applied to have his waste disposed at the German
waste management plant. He had filled in the "EN"
application form. On the part of the forms where the
analysis of the waste was required, the customer had
filled in two forms. One of them was within the limits so
that the waste would fulfil the required parameters for
incineration and the other form was filled in with the
required parameters for landfill. Thus the chemical
analysis provided of the waste was not an analysis by a
chemical laboratory but consisted just of values written
into the "EN" form. Furthermore the customer had adapted
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his description of the waste so that they would fulfill
the requirements of two disposal paths. The technical
manager of the plant was shown this application. He said
that such an application could not be accepted and thus
had to be sent back to the customer.
Conclusion
Service relationships in the waste management chain,
one facet of commercial contexts, could influence how
legal provisions for the handling of waste such as the
section 17 note or the "EN" procedure would be dealt with
in practice. Legal procedures were often not just handled
by one person but were related to the actions of various
different actors in the waste management chain. For
example, to some extent waste treatment plants did not
enforce legal provisions against other members in the
waste management chain. The relationship between these
different actors is relevant for understanding how the
law gains meaning in practice.
4.5. Conclusion
In this chapter I explored how commercial issues can
have an impact on the handling of wastes at the German
and U.K. waste management plants. In particular I looked
at the procedures for testing and rejecting incoming
waste loads, some other procedures at the waste treatment
plants and service relationships in the waste management
chain. When implementinq procedures in practice,
commercial considerations were taken into account. In
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some situations commercial considerations could be in
conflict with legal requirements; in others, they could
be integrated with legal requirements. Procedures for
handling waste could be set up in such a way as to allow
for the integration of legal requirements and commercial
aims. Hence, commercial aims did not necessarily lead to
the "breaking" of testing requirements. Loads would be
tested, but in less rigorous ways. It seems that
integration is also an appropriate term to describe the
staff's attitude towards both legal requirements and
commercial aspects of their work. In some situations both
legal requirements and commercial aims were perceived as
important. The question did not seem to be whether one
took precedence over the other, but of how to achieve
both in practice. Thus, the way commercial contexts
influence the handling of waste cannot be determined in
the abstract. Empirical observations can show that
commercial interests might also promote testing
procedures, such as the extended testing facilities at
the U.K. plant, or the pricing system at the German
plant. This has implications for understanding "empirical
compliance" i.e. compliance in practice. If there was
compliance it was not necessarily compliance with "legal
requirements". It could be compliance with an amalgam of
norms such as legal requirements mediated by commercial
considerations. What would be "normative" requirements on
the ground was influenced by a range of aims and
motivations at the plant: to implement legal requirements
but also to pursue commercial aims.
165
CHAPTER 5: TECHNOLOGICAL CONTEXTS A11D LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
5.1. Introduction
In the following chapter I want to explore the
relationship between technology and legal requirements.
In the first section of the chapter (5.2.) I will look at
the direct relationship between technology and the
implementation of legal requirements in practice. This
section has two parts. In the first part (5.2.1.) I will
explore the question of how technology might restrict the
implementation of legal requirements. In the second part
(5.2.2.) I will discuss how technology might promote the
implementation of legal provisions. In the second section
(5.3.) of the chapter I will explore a more indirect
relationship between technology and the handling of legal
provisions. How might a low technology culture affect the
implementation of legal requirements? In the third
section of this chapter (5.4.) I will look at how
deviations from site licence requirements, in the form of
minor accidents at the U.K. waste treatment plant, became
normal operating practices.
5.2. A direct link between technology and the
implementation of legal requirements
5.2.1. Technology restricting the iroplementation of legal
requirements
Process control and legal requirements
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The degree of control over the process of waste
treatment could determine if or to what extent legal
requirements could be implemented. Different types of
plant technology could provide different degrees of
control over the waste management process. The German "TA
Sonderabfall" attempts to increase process control so
that observance of legal requirements could be to some
extent "built" into a plant. For example, it requires
automatic measurement and control devices for new
chemical-physical waste treatment plants (para.
8.3.1.1.) . But in practice there seemed to be aspects of
plant technology which made the implementation of legal
requirements difficult.
Control over waste mixtures in an incinerator
During a supervision visit to a waste incineration
plant, a German waste control officer went into the room
from which an employee operated a crane. With this crane
the employee picked up waste from the waste storage
bunker and then loaded it into the incinerator. The way
the waste was mixed had an influence on the emissions
from the incinerator. Some waste mixtures would produce a
higher amount of certain emissions than others. For
example, particularly wet loads with a high proportion of
liquid wastes can increase CO emissions in the stack
gases. During the visit the waste control officer asked
if the crane operator could see from his work place
measurement instruments which showed what the actual
emissions from the incinerator were. According to the
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technical manager, there Were no such measurement
instruments available in the crane operator's box. The
foreman, however, would tell the crane operator if an
increase in air emissions occurred. Thus having no
measurement instruments in his box, the crane operator
had only a limited amount of control over the
incineration process. He could not watch the level of
emissions, though this was regulated through legal
requirements in the site licence. Hence, the technology
of the plant could determine if legal requirements could
in practice gain meaning. Some lack of control over the
treatment process could also be found in the German waste
treatment plant.
Limits to re-treating loads in the waste treatment plants
In some cases if substances in the effluent were
above the discharge consent limits this could be dealt
with through re-treating the load. Treated waste loads
would be diluted through mixing them with new wastes. But
there were limits to the 'recycling' of loads in order to
achieve the values set for discharges the sewer both in
the German and the U.K. waste treatment plants. In order
to recycle loads, there had to be sufficient storage
space. According to the staff working in the German and
the U.K. waste treatment plants, this was a problem when
the plants were working at full capacity. It was less of
a problem during the recession, when, due to a reduced
volume of wastes coming into the plant, there was
sufficient space. There were further limits to re-
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treating loads. For some substances, re-treating loads
was not a solution to reduce the effluent to discharge
limits. For example, according to a laboratory technician
at the German plant, if the cyanide treatment process did
not work as envisaged then high levels of cyanide would
still be found in the effluent that was to be discharged
into the sewer. Also, at the U.K. waste treatment plant,
the plant technology seemed to make the implementation of
legal requirements difficult. The senior chemist
explained to me that the very low levels set in the
discharge consent for some of the heavy metals meant that
the usual practices of dilution would not bring down the
level of metals sufficiently in the effluent which was to
be discharged to the sewer. According to him, the low
levels of metals allowed under the new discharge consent
required an amount of process control that the plant
technology could not provide. Also, an audit report
prepared by a waste producer who disposed of his waste
through the U.K. treatment plant criticised its lack of
process control. The report said that once a waste load
had been discharged there was no control over it until
its disposal as filter cake and as effluent to the sewer.
Limits to interrupting chemical treatment processes
The technology of the U.K. waste treatment plant
provided relatively little control over the chemical
reactions. Once wastes were mixed they could not be
separated again. If an adverse chemical reaction occurred
- resulting in the release of toxic fumes - it could
169
hardly be halted. As a precautionary measure, the R1 had
agreed with the plant that acids for the treatment of the
waste should not be run directly from the tanker into the
mixture of wastes to be treated. Instead, acids were to
be pumped first into a storage tank and then discharged
into the treatment tank in a more controlled manner.
Operational problems, however, could create difficulties
for the implementation of this procedure. During the time
that I was at the plant, the acid pump broke down. Until
the pump was repaired it was not possible to discharge
loads first into the storage tank but acids had to be
discharged directly into the treatment tank.
Conclusion
The technology of both the U.K. and German waste
treatment plants could affect the implementation of legal
requirements. In particular, control over the treatment
process could have an impact on how discharge consent
limits could be implemented.	 For some of the
discrepancies between what seemed technically possible
and what was legally required the notion of a "gap" seems
adequate. Both a lack of process control and
malfunctioning of equipment at the plants could make the
implementation of legal requirements more difficult.
Malfunctioning of equipment and legal requirements
Design problems
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According to a U.K. waste control officer, there
could be technical obstacles to the implementation of
legal requirements. At one waste management facility, the
operator had installed an incorrectly designed roof for
the treatment hail. The RP. had required the operator to
install an extraction system in a hail in which employees
were working. This was to deal with fumes arising from
filter presses in this hail. But according to the waste
control officer, since the roof was shaped like an
inverted V1 the extraction system did not work
efficiently. Thus design problems could be a long term
impediment to complete compliance, such as here where the
efficient working of the extraction system was
restricted.
Control panels not working
Also, the U.K. waste treatment plant had not been
purposebuilt, but had been constructed with second hand
parts from old sewage works. Parts used to break down.
Sometimes the shift change-over report between the two
chemists would read like this:
'Well, Herbert broke pit two yesterday. The
acid pump is still not working. Press three is
broken'.
Also, there was a control panel in the old
laboratory. It was supposed to show when the tanks, in
which the liquid wastes were treated or stored, were
full. But most of these tank level indicators did not
work. Section 22 of the site licence for the plant
required:
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"Sufficient instrumentation shall be provided
and utilised to ensure that a satisfactory
standard of treatment is maintained at the
facility and to warn of any process
malfunction. This instrumentation shall be
regularly checked and maintained and any faults
shall be rectified without delay".
According to the plant electrician, during a
previous summer one of the tanks containing liquid wastes
was so full that in the hot weather the waste expanded
and flowed over from the tank. Finally, the control panel
was repaired. New tank level indicators were installed.
At the beginning, however, these did not work either. For
some time the tank levels had to be checked by a charge
hand climbing up the tanks and looking into them. There
were five horizontal metal rings visible in the tank and
these served as guides for guessing the tank contents. If
the tank was full up to the first metal ring then 20% of
the tank were filled.
The state of the equipment in the German waste management
plant seemed to be better and the supervisor of the
treatment plant told me that they did not have much
problems with the equipment. Thus, it seems that
particularly at the U.K. plant, the lack of maintenance
and the malfunctioning of equipment could make the
implementation of site licence requirements more
difficult. In some situations, however, the plant
technology could not only impede the implementation of
site licence requirements but could also promote it.
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licence requirements
Protecting plant technology from damage
It seemed that at the U.K. waste treatment plant,
the implementation of site licence requirements could be
promoted by the aim to protect plant technology from
damage. The site licence required the operator to only
take waste loads which the plant could treat. It was in
the operator's own interest to try and screen out loads
which the plant had difficulties 	 in treating,
particularly if those loads could detrimentally affect
the plant technology. For example, viscous latex loads
could not be handled by the plant and needed to be
screened out because they could damage pumps and
pipework. Implementation of legal requirements could also
be incorporated into the plant.
Pipework and design of the plant
According to the supervisor of the German waste
treatment plant, the pipe work was set up so that the
legal prohibition on the mixing of wastes was applied
(para 4.2. "TA Sonderabfall") . There were two areas to
the German waste treatment plant. Firstly, there was the
pre - treatment plant, which dealt mainly with oily
wastes. Secondly, there was the chemical treatment site,
which handled acids, alkalines etc. The supervisor told
me that one day an officer from the RZ\. had come to make a
supervision visit and he checked that there was no
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possibility of mixing incoming waste loads from the pre-
treatment plant with incoming waste loads from the
chemical treatment side. This prohibition on the mixing
of waste loads from the pre-treatment plant and the
chemical side of the treatment was also important in
order to ensure the implementation of the discharge
consent limits on substances such as mercury. Only the
effluent from the chemical treatment site was tested for
mercury. The effluent from the pre - treatment side was
not tested for mercury since it would normally not be
expected to be present in oily emulsions.
Conclusion
In this section I have illustrated how the
technology of a treatment plant can affect in a direct
way how and if site licence and other legal requirements
are implemented in practice. In the following section, I
want to consider if the technology at the plant can also
affect the implementation of legal requirements in a more
indirect way. A low technology environment might
contribute to a culture at the plant where the
implementation of some site licence requirements might
not be the first priority.
5.3. "Bucket chemistry": Technology, culture and legaj
requirements
5.3.1. "Bucket chemistry'
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In the following section I want to illustrate what
the term "bucket chemistry" means by referring to some of
its characteristic aspects. These are limited knowledge
over process parameters and low treatment technology.
They distinguish waste treatment from modern chemical
production.
Limited knowledge over process parameters
The treatment process at the U.K. plant was
described by the chemists as "bucket chemistry".
Basically, waste treatment at the plant meant the mixing
together of loads of liquid wastes. By adding acid and
then lime, the metals in the liquid wastes were "felled
out" as metal hydroxides. Since waste is never a pure
product but a mixture of various substances, not all the
substances which take part in the waste treatment process
are known and the chemical reactions are not fully
understood. The treatment process was therefore not
completely controlled from the beginning to the end.
Instead, it was partly operated according to trial and
error. For example, the amount of lime needed for the
neutralisation of the waste mix after it had been
acidified could vary. Lime was run into the waste
mixture. The ph-value of the waste mixture had to be
checked and then some more lime might need to be added.
In case certain metals could not be treated by this
method, the whole load had to be divided into two. Each
half of the load could then be mixed with new incoming
wastes. Thus, the problematic substances in the waste
175
would be diluted if there was sufficient tank space for
such 'recycling' of loads.
Some aspects of the German waste treatment process
could also be described as "bucket chemistry". The waste
treatment process at the German plant was in principle
the same as that at the U.K. plant, except that the
treatment processes were carried out in smaller reaction
vessels. During a first tour around the plant, the
laboratory manager showed me the control panel in the
treatment plant. The panel provided the possibility of
opening or closing the treatment tanks' valve•s. The lab
manager pointed this out as an aspect of the advanced
technology of the plant. According to the staff working
in the treatment plant, however, they were reluctant to
use the valve opening mechanisms on the control panel.
They felt they had more control over the treatment
process by opening or closing valves manually at the
tanks. This was because the amount of treatment chemicals
needed could not be specified in advance but had to be
found out by adding small quantities of them. Then
progress in the treatment of the waste load had to be
controlled through measuring the ph-value each time after
adding treatment chemicals. One day the supervisor in the
treatment plant asked the apprentice to treat an acid
load with a chemical. The apprentice asked how much
treatment chemical he should add to the acid. The
supervisor replied:
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'Well, you have to see how it feels. I can't
tell you exactly how much. Keep checking with
the test strip if iron is still in the load'.
Thus, "bucket chemistry" involved limited knowledge
about the treatment process and partly a trial and error
approach in handling the waste loads.
At the German waste treatment plant, there was also
a pre-treatment provision for oily waste loads. This
treatment process was literally 'bucket-chemistry'. A
bucket full of the chemical separation agent would be
added to part of the waste load. Then a smaller bucket
would be filled with the mixture and through a visual
inspection an employee from the treatment plant would
check how well the oil had been separated out from the
rest of the load. It was not possible to specify in
advance how much of the chemical reagent was needed to
treat the oily waste loads. This had to be newly tried
out every time. Thus, also at the German treatment plant,
control over the treatment process was to some extent ad-
hoc and incremental.
Waste treatment as a low technology process
The treatment process at the U.K. plant involved low
level technology. This is also illustrated by the
following account. According to the senior chemist, a
proposal was put before the company board. According to
him, it was probably described as the plan for a
'sulphuric acid treatment plant'. In the view of the
chemist, in reality it would be a waste water after-
treatment. He explained that although the plant was
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already licensed to take in sulphuric acids, they were
usually not taken because they caused treatment problems.
It was normally not possible to comply with the very low
limit for some metals of 0.5 mg/i in the discharge
consent when treating these loads. With the new
'sulphuric acid treatment plant' an additional tank would
be installed, so that loads which would not come down to
discharge consent limits after the first round of
treatment could be re-treated. The new tank would provide
the additional storage space needed. Thus, the new
sulphuric acid treatment plant was not much more than an
additional tank to have storage space for the dilution of
waste loads.
Differences between waste treatment and chemical
production
The characteristics of the waste treatment process,
as outlined above, indicate some differences between
waste treatment and chemical production. The waste
treatment process is not tightly controlled. No
particular specifications have to be worked to when
treating wastes. The most specific control on the
treatment process is the fact that the effluent which is
to be discharged to the sewer has to meet the limits on
certain parameters as set out by the discharge consent.
A chemical production process, in contrast, is
controlled by the fact that a specified product has to be
obtained at the end of it. The specification for the
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filter cake which was produced at the end of the
treatment process in the U.K. waste treatment plant was
very broad and vague. It was supposed to be not 'too
sloppy' because a too high water content would pose
problems for landfilling the filter cake. In the
filterpress house, a sheet was provided for the employees
who operated the filterpresses to record the quality of
the filtercake. The descriptions here of the filter cake
were 'shit', 'sloppy' and 'o.k.'.
Conclusion
At the U.K. waste treatment plant, and to a lesser
extent at the German plant, the treatment process was not
a highly technical operation, controlled through a pre-
specified and fixed treatment scheme. Instead, operations
were partly handled in a trial and error fashion, in an
ad hoc way, with low technology and an incremental
approach towards the chemical-physical treatment of waste
loads. In the following section I want to ask what
impact, if any, such a low technology environment might
have on attitudes towards the implementation of site
licence requirements.
5.3.2. The impact of 'Tbucket chemistry" on attitudes
towards the handling of legal requirements
In section 5.2., I described how technology could
influence the implementation of legal requirements in a
direct way, through lack of process control and
malfunctioning of equipment. I want to suggest that
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technology could also influence the implementation of
legal requirements in a more indirect way. In my view
"bucket chemistry" could contribute to a particular
culture at the plants which influenced perceptions,
attitudes and approaches towards the handling of waste. I
will illustrate this in connection with the testing of
waste loads.
Testing of incoming waste loads at the U.K. waste
treatment plant
The treatment process was "bucket chemistry" and did
not require careful or exact handling of waste loads. In
my view, the haphazard way in which waste was chemically
treated influenced employees' attitudes towards legal
procedures. "Bucket testing" is part of "bucket
chemistry". It might have been more surprising if, amidst
the rudimentary and partly malfunctioning technology of
the U.K. plant, there would have been careful and exact
observance of the specific steps of various procedures.
"Bucket chemistry" did not require the sophisticated
quality management procedures which the supervisor tried
to implement at the U.K. waste treatment plant. "Bucket
chemistry" could work successfully without this. One of
the quality management procedures which the U.K. plant
tried to implement, was that the results from the testing
of incoming waste loads should be recorded on sheets and
that those sheets should be filed. But often these sheets
would be laying around in various corners of the
laboratory or be stashed into the bin. These quality
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management standards were frequently linked to the
implementation of legal requirements. For example, the
site licence required that a record should be kept of all
the waste loads treated (conditions 3 and 20)
Also, at the U.K. waste treatment plant, the testing
of incoming waste loads was partly rudimentary.
Individual waste loads arriving on the yard would
sometimes only be tested through smelling or a visual
examination of the sample, rather than the use of Merck-
dip kit test. There were commercial pressures to the time
limit and effort spent on testing (as discussed in
chapter 4). But apart from this, another factor that
might have mitigated against detailed testing was that
this was not necessarily required in order to make the
treatment technology work.
Testing of in-coming waste loads in the German waste
management plant
There was more testing of incoming waste loads at
the German plant than at the U.K. plant. The main reason
for this was probably that at the German waste management
plant the analysis facilities of the laboratory were not
part of the waste treatment plant. The testing of
incoming waste loads there was under the separate control
of the laboratory. But where the waste treatment plant
had some control over the testing it seemed to prefer
limited testing. The supervisor of the waste treatment
plant explained to me that in the mornings a visual
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inspection of a waste load that had been treated during
the previous day was sufficient, in order to check if the
metals contained in the load had been treated. According
to him, it was not really necessary to check with Merck
dip kit strips or to send a sample to the laboratory for
a more detailed chemical analysis. Again, it seemed that
the treatment process could work without more detailed
testing and thus there was no elaborate testing.
The link between "bucket chemistry" and a
rudimentary level of testing seemed also to exist in
other parts of the German waste management plant. it had
tanks for the temporary storage of liquid waste loads
which were to go to incineration for final disposal. It
was the task of the laboratory technicians to assign the
incoming liquid waste loads - according to their chemical
composition - to one of the waste tanks. According to the
laboratory staff, "mixed rubbish" went into the tanks.
Not many tests could be done on "mixed rubbish" anyway.
In fact the tanks were only distinguished through the
criteria "flammable" or "non-flammable". Thus, one aspect
of "bucket chemistry", i.e. the allocation of waste loads
to the tanks according to a few criteria, meant that no
extensive testing was necessary.
Also, according to a German waste control officer,
it mitigated against the implementation of legal
requirements that waste management facilities were just
handling waste and did not produce a product which had to
conform to certain specifications. He said that it
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basically did not matter much what was coming out of the
waste management process at the end. End products from
waste management processes, like emissions to air, water
or soil, had to comply with relevant legal standards, for
example limits on stack emissions. There was, however, no
commercial incentive to produce these end products to a
certain standard as there would be in a production
process. In my view, this also meant that there were not
many incentives to set up technology that would allow for
more control over end products. In order to make the
treatment process work, low technology could be
sufficient. This in turn could mean that there was no
technical incentive to comply with extensive testing
requirements. Thus a low technology environment at the
plants might contribute to a culture where the careful
and exact implementation of site licence requirements is
not considered very important.
5.4. Routine accidents
Introduction
In the following section I want to describe one
particular aspect of "bucket chemistry" at the U.K. waste
treatment plant. This was the fact that from time to time
minor accidents would occur. This could mean that U.K.
site licence provisions which required that incompatible
waste loads should not be mixed, were not implemented.
What implications do these
	
accidents have	 for
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understanding what constitutes compliance and what
constitutes !Vdeviancefv?
Minor accidents
At the TJ.K. waste treatment plant, there were
occasionally "NOx" reactions at the grids where waste
loads would be discharged. "NOx" reactions would occur
when acids and nitrates - incompatible waste loads - were
mixed. This could happen when a previous waste load was
not completely cleared out of the discharge pit while a
new acid load was discharged. Or, on the other hand, the
level of nitrates in a waste load might have been assumed
to be lower than it finally turned out to be. These minor
"accidents" did not appear to be an aberration from
normal work practices but a part of the way the U.K.
treatment plant was run. They seemed to be "normal
accidents" (Perrow, 1984) which were one aspect of work
practices rather than a temporary breakdown of order.
This also seems to be illustrated by the following
incident.
Noxing of the grids
One day the chemist and the technical services
director, who had come to visit the plant, had a
conversation in the laboratory of the U.K. plant. The
chemist told the director that a NOx-reaction had
happened while a group of local councillors had come down
to visit the plant. A waste load which contained nitrates
had just been discharged into one of the pits. There was
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another tanker which had a waste load of acids. This
tanker backed-up into the off-loading bay and hit the
wall. It broke its valve and acid leaked out onto the
nitrates load in the discharge pit. The pit started to
"nox". Slightly alarmed the technical services director
asked if the counci.11ors had written a complaint about
this. The chemist replied, laughing:
'Oh, no, no, we just showed them the other side
of the scrap yard. They were quite happy. They
don't understand anything anyway. We hosed the
pit down with water and so dealt with it'.
Hence, minor accidents were considered by the staff as
routine matters rather than as serious incidents and
third parties, such as the councillors, did not provide
controls on these accidents.
Accidents which become 'singled out'
When the RA takes out a prosecution in connection
with accidents one could initially gain the impression
that accidents are isolated, specific events. But in my
view, accidents could be the "tip of the iceberg" rather
than an event out of the ordinary. In cases where both
the German and the U.K. RA would take out a prosecution
against a waste management site, the reasons for which
the site was finally prosecuted were recurring incidents
rather than an isolated one. For example, the tanks of a
U.K. treatment plant, according to the site licence,
should have had lids on. Condition 26 of the site licence
for this facility required:
"Tanks used for the storage and treatment
of wastes likely to give rise to fumes or
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odours shall be of a closed construction and
fitted with extraction equipment. Equipment
shall be provided to treat extracted gases to
the satisfaction of the WDA to minimize fumes
and odours released to atmosphere".
The RA had attempted over some time to get the
operator to put lids on the tanks. Finally, an accident
occurred at the site. In one of the tanks an adverse
reaction happened. Two incompatible wastes were
accidentally mixed in a tank and noxious fumes rose from
it. Since the tanks were without lids, the noxious fumes
could have escaped into the atmosphere and thus have had
an impact on the people in the vicinity of the plant. One
of the employees at the waste treatment plant needed
hospital treatment.
The U.K. RA. prosecuted the operator for this
accident. One of the charges was brought under section 3
(1) b) COPA 1974 for operating a process in contravention
of the site licence conditions. The condition that the
tanks should have lids had been in the site licence for
some time, but only when the accident occurred was the
operation of the process officially defined as being in
contravention of the site licence requirements. Before
the court action this had been an ongoing situation at
the site.
There were also insufficient measurement instruments
at the plant which contributed to the accident. Again
this had been an ongoing situation at the site and was
only formally classified as "non-compliance" when the
prosecution for the accident was brought. The accident
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which finally occurred due to the mixing of incompatible
waste loads thus seemed to be not an aberration from the
normal working practices at the plant but the result of
ongoing working patterns and the low level of technology
at the plant. The following is a quote from the facts set
out in a file for the criminal prosecution of the
company:
"It is the prosecution's contention that the x
company was at fault in that they failed to
provide level indicators on tank 2, so that y
tsite chemist could not tell from the
indicators whether tank 2 contained any waste
and failed to provide adequate illumination of
the tank, so that y could not see the bottom of
tank 2 and could only tell the volume of the
tank by spitting into it and listening for the
echo".
"Normal" accidents could become routinized and could
be to some extent part and parcel of operations. "Normal
accidents" formed part of the pattern of handling wastes
and dealing with legal requirements at the U.K. plant.
What became later, for example in prosecutions for
accidents classified as "non-compliance" with site
licence requirements, might have been in practice not
'deviance' but a normal state of operations at a site.
5.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I explored the relevance of the
context of technology for the implementation of legal
requirements at the waste treatment plants. Technology
can in a direct way both restrict and promote the
implementation of legal requirements. Technology can make
it impossible or difficult
	 to	 implement legal
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requirements but it can also provide an incentive for
implementing site licence provisions.
"Bucket chemistry", which describes the low
technology at the U.K. and partly at the German waste
treatment plant, might also influence the implementation
of legal requirements in a more indirect way. "Bucket
chemistry" can promote a certain culture at the plant
which influences the staff's attitudes towards the
handling of waste. For example, "bucket chemistry" can
lead to "bucket testing". "Bucket chemistry" can mean
that there are few technical incentives for the
implementation of site licence requirements.
In the first two parts of the chapter (section 5.2.
and 5.3.) I described some "gaps" between the technology
of the plants and legal requirements. In the last section
of the chapter (5.4.) I illustrated how in the case of
"normal accidents" deviance from site licence provisions
can become part of the normal operating procedures at a
plant. Hence, deviance might be an abstract and
misleading term to describe aspects of site operations
which fail to fulfil site licence requirements. Deviance
might in fact be compliance with normal operating
procedures and only become classified officially as
deviance in a few cases when prosecutions are finally
taken.
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CHAPTER 6: WORK GROUP NORMS AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
6.1. Introduction
In the following chapter I want to explore how work
groups contribute to the creation and management of
standards for compliance in practice. Is the handling of
legal provisions influenced by the ways in which work and
communication between different groups at work are
organized? Firstly, I will deal with the relationship
between the sales staff and the chemists at the U.K.
waste treatment plant. Secondly, I will look at the
relationship between different groups of staff at the
German waste management plant.
6.2. The relationship between the sales staff and the
chemists at the U.K. waste treatment plant
The chemists were one of the work groups at the U.K.
waste treatment plant. They formed a group on the basis
of their membership of a common profession. They
considered themselves different from the employees
working on the yard through their knowledge and control
over the treatment process. At the U.K. waste treatment
plant, there was also a sales force which was separate
from the chemists in the laboratory. The sales staff were
housed in their own office. They did not work much at the
plant but often went out to potential customers in order
to get waste producers to bring their waste into the
plant.
189
Pressure from the sales staff to take in waste loads
Sometimes there were conflicts between the chemists
and the sales staff. The sales staff were keen to bring
as much waste as possible into the plant. The chemists
could interfere with those efforts because it was their
task to judge what waste could be brought into the plant
according to its technology and the site licence. The
sales staff would try in various ways to get approval of
samples by the chemists. On one occasion I observed a
sales representative handing in a waste sample with an
analysis form. On the right hand corner of the form the
sales representative had written as an instruction to the
chemists: "For approval for landfill". Since the U.K.
waste management plant was also operating a landfill site
the chemists at the treatment plant would sometimes also
deal with wastes that were to go to landfill.
Also the sales staff would try to persuade the
chemists to approve samples for the treatment plant by
letting them know that the sample was from an existing
customer. This could be seen as an indication to the
chemist that the refusal of the sample would be a
commercial risk. In a more direct way the sales
representative would tell the technician:
'We could do with the revenue'.
Another occasion where the sales staff would try to
persuade the chemists to approve waste loads was the case
of load rejections.
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'Finding a home' for rejected waste loads
It was the task of the head of the sales staff in
the U.K. plant to deal with loads which had been rejected
by the chemists. According to him, this meant that he
'had to find a home', i.e. an alternative disposal
outlet, for the rejected loads. He described his task in
relation to rejected loads in the following way:
'I try to strike a compromise between the sales
people who basically want to bring everything
into the plant and the chemists who reject
things out of hand'.
Sometimes the head of the sales staff tried to force
some of the rejected waste loads back into the plant. For
example, he would engage in arguments with the chemists
about the adequacy of the chemical tests, the results of
which had shown that the waste load should be rejected.
One day the chemist had been given a waste sample in
order to assess if the waste could be taken into the
plant. The chemist found that after treatment with the
plant sludge, the waste still contained too high
concentrations of heavy metals. There were limits on the
discharge of these heavy metals in the discharge consent.
According to the chemist, the high heavy metal content in
the waste sample meant that this particular waste stream
was not suitable for the plant. The chemist reported this
result to the head of the sales staff. He was not happy
with it and he queried it. The head of the sales staff
said that, according to the waste producer, there were no
heavy metals as found by the chemist in the waste load.
The chemist replied that it was possible that the heavy
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metals only showed up in the tests because of
complexants. Complexants occurred frequently in waste
loads and could pose problems because they would keep
metals in suspension and thus prevent these metals from
being treated out as metaihydroxides. The head of the
sales staff would also advocate the dilution of loads in
order to achieve compliance with parameters on the
discharge consent. The chemists contrasted their view on
waste dilution with the view of the head of the sales
staff. According to the chemists, the dilution of waste
loads in order for them to be accepted could not be
reconciled with a professional chemists' view of what the
waste treatment of waste actually implies. The chemists
described the attempts of the head of the sales staff to
take in loads which the plant could only treat by
dilution as 'bending the rules'. A similar conflict
between the sales staff and the technical staff seemed
also to exist at the landfill site operated by the U.K.
waste treatment plant. According to one of the
technicians:
'there was a bit of a clash of interest between
the sales people and the technicians'.
Con ci us ion
At the U.K. treatment plant, different work groups
such as the sales staff and the chemists had different
attitudes towards decisions on taking waste loads into
the plant. In my view these different approaches were
linked to the different tasks and aims of those two work
groups. Hence, different work groups could give rise to
192
different norms for making decisions about the rejection
or acceptance of waste loads into the plant. Standards
which arose in the connection with work group norms could
mediate what was understood as legal requirements and
have an impact on the implementation of site licence
provisions in practice. Now let us look at what impact,
if any, work group norms had at the German waste
treatment plant on the implementation of legal
requirements.
6.3. Work group norms at the German waste treatment plant
No separate sales force
At the German waste management plant there was no
separate sales force. According to the plant manager,
there was until recently no need for the active marketing
of the services of the waste management plant through a
separate sales force. There was even a shortage of
disposal capacities for hazardous wastes in Germany
(Bernstorff, 1993: 10) . This is in contrast with the U.K.
situation where so far there seems to be no shortage of
disposal space. In fact the U.K. imports waste from other
countries. According to a customer of the German waste
management plant, before the recession waste holders had
to wait for quite a while before they could bring their
wastes into the plant. While I was at the German waste
management plant, the recession started to have an impact
on the amount of waste coming into the plant. Some
marketing efforts were then made, mainly by the managing
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director and the technical manager. Though there was no
separate sales force at the German waste management plant
other work groups did have an impact on the
implementation of legal requirements.
Other work groups at the German waste management plant
At the German waste management plant the main groups
of staff were the office staff, the employees working on
the yard, the employees from the treatment plant and the
laboratory staff. These staff groups worked in different
parts of the plant and contact between them was quite
limited. Different sections of the plant would know
little about the way other sections of the plant worked.
How did these different work groups influence the
implementation of legal provisions?
6.3.1. Different norms at the yard and in the office: the
implementation of the "EN" procedure
The "EN" procedure
Different interpretations of legal regulations by
different work groups caine to play a role at the German
waste treatment plant. In order to explain this, it is
necessary to outline the procedure for the designation of
wastes to certain waste disposal facilities. The German
"TA Sonderabfall" regulations apply to hazardous wastes
as defined in - 2 Abs.2 bfG 1986. According to these
regulations hazardous waste streams are recommended to go
to certain types of waste disposal plants. In theory the
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waste holder is not completely free to decide for himself
where he will dispose of his waste. For example, waste
streams such as paint wastes ("Lack und Farbschlainm1t)
would be recommended as first priority to go to high
temperature, special waste incineration and then as a
second possibility to household waste incineration ("TA
Sonderabfall", Anhang C). The provisions of the "TA
Sonderabfall" are advisory only and not binding. But in
practice the way the BA for the German waste treatment
plant handled this, was that the waste holder had to
provide convincing arguments to the RLk if he wanted to
deviate from the recommendations of the "TA
Sonderabfall".
The determination of the disposal path for a
particular waste stream is carried out through a paper
procedure, called the "EN". In the German waste treatment
plant a group of staff dealt with this paper procedure on
behalf of the waste holders, the customers of the plant.
The staff had to elicit information about the wastes from
the customers in order to classify the waste into one of
the waste codes through which wastes are officially
described. The waste then had to be assigned to one of
the waste disposal plants that the "TA Sonderabfall"
recommended. Finally the filled in "EN" form was
submitted to the "PA" for authorization. Thus, through
the "EN procedure" the actual waste loads arriving at the
treatment plant were assigned to a specific final waste
disposal plant. Different work groups were involved at
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the German waste management plant in the implementation
of this paper procedure in practice.
Different work groups operate differently the "EN"
procedure in practice
The staff in the office operated the official
version of the "EN" procedure. But in practice the staff
on the yard were also involved in the implementation of
the "EN" procedure. The staff on the yard directed the
actual waste loads arriving at the plant to the storage
area. From there the waste would be transported to final
disposers. The waste loads arriving on the yard often did
not conform to the description given of the waste on the
"EN" paper form. This could mean that the waste load
could not go to the final waste disposal site that was
specified on the "EN" form. In practice the foreman on
the yard then directed waste loads into a different waste
disposal plant. This was a problem since under the legal
provision of the authorized "EN" the waste had to go to
the waste disposal plant specified in the "EN". The plant
tried to deal with this by having more than one "EN"
issued for one waste stream or by declaring a waste
stream to be a different type of waste stream which could
go to the particular waste disposal plant. In the
following section I want to look in more detail at the
different ways of decision making in the office and on
the yard.
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Different work groups have different ways of dealing with
the "EN" procedure
The decisions made in the office on the "EN" paper
procedure for the allocation of a final disposal plant
and the decisions made by the foreman on the yard were
guided by partly different considerations. The two groups
of employees in the office and on the yard had little
contact with each other. The office staff were located in
a building away from the yard. They never saw the waste
loads. They did not know what the waste really looked
like and what its actual composition and texture was. One
of the office staff recognized this as a difficulty when
assigning waste streams to disposal plants. He suggested
that staff from the office should be required to spend
some time at the yard in order to get to know what the
waste loads looked like in reality. One employee called
their assignments of waste to final disposal sites a
"lottery game". Also there was no feedback from the yard
to the office when waste loads were rejected or re-routed
to different disposal plants, so that information about
the actual composition of waste loads could be taken into
account for future decision - making in the office.
In contrast to the office staff, the foreman at the
yard knew exactly what the waste looked like since most
of the waste containers were opened and checked on
arrival under his supervision. He decided on the basis of
criteria which were to some extent different from those
of the office staff into which waste disposal facility
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waste should go. The foreman would take into account what
the "real waste" looked like. Thus, he would know that
different waste loads from a single waste stream could
vary. He would also know from experience what sort of
loads a final disposer would accept or reject and he
would assign waste loads accordingly. In contrast to this
the staff in the office did not really know the waste
from experience and they were operating with formal
acceptance parameters for final waste disposers as
provided on paper forms.
The foreman would also consider when assigning waste
loads to final disposers that at some landfill sites
samples of waste loads would be seldom taken. Hence
acceptance parameters imposed by final disposers could be
handled in a flexible way. The foreman would also take
into	 account	 practical	 considerations	 like	 the
coordination of waste vehicles. Sometimes there was
already quite a lot of a waste which was to go to a
particular final disposal site stored at the German waste
management plant. In that case it would make sense to
assign further loads for that disposal site. Then a
vehicle could be ordered to transport the whole waste
load to a final disposer. A further example for different
criteria used in the process of dealing with the "EN"
procedure is the following.
The office group who handled the "EN" procedure and
the employees on the yard imposed on waste producers
different formal standards for the implementation of
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legal requirements. On the "EN" the staff from the office
group requested that the waste loads delivered to the
plant had to conform to the waste description which was
determined when the waste stream was submitted initially
for analysis. This condition repeated a requirement from
the site licence.
On the yard, however, the waste was checked for
acceptability to final waste disposers, not for its
conformity with the description given on the "EN" by the
waste holder. It was also practically not possible to
check conformity between the initial waste description
and the arriving waste on the yard since the "EN" itself
was kept at the weighbridge. It was usually not seen by
the foreman on the yard and his laboratory technician
assistants who checked the loads. Thus, they did not know
how exactly the waste was described. They could, however,
phone the weighbridge and check in this way the "EN".
This was done in some cases.
Also, the German waste management plant had an
internal list which contained all the different waste
codes and all the possible final disposal paths which the
German waste management company could provide. Since
contracts expired or final disposers declined to take in
certain loads again the list changed frequently. But
updated versions of the list were not always available on
the yard. Thus, the office and the yard were partly
working on the basis of different standards.
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Conclusion
In this section I tried to show that there were
different work groups at the German waste management
plant which had different approaches towards the handling
of wastes. An important issue here was the relationship
between the yard and the office. The different outlook of
these two work groups had an impact on the implementation
of the "EN" procedure. The "office" and "the yard" had
different standards for handling the "EN". These
different standards arose out of the fact that the office
staff knew only the "waste on paper" whereas the
employees on the yard had first hand experience of the
"real waste". For the implementation of legal
requirements, however, not just the relationship between
the office and yard staff seemed to be important but also
the relationship between the staff from the chemical
laboratory and the staff working on the yard.
6.3.2. The relationship between the chemical laboratory
and the operations on the yard
Two work groups: women in the chemical laboratory and men
on the yard
Divisions between the chemical laboratory and the
people working on the yard were much more pronounced at
the German than in the U.K. plant. In the German plant
there was a clear gender division between the laboratory
and the yard. At the U.K. waste treatment plant there
were only male employees, both in the laboratory and on
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the yard. The laboratory staff and the employees from the
plant shared social facilities like the mess room and had
breaks together.
In contrast to this the German laboratory consisted
of a close-knit group of young women. On the yard of the
German waste management plant only male employees worked.
At the laboratory entrance door the women had put up a
hazardous waste warning sign. On the sign the name for
hazardous waste had been crossed out and "women lab
technicians" had been written over it. Male employees
from the yard who came with inquiries into the laboratory
were sometimes dealt with as intruders. Their inquiries
were dealt with not always in the most friendly manner
and they were discouraged from hanging out in the
laboratory. There were also separate messroom facilities
for the laboratory staff and the employees on the yard.
"Professional standards" in the laboratory of the German
waste management plant
The female laboratory technicians saw themselves as
more professional than the male staff working on the
yard. On the yard there were two male laboratory
technicians who assisted the foreman with the testing of
incoming solid waste loads. One of the laboratory
technicians remarked about the testing regime operating
on the yard:
'On the yard basically everything goes by
appearance. They do not conduct any further
tests there'.
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Furthermore the deputy laboratory manager told me
that sometimes the laboratory would get quantities of
effluent from the treatment plant that would be larger
than the amount of waste loads the plant would have
received during a day. According to her, one explanation
for this might be that the staff in the treatment plant
were diluting the effluent with tap water down to
discharge consent limits. This was contrary to the
provisions of the site licence which required the
treatment plant only to take in such waste loads which it
could treat down to discharge consent limits. The deputy
lab manager criticized the fact that the lab staff had
been told by the management that they were not to
question such issues. The professional self-image of the
laboratory technicians, however, still included an
awareness of commercial aims of the plant.
The laboratory staff considered it as important that
loads were accepted into the plant. They handled
standards in a flexible way. However they seemed to be
less concerned about pulling in waste loads than the
office staff or the staff on the yard. The deputy
laboratory manager explained that the laboratory staff
perceived limits to what they were prepared to do in
order to realize commercial aims of the plant. This seems
similar to the differences between the head of sales and
the chemists at the U.K. plant. This is further
illustrated by the following story.
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One morning - during the tea break at the German
waste treatment plant where both employees from the
office and the laboratory were present - a waste load
that was taken into the plant the previous day was
discussed. This load had a high content of amrnonium.
According to the laboratory staff, the load might have
been accepted into the plant - behind their back - by one
of the laboratory technician assistants from the yard.
The laboratory technicians argued that the ainmoniuiu level
was so high that it would be impossible to treat out the
metals properly. But the load had come on an authorized
"EN". The deputy laboratory manager criticized the fact
that the RA would allow such unsuitable loads to come
into the plant. The office employee explained that in
this case the BA might not have known about the high
level of aimnoniuiu in the load since they might not have
asked for this parameter. The office employee said that
they would only give that information from the chemical
analysis to the RA which the BA asked for. The deputy
laboratory manager was perplexed. Apparently she had not
known before that the office would sometimes only pass on.
some and not all of the information from the analyses of
the laboratory provided. Thus, different work groups had
a different approach towards the handling of information
from analyses.
Conclusion
There were different approaches towards the testing
and the rejection of loads by the staff from the chemical
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laboratory in the German waste management plant and the
staff working on the yard. The staff from the chemical
lab distinguished themselves from the staff on the yard
through a professional self-image, and seemed to be less
concerned with pulling in waste loads than the staff on
the yard and in the office. In the next section I want to
look briefly at the question how such work group norms
for handling wastes would arise at the German waste
management plant. In the next section I want to look
briefly at the question how such work group norms for the
handling of waste would arise at the German waste
management plant.
6.4. Learning work group norms
As outlined in the previous section work group norms
were important at the plants for the handling of waste.
They were an aspect of staff being socialized into life
at the plants. Thus, work group norms could be learned.
This became particularly clear among the group of office
employees who handled the "EN procedure in the German
waste management plant. One of the employees had recently
joined the company and sometimes asked his colleague how
to deal with certain tasks when processing 0ENT'
applications. Part of the job of the staff who handled
the "EN" procedure was to get the "ENs" authorized by the
RA. Therefore a skill in the job that could be learned
was to figure out what the RA. wanted to see on those
forms in order to adapt the processing of the forms
accordingly. What arguments was the RA likely to accept,
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what sort of information would be rejected as
insufficient etc.?
One day the new employee asked his colleague how to
deal with a waste that was to go to incineration. The
waste had been chemically analyzed by the laboratory in
order to check if it could go to a landfill site but the
amount of solvents in this waste load was too high. For
the German waste management plant this would have been
the preferred option because it was cheaper. The German
plant was allowed by the RA. to dispense with a chemical
analysis for the waste code that applied to this waste
load. Normally waste loads under this waste code were too
heterogeneous to be chemically analyzed. Therefore waste
holders were excepted from analysis requirements. Usually
waste under this waste code would go to landfill. But in
this particular case the solvent level was too high for
this. The problem was how could the employee justify to
the RA that the waste could not go to landfill as normal
but had to go to incineration? He could not use the
chemical analysis that showed that the solvent content
was too high because the German plant had always argued
that it was not possible to conduct a chemical analysis
of this waste. This was the basis on which the plant had
been permitted by the RA to dispense with the analysis
requirement. The colleague recommended trying to get the
"EN" authorized by the RA and simply request a disposal
path for incineration without adding the analysis to the
"EN". The new employee should wait and see if the RA
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would require extra information to support the proposal
by the plant that the waste should go to incineration
instead of the usual disposal path to landfill.
Situations like this would occur from time to time
in the office. The new colleague would be socialized into
the ways of how best to deal with the RP. and the
customers. Sometimes this would also include advice on
how to best manage requirements from legal regulations.
For example, the new employee learned that for the
"Sammel-ENs" no actual analysis would be conducted but
values for certain parameters would be entered on the
"EN" form that would just be below the required
parameters from the final disposer.
Knowledge of legal requirements
When trying to understand how work group norms were
constituted and how they mediate perceptions of legal
requirements it is important to look at the question how
much knowledge employees had of site licence
requirements. If the staff at the plant did not know much
about site licence requirements then work group norms
might fill easily a vacuum of lack of detailed knowledge
about legal requirements. The site manager of the U.K.
treatment plant told me that he felt that he did not get
enough training on legal matters. At a U.K. landfill site
- run by the same company which operated the treatment
plant - a sales person told me that the sales staff felt
that on the whole they did not receive enough training on
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legal regulation. Also, the site technician complained
about the fact that they did not get sufficient training
on legal regulation although in his view this was
directly relevant to his work.
Knowledge of site licence requirements
Some operators did not seem to know what the
standards were they were supposed to comply with. For
example, a site manager reacted surprised when a U.K.
waste control officer told him that the site licence
required him to provide analyses of new waste streams
coming into the plant. A new site manager had been
temporarily placed at one U.K. waste storage site after
there had been lack of implementation of legal
requirements there. The company had even been criminally
prosecuted by the RA. Criminal prosecutions were only
considered as the last resort by the BA. The new site
manager explained to a U.K. waste control officer who had
come for a site visit that his specific task was to deal
with the problems of waste handling that existed at the
site. During the visit the waste control officer found
that waste loads were still stored on areas at the site
which were not licensed for the storage of waste. It was
precisely this that had led to the prosecution. The waste
control officer drew the site manager's attention to
this. The site manager asked which area was licensed for
storage. This was indicated on the site licence. Hence,
apparently the site manager who had said that his task
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was to sort out the 'non-compliance' problem at the site
had not read the site licence.
Also, waste hauliers would not necessarily know what
wastes the U.K. treatment plant could take in according
to its site licence. Sometimes hauliers would suggest
bringing in wastes which the plant was not allowed to
take in. One day the chemist rejected a waste sample that
had come in for an analysis to test if it could be taken
into the plant. The chemist just read the general waste
description on the sample jar and then wrote 'reject' on
the accompanying form. He said:
'If they can't be bothered to read what is on our
site licence then we'll just reject it'.
The sales staff do not necessarily know the site licence
The sales staff at the U.K. treatment plant would
not necessarily know what waste could be taken into the
plant under the site licence. One evening the sales
representative brought in a sample of an organic waste
load and asked if this could be taken into the plant.
From the site licence it was clear that only inorganic,
not organic, acids could be taken into the plant. Once a
sales representative sent a solid waste sample to the
lab. It was clear from the technology of the plant and
its site licence that it could only deal with liquid
wastes.
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Knowledge of legal provisions at the German waste
treatment plant
At the German waste management plant there was
partly limited knowledge about relevant legal regulation.
For the work of the chemical laboratory the guide-lines
under the "TA Sonderabfall" on the assignment of certain
waste groups to certain types of waste disposal plants
was important. This was because the laboratory made
decisions on the assignment of waste streams to certain
disposal plants. There was not, however, a copy of the
"TA Sonderabfall" regulations in the laboratory. Also,
among the four office staff who were involved in
assigning waste streams to certain waste disposal
facilities only one had privately bought himself a copy
of the relevant "TA Sonderabfall" regulations.
Also, a copy of the site licence for the German
waste management plant was only in the office of the
technical manager of the plant. Thus there were no copies
in the laboratory, the office or the treatment plant. The
site licence contained, however, the detailed
requirements for example on the testing of incoming waste
loads.
Conclusion
Some staff at the waste management plants both in
the U.K. and Germany did not know much about the legal
provisions that could have an impact on their work. Such
a lack of knowledge of these provisions might influence
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what role legal provisions would play in the creation and
management of standards for the handling of waste in
practice.
6.5. Conclusion
In this part II of the thesis I explored the
question what are standards in practice for the handling
of waste at the waste management plants. How could such
standards mediate what was understood as legal
requirements in practice? In this chapter 6 I discussed
the question what impact work group norms have on what
becomes understood as standards for compliance. In
particular, I explored the partly different work group
norms of the chemists and the sales staff at the U.K.
plant and the impact this had on decisions about the
rejection of waste loads. At the German plant it seemed
particular the relationship between the staff in the
office and the staff working on the yard that influenced
how the "EN" procedure was handled.
The role that work group norms play in the handling
of legal provisions shows that standards for compliance
can not be determined in abstract. Instead standards in
practice develop also in response to the organizational
context in which waste is dealt with. These were here
various work groups with different tasks, such as the
chemists and the sales staff. The impact that work group
norms might have on what becomes understood as legal
requirements in practice also illustrates that "norms"
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for behaviour are not pregiven but develop with reference
to their organizational contexts. Furthermore these
"norms" are not static but are subject to negotiation and
re-negotiation, and hence dynamic. This is for example
illustrated by negotiation between the sales staff and
the chemists at the U.K. plant.
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CHAPTER 7: STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING S TANDARDS
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will describe strategies used by
the regulated to deal with different standards. As
illustrated in chapters 4,5 and 6, various standards
operate at the waste management plants. Different
standards might be in conflict with each other. For
example, legal provisions might require the employees to
handle waste in a particular way but commercial aims
might suggest a different course of action. How would
such tensions be solved? This raises the issue of how
potential social control exercised by different standards
could be managed. In particular, how would potential
social control through legal requirements be handled?
In the first section of the chapter, I will discuss
how official waste descriptions are used in order to
manage legal provisions. In the second section, I will
discuss the strategy of diluting waste loads. In the
third section, I will describe various forms of cheating
to mange legal provisions, as well as the technique of
widely applying exceptions to regulatory requirements
widely.
7.2. Managing official waste descriptions
Both in the U.K. and Germany, official waste
descriptions are used to describe waste streams. For
example, the official waste description "paint waste"
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(waste code: R80 in the U.K./D0E Circular, 55/76, May
21/1976) or "Lack- und Farbschlaimn" (waste code: 55503 in
Germany), describes waste from painting operations. In
the U.K., the DoE catalogue lists waste descriptions with
the corresponding waste codes. This is quite similar to
the German "LP.GA" catalogue which also lists waste
streams	 with	 their	 waste	 codes	 (in	 German:
"AbfallschlUsselnuinmer") . This "L1 - catalogue"
describes what is defined as waste under the objective
definition of waste according to § 1 (1) AbfG 1986. As in
the U.K., the different groups of waste in the "LAGA -
catalogue" are sometimes difficult to differentiate and
partly overlap ("TA Sonderabfall", Anhang C; 1992:142)
The foreman at the German waste management plant
pointed to empty containers which held paint residues. He
told me that the waste holder had classified this waste
under the "LAGA" - catalogue as "empty containers". But
in his opinion it could have been equally well classified
under the category "paint residues". These official waste
descriptions are important because the legal regulations
concerning waste management refer to regulated wastes.
For example, in the "EN" procedure in Germany, waste
streams would be described through these official waste
definitions. Both in the U.K. and Germany, site licences
described the kind of wastes which a plant was allowed to
take in through the official waste definitions. Also, the
German "TA Sonderabfall" regulations partly refer to
these waste descriptions.
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Waste descriptions have developed through general
usage in the industry and have finally become part of the
legal regulations for waste management. Thus the official
waste descriptions are not just "legal" categories but
their origin lies in the practice and customs of
describing wastes as developed by the waste management
industry ("TA Sonderabfall", Anhang C, 1992:140). Hence
what has become an important element in the legal
regulation of waste is the result of an integration of
industry customs with formal classifications of legal
relevance.
Managing site licence restrictions on the range of wastes
a site is allowed to take
Official waste descriptions could assist in the
manipulation of legal regulations. At the U.K. waste
treatment plant, a load rejection procedure operated (see
chapter 4, section 4.2.2.). According to the site
licence, waste loads which the plant was not allowed to
take under the list in the site licence were to be
rejected. Also, loads which the plant could not treat
were to be rejected (conditions 2 and 3). In practice,
waste descriptions like "yard waste" and "contaminated
water" could be used to manage these criteria for the
load rejection. "Yard waste" and "contaminated water"
were items on the list which the U.K. treatment plant was
allowed to take. It seems that in practice under these
waste categories, any kind of waste could be brought into
the plant, as long as it was accepted by the chemists.
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One day a tanker arrived at the yard of the U.K.
treatment plant. The driver brought a sample of the waste
load into the laboratory for testing. After some time the
driver came back to the laboratory and asked if the waste
had been accepted. He added:
'Well, otherwise we will bring it back as yard
waste'.
The U.K. waste management company operated another
waste treatment plant which mainly took in waste oils.
The site licence for this site stipulated that, among
other wastes, the plant could take the following:
"effluent	 sludges,	 interceptor	 wastes,
including oil, containing silt and muds".
The site chemist commented on this:
'This can be anything, really'.
Also, a German waste control officer told me that broad
waste codes in the site licence would allow a waste
management facility to take in waste streams which they
could not take in under any other waste description.
According to the technical manager of the German waste
plant, it became more and more difficult to find
appropriate descriptions for waste streams because the
German waste descriptions became increasingly specific so
that mixtures of wastes would have to be separated out
and assigned different waste codes. The technical manager
explained to me that this problem could be overcome by
describing waste streams under the general waste code of
"solid, oil and grease contaminated working materials".
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Managing the definition of special wastes
Waste codes could also be used in practice to manage
legal controls that apply to particular waste streams.
For example, by calling a waste load "yard waste" the
application of the U.K. Special Waste Regulations 1980
might be avoided. Under § 2 (2) AbfG 1986 a list of
special wastes has been drawn up and particular legal
requirements apply to these wastes. These special wastes
are described through official waste descriptions. Hence,
by assigning a particular description to a waste stream
the German waste management plant could to some extent
determine if it would fall into this list of special
wastes or not. The scope of control over wastes - to
which special legal requirements apply - was in practice
not necessarily determined by the legal regulations but
by the interpretation of the scope of waste descriptions
by the chemists. According to the deputy manager of the
chemical laboratory:
'the definition of the wastes to which special
supervision requirements apply is stupid. You
can turn and twist it as you like itT.
The official waste descriptions could not only help to
manage the definition for the list of special wastes but
could also help to manage the German legal provisions for
the assignment of waste to particular waste disposal
facilities.
Waste codes can help to manage the German legal
provisions for the assignment of wastes to particular
waste disposal facilities
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The official description of waste streams could also
assist in managing the German legal procedure for the
assignment of wastes to a final disposal facility under
the "TA Sonderabfall". These guidelines on the choice of
final disposers could be strategically managed by the
waste producer or the waste management plant. The waste
producer or the waste management plant had some
discretion in deciding under which description a
particular waste should be classified. According to the
German laboratory technicians, almost every waste sample
could be classified under two or three different waste
codes. For example, the German waste management plant
handled a waste load which consisted o cloth stiips arid
which had been used in an air filter. This waste load was
first assigned the description "filter cloth with noxious
contaminants" (in German: "FiltertUcher mit schädlichen
Verunreinigungen"). Later this waste description was
changed by the chemists and the same load was described
as "solid, grease-contaminated and oily work materials
(in German: "feste, fett- und ölverscbmutzte
Betriebsmittel"). The waste description was changed in
order to be able to bring the waste to a landfill site
that could accommodate this type of waste.
For the RA it would be quite difficult to get an
accurate perception of the waste stream on the basis of
its description in the "EN" paper procedure. For example,
the waste management plant initially described initially
a waste stream as "solid, grease and oil-contaminated
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work materials", but later it was decided that the same
waste stream should be described as "work materials,
containing solvents". The PA would not have much
opportunity to query the application of particular waste
descriptions to certain waste streams. It was the waste
management plant which classified waste streams under
certain descriptions. It was staff at the plant, not the
PA, who would see and analyze the waste. Unless there
were obvious discrepancies between the chemical analysis
of the waste submitted on the "EN" and the official waste
description, the PA would not have much ground on which
to query the description of a particular waste stream.
Furthermore, the volume of "ENs" which the PA had to
process would render it unlikely that it would question a
waste description.
According to the staff in the German chemical
laboratory, the majority of wastes, which were proposed
for the plant had already been assigned a waste
description by the producer or haulier. This meant that
they could express in some cases a preference for a
certain disposal path through which he would assign a
waste description to his waste. This might have enabled a
waste producer or haulier to take into account corniriercial
issues like the differential costs of waste disposal at
landfill sites and incineration. One day a waste holder
inquired at the plant about the disposal of "oily working
materials". One of the employees in the office commented
on this case:
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'If we want to bring it to landfill we could
classify	 it	 under	 "empty containers	 -
contaminated"	 (in	 German:	 "Ernballagen-
verunreinigt").
Hence, in some cases, the legal guidance from the
"TA Sonderabfall" was applied in reverse mode. While the
"TA Sonderabfall" seems to envisage that wastes should go
to certain disposal plants because they would come under
a certain waste description ("TA Sonderabfall", Anhang C;
1992:142,143), in practice waste streams would sometimes
go to the disposal plant chosen by the waste management
plant or the waste holder by assigning it a certain waste
description. Thus, social control from the legal
regulations could be managed and partly avoided. The
waste management plant was still able to some extent to
bring the waste to final disposers of their choice and at
the same time to "comply" with guidance from the "TA
Sonderabfall". The way the computer system was set up in
the laboratory of the German waste management plant also
helped to apply the legal provisions of the "TA
Sonderabfall" in reverse mode.
The computer system
The computer system which was installed in the
German laboratory facilitated the process of working
backwards from the legal guidance from the "TA
Sonderabfall" backwards. This computer system listed all
the final disposers. For each disposer it showed the
range of waste descriptions he was licensed to take in.
The plant or the customer might already have a certain
preference for a particular final disposer, for example,
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on the basis of price or the availability of disposal
capacity. Thus, when assigning a description to the
sample, the computer system could help to assign a waste
code on the basis of the choice of a final waste
disposer. The chemists could enter the names of disposal
sites into the computer and then check what waste codes
these different disposal sites were allowed to take.
Thus, the computer system could further help to manage
social control over the assignment of disposal paths for
waste streams. The example of the computer system also
shows that ways of managing legal requirements could not
be just distinct acts nor the result of particular
decisions, but could become entrenched in day to day work
practices of dealing with waste. There were, however,
also limits to the flexible use of official waste
descriptions.
Limits to the flexible use of official waste descriptions
According to the office supervisor at the German
plant, the fact that the waste descriptions could be
interpreted in a broad way meant also that each final
disposer could have a different view on what waste to
expect under the description. Thus final disposers might
reject loads from the German waste management plant
despite the fact that they were consigned under a waste
code which the final disposer could take. Hence, the need
to operate a system of waste descriptions which would
also be understood and accepted by the final waste
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disposers mitigated against the arbitrary use of waste
codes and hence restricted discretion in their use.
A further constraint on the flexible use of waste
descriptions was the risk that final disposers would
notice discrepancies between the description and the
actual waste. For example, a waste holder had applied to
the German management plant to have his waste disposed
of. The waste was described as "saw dust, contaminated
with heavy metals". The staff in the office of the German
waste management plant first considered disposing of the
load through a "Sarnmel-EN". Under the "Samniel-EN" less
paperwork had to be prepared. Therefore this would
normally have been the preferred option. Under the
"Sainmel-EN" various similar waste loads were mixed and
disposed of together. But finally the staff decided
against this because they suspected the metal
contamination in the saw dust to be rather high. Thus, in
case the final waste disposer would take a sample and
find metal contaminations above what the plant had
described, it was finally decided not to dispose of the
waste through the "Sainmel-EN".
Conclusion
A central aspect of the regulation of waste
management is that legal regulations apply to waste as it
is officially described through standard terms. The waste
management plants and waste producers have discretion in
applying descriptions to particular waste streams. Thus
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the plants were able to some extent to manage legal
regulations for wastes. Social control through legal
regulations over waste management could be partly avoided
and commercial aims could be taken into account when
describing wastes. For example, the German plant was able
to "comply" with the "TA Sonderabfall" guidance on
sending certain waste streams to certain disposal paths
nd to realize their commercial aim to send as much waste
as possible to landfill.
The manipulation of legal regulations through the
flexible application of standard descriptions is specific
to waste. An important characteristic of waste regulation
is that those who are subject to regulation, i.e. waste
management plants and waste producers, have a monopoly of
information about the waste. Their descriptions of the
waste can influence sometimes what legal regulations
apply, if any at all. For a more detailed discussion on
the relevance of information for what becomes understood
as compliance with legal regulations in practice see also
chapter 10 and 11. It is also specific to waste
descriptions that they are difficult to carry out
accurately. Waste, by its very nature, is a heterogeneous
product which is difficult to describe and can be usually
described in various ways depending on sampling
techniques. This suggests that waste regulation poses
specific issues for the management of social control
through legal regulations which might not necessarily
apply to other areas of regulation.
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7.3. Diluting waste loads
A strategy for managing the legal provisions of the
discharge consent - both at the German and the U.K. waste
management plant - was to dilute waste loads. This could
enable the plant to do two things at the same time.
Firstly, through diluting waste loads, the plant could
take in problematic loads which otherwise it could not
treat down to discharge consent limits. Secondly, and at
the same time, the plant could observe the limits on the
discharge licence. Thus, to some extent, the waste
treatment plants could avoid restrictions on the wastes
coming in. This is illustrated by the following quotation
from a proposed working plan of a U.K. waste treatment
plant:
"Where waste streams are accepted into the
plant but could cause a problem by exceeding
our consent limits to either [the water
company] or landfill sites the procedure is as
follows: The waste is offloaded via a closed
discharge line into either ST [storage tank] 9
or ST 10. This gives us the facility to 'bleed'
waste into the treatment tanks at a rate
determined by the lab to ensure that, when
treated and dewatered, both the filter cake and
the effluent are within the limits of the
consent".
Hence, the practice of diluting waste loads could
operate on two levels. On the one hand, it could be an
informal practice at the waste treatment plants. On the
other hand, it could be part of the legal standards
through the incorporation into the working plan of a
waste management site which formed part of the site
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licence. Thus, formal legal standards could provide their
own mechanism for overriding them.
7.4. Cheating
Hiding waste at a transfer station
Another strategy for dealing with different
standards could be cheating. A U.K. waste control officer
showed me that at one waste storage facility, waste was
effectively hidden from view behind a corrugated iron
wall. The waste control officer said that it took him 12
months before he discovered that in this space waste was
stored. There was only a very narrow opening through
which one person could squeeze into this storage area.
Waste was stacked up so tightly and high that there was
not enough space to inspect the drums, for example, for
leakage. Sufficient space for inspection, however, was
required under the site licence. At the German waste
management plant, strategies for cheating could also
relate to the testing procedures for waste.
Cheating in analysis requirements
In most cases a sample of a waste stream for which
an "EN" had to be authorized was submitted to the German
plant. The laboratory would then analyze the waste for
the acceptance parameters of final disposers. For
example, if the waste was to go to landfill site A then
the laboratory would analyze all the parameters that this
landfill site had specified as its acceptance parameters.
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In most cases the values for these parameters would then
be entered on the "EN" form.
But in some cases the staff in the office of the
German waste management plant would in a few cases adapt
the information provided on the analysis sheets to what
the chemical parameters would have to be. Thus, on paper,
the waste would conform to the site licence requirements
of a final disposer.
Changing waste descriptions on the "EN"
Sometimes the office staff, with the agreement of
waste hauliers, changed information on the "EN" that was
to be submitted to the RA. For example, a waste stream
had been described first as "flammable" and was supposed
to go into incineration. This was then changed to assign
the waste to landfill. This change was only possible if
the description of the waste was made to be "non-
flammable". Thus on the "EN" the description of the waste
was changed from "flammable" to "non-flammable". Also the
supervisor of the German waste treatment plant told me
that in some cases a waste load could not be taken in,
according to the acceptance parameters for the treatment
plant. But it would be possible to take in the load by
adjusting the parameters for the waste loads on the
analysis form, so that they would correspond to the
acceptance limits. Sometimes analyses were invented at
the German waste treatment plant.
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Analyses from the laboratory and from the treatitient plant
A sample of effluent that was to go to the sewer
after treatment was usually given to the laboratory. The
laboratory would then analyze this sample for conformity
with the parameters on the discharge consent. The actual
values found in the sample would be written on an
analysis sheet which the treatment plant staff picked up
from the laboratory. While I was in the treatment plant I
observed that in some cases certain parameters were over
the limits of the discharge consent. Sometimes the
treatment plant staff would then enter a value on a new
analysis sheet that would be below the required limit.
The analysis sheet from the laboratory was then thrown
away. By looking through the analysis sheets filled in by
the treatment plant, one would have the impression that
they always complied with the discharge consent. In fact,
the actual effluent discharged might not always have
conformed. Another type of invented analyses were what
was called in the German office "self-knitted" analyses.
"Self-knitted analyses"
In the office of the German waste management plant
some "ENs" were processed without an analysis of the
waste stream being available. A waste disposal path was
assigned by the office staff through the "EN" form which
had to be authorized by the R7.. In order to make a
decision about what final disposer should take the waste
stream a chemical analysis of the waste was necessary
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according § 8 (1) AbfRestUberwV) . In some cases, however,
the staff assigned a disposal path for the waste only on
the basis of the general description and the information
about the production process from which it originated.
Then assumed values were entered into that part of the
"EN" form which asked for the values from the chemical
analysis. These kinds of values were described by the
office staff as "self-knitted" (in German:
"selbstgestrickt") or an analysis for which they had
"thrown the dice" (in German: "gewtirfelte Analyse").
Particularly on the "Samrnel-ENs", assumed values
were written in to the chemical analysis section which
were just below what the final disposer would require.
According to the office staff, it did not make sense to
provide a chemical analysis of the waste since the
composition of waste loads would change according to the
route the waste haulier would follow during his waste
collection. One day the haulier would collect waste from
four different producers and on another day he would
collect waste from five other producers. Thus the
composition of waste streams delivered by the haulier to
the German waste management plant would differ
considerably. This was despite the fact that the waste
was consigned under one common description. On another
occasion the R7 had sent back an "EN" that the waste
management plant had submitted for authorisation. The RA
said that the sum of metals for this waste stream would
need to be smaller than 50 mg/i. The office staff dealt
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with this by writing into the analysis section of the
form for the metal content "< 50 mg/i". The "EN" was then
resubmitted to the PA. Another type of shortened analyses
were "quick ENs".
Quick "ENs"
In case an "EN" had to be processed very quickly
values would be sometimes entered on the "EN" form
without a chemical analysis being available for the waste
stream. In such a case an "EN" that had already been
authorized by the PA for the same official waste
description was looked up in the files. Then the form,
including the parameters for the chemical analysis, was
copied onto the "EN" form for the new waste stream. To
the PA this form would look accurate and in itself
coherent although the actual waste stream might have been
different from the way it was described on the form.
Deducting values for analyses
Another way to cheat in analysis requirements was to
try and deduct values for chemical parameters from
already existing information from a chemical analysis of
the waste. In some cases the PA wanted more information
about a waste stream. In this case the office staff used
to phone up the laboratory manager and ask if the
chemical parameters that the PA had asked for could not
be deduced from the already existing information about
the waste. This procedure would avoid the need for a new
sample, for an analysis of the waste would have to be
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required from the customer. Thus further costs could be
saved for the customer in connection with the analysis of
the additional parameters the PA had asked for.
Conclusion
One way of managing legal requirements for the
testing of waste could be to cheat in analysis
requirements. Analyses for waste were provided in Germany
on the paper form of the "EN". This made it difficult for
the PA to detect possible shortcomings in the way the
plant handled analysis requirements. On paper "formal
compliance" could be maintained while at the same time
the plant was able to take in wastes which it night not
be allowed to take according to the site licence or
discharge consent, or about which it did not know if they
could taken. Hence, cheating in analysis requirements as
described in this section could provide an integration of
commercial aims, such as the acceptance of waste loads,
and the need to demonstrate on paper to the BA "formal
compliance" with acceptance criteria or discharge limits.
Apart from cheating, another way of managing standards
was to widely apply exceptions granted by the PA to
regulatory requirements.
7.5. The wide application of exceptions to regulatory
requirements
The "Sammel-EN" was an exception to the normal "EN"
procedure. The staff at the German waste management plant
tried to apply this procedure as widely as possible.
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According to the "Sarumel-EN", smaller amounts of waste
could be collected by hauliers and made into larger loads
( 10 (1) Nr.4 of the AbfResttYberwV 1990) . One large load
could be processed through one "Sanmiel-EN". Under the
"Sammel-EN" less paperwork had to be prepared. According
to the staff in the German office, it was an easier way
of operating the "EN" procedure.
Since the waste loads collected were a mix of
different, though similar, wastes, the descriptions of
them were quite general. Typical waste classifications
used for these "Sainmel-ENs" were for example "plastic
containers with noxious contaminants" (in German:
"Kunststoffbehältnisse mit schadlichen Restinhalten")
"mixture of alkalines" (in German: "Laugen,
Laugengemische") etc. A considerable advantage of these
"Samnmel-ENs" was that the RA did not require a chemical
analysis for some official waste descriptions. Thus, the
waste holder saved the costs of a chemical analysis.
These waste loads would be assigned to final waste
disposers simply on the basis of the general description.
Thus, if the final disposer was allowed to take waste
under that official description then the waste would be
assigned to this plant. With the full "EN" it would have
to be checked, on the basis of a chemical analysis, to
see in addition if the waste complied with the acceptance
parameters of the final disposer. For some of the waste
loads, which were to be consigned on "Sainmel-ENs", the
office staff would simply insert on the "EN" form values
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that would be below the parameters that the final
disposer had spelled out as acceptance standards.
7.6. Conclusion
In the previous chapters of this second part of the
thesis, I have outlined the contexts in which the
implementation of legal requirements occurs at the waste
management plants. These contexts can have an impact on
what is understood as legal requirements in practice.
What I wanted to show in this chapter is that various
constraints and requirements concerning the behaviour of
the regulated are not static but can be manipulated in
practice. They can be handled in a dynamic way. Thus,
behaviour was not determined by what became understood as
requirements in practice but to some extent requirements
would be handled in a flexible way. This means that the
kind of social control that might be exercised by legal
requirements over what the regulated do cannot be defined
in the abstract but depends on the practical
circumstances of the particular implementation situation.
Some of the behaviour at the plants which I described in
the previous chapters is behaviour which remains below
the threshold of what comes to the attention of the RA.
The regulated can manage the social control of legal
requirements because sometimes the BA has little
information about what is happening at a plant. In the
following part of the thesis I want to look in more
detail at the relevance of interaction between the
regulated and the regulators for managing social control,
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and hence for defining what constitutes compliance in
practice.
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PART III: INTERACTION BETWEEN THE REGULATED AND THE
REGULATORS AND COMPLIANCE
Outline of Part III
In the first section of part III of the thesis
(chapters 8 and 9), I will look at the question of how
the meaning of regulatory requirements is negotiated in
the interaction between the regulated and the regulators.
In the second section of part III (chapters 10 and 11), I
will deal with the question of how and what the regulated
get to know about the waste management plants. How does
this influence what becomes understood as compliance in
practice?
CHAPTER 8: ADAPTING STANDARDS FOR COMPLIANCE AT THE STAGE
OF SITE LICENSING AND IN THE FIELD
8.1. Introduction
An important question for understanding legal
compliance is "compliance with what"? In theory a major
source of standards for legal compliance is the site
licence of a waste management facility. What are the
standards in such licences? To what extent are these
abstract legal standards? To what extent do they draw on
existing social practices of handling waste at waste
management plants? My field data show that another source
of standards for compliance are those created in the
field after licences have been issued. Field standards
can interpret, clarify or alter site licence standards.
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Waste control officers go out into the field and visit
waste management sites for supervision purposes.
Practical situations come up in which they have to
decide, often there and then, what standard the operator
should observe. Not all practical situations are
regulated through standards in the site licence. What are
the outcomes of such negotiations in the field? In the
first section of the chapter, I will give examples of the
adaptation of standards at the stage of site licensing.
In the second section I will explore the negotiation of
standards in the field.
8.2. Adapting standards at the stage of site licensing
8.2.1. Adapting standards to commercial considerations
Both the German and the U.K. RA adapted standards
for handling waste, laid down in the site licence, to
some extent to what the regulated could implement. In a
new draft licence for a U.K. waste storage site, the time
that waste could be stored on the site was restricted.
The licensing section of the U.K. RP had first put down
in the draft licence that waste should only be stored for
one month. A waste control officer who visited the site
frequently was asked for his comments on the draft
licence. He suggested that the time limit should be
extended to six months. He wrote in his comments:
'I do not think that it is realistic to turn
stuff over within a month. They are dependent
on final waste disposers. If they [the final
waste disposer] do not take their waste they
cannot get rid of it'.
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When standards were imposed at the stage of site
licensing commercial considerations were sometimes taken
into account by the RA. A TJ.K. waste control officer
explained to me that the way the compacting of waste was
done at a landfill site was not prescribed by the site
licence. Only the thickness of the cover was regulated.
According to the waste control officer, it would be too
prescriptive to make requirements about the way the cover
should be compacted. He continued:
'We have to allow them to operate within
financial margins'.
Another U.K. waste control officer, who was
licensing sites, told me that they had to put conditions
in waste management licences which were enforceable,
reasonable and clear (see also WMP no.4; 1990:3, para.l)
The waste control officer continued:
'I can't put in conditions that are too
expensive. [...] One has to look for what the
particular operator can afford'.
Also, sometimes standards about working plans were
adapted to what the regulated did in practice.
8.2.2. Satisfactory and unsatisfactory working plans
Under guidance from the DoE (WMP No.4, 1990:11,
para.2.3-2.9), and according to the U.K. RA's internal
policy, a working plan of a waste management facility
should be submitted before a licence would be issued for
the facility. In guidance to operators on how to draw up
a working plan it was stated:
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"If, however, a satisfactory document has not
been submitted within a specific period,
operators should be aware that the disposal
operations at the site should cease until
approval is given. This is the only way that
the approval of a working plan can be
guaranteed. Without this provision there is
little incentive for an operator to submit a
document which the authority will be able to
approve. The consequence of not approving the
working plan within this specified period will
be a condition of the licence so that the
operator is fully aware of its significance on
the activities of the facility". (policy
document from U.K. RA).
The working plan is a document in which the operator
outlines how he intends to run his operations. From my
observations, it appeared that in the majority of cases
the U.K. PA would not issue a licence before a
satisfactory working plan had been submitted. But in some
cases waste management sites which had not submitted,
what was in the view of the PA a satisfactory working
plan, were allowed to continue to operate lawfully with a
licence. Through the field visits, on which I accompanied
U.K. waste control officers, I got to know two waste
treatment plants. There, over a number of years the PA
had tried to persuade the operator to submit what the RP
would accept as a satisfactory working plan. Operations
at these facilities were not stopped but the operators
had licences under which they could operate. Thus,
standards on working plans were in practice sometimes
adapted. Another way to adapt standards was to negotiate
compromises for site licence conditions.
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8.2.3. Negotiating compromises for site licence
conditions
In the German RA, some standards for waste
management facilities were negotiated with the operator.
For example, for a waste management facility which
proposed to treat contaminated soil, the water pollution
control division of the RA had required the following: 2
foils had to be installed beneath the surface of the area
where the contaminated soil was handled. The operator
argued that this was too expensive. The requirement was
finally changed to the following:
"The ground of the hail can be sealed through
one layer if it has been ensured that from t'ne
soil washing plant itself no water polluting
substances can seep out, such substances as to
seep out can be collected through containers
which are separately installed beneath the
washing process and if the substances so
collected can be disposed of safely" (my
translation)
Sometimes site licence conditions would be adapted on the
basis of information from supervision in the field.
Adapting site licences on the basis of supervision
experience
In some cases, the U.K. RA planned to make changes
in the site licence so that the operator would find it
easier to implement it. This was the case at one site
where, according to a U.K. waste control officer, there
had been a history of a lack of implementation of the
legal requirements which even led to prosecutions. The
site was frequently visited, sometimes two to three times
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per week. Finally, the licence for the site was due for
renewal. According to the U.K. PA, new conditions in the
licence were to help the operator to comply. Also, in the
German PA on some occasions, site licence conditions were
adapted to what the operator could comply with. The
leader of a team of German waste control officers
advocated site licences with which the regulated could
comply. On one occasion he expressed concern about the
fact that in some site licences the German PA would
demand more from an operator than legal regulations
required. For example, the technology of a waste
incinerator might be so advanced that flue gas emissions
could be beneath the limits set by the legal regulations
such as the 1T TA Luft" or 17. BimschV. (vom 23. Nov. 1990,
BGBL. I S. 2545, ber. S. 2832) . In some cases, the German
PA would set the emission standards in the licence
according to what the operator could technically achieve,
rather than setting it according to legal standards. The
leader of the group of waste control officers argued that
it was wrong to expose the operator to an increased risk
of committing an administrative offence. An
administrative offence would occur if the operator
breached the site licence standards, even if he was still
in compliance with the legal regulations of the "TA
Luft". Thus, in both the German and the U.K. PA,
standards in site licences for waste management
facilities were to some extent considered not as
standards to which an operator should 'work up to'.
Instead, they should be partly adapted to what operators
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could realistically achieve in practice. Another way of
adapting site licence standards was to make site licence
conditions less onerous.
8.2.4. Making site licence conditions less onerous
Standards could be adapted to the way an operator
wanted to run a site. In one case, a German operator
objected to the requirement that malfunctioning or
complete failure of a carbon filter for controlling air
emissions should be monitored continuously through an
optical and acoustic warning signal. The regulated
offered instead to control manually, for example through
quick tests, ("Dragerrohrchen") the level of
contaminants. This would indicate if the carbon filter
was working or not. As far as the testing procedure for
the carbon filter was concerned, the R7. did not accept
the regulated's point of view and insisted on the more
extensive control devices for the carbon column it had
suggested.
In a further case, a German operator commented on
the definition of "treated soil" which the RP. had used in
the draft site licence. The RA had not defined this term
in more detail. The operator suggested that it should be
understood that at least 50% of the samples of treated
waste should fulfil certain parameters for substances in
the soil. The operator argued that unless this
modification was to be added the site licence would
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require that every sample of the treated soil would have
to fulfil the standard for the soil parameters.
This negotiation of site licence requirements was
relevant in two ways. Firstly, it indicates that
standards are partly adapted to what the regulated can
comply with. Thus standards in site licences might not be
so much norms to which the regulated work up to. Instead
they can be a reflection of what the regulated are able
to achieve in practice. Secondly, negotiation of site
licence standards cannot be just understood as a form of
capturing the RA; winning the RA over to the operator's
point of view of what the could do. Instead, the BA used
the negotiation of site licence conditions in
enforcement. The BA would sometimes argue that since the
operator freely agreed to the licence conditions, he
could not later complain that he was unable to implement
some of them. Thus, the BA attempted to base the
normative appeal of site licences on the fact that they
were negotiated. The BA tried to invoke self-regulation
in order to enforce legal requirements. In short, it was
not the formal characteristic of the legality of the site
licence but the operator's agreement to it which counted.
Hence, compliance in practice could be a consensual,
negotiated concept. Empirical compliance is not
necessarily the outcome of a process of social control of
the BA over the regulated. Instead, it can contain self-
regulatory elements, such as the imposition of standards
by the regulated on the regulated process. Standards for
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compliance are negotiated between the regulated and the
RA, not just at the stage of formal site licensing, but
also in the field.
8.3. Negotiating standards in the field
Introduction
Standards created in the field are often neglected
in concepts of 'formal compliance' which usually focus on
abstract legal rules. Norms negotiated in the field can
be simply operational standards where the waste control
officer and an operator agree on how to carry out certain
activities at sites. I will give a few examples of these
negotiated standards. More importantly though, I will
illustrate how requirements negotiated in the field can
produce empirical compliance. Some of the standards
negotiated in the field are adaptations or
simplifications of formal standards laid down in
regulations or site licences. In the following section, I
will give a few examples which illustrate how and what
standards were negotiated in the field.
8.3.1. Negotiating operational developments at sites
At waste control officer and a site manager
discussed and agreed how a landfill site should be filled
in. Records of these agreements struck in the field would
be written down in the waste control officer's notebook.
For example, in a note book the following entry could be
found:
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"Agreed the next few weeks tipping with x [site
manager], i.e. the complete infilling of the
remaining void in area A, then inf ill between
the net bund and the .... high part of area B
and then finish with C. Relocate site road onto
area C [...]".
Competing compliance
Standards created in the field could be more onerous
than requirements from site licences. At one of the sites
which a U.K. waste control officer visited frequently, he
told the site manager:
'You are within the volume of waste that the
licence permits you but you have to ask
yourself, given the amount of waste that you
already have on the yard, can you handle so
much waste?'
The waste control officer pointed out to the
operator that the breach of site licence conditions about
the handling of waste was caused by too much waste on the
yard. The operator failed to implement provisions that
required to store wastes only in certain areas of the
yard. The operator, however, was in compliance with the
limit spelled out in the site licence for the amount of
waste the site could take in. Thus, compliance with site
licence provisions on the handling of waste could be in
competition with compliance with the limit on the amount
of waste allowed into the site.
Negotiation in the field can provide control over
standards
The negotiation of standards in the field was a
resource for the waste control officer's work. Standards
created in the field could provide discretion and thus
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power for the waste control officer. It appears that U.K.
waste control officers who went out into the field to
visit and supervise facilities preferred to retain some
control over standards which the regulated had to
implement. A U.K. waste control officer from the
licensing section explained to me that some monitoring
officers preferred standards in site licences such as
"the site has to be kept clean to the satisfaction of the
RA" because this would allow the field officer to set
his/her own standard in the field. In contrast to this,
licensing officers would prefer a clearly defined
standard such as "the site has to be kept clean as
detailed in the working plan". The working plan would set
out in more detail the procedures according to which the
site should be kept clean. This would leave no
flexibility for the waste control officer to set his own
standard. Standards negotiated in the field could not
just be a resource for the waste control officer but they
could also be to the advantage of the regulated.
Sometimes standards could be adapted to commercial
considerations.
8.3.2. Adapting standards to commercial considerations
Operators could apply for changes in licences in
order to have the licence adapted to accommodate their
operational activities. For example, a U.K. operator
applied to the RA to have his opening hours extended. The
relevant condition in the licence was changed to
accommodate this. At a U.K. landfill site, the licence
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spelled out how much special waste on the one hand, and
how much commercial and household waste on the other
hand, the site was allowed to take in. A considerable
area of the site had already been filled in. It now
wanted to make the most of the remaining space. The
operator applied for a licence amendment to the RA in
order to get an increase in the amount of special wastes
the site could take because he made a higher profit on
those. The U.K. waste control officer who regularly
visited the site said that there would be no objection to
this because after all the site was a commercial concern.
Also, in a file with written reports on another landfill
site, I found the following entry:
"Increased domestic waste being taken in
because of contractual agreement with company
x. So commercial waste reduced accordingly -
not causing any handling problems".
An adapted site licence could be a tool for
achieving compliance and not just a standard to be
complied with. Another entry in a file about a U.K. waste
management facility read:
"Looking at the waste returns it was noted that
some days more than the licensed five sharps
boxes were coming into the site. I [waste
control officer] spoke to the manager about
this and I suggested that on the new modified
licence, the number is changed to approximately
ten sharps boxes per day".
The data here about the adaptation of site licences
reflect that the regulated participate in the creation of
standards. What seems at first sight a regulatory system
through licensing of activities by a public authority has
self-regulatory elements. In files of the German RA
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relating to the licensing and supervision of waste
management facilities, notes could be found regularly
about the negotiation of standards. Some of these
recorded entries showed that regulatory requirements
could be simplified.
8.3.3. Simplifying regulatory requirements
Simplifying testing procedures
In one file, notes were made on the negotiation of a
procedure for testing certain substances in the effluent
of a waste management plant. The RA had first asked the
regulated to carry out "bio tests" for testing
chlorphenols in the effluent of a soil treatment plant.
The regulated opposed this testing procedure on two
grounds. Firstly, they argued that it was "technically
and financially impracticable" to carry out these tests.
Secondly, they argued that there was no need to carry
them out. They intended to separate waste streams that
might contain chlorphenols from other waste streams taken
in and deal with them separately. According to the
operator, waste loads containing chior phenols would not
end up in the normal treatment process and thus could not
appear in the effluent which was discharged to the sewer.
In the negotiations, the regulated finally offered a
compromise solution. They would be prepared to test the
effluent "sporadically" by fish tests. It was agreed
between the RA and the regulated that during the first
two months biological tests would be carried out monthly
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and after this, tests would only be carried out once per
half year. Another way to adapt standards was to provide
exceptions.
8.3.4. Exceptions
Exceptions from testing procedures
On some occasions, the regulated and the operator
negotiated exceptions to legal provisions. For example,
the RA had required the German waste management plant to
test certain substances in incoming wastes according to
the "DIN" chemical testing procedures. The "DIN"
procedures are standardized procedures which are the
equivalent to standardized U.K. testing procedures such
as the British Standards Institute (BSI) norms. The
laboratory manager at the German waste management plant
arranged a meeting with officers from the RA in order to
negotiate that the plant should be excepted from these
testing procedures for incoming waste loads. In his view,
the testing of incoming waste loads was not supposed to
take too long in order to guarantee a reasonable "turn-
around T' time for tankers. However, the "DIN" standards
required the testing of certain parameters in the eluate
of the waste samples. It took 24 hours to prepare the
eluate of a waste sample. The German plant wanted the RA
to approve a more simplified chemical testing procedure
like the Merck-dip kit tests, which were in fact already
in use.
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Exceptions from the discharge consent
Furthermore the supervisor of the German treatment
plant told me that the plant could apply in individual
cases to the RPL for exceptions from the discharge
consent. One day the treatment plant had taken in a
sludge that contained a very high amount of nickel. It
was only later realized that the sludge could not be
treated down to the discharge consent limits. The plant
applied successfully to the RA for an exceptional
derogation from the discharge consent. During a limited
period of time the effluent from the treatment of that
sludge could be discharged, despite the fact that it was
above the discharge consent limits for nickel.
Exceptions from the site licence
The site licence for the German waste treatment
plant required that the mixture of treated wastes from
the pre-treatment plant on the one hand and from the
chemical treatment side on the other hand, had to be
handled separately. Thus, at any one time, the filter
presses should either press waste mixtures from the pre-
treatment plant or from the chemical treatment side. The
RA inserted a condition to this effect in the site
licence in order to prevent wastes from being mixed in
breach of the legal prohibition on this. Through the
mixing of wastes, problematic substances in the waste
could have been diluted. The German treatment plant,
however, managed to convince the RA that they could not
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operate the presses with waste charges only from one line
of the treatment. Treated waste from both the pre-
treatment plant and the chemical treatment plant was
required in order to have a thick enough sludge that
could be processed through the presses. Thus, this
informal standard had been negotiated while in the site
licence the official requirement of not using the presses
for waste loads from the pre-treatment and the chemical
treatment side remained. This indicates that sometimes
standards negotiated in the field could be informal and
would not necessarily lead to amendments of the site
licence document, even if they deviated from it.
Standards could be also adapted in practice by waste
control officers tolerating certain conditions.
Tolerating operating practices
The RA did not expressly agree to a particular
situation at a site but sometimes tolerated some working
practices. For example, the supervisor of the German
treatment plant told me that there had been a long-
standing argument with the RA. about the limit for the
discharge of iron in the treatment plant effluent. At the
beginning, the RA had set a limit of 3 mg/l of iron. The
treatment plant protested and after a lengthy argument
the limit was set to 10 mg/i. Some time later the RA,
however, reduced the limit again to 3 mg/l. The staff at
the plant argued that they could not conform to this
limit. According to the treatment plant supervisor, this
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resulted in a situation where the PA tolerated in
practice some deviation from the 3mg/i in the effluent
Further exceptions: quick decisions
In some cases, none of the disposal routes for which
a waste stream had been authorized was available at the
German waste management plant. Also, it might not have
been possible to declare the waste stream as a different
waste stream for which other disposal routes were open.
For these cases the plant had negotiated a particular
agreement with the German PA. According to this, the
plant informed the PA via a preprinted fax of the
situation and applied for a different disposal path. This
was a considerably shortened version of the whole "EN"
procedure. For example, in contrast to the "EN", the fax
would not necessarily contain an analysis of the waste.
According to staff from the treatment plant, this fax
procedure was not all that useful since it would not work
on Friday afternoons when the staff in the PA had already
left the office. Furthermore it could still take up to
six hours for a reply to arrive from the PA. According to
the supervisor in the treatment plant, a tanker could not
wait too long on the yard before it could be decided what
to do with it. Therefore the fax procedure was best used
only as a last resort. Efforts would be made to try and
find other solutions, for example, by classifying a waste
load under a different waste stream and hence under a
different "EN".
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Exceptions to acceptance parameters at German waste
management plants
Waste loads that were to go into a German waste
disposal plant would have to be declared on the 'TEN".
Usually, an analysis of the waste would have to be
attached to it. According to a German waste control
officer, if this analysis showed that the parameters of
the waste were above the discharge limits then the waste
control officer who supervised the plant had the
discretion to decide if the waste load could be taken or
not. It could be seen from entries in the file on the
supervision of plants that sometimes waste was above the
limits for certain substances set out in the licence. In
this case the operator would provide reasons why he still
should be allowed to take in the waste. For example,
operators would write that the emission limits would not
be broken because the plant technology would enable
observance of the limits.
Getting clearances for exceptions from the list of wastes
that could be taken into the waste management plant
Another outcome of negotiations could be that a
waste management plant would get a clearance from the RP.
for certain ways of handling waste which would be an
exception to the general legal provisions. For example,
the site licence allowed the U.K. waste treatment plant
only to take in inorganic, not organic acids. The plant,
however, wanted to take wastes arising from orange juice
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production. Orange juice wastes, containing citric acid,
might be classified as an organic acid but according to
the senior chemists this was a 'grey area'. The plant
thus contacted the RA and asked for permission to take
these wastes. The RA granted this permission.
8.3.5. Ad hoc agreements between the regulated and the
regulators during site visits
Bunded areas for tanks
Some agreements were negotiated in the field as a
way of dealing with newly arising situations. Both in the
German and U.K. RAs waste control officers would
frequently detect that the operator was not implementing
provisions from the site licence during a site visit. In
that case, an agreement might be struck between the waste
control officer and the operator on how the situation
could be changed. For example, during one of the visits
of a German waste control officer to check planning
conditions, she noted that a tank of oil was not stored
in a bunded area. According to her, containers with
substances that can cause water pollution have to be
stored in bunded areas. It was finally agreed between the
waste control officer and the operator that the wall
around the yard could be considered as constituting a
bund for the oil tank.
This agreement was a compromise, since, according to
the waste control officer, she could have asked the
operator to install a bund around the oil tank rather
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than to accept the yard as the bunded area. Also, the
waste control officer could have asked the operator to
install a protective guard ("Anfahrschutz") around the
oil tank, guarding it from being rammed, for example, by
vehicles used on the yard.
"Clown" telephones and the classification of waste
Sometimes new situations would arise in the field
and it had to be decided what actually constituted the
implementation of legal requirements. At a U.K. landfill
site, a load of toys, in the shape of clown telephones,
was to be disposed of. The paint on those toys contained
lead. It had to be decided if these toys should be
classified as non-special or special wastes. There were
restrictions on the amount of both types of wastes the
landfill site could take in. But special wastes were more
profitable wastes. Disposal prices for these were higher.
Thus, the technician from the landfill site wanted the
toys to be classified as non-special wastes, so that they
would not decrease the amount of special wastes left that
could be still landfilled. The waste control officer
finally agreed to this but said that he would have to
verify it with the section leader in the BA.
Adapting standards in the field to particular
circumstances
Standards might be adapted to the particular
circumstances of individual waste management sites. A
senior manager in the U.K. BA told me that a standard
252
condition in site licences, that the waste at a landfill
site should be covered with soil at the end of the
working day, could be applied differently at individual
sites. For example, at a site out in the countryside, it
would not be so important that the cover would be thick
enough. But at a site in a more urban area with nearby
housing, where children might be playing, it would be
important to have a thick enough cover to prevent people
from coming into contact with deposited waste. In short,
U.K. waste control officers would sometimes adapt the
conditions in a site licence to the surroundings of a
site. Hence, standards in practice were not necessarily
universal.
This point is also illustrated by the following
story. I accompanied a U.K. waste control officer to a
waste management site which processed used oil. According
to the site licence, the site should not be a detriment
to the local amenity and the road outside the yard should
be kept clean. Vehicles, however, leaving the site would
carry oil onto the road and the area around the site. The
site was situated in an industrial area. According to the
U.K. waste control officer, it did not matter too much
that the road outside was slightly oil-contaminated
because 'the area was bad anyway T . Also, according to
him, it would be difficult to prove that the oil came
from that site and not an adjacent facility which was
also handling oils. Prosecutions could be another
situation where standards were adapted.
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Prosecutions and the adaptation of standards
A senior manager in the U.K. RA told me that
sometimes licences would be adapted after a prosecution.
A prosecution would most likely show that a company was
not able to implement legal requirements. Furthermore,
after a prosecution, the RA would be in a strong position
to negotiate with the operator. The operator could not
really object to site licence changes in this situation.
Hence, criminal prosecutions might be used in some cases
by the U.K. PA as a resource for the negotiation of
changes to licences. They might also be used as a pointer
to problems at a site which might be remedied through the
adaptation of standards to what the regulated could
implement. In the German RA, adapting standards to what
operators could realistically achieve was one aspect of
associating the task of waste management planning to the
enforcement of legal requirements.
Adapting standards by linking waste management planning
to enforcement in the German BA
One important aspect of the work of the German PA
was the attempt to link the planning of waste management
facilities with enforcement. According to a German waste
control officer, this connection could mean that
conditions imposed on a waste management facility in a
licence would be adapted to what a facility in practice
was likely to achieve. A good example of such a link was
the plan for scrap yards.
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The waste disposal plan for the scrap yards
In this plan, standards imposed on waste management
facilities were adapted to what the facilities could
implement. A German waste control officer who was
supervising scrap yards had noted problems with the
implementation of legal provisions there. He told me that
through the plan he did not want to 'gold-plate' the
scrap yards but make sure that they at least implemented
a minimum of standards ('Wir wollen hier nicht die
Autowrackplätze vergolden').
According to the German waste control officer, one
common problem at the scrap yards was that they failed to
concrete areas where they were dealing with water
polluting substances such as oil. He explained that scrap
yards often lacked money to pay for concreting large
areas of their yards. Hence, the requirement set out in
the plan was not an abstract and universally worded one
that all scrap yards need to be completely concreted.
Instead it said:
"The whole scrap yard is generally to be
protected ("zu befestigen")".
This was a more flexible requirement that could be
adapted to the individual circumstances such as the
financial circumstances of the scrap yard operator.
According to the waste control officer, the situation
could be adapted if the scrap yard operator confined the
handling of polluting substances to a particular area.
Only this area would then need to be covered up.
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Furthermore, the requirement in the plan only said that
the yard would need to be protected. This left
flexibility on how to do this. Thus, the expensive option
of using concrete was not made mandatory. Also, according
to the plan, oil interceptors were not always necessary.
Hence, the waste control officer had flexibility to
decide in individual cases if adequate protection of
groundwater and soil could be effected without an oil
interceptor. Another way for adapting standards to what
the regulated could achieve was simply to provide time to
implement them.
8.3.6. Adapting standards through providing time for the
implementation of legal provisions
Sometimes the outcome of negotiations between the
regulated and the RP in the field was that the BA would
provide time for the regulated to implement legal
provisions. For example, the German waste management
plant had tanks into which liquid waste loads were
discharged before they were transported to landfill. The
licence to operate these tanks had expired. The BA,
however, tolerated the operation of the tanks without a
valid licence while the German plant obtained a
consultant's opinion on the possible technical upgrading
of these tanks.
Sites awaiting a decision
Enforcement action was not always inunediately taken
against unlicensed sites as soon as their existence was
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discovered by the U.K. PA. Until a final decision had
been made on whether these sites would be prosecuted for
operating without a licence or closed down without a
prosecution, the sites were allowed to operate. Usually
'an eye would be kept' on those sites. Thus, some
supervision by the PA was also extended to sites that in
theory should not exist, i.e., unlicensed waste
management sites.
Providing time for implementing legal provisions for
newly licensed sites
Furthermore, according to a U.K. waste control
officer, if a licence was newly issued, then the PA would
give the operator about one month 'to settle into things'
and adapt to the licence. During this time allowance
would be made for 'non-compliance'. In some cases site
licence conditions had not been finally agreed during the
licensing process. In this case the operator would get a
deadline in the site licence which provided for further
time to implement legal provisions. For example, in one
U.K. licence, condition 11 read:
"Measures to control any environmental hazard
during the discharge of waste into reception
tanks or pits shall be installed within six
months of the issue of this modification and
subsequently maintained and used in accordance
with the working plan".
In the same licence modification the following statement
could also be found:
"Within one year of date of modification all
tanks shall be of a closed construction".
257
Negotiation as a delaying tactic
Negotiation could be used to provide time for the
implementation of legal provisions. Sometimes, while the
BA and the regulated negotiated, legal provisions were
not implemented by the operator. For example, at one
waste management site the BA wanted the operator to
install scrubbers on top of the tanks in which liquid
waste loads were stored and treated. A licence condition
required this but the operator did not implement it.
Finally, the BA served a section 93 (1) COPA 1974 notice
on the company which operated the site. The notice
required the operator to tell the BA what steps he had
taken to comply with conditions in the licence, e.g., if
he had entered into contracts with suppliers and the date
by which the company would plan to implement the
conditions. Hence, a lack of implementation of legal
provisions could exist for some time at a site while
negotiations between the operator and the BA were
ongoing. Thus, 'non-compliance' was not necessarily
measured in absolute terms by the BA but could be
measured in relative terms. Some activities would only
count as 'non-compliance' during the time that the BA
specified. A U.K. waste control officer told me:
'We give advice, we give people time to put things
right, we do not move in immediately and say 'you [
operator] got things wrong, you will be nicked for
this', but we tell people about it and then give
them time to put things right'.
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Flexibility in handling standards: "de minimis rule"
U.K. waste control officers allowed for some
flexibility in the handling of legal standards. One day a
waste control officer visited a hospital waste
incinerator. According to the licence, bags in which
clinical waste was stored and containers for sharp
instruments ("sharps") had to be closed. If one of those
boxes or bags were open then technically the licence
condition had been broken. According to section 3 (1) (b)
COPA 1974, the operation of a process in breach of site
licence conditions could constitute a criminal offence.
When I accompanied a waste control officer at a visit to
this site he explained to me:
'If there is only one bag open and the rest of
them are properly closed then we don't
prosecute. That would be just petty. In that
case we tell them to change it'.
This approach might be described as a "de minimis
rule" under which breaches of site licence conditions
that were classified as minor breaches did not attract
formal enforcement action. Other U.K. waste control
officers also told me that 'minor' compliance problems at
sites would not be prosecuted. A waste control officer
would query the situation and then usually the operator
would himself offer to change it.
8.4. Conclusion
In this chapter I dealt with the question
'compliance with what?'. I looked at the creation of
standards at the stage of site licensing and in the
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field. Site licence standards do not only draw on legal
orders, i.e., requirements from statutes, regulations and
guidance, but also on the social practices of the
regulated. Site licences can be adapted to what the
regulated do in practice at facilities. Thus, standards
in site licences can help to produce 'compliance'.
Standards in practice can be created in the interaction
between the R1 and the regulated. The regulated
participate in the setting-up of these standards. What
seems at first sight a classical regulatory system
through licensing of activities by a public authority has
self-regulatory elements, such as the imposition of
standards by the regulated themselves on their own
process. Hence, empirical compliance is not just a
normative, but a consensual and negotiated concept.
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CHAPTER 9: HOW ARE STANDARDS ADAPTED? EXPLAINING
NEGOTIATION
9.1. Introduction
Having outlined in chapter 8 that standards are to
some extent negotiated and adapted in the interaction
between the regulated and the RA, I now will discuss how
this is actually achieved. In particular, I will refer to
three factors which seem to be relevant for understanding
negotiation. Firstly, I want to look at the relationship
between legal provisions and negotiation. Is a notion of
"bargaining in the shadow of the law"
(Mnookin/Kornhauser, 1979) appropriate to describe some
of the negotiation situations I observed? What is the
nature of the social order achieved in the interaction
between the regulated and the BA? Are site licence
standards imposed by virtue of legal powers or are they
negotiated? Secondly, I want to come back to the issue of
what becomes understood as legal requirements in
practice. How does negotiation contribute to what becomes
understood as a normative requirement in practice?
Thirdly, I will not just look at legal frameworks but I
will explore the relevance of shared cultures between the
regulated and the regulators for understanding
negotiation. Fourthly, as in the previous chapters 4,5
and 6 I want to come back to the theme of contexts. I
will explain how negotiation is shaped by the context in
which enforcement officers carry out their tasks. This
context can involve contradictory requirements, such as
being on good terms with operators and enforcing
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standards against them. This refers back to the idea that
what becomes understood as compliance is partly a
consequence of the management and integration of
conflicting demands on the actors' behaviour.
Sources of information
During the field work, I sat in on some meetings
between the operator and the German BA which dealt with
the licensing of waste management facilities. There
seemed to be fewer meetings between the operator and the
U.K. BA in connection with the licensing of sites than in
the German RA. Licensing took up less time in the U.K. BA
than in the German BA. In Germany waste management is a
politically more contentious issue than in the U.K. The
licensing of facilities takes on average longer and some
licensing procedures are in practice more complex, due,
for example, to intensive and adversarial public
participation (Striegnitz, 1992:5) . In the U.K. BA, I had
no access to meetings on the negotiation of licences
between the operator and the BA, but I had access to
files on waste management sites which sometimes contained
notes on licence negotiation sessions between the
operator and the BA. I also have a few comments from
waste control officers on meetings about the licensing of
waste management facilities. In the German BA, waste
control officers were responsible both for the task of
licensing and supervising sites. This meant that waste
control officers had less time to go out into the field.
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Thus, in the German BA I observed in absolute terms less
negotiation in the field than in the U.K. PA.
9.2. Variation in negotiation: different responses to
different operators
It appears that both in the U.K. and German RAs
negotiation was used differently with various operators
(see also Genn, 1993; Hutter,1988). In the U.K. PA,
negotiations in connection with the working plan or site
licences seemed to be conducted particularly with larger
companies, which operate several sites, and with
operators of complex sites, such as transfer stations or
waste treatment plants. There seemed to be less
negotiations with smaller operators or operators of non-
complex sites, such as small transfer stations for inert
wastes. Similarly, in the German BA, negotiations about
site licences seemed to take a different form for various
operators. Some operators had their own idea of what
procedure their process should be licensed under and they
would negotiate about this with the German PA. Other
operators would be simply told by the PA according to
what procedure their process would be licensed. Thus,
when reading the following sections in this chapter it is
important to bear in mind that the data reported here do
not reflect the PAs' approach to
	 JJ operators.
Negotiation was extensively used but waste control
officers had discretion on how they carried out their
work. Thus, different waste control officers had
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different approaches to the use of negotiation. Some were
more in favour of it than others.
9.3. The importance of negotiation: negotiation and other
ways of interaction between the regulated and the RA
Negotiation can be one form of interaction between
the regulated and the PA. There are other forms of
interaction between the PA and the regulated can
interact. For example, the PA can attempt to influence
the behaviour of the regulated through criminal
prosecutions. The RA can also rely on formal legal
provisions which the relevant statutes provide (such as
the "Verwaltungsvollstreckungsgesetz't 1953 in Germany and
COPA 1974 in the U.K.). I want to locate briefly
negotiation within the context of other forms of
interaction between the PA and the regulated, such as
criminal prosecutions and the use of formal legal
provisions. What was the relationship between negotiation
and other legal provisions? Was negotiation only used
when there were no other legal forms of interaction
available?
Apart from criminal prosecutions there were other
formal sanctions available to the U.K. PA under COPA
1974, such as the revocation of a site licence under
section 7 (4) and section 9 (4) (b) and the serving of
enforcement notices on the regulated under section 9 (4)
(a). But from records in the enforcement section, it
appeared that they were seldom used. According to a U.K.
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waste control officer, he had to consider carefully when
to serve a notice for failure to implement site licence
conditions. If the operator did not comply with such a
notice, the next step would be the revocation of the site
licence and this was definitely only to be considered as
the last resort. Thus, formal legal enforcement
provisions were less often used than they could have
been.
Negotiation did not just fill the 'gaps', for which,
for example, German administrative law made no provision
but negotiation was also used where other more formal
legal provisions could have been used. From my
observations in the German RA, it appeared that not just
criminal sanctions but also other sanctions available to
the RA were only used as a last resort and were partly
replaced by negotiation. German administrative law, of
which waste management law is a part, is a developed area
of the law which provides for concepts such as the
administrative decree (in German: "Verwaltungsakt") or
administrative orders ("Anordnungen"). Empirical research
has shown that formal legal provisions are often replaced
by more informal types of interaction between the
regulated and the RA (Bohne, 1980). Negotiation partly
replaced the use of criminal prosecutions both in the
German and the U.K. PA. This is in accordance with the
German cooperation principle which says that
environmental protection should be achieved together with
the regulated rather than against them (Klopfer,1989:91).
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In some cases, however, both in the U.K. and Germany,
negotiation would not replace the use of criminal
prosecutions but could be used togethex with
prosecutions. A U.K. waste control officer made the
following comment about what he considered as a lack of
implementation of legal requirements at a site he
frequently visited:
'You know when you come down here to the site,
every time you could nick somebody for at least
fifteen things'.
This quotation illustrates that it is not the
identification and prosecution of non-compliance that is
necessarily considered as important ("naming and
blaming") (Felstiner/Abel/Sarat; 1981) . Some sites which
were considered as problem sites were visited by the
waste control officer not in order to find out if there
is "non-compliance" or "compliance". In the waste control
officer's view it was clear that there was "non-
compliance" at the site. Instead he visited problem sites
in order to sustain a process in which the behaviour of
the regulated could be gradually changed towards
compliance. One tool for this was negotiation. The
evaluation of conditions at a site is not necessarily
important in the context of empirical compliance. Instead
the operator should be persuaded to aim for improved
standards. Negotiated standards could replace reliance on
formal	 legal	 provisions.
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Unenforceable site licence conditions
On some occasions the RA did not rely on legal forms
in its interaction with the regulated but on negotiation.
For example, the licensing section of the U.K. RA wrote
draft licences for waste management sites. These draft
licences were passed on to other sections in the PA, such
as the officers who conducted field visits and officers
in the enforcement section. The enforcement section
checked these draft licences, particularly on the issue
of whether their conditions were enforceable in law.
According to DoE guidance, site licences should only
contain conditions which are enforceable (para.13 WMP
no.4, 1990:9) . From the files on the licensing of
different waste management facilities I could see that
quite often the enforcement section had commented that in
its view the conditions were not enforceable. The
licensing section nevertheless often inserted these
conditions in licences. Thus, licences were issued which
contained conditions which might not be enforceable in
law. To persuade operators to implement the provisions of
these site licences was probably more based on the
individual authority a waste control officer established
in the field in direct interaction with the regulated
rather than the formal authority of the law. This
indicates the importance of negotiated order for ensuring
implementation of site licence conditions in contrast to
the authority of the formal law. This example illustrates
that when looking at situations where the regulated and
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the RA "bargain in the shadow of the law"
(Mnookin/Kornhauser, 1979), it is important in some
situations not to overestimate the importance of the
legal framework in which negotiation occurs. The formal
authority of the law might become irrelevant where the
personal authority relationship negotiated in the field
between a waste control officer and the regulated might
provide a foundation on which normative requirements by
waste control officers rest. This might be a twist on the
notion of "bargaining in the shadow of the law!!. In the
next section I will explore how the regulated and the
regulators did not just bargain in the shadow of the law,
but also in the shadow of the social practices.
9.4. Negotiating with reference to the social practices
of the regulated
Licensing officers' knowledge of sites
In order to understand negotiation and its
relationship to formal legal provisions it is important
to explore how standards were negotiated between the
regulated and the BA. Both in the U.K. and the German BA,
it was considered as important that waste control
officers who licensed sites should be familiar with
conditions at sites. In the U.K. PA, this meant that
licensing officers would visit sites before drawing up a
licence. In the German BA, a waste control officer told
me that it was one of the positive aspects of merging the
licensing and supervision of waste management facilities
268
that now the licensing officers would know conditions at
sites from first hand experience. According to some
German waste control officers, this would improve the
quality of licences because now licences would be more
closely related to what operators actually did at sites.
Consultation of the regulated at the stage of site
licensing as an opportunity to adapt site licences
Both in the German and the U.K. R, the site licence
was sent in draft form to the regulated before it was
finally approved. This was done in order to give the
regulated the opportunity to comment on it. Thus, the
site licence was a negotiated rather than an imposed
order. According to a German waste control officer, a lot
of operators would not read the licence. In the licensing
procedure for some waste management facilities,
negotiations would be conducted by an engineering or
environmental consultancy on behalf of operators.
According to the waste control officer, to give the
operator an opportunity to read the draft licence should
prevent the operator discovering - after the licence had
been formally issued - that it was too expensive to
comply with. Another tool for the U.K. RP to adapt
standards to what the regulated could comply with was the
working	 plan.
269
Working plans as a tool to adapt standards to actual
practices at sites
Working plans were an important aspect of the
licensing of U.K. waste management sites. In the new
revised version of WMP No.4 the DoE advocated the use of
so-called working plans for the licensing of facilities.
The working plan is a statement drawn up by the operator
on how he intends to operate his waste management
process. According to the DoE, working plans were used
for the licensing of facilities in order to adapt
licences more to the individual circumstances at
particular waste management sites (WNP no.4, 1990; para.
1.4).
A U.K. licensing officer told me that some waste
management facilities used consultants to draw up working
plans for the operator. According to the licensing
officer, this was not always an advantage because the
consultants would not necessarily know what was going on
at the site. Instead he found that sometimes consultants
wrote working plans which were not practicable:
'They [consultants] might have all sorts of
ideas and agree a working plan with us [Rh] and
then the guy on the site says: No way, I can't
work that'.
In Germany, a particular document called "working
plan" does not exist, but operators do have to submit
with their licence application a statement about the
operations at the site. This seemed to be similar to
working plans in the U.K. For example, according to a
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German waste control officer, proposals by an operator on
how to deal with certain aspects of the operations might
make it unnecessary to regulate those aspects of the
operations through a licence condition. Another German
officer explained that it was important to adapt licences
to some extent to what the operator was actually doing in
practice. He said during negotiations over a site licence
with an operator:
'We want to follow reality with this licence.
Negotiations between the RA and the operator
should help to approach step by step what is
realizable'.
According to a U.K. waste control officer, licences
would be written around the working plan. This meant that
conditions would be inserted in the licence which
referred back to the working plan. For example, a
condition in the licence could say: the testing of
incoming loads is carried out in accordance with the
procedures spelled out in the working plan. Working plans
could also adapt standards to actual conditions at sites
by providing formal legal status to alternative
standards.
Working plans: providing formal legal status for
alternative standards
On some occasions, waste management plants would
take waste loads if they could be treated by the plant
although they might not be allowed into the site under
the site licence. This occurred at the U.K. waste
treatment plant where I conducted field work and,
271
according to U.K. and German waste control officers, at
other sites. The site licence night have required that
the waste load should conform to the analysis of the
initial waste stream. Hence, taking in wastes if they
could be treated at the facility became an alternative
standard to the site licence standard. In some working
plans for U.K. sites I saw that operators had spelled out
that they were operating this practice. By being part of
the working plan this alternative standard would be part
of the standards of the site licence and hence become
part of the legal standards for operations at the site.
It would modify the list of wastes spelled out in the
site licence. The working plan stated:
"If the waste does not conform to the original
analysis the matter is referred to the plant
manager who decides if the plant has the
ability to handle the waste. If the plant can
accommodate the waste then permission is
obtained from the WDA and the waste producer
prior to discharge".
Also the working plan for another waste management
facility contained such an alternative standard:
"Waste not specified in Schedule B can not
normally be accepted. However, if the non-
specified wastes are present at trace levels
and are shown at pre-sampling to be treatable
within the plant, verbal consent can be
obtained from the PA. For waste with a higher
contamination level of a non-specified nature
written consent may be given by the PA subject
to a satisfactory treatment method. In
emergency situations, when immediate contact
with the PA is not possible i.e. outside of
working hours and it is thought that treatment
can be effected the waste can be collected and
transferred to [the waste management facility].
On	 arrival	 it	 is	 subject	 to	 normal
samplinq/analysis procedures".
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Thus, site licence standards could be adapted to actual
practices at plants through the working plan. In some
cases this could mean that customary practices to
circumvent site licence provisions could be elevated into
formal site licence standards.
Limits to adaptation of site licence standards to the
social practices of the regulated
Licences issued by the U.K. BA would not
completely copy the provisions of the working plan. In
connection with some issues the licence could override
the working plan by imposing different procedures than
the operator had envisaged. The operator was not
completely free to write the working plan the way he/she
wanted to, but the BA provided written guidance to
operators on what aspects of the operations of a waste
management facility should be covered. Thus, although
working plans gave the operator an opportunity to
influence the standards the PA miqht impose on his/her
process, there were limits to this. The BA would not
accept all procedures proposed. Part of the licensing
task was the critical scrutiny of working plans. In order
to explain negotiation it is not just important to look
at the relationship between legal frameworks and
negotiation but also take into account cultural aspects
in the interaction between the regulated and the PA.
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9.5. Negotiating within a framework of shared cultures
In this section I will illustrate that negotiation
about standards for compliance and what constitutes
compliance was conducted within a framework of partly
shared cultures. In fact shared cultures were an
important basis for negotiation. Shared culture means
shared knowledge, understandings and concerns. I will
refer to two examples which illustrate this: Firstly,
seeing conditions at a site through the eyes of the
regulated, and secondly, being sympathetic to commercial
considerations of the regulated.
Looking at the regulated process through the eyes of the
regulated
Sometimes the waste control officer would look at
the regulated process through the eyes of the regulated
by identifying with the role of manager of the regulated
process. The waste control officer would not perceive
himself as separate and distant from conditions at a site
but would have close knowledge of the concerns of staff
at the site, their pressures and problems. Hence, when
pointing out why implementation of legal provisions would
make sense from the point of view of the operator, waste
control officers would sometimes put themselves into the
operators' shoes. For example, at a landfill site a U.K.
waste control officer discussed with the site manager the
state of the road. The road into the quarry had to be
adapted as the quarry was filled in. The waste control
274
officer discussed in detail with the operator how the
road should be built and safety aspects of this.
Waste control officers could become so closely
involved that their job was not just about enforcing site
licence provisions but resembled more the job of the
manager of a site. At one U.K. waste management site lack
of implementation of legal requirements was reoccurring
and the site was frequently visited by a waste control
officer. A new manager had been temporarily assigned to
the site in order to deal with its problems and to
implement legal requirements. The waste control officer
made detailed suggestions on how the handling of waste
could be improved. He told the new manager:
'One of the things I would like to see is that
the people from the treatment plant help out
the people from the transfer station. Sometimes
there is not much to do at the treatment plant
and it would be good if the guys then would
just help out at the transfer station'.
The new manager replied to the waste control officer:
'Well, you are not getting paid for managing
this place'.
Waste control officers perceived management issues
such as how staff was deployed, qualifications of staff,
the co-ordination of various tasks at a site, as relevant
to the site's ability to implement legal provisions.
During a walk around the site the waste control officer
explained to me that a lack in the planning and
coordination of incoming and outgoing waste loads at a
waste transfer station caused problems of handling waste
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at the site and lead to the breach of site licence
conditions. The waste control officer explained that now
that the site manager had developed a new system for
managing waste movements. As a result of this the
situation at the site had improved because the manager
now had an overview of what was going on at the site. A
further aspect of shared cultures between the regulated
and the regulators could be that sometimes waste control
officers were sympathetic to commercial considerations of
the regulated.
Being sympathetic to commercial considerations of the
regulated
Some waste control officers felt that the U.K. RA's
management, such as team leaders, was emphasizing close
contact with waste management sites. As one U.K. waste
control officer explained:
'I think we go to sites too often. You become
part of things, you become part of the company.
You start talking to them like a company
representative. You get too close to things'.
If they [the management in the RA] are so keen
on the private sector they should go and work
for them'.
But also some waste control officers seemed to be
sympathetic to the idea that operators had to take into
account financial considerations when planning their
waste management facilities. The leader of the group of
German waste control officers who supervised waste
incineration plants told me that operators would usually
try in preliminary negotiations to lower the regulatory
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requirements the RP was asking for. According to him,
operators had to do this because otherwise they would not
be able to invest. Though each side tried to put their
case, negotiations between the RA and the regulated were
based on some shared understandings. One of these seemed
to be that they would only be required to do what they
could convince the BA they were able to do. Arguments
about the commercial ability of the operator to fulfil
requirements were part of this.
Furthermore,	 a frequently adopted negotiation
strategy of waste control officers in the field was to
point out that compliance was in the commercial interests
of the regulated. For example a U.K. waste control
officer told a site manager:
'You know it is to your advantage if you get
rid of those drums quicker because you will be
quoting the person who gives the stuff for
disposal to you and then it comes here and it
is just stored. Disposal prices go up all the
time and then if you pass the stuff on for
disposal you will be paying more than you
quoted for and you will be losing out on
money'.
Conforming with legal requirements could not just be
seen as implementing legal rules therefore, but also as
implementing other business values such as in this case
enhanced profitability from the faster turn-over of
waste. Similarly, during one visit to a waste management
site, a U.K. waste control officer told the operator that
it would be to his advantage to leave some space between
a row of drums. If the operator wanted to inspect at drum
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at the rear end of the hail he could do this more easily
if he left enough space. Otherwise the operator would
have to remove all the drums with the forklift to get to
a drum at the rear. During another walk around a site, a
U.K. waste control officer picked up lab smalls and asked
what chemicals they contained. The immediate site manager
did not know the answer. The U.K. waste control officer
told him that this should not happen. As a reason for
this the waste control officer did not refer to site
licence requirements but to the commercial aims of the
facility. The site was working towards registration for
the quality management standard BSI 5750 which could help
to improve marketing of its services. The waste control
officer argued that for registration with BSI 5750 the
site would have to be able to show to customers that they
could trace items of waste from their original
consignment to their final destination. Apart from shared
cultures between the regulated and the regulators the
context of the waste control officer's job is important
for explaining negotiation.
9.6. Explaining negotiation through the context of the
waste control officer's job
Negotiation as a way for waste control officers to "get
the job done"
Like the staff at the waste management plants, waste
control officers had "to get their job done" in the
context of various, and partly conflicting, demands.
278
Being a waste control officer required dealing with
various aims, such as promoting one's career,
'controlling' what waste management plants do and dealing
with expectations from the public about waste control
officers' work, as well as fulfilling organizational aims
of the PA. In my view, negotiation could help waste
control officers meet different demands of getting their
job done. For example, negotiating a solution to an
enforcement problem could enable officers to stay on
'good terms' with operators and at the same time fulfil a
task of 'social control' in steering operating practices
at facilities in the direction the PA perceived as
conforming with requirements.
Also, according to a U.K. waste control officer,
agreements negotiated in the field between him and the
regulated could be important for managing the supervision
of sites. He told me that the PA agreed with a waste
treatment plant operator that it would not take in
voluntarily certain waste streams although it was
licensed for it. The PA did not want the waste treatment
plant to take in these waste streams because the plant
had no equipment installed at the tanks to scrub
emissions from the waste loads. According to the waste
control officer, it was good that the PA had been able to
strike such an agreement with the regulated because
otherwise it would have been difficult to prevent the
regulated from taking in such loads.
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But some of the U.K. waste control officers also
perceived that negotiation with operators could make
their job more difficult. One of the drawbacks of
negotiation seemed to be that it could be used by the
operator as a delaying tactic and that it did not involve
clear steps of an aggravated enforcement response or time
limits, such as legal provisions provide starting with
prosecutions and leading ultimately to licence
revocation. At one U.K. site, a waste control officer had
spent a lot of time trying to deal through negotiation
with the recurring lack of implementation of site licence
provisions. He finally commented to me that he would
prefer the following system:
'You give them two slips in relation to a
complaint and then they get a letter and then
they get nicked'.
Needing to be "on good terms" with operators
The personal dimension of the relationship between
the regulated and the waste control officer could promote
a cooperative rather than an antagonistic approach,
involving negotiation in the field rather than the use of
criminal prosecutions. A U.K. waste control officer
explained to me:
'I have been on sites and served notices. I
have been Mr. Nasty but it is not a nice thing
to do and people stop to cooperate. If you ask
them a question they will simply say: 'I have
not been told, I don't know etc.', which makes
your job impossible'.
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Formal enforcement action such as serving notices
and criminal prosecution for failure to implement legal
provisions could be counter-productive for promoting what
U.K. waste control officers perceived as compliance. Also
in Germany criminal prosecutions were only be used as a
last resort because they could diminish the operatorvs
willingness to implement legal regulations. The waste
control officers did not want to promote a
confrontational stance. How important the German BA
considered this cooperation principle is also illustrated
by the statements made in an official press release by
the German BA. In this, the PA pointed to its success of
having reduced the amount of special waste arising in its
area. The BA stressed as a particularly positive aspect
of this achievement that these reductions were achieved
through cooperation between the PA and the relevant
industrial sectors. The press release specifically
mentioned that no authoritative legal instruments were
used, such as subsequent administrative orders or the
repeal of licences. Thus, cooperation with the regulated
- which had also the status of a formal principle in
Germany - was a practice in both the U.K. and German BA.
The impact of the relationship between the waste
control officer and the regulated on the collection of
information
For waste control officers, an important resource
for the collection of information about sites during
field visits was the personal relationship they developed
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with employees at a site. One U.K. waste control officer
told me that he would often stay at a site for a while,
for a coffee and a chat, in order to get to know trade
gossip and information about sites and the industry in
general.
Personal aspects of the relationship as a resource for
negotiation
Also operators tried to use the personal aspects of
the relationship between the regulated and the regulators
in order to promote a cooperative climate of negotiation.
As one waste control officer put it:
'People at sites: they send you Christmas cards
and ask how you are, they try to get on first
name terms with you'.
A U.K. waste control officer told me that operators would
try sometimes to get clearances over the phone from a
waste control officer for certain actions. According to
the waste control officer, the regulated would try
strategies as described above in order to create a 'good
relationship' with the waste control officer in which it
would be easier for the operator to ask for such
clearances. Thus, 'being on good terms' could be a two
way requirement that was perceived both by waste control
officers and operators as important to achieve their
respective aims.
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Cooperation approaches can make the use of prosecutions
more difficult
Some German and U.K. waste control officers thought
that a cooperative approach might make the use of
punitive sanctions - the last resort in cooperative
approaches - more difficult. According to a U.K. waste
control officer, taking out a prosecution against a site
where there had been recurring failure to observe site
licence provisions could be difficult. The operator would
argue that his practices had not attracted enforcement
action for some time. Therefore he was justified to think
that the waste control officer consented to the practices
operated at the site.
Similarly in the German BA it was perceived that
acquiescence to operating conditions or agreements in the
field which would lag behind legal standards could be
counterproductive. If the BA finally decided to take out
a prosecution the operator could try to argue that the BA
had allowed his activities. This was an especially
important factor in Germany because there waste control
officers can be charged with being an accessory to an
environmental crime if they have acquiesced in or allowed
what might be considered as criminal practices (Schönke-
Schröder, 1988, Vorbem. § 324 ff, Rz. 38,39,40,41).
Hence, the use of negotiation as the main enforcement
response had a self-maintaining social dynamic, in which
- once negotiation was used - it became more difficult to
use prosecutions.
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Limits to being 'on good terms' with operators
According to the U.K. waste control officer, the
fact that there could be a relationship between the
regulated and the waste control officer could be both a
resource and a barrier in enforcement work. On the one
hand a close working relationship was important for
gaining information about the regulated process. On the
other hand, according to a U.K. waste control officer it
could mean that he would lose his critical distance to
the regulated site. Some U.K. waste control officers
expressed their concern that they might start accepting
operating practices at a facility simply because they had
always been like that and the waste control officer
became familiar with them without questioning them.
Getting too close to the operator could be in conflict
with the control and enforcement role which waste control
officers perceived as part of their task.
Needing to be reasonable
Some U.K. waste control officers considered it
important to be seen to act reasonably in their dealings
with operators. In an exchange with an operator at a site
where, in the view of the R/, there had been repeated
non-compliance a waste control officer said to a director
of the company:
'Well, I get upset when I have to repeat myself
and when the staff do not answer my questions'.
I try to be reasonable. I write letters if I do
not get a reaction to what I say and then at
the end the next step is prosecution. You just
do what the next step is'.
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Another U.K. waste control officer told an operator:
'You know I try to be reasonable, if you give a
reason why you can not use the shredder then
this is airight. Then I know why you could not
move the drums from the shredder hall'.
The issue here was that the operator stored waste
drums in the shredder hail despite the fact that this
part of the waste management facility was not licensed
for the storage of waste. The waste control officer tried
to describe his enforcement efforts as reasonable. He
indicated that if the operator would provide reasons for
the failure to implement legal provisions this would show
to the waste control officer that at least efforts had
been made. Waste control officers tried to promote the
normative appeal of legal provisions by pointing out that
conditions were reasonable. Waste control officers would
not tell operators in the field: "This is the law and
therefore you have to conform to it". Instead they would
point out that their demands were not just legal but
reasonable with reference to a common sense understanding
of the situation. Thus, reasonableness rather than formal
legality became a justification for requirements for
legal compliance.
Apart from pressures to be on good terms and to be
reasonable, waste control officers also had to consider
the advancement of their careers when organizing their
enforcement work. A German waste control officer
explained that when considering what tasks to tackle for
enforcement he would focus on those which would promise
success. According to him, it was important to choose
285
those enforcement tasks that would help to portray a
positive image of his work efforts. There could be
further organizational and enforcement incentives for
negotiation.
Organizational and enforcement incentives for negotiation
Instead of serving formal administrative orders it
was conuuon for German waste control officers to negotiate
an agreement with the operator and then write an entry
about it in the file ("Vermerk"). According to the leader
of the group of waste control officers who were
supervising waste incineration plants, one of the
advantages of using informal agreements was that they did
not require the waste control officer to observe all the
technical legal procedures he would have to refer to when
serving a formal administrative order on the operator.
This meant less opportunity for making mistakes and less
opportunity for being criticized in case something went
wrong. 'Informal' ways of interaction could shield a
waste control officer's actions from legal and
organizational accountability.
A German, waste control officer told me that she
tried to avoid formal legal provisions and relied on
negotiated agreements instead of administrative orders
("Anordnungen") when requiring an operator of a waste
management facility to do something. In her view, if she
did not use formal legal measures then also the operator
would not be able to use the formal objection procedure
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("Widerruf") which would most likely complicate and
prolong sorting out an issue. Thus, 'informal' ways of
interaction between the regulated and the RA could also
involve depriving operators of formal legal remedies.
9.7. Conclusion
Negotiation plays an important role in what becomes
defined in practice as compliance. Negotiation was a
pervasive feature in the interaction between the
regulated and the RA both in Germany and the U.K. It was,
however, not uniformly applied to all operators.
Negotiation seemed to be particularly used in connection
with larger operators and complex sites. Negotiation
could replace the use of criminal sanctions or other
legal forms for shaping behaviour of the RA, such as the
VA.
Waste control officers would not just try to
negotiate standards with the regulated but would also try
to negotiate the normative appeal of legal provisions.
Thus, in the field it was not a formal normative appeal
of the law that seemed to count. Instead, waste control
officers would attempt to provide incentives for
compliance by reference to non-legal social orders like
commercial aims and reasonableness. Bargaining between
the BA and the regulated is not just carried out "jn the
shadow of the law" but also in the shadow of the actual
social practices at waste management sites. This is
achieved through consultation at the site licensing
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stage, through waste control officers' knowledge of sites
and through working plans. One reason for this is
probably that apart from the guidance in WNP no.4 there
are not much legal provisions on the contents of site
licences (see also section 6 (2) COPA 1974) . Furthermore
negotiation can be promoted by shared cultures between
the waste control officers and waste management
operators. Finally, also the context of the waste control
officer's job is important for understanding negotiation.
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CHAPTER 10: INFORMATION AND PERCEPTIONS ABOUT WASTE
MANAGEMENT FACILITIES
10.1 Iiitroduction
In the following chapter I want to explore what role
information plays in the construction of notions of
compliance and non-compliance. How and what information
is collected about regulated sites? How do we know what
is compliance? How do the regulated know; how do the
regulators know? What are the limits to gaining
information about regulated sites?
Information is a key resource in interaction between
the regulated and the regulators. The RA bases its
evaluations of whether the regulated are complying on
information they obtain about a regulated waste
management facility. What aspects of the relationship
between the regulated and the RA influence how
information is evaluated?
10.2. How do waste control officers gain information
about waste management facilities?
Information gathered from the office and from the field:
differences between the U.K. and the German BA
There were differences in the way supervision of
waste management sites was carried out in the German and
U.K. RA. In the German RA, waste control officers stayed
most of the time in the office and worked from their
desks. In contrast, in the U.K. RA, waste control
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officers spent most of their time in the field visiting
waste management sites. Thus, in evaluating if facilities
were in conformity with legal regulations the German and
U.K. waste control officers would draw on different types
of information about the regulated process.
One of the reasons why the German waste control
officers spent most of their time in the office was that
the supervision and licensing of sites was not handled by
different groups of waste control officers but had been
merged into a single unit. The German waste control
officers were now assigned a range of waste management
facilities for which they were responsible both for
licensing and supervision. According to the German waste
control officers, this meant that they had to spend more
time on the task of licensing than on supervision. There
might have been also other reasons why the German waste
control officers spent more time in the office. According
to a German waste control officer, going out to field
visits did not carry much prestige. One of the reasons
for this was that field visits were considered as a task
which did not require as much qualifications as the
licensing of facilities. The waste control officer
explained that being at the desk and thus in the office
was important for advancing one's career through being
visible and interacting with colleagues and section
leaders. My observations confirmed this. I observed that
a considerable amount of time was spent by the waste
control officers who dealt with waste incineration plants
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on meetings with their leaders in the RA to discuss and
agree issues such as strategies of dealing with
operators. In what circumstances would German waste
control officers visit a site?
In the German RA. there seemed to be two main
situations in which waste control officers would visit
waste disposal sites. Firstly, sites would be visited if
there were specific complaints about them, for example
from neighbours ("Anlal3ttherwachung"). Secondly, sites
would be visited at the end of the building phase. Under
German waste management law the licensing of a waste
disposal facility under § 7 (1) AbfG includes the
granting of planning permission for the development to be
carried out for setting up the waste disposal operations
( vv Konzentrationswirkung U ) .
 German waste control officers
would visit sites after the building operations had
finished in order to determine if they had been carried
out in conformity with the planning permission in the
licence.
In the U.K. RA., the tasks of licensing and
supervision of waste management facilities were
separated. There was a separate group of waste control
officers whose only task was to supervise waste
management facilities by visiting them and to a limited
extent by checking written information such as section 17
notes. There was another group of waste control officers
whose task it was to draw up licences for waste
management facilities. Sometimes these waste control
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officers would also visit waste management sites in order
to gather information for the licensing procedure but
they would supervise sites.
The German waste control officers had less field
experience to draw on when evaluating sites. They had
less detailed and practical knowledge about sites than
U.K. waste control officers. They would not necessarily
get to know about possible lack of implementation of
legal provisions "on the ground". This could influence
what they perceived as compliance or non-compliance.
Problems with relying on information about waste
management sites to which access could be gained from the
office
The quality of information which could be accessed
in the office could be limited. A German waste control
officer told me that written information would not always
portray an accurate picture of a regulated site. For
example, there would be changes in the process in
practice but operators would not always send new plans to
the RP.. On some site visits to which I accompanied German
waste control officers the officer asked the operator to
provide new plans of the site to the RA because what the
process looked like in practice did not tally in all
respects with the plans the operator had sent in earlier.
Relying on information from the office could
influence what the German waste control officers
understood as compliance. I accompanied a German waste
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control officer on a visit to a waste incineration plant
he had licensed and which was in the process of being
built. He had required in the licence special building
provisions for the collection of rainwater at the site in
order to prevent contaminated water from the area of the
waste incineration plant seeping into the surrounding
soil. When inspecting the building site the waste control
officer told me that he was frustrated to see that what
he had intended to get implemented through the licence
apparently was not realized in practice. The pipes were
not properly laid and the foundations were not right
either. The waste control officer remarked:
'The applicant submits his licence application
and on paper everything looks fine and good and
then later in practice it looks completely
different'.
Some German waste control officers said that various
sources of information about the regulated process,
including visits, were important for the supervision of
sites. According to one waste control officer in the
German BA, however, a good licensing procedure could
reduce the need for supervision of a waste management
facility through visits. During the licensing procedure
the waste control officer would see so much information
about the plant and check this thoroughly that there was
less need for close supervision of the process. A good
licence was supposed to put standards into place, so that
the enforcement of them through site visits would be less
important. In my view, however, in the absence of
information about the state of a site, for example
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through site visits, waste control officers had no way of
knowing if the site was operating according to the
licence.
This was confirmed by the view of another waste
control officer who said that air emission data from a
waste incineration facility which under a new project
were planned to be submitted to the via a computer
link could only provide a limited account of the
regulated process. In his view it was important to get
impressions also of other parts of the regulated process.
A focus on the supervision of air emissions could mean
that other possible areas for lack of implementation of
legal provisions could be neglected such as the handling
of the contaminated slag produced in the incineration
process.
"Incident supervision" in the German RP
According to a German waste control officer, the
term to describe the supervision of waste management
facilities in the area of the German R1 was "incident
supervision" ("Anlal3Uberwachung"). Supervision visits
would be carried out only if there was a particular
incident such as complaints by neighbours about a
facility. According to the waste control officer, this
meant few supervision visits. Not every neighbour would
complain about emissions above the limits spelled out in
the licence for a waste management facility. Hence,
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failure to implement legal provisions would not
necessarily come to the attention of the RA.
In one of the files on the supervision of a German
waste disposal site waste control officers had recorded
their observations when they visited a site after they
had received a complaint about dust emissions. It was
noted that the officers saw quite a few things at the
site which were not in conformity with the site licence.
For example, contrary to the site licence the waste
disposal plant had never sent the monthly figures on
incoming and outgoing waste to the RP.
Furthermore the waste control officers detected
discrepancies between information in the site diary on
the emptying of oil traps and interceptors and the
TTactually carried out measures". Information on the
invoices about the frequency of the work carried out by
the companies who emptied the oil trap and the
interceptor did not tally with the information recorded
in the site diary. Also, according to the site licence
the waste disposal plant was supposed to be a member of a
self-regulatory provision which consisted of a
supervision team set up by the trade association. But the
plant was not a member yet. Unless the officers would
have visited the site in connection with the complaint it
would have been unlikely that they would have found out
about the failure to implement other legal provisions at
the site.
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"Incident supervision" in the German RA involved
less field visits than were carried out in the U.K. RA.
It meant less information about operating practices "on
the ground" of waste management facilities. This could
influence what aspects of the operating practices of the
regulated became evaluated as conforming or not
conforming with legal provisions. Some failures to
implement legal provisions will remain below the
threshold of attention and knowledge of waste control
officers.
Organizational issues and the collection of information
The way different tasks were organized in the RA
could influence what the waste control officer would be
able to define as implementation of legal provisions or
failure to implement them. A U.K. waste control officer
told me that not he but a different unit in the PA was
responsible for dealing with section 17 notes which
contained information about the waste loads that the
waste management plant took in. Thus, he did not really
know what waste loads were coming into the waste
management plants he supervised.
This was, however, important in order to evaluate if
the plant only took in wastes for which it was licensed.
The unit which dealt with section 17 notes would only
give the notes to him if a new waste stream caine into the
plant. Since the waste control officer did not routinely
see all the section 17 notes for the waste management
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sites he was supervising he did not know when waste had
been brought into a site. This made it difficult to
monitor the site licence requirement that waste should
only be stored for a certain amount of time at a transfer
station. Thus, the way how the waste control officer's
task was organized in the RA could have an impact on the
kind of information he would have about the regulated
process. This in turn would influence what would come to
be evaluated as conformity with site licence provisions.
Overall perceptions of sites rather than implementation
of individual site licence conditions counts
It seems that when evaluating a site, what mattered
was an overall perception of the site, not the question
whether conditions were implemented in a very detailed
manner. A U.K. waste control officer went on a
supervision visit to a site which usually involved a walk
around the site and a conversation with the site manager.
The site handled waste oils. After the visit the U.K.
waste control officer told me:
'The yard is very good, it has good concrete
and is very clean'.
This statement was basically a positive assessment of the
limited pollution potential of this site. There was
little oil contamination that could for example affect
the groundwater. The officer's perception was not an
evaluation of the implementation of detailed site licence
conditions.
297
Similarly during another site visit a different
waste control officer told me that:
'You see by instinct if a site is alright. You
know with this site it is clean, the yard
surface is alright'.
Perceptions of the regulated process would not just
be related to conformity with legal rules in a narrow
sense but seemed to encompass a broader view of what is a
'good' site. In files on the supervision of German waste
management facilities there would be no entries that said
for example "condition 6 of the licence for this process
is complied with". Instead file entries said things like
"no irregularities", "good housekeeping" etc. Also the
enforcement policy of the U.K. RP in relation to licensed
sites said:
"The assessment of waste disposal activities
can be highly subjective [my emphasis] and the
topic does not lend itself to be structured
within a set of hard and fast rules [my
emphasis]. For this reason, this policy relies
on the experience [my emphasis] of all officers
who have cause to monitor sites, who shall have
regard for advice that may be given by HMIP,
other appropriate advice and in particular to
specific policies that may be determined by the[local government coinniittee]. Where incidents
are witnessed or breaches of conditions are
noticed this must be drawn to the attention of
the [manager] of the relevant division".
Thus, cultural knowledge of waste control officers
acquired over years by experience would be relevant for
assessing sites not just legal norms. This also indicates
that sites empirical compliances was assessed on an
individual basis rather than on the basis of uniform
rules applied across the board without considerations for
site specific circumstances.
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A focus on 'visible' aspects of a waste management site
Evaluations of waste management sites by U.K. waste
control officers hinged on particular aspects of it. The
main supervision activity of U.K. waste control officers
were visits to waste management sites which involved
walks around the site and conversations with, usually, a
site manager or site chemist. Supervision of the
regulated process seemed to focus particularly on the
visible aspects of it. Hence, what became evaluated as
compliance or non-compliance was often what could be seen
during a supervision visit. What became evaluated as
compliance or non-compliance could be just one chunk out
of a range of activities that could have been evaluated.
Written documents about the regulated process like
site diaries etc. which operators were required to keep
under the site licence seemed to be seldom used in
enforcement practice both in the U.K. and German R1..
During site visits to which I accompanied waste control
officers they would seldom ask the operator to show them
site diaries etc. Most of the information waste control
officers gathered and on which they based evaluations
about 'compliance' of a waste management site was visual
information. This was derived from inspecting the process
and securing explanatory information from a site employee
about the situation at the plant.
Some German waste control officers said that they
had not much time for the supervision of sites and thus
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they had even less time to look through paper work on the
sites. Furthermore some of the U.K. waste control
officers told me that one of the reasons why they had
chosen to become a waste control officer was that they
did not want to sit in an office sifting through papers.
Instead they were keen to go out to site visits at waste
management facilities.
Thus, when evaluating if behaviour was in conformity
with legal provisions the waste control officer focussed
on a particular type of information and thus on a
particular aspect of the regulated process. Site diaries
would allow for example checking to see if the waste
taken into the site by the operator conformed to the
range of waste the facility was allowed to take in
according to the site licence.
Visual inspections of the process through a site
visit would focus more on issues like was there any
equipment that was malfunctioning, how was the waste
treated, incinerated, stored landfilled etc. Were basic
requirements for the type of operation complied with? For
example, was the waste only stored in the area that was
licensed, was the landfilled waste adequately covered at
the end of the working-day etc.?
What becomes evaluated as compliance or non-compliance?
Visible aspects of a waste management facility
seemed to be more likely to be evaluated for conformity
with legal provisions than more complex and less visible
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aspects, such as procedures for the inspection and
analysis of incoming waste. This was the case when I
accompanied a U.K. waste control officer to site visits.
The walk around the site usually would not involve the
checking of the procedure used.
On one occasion, since it was raining, the waste
control officer went into the site laboratory. This was
quite a rudimentary laboratory consisting of a small
porta cabin with a sink, a ph-meter an ion counting
machine and one kit of Merck dip kit strips for zinc. The
U.K. waste control officer explained to me that this was
only a small laboratory where the waste loads arriving at
the facility would be checked for conformity with the
description given by the producer of an initial sample of
the waste stream.
According to the waste control officer, a full
analysis of the initial samples of waste streams was
carried out in a bigger laboratory when the waste stream
was first offered to the treatment plant. The U.K. waste
control officer did not say if in his opinion the small
laboratory was adequate to test incoming waste loads for
conformity with the site licence restrictions on the kind
of waste which could be taken into the facility. Given
the fact that at the time that I saw this laboratory
there was only testing equipment for one heavy metal i.e.
zinc, it is questionable if incoming wastes could be
assessed as being able to be taken in under the site as
required under the site licence.
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Standard forms
The occasional use of standard forms in the U.K. RZ\.
for writing reports on site visits seemed also to promote
a focus on particular aspects of a site. These preprinted
forms contained boxes that could be ticked in order to
indicate the state of a waste management facility. These
forms had a general common format but were individualized
according to what particular type of facility they should
describe - a landfill site, a waste treatment site, a dry
waste transfer station etc.
These forms promoted the development of particular
images of waste management facilities. They listed issues
for site supervision which focused particularly on the
visible aspects of the operations such as "pipework,
conditions of yard surfaces, security, lighting, primary
road vv
 etc. Other issues which were also regulated through
site licence conditions were less prominent. Some of
these were important, such as the condition relating to
the checking and analysis of incoming wastes. This would
be important in order to assess conformity with the list
of wastes that a facility was allowed to take in under
its site licence. But the preprinted forms did not refer
to such procedures.
There was the category "waste type - e.g. difficult
or other wastes" on the preprinted form. But this section
appeared to provide only an opportunity to tick if such
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waste was taken in or not at the inspected facility, not
to state how it was analyzed or if it was analyzed.
Furthermore there was nothing on the preprinted form
for the treatment plants that would refer to the site
licence provisions that waste should only be accepted if
it had been sampled and analyzed beforehand. This was
despite the fact that there would usually be in site
licences a couple of conditions relating to the sampling
and analysis of waste loads arriving at a site. There
also seemed to be no category on the preprinted report
forms which referred to another frequent site licence
provision for treatment plants. This was that discharge
pits should be cleaned out in case incompatible loads
were discharged.
How important this procedure is is illustrated by
the fact that a serious accident occurred at one
treatment site which was caused by non-adherence to this
procedure. Toxic fumes were emitted from the discharge
pit where a waste load which was discharged reacted with
the rest of a previous waste load in the pit. The site
was prosecuted by the U.K. R7 3. for this accident.
On the preprinted forms there was no item that dealt
with the amount of waste that a facility was allowed to
take in. The preprinted report forms in the U.K. R7
covered only a segment of legal requirements of the site
licence. They seemed to focus particularly on visible and
static aspects of site operations rather than procedures
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for handling waste. Thus, standard forms might contribute
to the creation of particular images of regulated
facilities. These images put the spotlight on the
evaluation of certain aspects of the operations for
evaluations of compliance at the expense of others.
10.3. Limits of the PA to gaining information about waste
management facilities
Introduction
After having outlined in the previous section what
are sources of information about regulated waste
management sites I want to illustrate in this section
what are constraints on the collection of information
about sites by waste control officers.
Difficulties in collecting meaningful information
It could be difficult for waste control officers to
get meaningful information about waste management sites.
Unless information could be collected over a period of
time, no more than just a "snapshot picture" of the
regulated process would be provided, that is, information
that could be limited or misleading. While the U.K. PA
did undertake continuous visits to sites over some time,
in some situations, information about a site remained a
mere "snapshot". The operator of a waste incineration
plant told me that a consultant had tested air emissions
of the incinerator. According to the operator, these test
reports did not provide an accurate picture of the
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process. He told me that the report only showed
conformity with air emission standards for that day. But
on another day with a different waste composition the
emissions tests might produce different results.
In Germany too, a waste control officer told me that
he found it difficult to get an insight into the
regulated process for similar reasons. According to him,
he would only get a global and general rather than a
detailed understanding of a waste management process
during site visits. He could get to know for example the
state of repairs at the facility, the general condition
the plant was in and its overall cleanliness. But he
would not get to know 'details'. In his view operators
would often show around officers and hence he would only
see what he was supposed to see. Thus, difficulties for
collecting information about the regulated process could
be related to the "snapshot picture" nature of some of
the information. Another difficulty for collecting
meaningful information about the regulated process could
be that information sometimes had to be collected in
adverse circumstances.
Collecting information in adverse circumstances
Collecting information about the regulated process
was not always easy. A U.K. waste control officer
explained to me:
'Operators can be funny. They let you wait a
long time and then I walked into the room and
[an employee at the site] said: 'I think the
room is full already'.
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The waste control officer continued:
'I did not know what to say because it would
have been immediately confrontational, so I
just left the room'.
According to a U.K. waste control officer, some
operators would be reluctant to provide information about
their process because they argued that certain
information was commercially confidential. For example,
one waste incineration plant which operated a new process
did not want to provide information about it. According
to a licensing officer, this made the task of licensing
and regulating the facility through conditions more
difficult.
One U.K. waste control officer told me that on a few
occasions, officers had been asked not to come onto a
site or had been assaulted by operators. According to
him, sometimes waste control officers would go out to
site visits in pairs because this would help to
corroborate information collected at sites and would make
them less vulnerable to the risk of physical attacks.
Information about "moving targets"
Limits to gaining information about the regulated
process could make the evaluation of a process as
conforming or not conforming to site licence standards
more difficult. To some extent, what was to be evaluated
appeared to be a "moving target". It could be difficult
to describe waste both in the U.K. and Germany. A sample
of a waste stream would be brought into the German or
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U.K. laboratory for a detailed analysis. This analysis
might find that the waste could be treated and taken into
the plant.
Sometimes, however, when the actual waste load
arrived at the yard the waste was quite different and in
fact could not be treated. According to the U.K.
laboratory technician, this could be due to the fact that
the selection of samples was not necessarily
representative of a load. When a sales person took a
sample of the waste he might only collect waste front the
top part but not from the lower depth of a liquid where
the waste composition could be different. Sometimes it
was difficult to obtain representative samples of waste
streams even if a better sampling technique would be
applied. Particularly at the German waste management
plant, it was nearly impossible to take representative
samples of heterogeneous waste loads. That information
about waste might be difficult to collect because waste
loads could be a "moving target" could be utilized by the
regulated in order to show that they were implementing
legal provisions.
How information about "moving targets" was strategically
managed at the German waste management facility
Difficulties in describing wastes could be used by
the regulated to manage and produ.ce a perception of
compliance. According to one of the employees from the
yard of the German waste management plant, the system for
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testing wastes for conformity with acceptance parameters
of final disposers could be strategically managed. A
waste sample could be taken in such a way that it could
produce conformity with the acceptance parameters. The
waste could be quite heterogeneous so that a sample would
not necessarily take in all of the waste components of a
waste load. This could assist the German waste management
plant in achieving compliance with acceptance parameters
of final disposers.
Some of the more 'problematic' substances such as a
load of paint waste that contained a high concentration
of chlorinated solvents, could be left out from the
sampling. An analysis of the sample would then show a
level of chlorinated solvents in the analysis that would
be acceptable to the final disposer.
According to one of the employees working on the
yard, this system of taking samples selectively worked on
a rather subtle level. According to him, it could be
detected from the foreman's tone of voice, when he gave
an order to take a sample of a waste load, if he wanted
to have the waste load approved in the analysis through
the laboratory or if he wanted it rejected. The employee
would ensure a suitable waste mix in the sample
accordingly.
Thus what information would be provided to the BA
could be influenced to some extent by the German waste
management plant. This could be strategically managed so
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that information about the waste load could show
conformity with the acceptance parameters of final waste
disposers. But a different sample of the load might have
showed non-compliance.
According to the staff from the German laboratory,
the analysis of samples for solid wastes only were
indicative of the sample rather than the waste stream as
a whole. Retesting done on a different portion of waste
from the waste sample was sometimes carried out and could
lead to completely different results.
These analyses were nevertheless carried out on a
routine basis and carefully recorded and supplied with
the "EN" to the RA. The EtA would authorize or reject the
"EN" on the basis of this information. The legal
provisions of the "EN", however, envisaged that the
analysis would provide information about the waste
stream, not just the particular waste sample tested.
Another reason for difficulties in describing waste
loads accurately was that waste loads could be
contaminated by previous waste loads. At the U.K. waste
treatment plant, if a tanker would not be washed out
between carrying two loads the second load sampled could
contain traces from the first load.
Trust, self-regulation and information
It seems that in some situations the German EtA would
rely more on trust or on what it perceived as indicators
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of conformity with legal provisions rather than complete
information. Some requirements about the provision of
information to the RP. had a self-regulatory element. In a
number of cases the frequency of monitoring could be
reduced if certain results were obtained. In a German
site licence it was agreed that if weekly test results
showed to the German RP. that parameters were observed
then the testing frequency could be reduced to a monthly
interval.
The RA had no means of knowing if during the period
of reduced testing there would in fact be observance of
discharge parameters. In the absence of information about
this, trust in the regulated's behaviour would be
required. Hence, perceptions of a site based on
indicators such as conformity with emission limits over a
certain period of time could influence if a site was or
was not considered as implementing legal provisions.
Evaluations of a site as conforming with legal provisions
would not necessarily be based on complete or continuous
information about sites.
Information asymmetry: The regulated know more about the
regulated process than the waste control officers
Some of the German waste control officers thought
that the operator of a waste management plant had an
advantage over them as far as information about the
regulated process was concerned. As one German waste
control officer put it:
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'Technically and as far as his knowledge is
concerned the operator is always one step
ahead. You have to ask the operator what it is
he is doing'.
A waste control officer told me that in her view the
regulated knew their process and its particular problems
best. Hence, only the regulated would really know how to
solve particular technical process problems that lead to
a failure to observe legal provisions.
Also, one of the leaders of a team of German waste
control officers told me that it was impossible for them
to supervise exactly what waste loads were going into the
plant. If a plant could technically handle a particular
waste stream but was not licensed for it then it was not
possible for the waste control officer to get to know
about this and prevent it. According to him, this was an
aspect of the operations that was outside the scope of
knowledge and control by the waste control officers.
10.4. Information and the management of trust
Introduction
Information provided by the regulated about their
process was an important resource in negotiations about
standards for compliance. Information about a waste
management facility did not exist in a vacuum but was
traded in the relationship between the regulated and the
RAs. How information became evaluated and utilized could
be influenced by the relationship that exists between the
regulated and the RAs. In this section I want to look at
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one aspect of this relationship, the management of trust,
and the way it might have an impact on information.
Information, trust and negotiation
Negotiation between the regulated and the regulators
required a degree of trust between them. For example,
during supervision visits the waste control officer would
have to ask the operator about the state of the
operations at the site. Sometimes waste control officers
had no way of knowing if information provided by site
employees was accurate. Also the decision to trust or not
to trust information provided by staff could determine if
the waste control officer would probe further or accept
an explanation. Trust was necessary in order to build up
a relationship and get a conversation going. Waste
control officers could not always pursue suspicions and
questions.
At a German waste incineration plant a waste control
officer asked the operator during a visit if measuring
devices were available in the room from which the
employees operated the loading of the incinerator. The
operator replied that some measuring devices were
available in this room. Otherwise the shift supervisor
would tell the employees if there would be a rise in the
emission of particular substances. Thus the loading of
the incinerator could be adjusted accordingly. The waste
control officer seemed to accept this explanation and did
not question it further. But he could not know if this
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was an accurate account of what happened in reality on a
day to day basis.
Risks in the negotiation of standards
To trust operators was not necessarily perceived as
an easy task by waste control officers. One German waste
control officer said that operators sometimes did not
promote trust into them. For example, on one occasion
while she was visiting a site a waste control officer had
noticed the following. Under the site licence the
operator was required to use a carbon filter to scrub
flue gas emissions. But he had simply switched off the
carbon filter. The instrument for measuring the 11e gas
emissions had been switched on as required by the site
licence. The control measurements were carried out but
without the carbon filter. According to the waste control
officer, this story illustrated that trust into operators
that they would implement site licence requirements could
be sometimes misplaced.
One of the reasons why trust might be a problem in
the interaction between the regulated and the regulators
is that negotiation and the exchange of information
occurred in what was ultimately an adversarial situation.
According to a German waste control officer, negotiations
with operators for the licensing of large plants could be
a task that would require considerable skill. The waste
control officer explained that during the negotiation
sessions the operator would also take notes on what had
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been said and agreed. In order to keep control of the
events it was necessary for the waste control officer to
have 'experience, a good memory and integrity'. According
to the waste control officer, operators would sometimes
try to contest what was said during such meetings. Also,
at the end of a negotiation session between an operator
and the BA which I observed a senior representative of
the BA told the operator that it would not make sense if
different versions of events would appear in the
operator's and the BA's protocol of the session. This
illustrates that to some extent the relationship between
the regulated and the BA might have been adversarial.
Conflicting views on the contents of negotiations could
be one aspect of this.
Trust, poker and "manoeuvering through the backdoor"
Waste control officers could not always check out
the reliability of some of the information provided by
operators. Thus, one difficulty in negotiations could be
to what extent the PA would trust information provided by
the operator. For example, a German operator of a waste
storage facility and a waste control officer negotiated
the kind of waste the plant would be allowed to take in.
The waste control officer said that fly ash and slag from
waste incineration plants should be excluded. The
operator then suggested that they wanted to take in
"gypsum waste with noxious contaminants" ("Gipsabfalle
mit schädlichen Verunreinigungen"). The officer probed
during the negotiations with the operator what sort of
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wastes the operator wanted to take into the plant under
this description. The officer explained during the
meeting that he wanted to prevent the operator from
taking in residues from waste incineration under this
waste description 'through the backdoor'.
The leader of a team of German waste control
officers who supervised waste incineration plants
referred to problems in trusting the regulated during
negotiations for a licensing procedure. He said that he
was not quite sure how much the operator really knew
about his process and thus how good the information he
was providing was to th RP.. Re. c	 tte.ci or
saying that the operator 'sits there with his poker
face'.
Limits to information about the regulated process
meant that waste control officers had to decide on what
aspects they would trust the regulated's statement about
the waste management facility and on what aspects they
decided to probe. A German waste control officer was
involved in the definition of the start-up, shut-down and
normal operating status of a waste incineration plant.
She told me that this was an issue where she had to trust
the operator about the information he provided. It was
all detailed and experience-based information that only
the operator could have.
Furthermore, during a visit to a building waste
recycling facility, a German waste control officer
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checked if a licence condition had been implemented.
According to the licence condition, no permanent work
places should be created in the hall where building waste
was presorted. During the site visit the waste control
officers saw two employees sorting building waste by
hand. The waste control officer asked if there were
permanent work places at the site for presorting building
waste. The operator replied:
'Well, in principle not but sometimes large
pieces which the GCB can not move have to be
sorted out. But otherwise we do not sort by
hand'.
Another waste control officer continued:
'So, you mean the work description 'sorting'
does not exist?'
The operator replied:
'No'.
It seems that from the operator's statements the waste
control officers concluded that no permanent work place
'sorting of building rubble' existed.
10.5. Conclusion
In this chapter I illustrated that information about
regulated waste management sites is not a straightforward
concept. Several factors have an impact on what is
information for the purposes of evaluating compliance
with legal requirements at waste management sites. Waste
control officers do not get to know all possible
information about a site but the information they get
constitutes a segment out of the possible range of
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information that could be obtained about a site. There
are several factors that influence what segment of
information waste control officers get to know about
waste management sites. Firstly, there are practical
limits on what information they can gain about the
regulated sites. According to some waste control
officers, there is an information asymmetry between the
regulated and the waste control officers. Operators who
run day-to-day their waste management process know it
better than waste control officers. Furthermore, it seems
to be in the nature of waste loads that they frequently
change and are difficult to pin down by accurate
descriptions. These difficulties in describing waste
loads can assist the regulated in demonstrating
compliance to the RA. Testing procedures can be adapted,
in the case of heterogeneous waste loads, so that the
test results show compliance with waste acceptance
parameters. Secondly, the way waste control officers!
work is organized can influence what kind of information
waste control officers obtain about the regulated sites.
The licensing and supervision of waste management
facilities was merged into a single unit in the German
PA. This meant that the German waste control officers had
less time than their English counter parts to collect
information about regulated sites through field visits.
Thirdly, supervision practice leads to a focus on the
collection of a particular type of information about
regulated sites at the expense of others. It seemed that
waste control officers collected information particularly
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on the visible aspects of running a waste management site
at the expense of more complex and difficult aspects such
as procedures for the testing of incoming waste loads.
Also, waste control officers seemed to be more concerned
with an overall picture of a site rather than the
detailed implementation of particular site licence
conditions when evaluating sites for compliance.
Fourthly, what becomes understood as information is
influenced by the fact that information is exchanged in
the partly adversarial relationship between the regulated
and the RA. What becomes accepted or not as 'information'
can be influenced by interpersonal aspects of this
relationship, such as trust. What is perceived as valid
information about the regulated process in turn
influences what is understood as compliance or non-
compliance.
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CHAPTER 11: HOW DO OPERATORS MANAGE INFORMATION AND
PERCEPTIONS ABOUT WASTE MANAGEMENT SITES?
11.1. Introduction
In the following chapter I will explore how the
regulated manage information and, through this,
perceptions of regulated sites. Can the management of
information assist the regulated both in achieving what
they want to do and at the same time being considered as
complying with legal provisions? On what basis do the
regulated and the regulators know what is compliance? How
do we know? Ultimately, these questions are concerned
with the nature of information. Is information neutral or
can it be partisan? In this chapter I will explore what
impact different scope and types of information about a
regulated waste management facility have on the
evaluation of a site as conforming or not conforming with
legal provisions. What are strategies used by the
regulated to manage perceptions of their sites?
11.2. The management of perceptions at site licensing
stage
U.K. licensing officers told me that information
presented in licence applications could be used by
operators to invoke a particular image of the regulated
process. Thus, it was necessary to check information
provided in documents submitted for licence applications.
For example, an operator had applied for a dry waste
transfer station. The licence had been given for comments
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to an officer from the enforcement section of the U.K.
RA. He noted:
'I was not quite sure what was fact and what
was fantasy. I am concerned about the hospital
waste. In its worst reading it will be a
clinical waste transfer station'.
Operators in some cases were vague on the actual
shape of their operations. Setting standards for sites
during licensing required questioning some of the images
of a process presented by an operator. This was necessary
in order to regulate the actual activities going on at a
site rather than regulating the activities at the site as
described in the licence application. The actual
activities at sites might be different from descriptions
of them in the licence application.
Information and control at the stage of site licensing
What and how much information is provided by the
regulated at the stage of site licensing can influence
the scope of control of the RA over the site. The
following story illustrates how the management of the
supply of information by the regulated could influence to
what extent they would be regulated through site licence
conditions.
According to the leader of the group of German waste
control officers who supervised waste incineration
plants, the German RA had been able to write an air
emission limit for dioxin into one licence which was
below the requirements of the legal regulations of the
17. BimschV (17. BimschV. vom 23. Nov. 1990, BGBL. I S.
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2545, ber. S. 2832). He explained that the PA had been
able to do this 'because the operator had made a
mistake'.
During the preliminary negotiations about the site
licence the operator had specified what sort of
incineration technology and what type of pollution
abatement equipment he would install. The BA then knew
how much dioxin the plant would roughly emit and with
what emission limit the plant would be technically able
to comply. The PA wrote an according emission standard in
the licence which was below the legal requirements which
the BA would have otherwise chosen as a standard. The
leader of the group of waste control officers who
supervised waste incineration plants told me that because
the operator's technology could conform with this low
standard the operator could not argue against it. This
example shows that in some cases the detailed supply of
information can expose the operator to more or stricter
regulation by the PA than would be the case if the BA
knew less.
Providing insufficient information
A common difficulty both for the German and U.K. PA
at the stage of licensing was that often the prospective
operator would submit insufficient information about his
process. For example, sometimes the information would not
be detailed enough to enable the PA to draw-up a licence.
An indicator of this would be that sometimes both in U.K.
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and German licences there were conditions which required
the operator to submit further information.
Not to provide certain information could be an
attempt by the regulated to try to avoid the imposition
of conditions on a particular issue. For example, a U.K.
waste control officer from the licensing section of the
RA told me that an operator had said to him that he was
not prepared to submit a detailed description of his
process because this would amount to 'putting himself
into a strait-jacket'.
Providing a lot of information
Sometimes the problem would not be too little but too
much information about the regulated process. According
to one German waste control officer, if the regulated
provided a lot and complex information about the process
then this could be a tactic for confusing the waste
control officer. For example, for the licensing of a
large waste incineration plant several arch files were
submitted by the operator with information about the
regulated process. A waste control officer told me that
they would say that they had checked all this material
but in fact only a certain amount of it could be checked.
Different degrees of intensity in checking these
materials had to be applied. Some material could only be
checked for plausibility.
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Managing perceptions of the regulated process
The way a licence application would be written and
in particular the amount and detail of information
provided in it could influence what the final licence
would look like. According to a German waste control
officer, he preferred it if the operator would provide a
detailed description of the process and how it was
operated because it would save time in licensing the
facility. This information about the process would be
incorporated in the licence. For example, one of the
first conditions in the licence would require the
operator to run the waste management facility as
described in his own information about the process. If
this information would be quite detailed then this would
require less additional conditions to be imposed to
regulate further aspects of the waste management
facility.
Thus, to some extent the operator could write his own
licence conditions. According to the German waste control
officer, it would be important that the operator
'emphasized the right things' in the licence application.
This was important for convincing the waste control
officer that an issue was already sufficiently regulated
through the operator's own procedures without requiring
further licence conditions.
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Images of sites created at site licensing stage and in
the field
German waste control officers knew sites both from
licensing and supervision in the field. What was
considered as compliance could be influenced by
perceptions they had gained of the regulated at the stage
of site licensing. During a walk around a waste
management site a German waste control officer observed
that some health and safety provisions were not
implemented. He explained to me that this was not his
area of responsibility but had to be dealt with by health
and safety officers.
There was also a technical problem at the site
because the waste management process could technically
not adequately cope with the type of waste which was
taken in. After the walk around the site the waste
control officer expressed satisfaction with the state of
the facility. He said:
'Well, I also know from the licensing
procedure, when we got to know the operator
better, that they were reliable and they made a
good impression. For example they always
responded to our requirements, they improved
the licensing application and supplied further
information'.
Hence perceptions about the regulated which the waste
control officer had gained during the licensing procedure
might have influenced what a waste control officer would
consider as a 'problem' at a site and what would be
evaluated as requiring or not requiring further action.
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Another German waste control officer also told me
that during the procedure of licensing a plant she would
start to get a picture of the facility, if it was a good
or a bad facility. One could see that for example from
the quality of the licence application documents. The
waste control officer continued:
'I have seen internal guidance that says that
waste management facilities should be visited
regularly. But what does 'regularly' mean?
There are facilities where I know I can let
them get on with the job for half a year
without a visit and there are facilities where
I know, when I leave the doorstep everything
goes wrong'.
11.3. The management of perceptions in the field
According to a U.K. waste control officer, the
regulated would take active steps to give a positive
impression of their process to the waste control officer.
One U.K. waste control officer told me that at one
landfill site
'the roadsweeper will appear miraculously when
I turn up. It goes like that: If the Council
comes around, we must keep them happy'.
Standard excuses
Part of the attempt to give a positive impression of
the regulated process was that operators would make
excuses for the failure to implement legal provisions.
According to the U.K. waste control officers, there were
some standard excuses which were sometimes recited as a
joke by waste control officers in the office.
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For example, if a road near a waste management site,
such as a landfill site, was very muddy and dusty and the
U.K. waste control officers remarked upon that to the
operator then some standard excuses were:
'the roadsweeper has broken down' or: 'the
brush of the roadsweeper is broken'.
If the waste level at a waste transfer station was too
high:
'the bulker has broken down' or: 'the compactor
at the landfill site has broken down' or: 'the
driver is off sick'.
Hence determining the state of a site would require to
look through some of these excuses.
Information management and evading control by the RA
Sometimes operators would try to shield aspects of
sites from evaluations as compliance or non-compliance.
In some cases an operator would only provide information
after he had already carried out what he wanted to do.
The RA would only approve with hindsight what the
operator had done.
In a file on the supervision of a German waste
treatment plant I had read that an operator applied for
an extension to the range of wastes they were allowed to
take into the plant. The operator said in his application
that he would only now apply for these new wastes because
beforehand they were not able to attach with "sufficient
accuracy" a waste code to these wastes.
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This seems to suggest that the operator had already
taken in these waste streams for some time but declared
them under waste streams for which the plant was already
licensed. When the operator was able to apply specific
waste codes to these new waste streams he contacted the
RA to get the new waste streams approved for treatment at
the plant. Thus, by controlling information about the
regulated process the operator could decide for himself
in some cases what aspects of his operations would be
evaluated by the RA for compliance.
Limits for the regulated to create a positive image of a
waste management facility
Waste control officers were aware of attempts by the
regulated to create positive images of the regulated
process. For example, a new manager at a U.K. waste
management site accompanied a waste control officer on
his visits and took down notes of what the waste control
officer said in a little note book. The waste control
officer said to me:
'This might have been just to impress us'.
Another U.K. waste control officer told me:
'You have to let them know that you can call
their bluff'.
In a file on the supervision of a German waste
incineration plant a programme for the supervision of the
plant had been laid down by a waste control officer. The
waste control officer had noted:
"with the aid of written information and the
actual situation"
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it should be checked if halogenated hydrocarbons and
aromates were burnt at the same time. The waste control
officer's note in the file indicates that he was aware
that there might be discrepancies between written
information about the process and the actual situation in
practice.
Images of regulated sites and enforcement responses
Images of regulated sites could have an impact on
what enforcement response the site might encounter from
the RA. For example, there were different inspection
frequencies for various sites in the area of the U.K. RA.
There was a considerable number of waste management sites
in the area of the RA. Given limited resources, decisions
had to be made on how to distribute them. Some sites,
which were classified as 'problem sites' could attract
enforcement visits of up to four times a week, while
other sites which were considered as small and
'unproblematic', such as small inert, dry waste transfer
stations, would be visited much less frequently.
11.4. Managing perceptions through consultants' reports
Introduction
In the following section I, will explore one
particular strategy of the regulated for the management
of	 information.	 These	 are	 consultants'	 reports
("Gutachten") about waste management sites. This was an
aspect of the management of information in the German RA
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which I did not come across during my field work in the
U.K. RA. According to a German waste control officer,
consultants' reports would be obtained if there was a
serious enforcement problem at a regulated facility.
Either the operator or the BA could commission a report.
Consultants' reports indicate that for understanding
how evaluations of compliance come about it is not
sufficient to look only at the relationship between an
operator and the BA. Third private parties like
consultants can be important for understanding how
compliance is achieved. In Germany, private consultants
not only work on behalf of operators but also carry out
some of the BAs tasks. Consultants' work is an important
aspect of the changing relationship between operators and
the German BA, some of which involves the privatisation
of public authorities' work.
Consultants' reports as constructed accounts
It	 seems	 that operators	 tried to utilize
consultants' reports to create favourable images of their
sites in two ways. Firstly, there is the image that
consultants' reports are a source of information provided
by an 'independent', professional, possibly neutral and
objective party. For example, a craft trade association
("Handwerkskainmer") had issued a guide for operators on
how to approach the licensing procedure with a BA. This
guide stated that companies should think of employing
consultants because they were often trusted by the BA.
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This could be to the advantage of the operator. The image
of a consultant as being a neutral, and independent third
party who might carry some goodwill with the RA could be
used by the regulated. Secondly, the contents of a
consultant's report might assist operators in putting
across what constituted in their view compliance with
legal provisions.
In the view of a German waste control officer, these
reports could play a role in the management of
information by the regulated. According to this officer,
the consultant could be a neutral "middle-person", but
more likely, the consultant would probably take into
account to some extent the operator's views and interests
given the fact that he was employed by the operator and
paid by him (in German the waste control officer said:
'Wes Brot ich freB, des Ding ich schreib') . The waste
control officer explained to me that the operator would
go through drafts of the report in order to exercise some
control over its contents. This indicates that the waste
control officer was aware of operators' attempts to use
information to portray favourable impressions of the
regulated process.
Reports on air emissions
In my view, consultants' reports were not
necessarily a completely independent, neutral source of
information about waste management facilities but were
drawn into the process of adversarial procedures in the
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licensing of waste management facilities. The German PA
was involved in the licensing of the technological
upgrading of a waste management facility. As part of the
upgrading of the facility the PA attempted to reduce the
level of air emissions from the incineration plant. The
PA had asked the operator to provide a consultant's
report about air emissions from the plant. In fact the
consultant for the operator gave various different
versions to the PA of air emissions from the waste
incineration plant. Finally, the consultant presented to
the PA a report which was described as the final result.
During a meeting between the operator, the consultant and
the PA, which I attended, a waste control officer asked
the operator if this result was
'still a scientific result or a negotiated
result'.
Thus, consultants' reports seemed to be drawn into
the partly adversarial relationship between the PA and
the regulated. Information presented in these reports was
not entirely neutral but part and parcel of a process of
adapting representations of reality to various interests.
Consultants' reports can help operators to put their
point of view across to the BA
Sometimes consultants' reports could be a tool for
the operator to state his view of the situation more
forcefully. A consultant's report would enable the
operator not just to make arguments about costs or
practicality in negotiations with the PA, but
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consultants' reports could back up an operator's view
through technical arguments. At one of the waste
incineration plants a waste control officer was
supervising, she asked the plant to show to her how they
were intending to conform to new regulations which had
just come into force ("TA Sonderabfall"). As a response
to this the operator commissioned an environmental
consultancy to write a report. According to the waste
control officer, the report would be quite useful for the
task of supervising the waste management facility because
she herself would not have enough time to get out of the
office and conduct a thorough examination of the plant in
order to check how they were implementing the new
regulations. But the environmental consultant who would
write the report would have time to conduct such a
detailed investigation.
The report summarized the legal provisions of the
new regulations. These summaries partly put forward their
own interpretation of the legal provisions. For example,
some smaller parts of the legal regulations were left
out. The provisions on emergency plans said that a site
diary should be kept by the operator according to section
5.4.2. of the "TA Sonderabfall". This requirement had
been omitted in the consultant's summary of the legal
provisions. This was criticized by the waste control
officer.
The justification given by the consultant for her
interpretation of the legal provisions was that the
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regulations were only guidance to the administration
("Verwaltungsvorschrift"), they were not binding on the
operator. Only the aims not the precise details of the
regulations had to be implemented. The legal validity of
this argument is questionable. It is right that the
general position is that administrative regulations
("Verwaltungsvorschriften") are primarily only binding on
the administrative authority not on third parties such as
the operator. The exact extent of the effect of these
"verwaltungsvorschriften" on operators is, however, a
matter of dispute. Erichsen et. al. (1992:137, - 7 IV 4,
Rz. 46) for example argue that "Verwaltungsvorschriften"
like the "TA .ZAbfall" can be binding on third parties.
Moreover, part of the argumentative strategy of the
consultant's report was to classify behaviour of the
operator into three categories. These three categories
provided answers to the question if the requirements of
the new regulations were complied with at the plant.
These were "requirements fulfilled", "requirements partly
fulfilled" and "requirements not fulfilled". At the end
of the report the author had listed all the various parts
of the new regulations. In an adjacent box it was ticked
if these requirements were "fulfilled", "partly
fulfilled" or "not fulfilled". None of the boxes for "not
fulfilled" was ticked. Instead most of the time
"fulfilled" was ticked or it was entered "probably
fulfilled from August 1992 onwards" or "fulfilled very
soon".
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At the waste management facility for which the
report was written there was also a small chemical-
physical treatment plant. In the final tank of the
treatment plant was a device which measured the turbidity
of the liquid, which was to be discharged to sewer. The
measurement of this parameter would enable control of
conformity with the parameter of suspended solids in the
effluent. If the measurement showed that there was too
much turbidity then the effluent would need further
treatment before it could be discharged in conformity
with the discharge consent. According to the consultant's
report, the turbidity of the effluent was no longer
measured because algae grew on the device and thus
prevented accurate measurements. The report argued that
this was an acceptable situation since analyses of the
contents of the final treatment tank were carried out
before the effluent was discharged to sewer. According to
the report, a 'too high' solid contents could probably be
detected at that stage.
It was, however, a central theme in the requirements
of the "TA Sonderabfall" to require automatic measurement
devices for various stages of the chemical-physical
treatment process for better process control. The
consultant's report put forward various arguments why at
the plant it was equally safe and acceptable not to have
automatic measurement devices but to rely on manual
controls. It was a coimnon strategy employed by operators
to argue that failure to implement control devices
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required under regulations was not a problem because they
had alternative ways of controlling the process. The
consultant's report also tried to portray a positive
image even of those aspects of operations which might not
have been in compliance.
'From the current non-compliance of
requirements cannot be derived an immediate
need for action, since soon a new intermediary
storage area will be built which will comply
with the requirements of the "TA Abfall".
In another part the report said:
'Sufficient amounts of sorption materials have
to be available for dealing with spilled or
leaking waste'.
The consultant's report remarked on that:
'In the acceptance area it is not necessary to
have sorption materials because the acceptance
area slopes down over about 5 metres to a
discharge point'.
The waste control officer criticized the fact that for
the most part, the consultant's report suggested
solutions for technical changes which would only involve
little expenditure for the operator: 'the consultant's
report envisaged mainly solutions for DM 2,50'. According
to her the report failed to mention and engage with the
more difficult problems for the implementation of the "TA
Sonderabfall" at the waste incineration plant. These more
difficult problems would cost more money to solve.
Also, to some extent the consultant's report tried
to justify current practices at the waste incineration
plant rather than advocate changes in order to conform to
the new regulations. For example, the new regulations
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(para. 5.4.3. "TA Sonderabfall", 1992:85) recommended
that the plant should have a log-book that would assemble
information from various different parts of the plant
(e.g. the laboratory, the waste acceptance area etc.).
The consultant's report said that it was not practicable
to collect all the information together in one common
log-book.
Conclusion
In this section I have discussed consultants'
reports, which are one aspect of the provision of
information about the regulated waste management process
in Germany. They can influence what becomes understood as
compliance by the RA and the regulated. Consultants are
an important third player in the relationship between the
regulated and regulators, particularly in Germany. They
partly carry out "regulatory" tasks on behalf of the
German BA such as to gather information about the
implementation or the lack of it of new legal
regulations. In my view, the use of consultants' reports
illustrates that to some extent information about the
regulated process is not necessarily "objective" or
"neutral". Instead consultants' reports are part and
parcel of the process of constructing and given emphasis
to competing versions of what constitutes compliance.
11.5. The management of perceptions through legal
procedures
Introduction
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In the following section, I will illustrate how
legal procedures can assist in the strategic management
of information. The strategic management of information
can in turn help to manage legal constraints on
activities of the regulated. The German waste management
plant had to conform to the "EN" procedure. But there
were various ways the regulated could both conform with
the "EN" procedure, which in theory regulates the
disposal path of waste, and at the same time realize
their commercial aims in assigning a waste disposal path
for waste streams.
Discrepancies between "paper waste" and "real waste"
The "EN" forms under German waste management
regulation were valid for five years. But according to
the staff at the German waste management plant, waste
loads were changing frequently and within a five year
period the chemical analysis provided on the "EN" would
probably no longer be an adequate description of the
waste. Thus, the waste stream that existed on paper on
the "EN" forms would not necessarily exist in practice as
it was described on the paper form.
Information on paper procedures and control
Information provided to the BA by the German waste
management plant could have an impact on the extent of
the BA's control over the plant. The German waste
management plant had an argument with the BA about the
question whether certain parameters, like heavy metals,
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should only be analyzed if they would be expected in the
waste or if they should be analyzed as a matter of
principle. From the production process, from which the
waste would originate, it could be already guessed if it
was likely that certain substances would be in the waste
load or not.
For example, in a metal plating solution heavy
metals would be expected to be in the waste stream. To
test only for parameters that one would expect in a waste
load could lead at the end to a description of the waste
which would only show what the people who analyzed it
wanted to see in it. Finally, the R required the German
waste management plant to test every waste stream for
certain parameters as a matter of principle and not just
in the event that the waste stream was expected to
contain these substances.
In some cases the regulated could get the regulators
to adopt their view of what constitutes compliance
through the strategic provision of information on the
"EN" form. One of the employees from the office of the
German waste management plant visited a customer at his
plant. Through a visual inspection of the waste at the
customers' premises the employee decided that the waste
stream should not go into the German waste treatment
plant but that instead the waste should go to
incineration. The employee said that he probably would
have no problems getting this approved by the BA because
he would enter such values for the analysis on the "EN"
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form that the RA would not authorize the waste to go into
the treatment plant.
Information about the regulated facility could be a
resource for creating particular images of it. Even types
of information that might appear at first sight as "hard
and fast" information can be managed and negotiated
between the regulated and the regulators. While I was at
the German RA a material change to a waste incineration
plant was licensed according to - 7 (1) AbfG 1986. One of
the main issues of contention between the operator and
the Rk was the question how much waste this waste
management plant was currently taking in. This was
important because the RA. wanted to see the material
change at the plant as a technological up-grading of the
plant in order to produce an improvement in its air
emission standards. In meetings between the operator and
the R which I observed the stated that it did not
want the waste management plant to raise the amount of
waste it took in. The RA suspected that the operator
wanted to increase the amount of waste coming into the
plant in order to raise its commercial potential.
The operator said in negotiations with the RA that
it was difficult to give an exact figure of the amount of
waste that was taken into the plant. A considerable
amount of time in these negotiations was spent on
debating the basis and accuracy of various figures which
were put forward both by the operator and the RA for the
amount of waste the plant was taking in.
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The PA did its own calculations of the amount of
waste on the basis of transfer notes ("Begleitscheine")
which the operator had to provide to the PA. These
transfer notes have to accompany waste loads which are
delivered to the plant. They state the amount of waste
delivered. According to the operator, however, these
forms would not necessarily provide accurate information
about the amount of incoming waste. For example, the
amount of waste accepted at the plant would not be
exactly the amount of waste disposed of at the plant.
Furthermore, according to the operator, errors in filling
in the forms, for example choosing the wrong measurements
could introduce inaccuracies. It appeared that there was
no "hard and fast" basis for the figure of the amount of
waste the operator was taking into the plant.
Filling in formal paper forms might be taken by the
regulated as an indicator of 'compliance'
Also, from the discussions between the BA and the
operator it appeared that there was a discrepancy between
the operators' figures for waste handled at the
incineration plant and the figures of the BA on the basis
of supervision tools such as the transfer notes. One of
the waste control officers remarked about this:
'Why does one do this supervision through the
transfer notes if the figures are so much in
discrepancy?'
The closer look the BA took during this licensing
procedure at the transfer notes showed that the
information provided on those paper procedures did not
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give an accurate picture of how much waste came into the
plant in practice. Normally, if the paper documents would
not be as thoroughly scrutinized as they were in this
case because of the licensing procedure - the PtA would
not necessarily get to know about possible inaccuracies.
Thus, it could not necessarily be determined from the
transfer notes if the waste management facility was in
compliance or not with the licence limits on the amount
of waste coming into the plant. It appears that in the
normal case simply the filling in of the transfer notes
in itself would count as compliance with the limits
imposed on the amount of waste to be taken into a plant.
Usually, no detailed scrutiny of the transfer notes was
carried out. This was probably also due to a lack of time
by staff in the RZ.. Thus, conforming with legal
requirements to provide information could be taken as an
indicator. It could be taken as an indicator of
compliance with the legal provisions about which
information should be provided. Once the requirement to
provide information might have been complied with the PtA
would not necessarily probe if the situation in reality
at a plant was in fact adequately described by this
information.
In a situation where information about regulated
sites is partial, uncertain or incomplete one way to deal
with this is to look for indicators of conformity with
legal provisions. Compliance with indicators could come
to replace substantive compliance. This might be an
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inevitable feature of the bureaucratic administration of
high volume paper work. Hence, some legal procedures
which were operated on paper forms could assist in the
management of information such as shielding information
about actual practices at a plant.
Limits to managing information on paper procedures
One of the problems that arose for the staff in the
office of the German waste management plant was that
sometimes the RA wanted more information about the waste
stream for which an analysis had been made-up on the
"EN". It was considered as a problem by the staff that
they then had to construct further information about the
waste stream. For example, one day the supervisor of the
office staff, who handled the "EN" procedure, discussed
an "EN" she was working on. She had submitted this "EN"
to the BA. On the section of the "EN" form that asked if
the waste could not be recycled the supervisor had
written that this was not possible because of the high
metal contamination of the waste. Now the RP had sent her
this "EN" form back asking that she should specify what
metals exactly were in the waste stream. But she could
not really specify these metals because no analysis had
been carried out.
According to the supervisor of the office, staff who
handled the "EN" procedure, a further problem that could
arise in connection with the assumed values for chemical
parameters was that these values were different from what
342
the waste looked like in reality. This meant that the
values that were entered on the "EN" would differ from
the actual waste that was delivered on the yard of the
facility. This could increase the risk of the waste
having to be rejected or simply increase the problems of
handling this waste on the yard. Hence, it was in the
interests of the waste management plant to limit the
extent to which they would manage information on paper
procedures.
Conclusion
In this section, I explored how legal procedures for
the provision of information to the RA can assist the
regulated to manage various legal constraints on what
they can do. Legal procedures for the provision of
information can give rise to a discrepancy between "real
waste" and "paper waste". This could be partly of help to
the regulated to manage practical problems for the
handling of waste where the regulated could not conform
to legal standards. While on paper 'compliance' with
legal provisions could be shown there might not
necessarily be 'compliance' on the ground. This points to
an interesting aspect of legal regulation. Legal
provisions that might be considered at first sight as
standards for 'compliance', such as here requirements for
the provision of information in legal procedures, might
help to shield lack of implementation of legal
requirements from the RA. Furthermore, compliance with
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legal procedures can come to be taken wrongly as an
indicator of compliance.
11.6. "Hard data" and the mauagement of information from
testing
Introduction
One of the ways of gaining information about waste
load was testing equipment. Results from testing,
however, did not always produce unambiguous information.
In this section, I will describe some limits of this
knowledge base on which evaluations of 'compliance' rest.
Limits to information from analysis procedures
Interpreting test results
As the staff from the laboratory of the German waste
management plant explained to me, results from analysis
equipment such as ICP and gaschromatography required
interpretation. Testing results obtained from these
analysis procedures did not speak for themselves. For
example, sometimes peak values for certain substances in
the waste sample would show in the analysis result. The
staff had to decide if this was an aberration in the
working of the analysis machine or if this was a genuine
reading of a substance contained at high levels in the
waste. In order to be better able to judge the accuracy
of their analysis machines the laboratory manager of the
German waste management plant planned to introduce a
quality control procedure for its analysis procedures.
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This meant that the laboratory staff would monitor and
record the results obtained from the analysis machines
and thus gain statistical data for calculating the normal
aberrations in the analysis results.
Some German waste control officers distinguished
'genuine non-compliance' from 'technical non-compliance'.
The leader of the group of waste control officers who
supervised waste incineration plants explained to me that
in his view it was a problem that some air emission
limits for waste incineration plants were very low. He
quoted as an example the limit for the emission of
dioxins which was according to the 17. BimschV 0,1 ng/m3.
Small inaccuracies in the measurement technique could
produce readings for the emissions that were above the
emission limit. According to the waste control officer,
such technical or unintended 'non-compliance' could be
difficult to distinguish from 'genuine' non-compliance.
Technical and legal definitions of 'compliance'
The following story illustrates that technical
criteria are relevant for the definition of compliance in
practice. In order to understand what is compliance it is
important to know how technical aspects of the waste
incineration process can influence what becomes a legal
definition of compliance. Also, what is considered as
relevant information for the purpose of evaluating
compliance can be negotiated between the regulated and
the RA.
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A German waste control officer told me that for a
waste incineration plant she was supervising it had to be
defined when measurements of emissions of the process
should start in order to assess compliance. When the
incineration plant would be started up it would take some
time until the full incineration temperature had been
reached and thus until normal operating conditions were
achieved.
During this start-up time, it would be technically
difficult for the incinerator to conform to air emission
limits. Thus, the waste control officer had to make an
assessment from what time on the plant should achieve and
maintain compliance with air emission standards. Hence,
the legal evaluation of conformity with legal
requirements only started after a time limit that was
defined by the waste control officer according to
technical criteria.
For defining what constituted the start-up time of
the incinerator the operator had coitmissioned a
consultant's report. This report suggested that after a
certain amount of hours of start-up time the normal
operating conditions of the incinerator had been
achieved. The report suggested that on top of that five
hours should be added as a safety margin. Thus, the
application of a legal evaluation of 'compliance' was
adapted in practice to what the process could technically
achieve. It contained even a safety margin in favour of
the operator.
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The practical result of the definition of start-up
time, normal operations and cool-down time was that only
during what was defined as normal operations would the
technical measurement devices be switched on which would
monitor for conformity with emission limits. For this
waste incineration plant the start of measurements for
compliance with air emission limits was changed.
Previously, the operator had switched on manually the
measurement system after the completion of the start-up
phase. This was changed to a system where according to
the hours listed in the report plus the safety margin the
measurement device would be switched on automatically.
According to the consultant's report, this would have the
advantage that then the operator would be forced to take
all measures possible to reduce emissions once the
incinerator had been started because the emission
recording would be switched on automatically.
Interference of different emissions
A German waste control officer explained to me that
information based on air emission measurements might not
be conclusive. For example, it had been found in relation
to the measurement of HCL at a waste incineration plant
that the presence of Bromine and Iodine interfered with
the measurement system and caused abnormally high HCL
readings. The waste control officer pointed out that such
data usually needed further interpretation before
concluding that there was compliance or non-compliance.
For example, a distinction had to be drawn between, on
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the one hand, data above emission limits that were the
result of errors produced, possibly, through the
interference of other substances with the measurement
system. On the other hand, there were data above emission
limits which showed 'genuine', i.e. non-accidental non-
conformity with legal emission limits.
Managing testing requirements
In some cases the regulated tried to get approved
what they were doing through the strategic management of
information. One of the German waste control officers
told me that there had been an enforcement problem at one
of the sites he was supervising. The operator was
transporting contaminated soil in barges to his waste
management site. According to the site licence, the
barges' hutches were supposed to be closed in order to
prevent contaminants entering the atmosphere. In fact it
had been discovered that the hutches were kept open. The
waste control officer then asked for measurements of the
air coming off the hatches. He commented on the
analytical results the operator had given him:
'The operator can also deceive you. For example
they have given us a measurement result
(MeIwert) for total carbon (Gesamt C) instead
of phenol. This does not measure what is
relevant'. The operator can also pacify you.
Then they will say that the next time they
measured 1.25 ppm. But that this was only a
peak value'.
Hence, the regulated tried to present a more favourable
image of a site by presenting information in a certain
way to the RP..
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The following illustrates how the regulated might
attempt to strategically manage the provision of
information to the PA. A German waste incineration plant
had according to the site licence to comply with a
minimum temperature of 800 C for° incineration. In the
file on the supervision of this plant, it was noted that
the technical device for measuring the temperature had
been installed outside the combustion chamber. According
to the file entry, this was the reason why in a few cases
low values for the temperature in the combustion chamber
were measured. The file entry said that no correlation
could be made between the temperature measured outside
the combustion chamber and the temperature inside the
combustion chamber. According to the file entry, the
operator had offered to commission a consultant's report
about the question what the relationship was between the
temperatures. The waste control officer did not know to
what extent the low temperatures measured outside the
combustion chamber were indicative of the temperature in
the combustion chamber. Thus he had no means of
evaluating whether or not the operator was conforming to
the requirement of having a minimum temperature of 800°C.
In connection with the same waste incineration
facility another incident was reported in the file on the
supervision of the plant. On one occasion there had been
a red emission plume and high levels of HCL and dust had
been emitted. A waste control officer had then visited
the plant. In the file entry it was noted that the
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plotter that showed the S02 emissions measured in the
flue gas had been changed by 10 to 15 minutes by the
operator. Thus, it would not have been possible to say
exactly what amount of substances were emitted at a
particular time. According to the file entry this defect
was then corrected.
Information data from testing procedures were not
necessarily hard and fast. According to the supervisor of
the German waste treatment plant, this could be used as a
defence against allegations of non-compliance by the RP.
For example, if the BA would allege that the limits on
the discharge licence were not adhered to by the plant
this could be countered by stating that the chemical
testing procedure for the effluent applied by the PA was
inappropriate. According to a different testing procedure
different results might be obtained.
Discrepancy between information requirements in legal
provisions and actually available testing equipment
In the previous section, I have reported that
information data from testing procedures are not
necessarily "hard and fast". Sometimes, there was even no
or no accurate testing equipment to determine compliance
or non-compliance with legal provisions.
U.K.
At the U.K. waste treatment plant there was
insufficient testing equipment to measure conformity with
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the discharge consent before the new laboratory was
installed . The discharge consent specified relatively
low levels of metals that could be discharged to sewer in
the effluent. The Merck dip kit tests, however, from the
old laboratory could not measure metals in such low
concentrations. For one parameter to which the plant was
supposed to conform there was no testing method at all
available in the old laboratory. For some of the
parameters that the U.K. waste treatment plant had to
comply with, the waste treatment plant had no testing
equipment. According to the senior chemist, the water
company had conducted tests for it in the waste treatment
plant effluent and had found that the level for some of
the metals was above the level allowed by the discharge
consent.
The discharge consent of the U.K. waste treatment
plant required that the effluent discharged to sewer
would not contain certain metals at a level higher than 5
ppm. Available in the old laboratory, though, were only
the Merck-dip kit tests that would detect these metals
above concentrations of 10 ppm. The senior chemist
commented on this:
'We might as well guess then the level of the
metals in the load'.
Also, according to the site manager of the U.K.
waste	 treatment plant,
	 the	 old laboratory was
insufficient	 to	 measure	 conformity	 with	 legal
requirements under the discharge consent and the site
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licence. A new laboratory was set up during the time that
I spent at the plant.
Calculating "loading ratios" at a landfill site
Waste management plants had insufficient knowledge
about their operations to judge whether or not they were
implementing legal provisions. In theory, the intake of
wastes into landfill sites which take both special and
"normal" wastes is controlled and managed through
"loading ratios". They require that over a certain period
of time a specified amount of difficult waste in
comparison to "normal" waste should be taken into the
landfill site. This should 'dilute' more difficult wastes
with other wastes. For example, there could be a loading
ratio between difficult wastes containing heavy metals
and household waste.
According to the site technician at a landfill site
operated by the same company which operated the U.K.
waste treatment plant, this requirement was not easy to
put into practice since it was difficult to calculate the
exact weight of problematic substances in the actual
waste loads: how many grains of a particular metal were in
a grinding sludge for example? The site technician tried
to calculate loading ratios by recording incoming waste
loads on a card index. According to him, this was not a
very accurate method. In the view of the site manager,
conforming to loading ratios in future would be possible
through a computerized system which would calculate the
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weights of different wastes. It would give indications of
conformity to loading ratios for example by plotting a
graph for the "normal" waste against a graph for
difficult wastes.
Germany
In the German waste management plant, there were
similar limits to the information available about the
waste treatment process in order to judge conformity with
legal provisions. For example, the discharge licence at
the German waste management plant required the treatment
plant to conform to certain limits for some substances in
the effluent discharged to the sewer. There was also a
limit for tin. According to the laboratory manager, the
laboratory did not test the treatment plant's effluent
for this parameter. The laboratory manager said:
'According to our experience there is no tin in
the waste loads that we accept'.
The laboratory manager explained that it would require an
extra effort to test the effluent for the tin parameter.
The effluent was routinely tested on the ICP analysis
machine. The machine would run a standard programme for
the testing of a range of metal parameters in the
effluent. Tin could not be measured in this standard
programme. A different testing procedure would have to be
extra set up for the tin parameter. According to the
laboratory manager, this would take up too much time.
Also, when waste streams were initially assessed for
their suitability to be taken into the plant the waste
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stream would be tested for mercury. But waste loads
arriving at the plant to be taken into the treatment
plant were not tested for these heavy metals because,
according to the laboratory staff experience, had shown
that there was usually none of these heavy metals
contained in the loads.
Lack of testing equipment for wastes which were supposed
not to be taken into the site
Sometimes, it could not be judged if there was or
was not conformity with the legal requirements in the
site licence on what kind of wastes could be taken into
the U.K. and the German waste plant. For example, both
licences forbid radioactive wastes to come into the
plants. But both at the German and the U.K. plant there
was no testing equipment to check if waste loads were
radioactive. The German laboratory technicians considered
this as a problem. They thought that it might be quite
likely that some waste holders could mix into their waste
radioactive wastes that were otherwise difficult and
expensive to dispose of.
A particularly clear case of insufficient analysis
equipment in order to ensure compliance with provisions
of the site licence was an oil treatment plant run by the
same company that operated the waste treatment plant.
According to the site licence, the plant was not allowed
to take in oils contaminated with PCB's. The site chemist
explained that there was, however, no analysis equipment
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to test for PCB's. He said that he could detect PCB's by
the colour of the oil. If it was bluish or otherwise
discoloured then this would be an indicator for PCBS.
Standards of testing
A similar problem of judging conformity with site
licence standards seemed to exist at the U.K. waste
treatment plant. In order to determine conformity with
the conditions in the discharge consent it would have
been necessary for the regulatory body, the water
company, to have an adequate testing and control system
for the effluent that this waste treatment plant
discharged into the sewer. There was a plastic bottle,
where the water company would take their 24 hour sample.
But this bottle was not secured and openly accessible to
everybody. One of the waste control inspectors from the
RA remarked upon this and said this was not really an
appropriate sampling device since everybody could tamper
with it.
A very similar situation seemed to exist at the
German waste treatment plant. At the beginning the
laboratory manager pointed out to me a box in the
treatment plant that contained an automatic effluent
sampling machine. According to him, regularly and
automatically sample columns would be filled here with
samples of the effluent from the treatment process.
According to the laboratory manager, the box had metal
seals so that the samples could not be tampered with.
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When I was actually at the treatment plant, the
supervisor told me that the automatic sampling device was
broken and that the box no longer was closed through the
metal seals. It was not quite clear if the U.K. waste
treatment plant did in fact monitor regularly its
effluent for conformity with the discharge consent but in
the German treatment plant effluent was nevertheless
regularly tested. Records of the tests carried out by the
chemical laboratory were filed.
Conclusion
In this section I looked at testing provisions for
some aspects of waste management operations, such as
stack emissions, as a source of information about the
regulated process. At first sight this type of
information might be considered as "hard and fast"
information. It seems, however, that technical procedures
for testing might also not provide complete, unambiguous
or certain information about the regulated process. This
can make it difficult to assess if there is compliance or
non-compliance. Testing requirements can also be managed
by the regulated or they might simply be discrepancies
between testing equipment available at a facility and
testing equipment which would be required to assess
conformity, for example, with site licence provisions.
11.7. Conclusjn.
In this chapter I explored strategies of the
regulated to manage information and perceptions about
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waste management sites. Information about sites does not
exist in the abstract but is a key resource in the
relationship between the regulated and the regulators. To
present information in a certain way might help operators
to manage perceptions of their facilities in order to get
favourable evaluations from waste control officers. I
explored how this happens at the stage of site licensing,
in the field, through consultants' reports as well as
through legal procedures for the provision of information
and through information from testing. I tried to
illustrate the complex nature of information. What counts
as information is socially constructed in the
relationship between the regulated and the regulators.
This has implications for understanding how evaluations
of compliance are achieved in the field. The regulated
participate in this process and thus can have an impact
on what becomes understood as compliance.
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CHAPTER 12: FORMAL AND EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS OF LAW AND
COMPLIANCE
12.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss
different concepts of law and their implications for a
concept of compliance. Let us start with the idea that
compliance contains assumptions about the link between
rules and social practices. Concepts of law become
relevant if we raise the question compliance with what ?
(Hopkins, 1994) Compliance does not happen in the
abstract but it occurs in relation to standards.
On the basis of original field data on behaviour
at the waste management plants and interaction between
staff at the plants and waste control officers, I will
criticize in this chapter "gap analysis" and - usually
linked to this - formal notions of law. According to "gap
analysis" we can point to discrepancies between the
formal requirements of the law and what the regulated did
in practice. In contrast to this I will argue that formal
notions of law need to be complemented through
empirically informed notions of law and that the notion
of the "gap" needs to be replaced in some situations
through the notion of "integration".
In particular I will look at the following
questions in this chapter. What can we understand by a
concept of rules? What becomes considered as normative in
the field? Does any notion of general rules disappear in
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favour of ad - hoc decisions that guide behaviour in
particular situations? What type of rules develop during
the enforcement of waste management regulatIon In
practice? How useful are the terms "law in the books" and
"law in action" in analyzing the field data? What role do
structure and agency play in how the law gains meaning?
Are rules and social practices different or similiar
concepts? Can social practices become normative and can
formal rules be an expression of social practices? To
what extent is it possible to achieve a "fit" between
rules and social practices in the field? What role do
various techniques of adapting rules to actual social
practices play in achieving such a "fit"? What are the
limits to this process? How appropriate is the notion of
"capture" to describe the adaptation of rules to social
practices?
The chapter is divided into two main sections. In
the first section I will discuss basic aspects of "gap
analysis", in particular the idea that "gap analysis"
privileges formal legal rules. I will describe how the
field data point to a broader notion of law which
consists of different normative contexts which can
overlap. I shall discuss the process of the social
construction of these normative contexts and sources of
normativity. In the second section I will discuss one of
the main aspects of "gap analysis". "Gap analysis"
usually perceives a conceptual distinction between rules
and social practices. But to what extent can we
distinguish rules and social practices in the field?
359
12.2. Normative contexts in the field
Concepts of law in "gap analysis"
"Gap analysis" privileges the formal law because
the gap is constructed by reference to formal legal rules
(see Pearce/Tombs,	 1990;	 Hopkins/Parnell,	 1984:180;
Hucke, 1980:83; Bohnert/Klitzsch, 1980:200; Winter,
1975:28; v. Weick, 1973:147) . Yeager (1991:13, chapter 7)
for example distinguishes between "publicly stated
purposes of the legislation and its implementation".
Hopkins (1994) perceives compliance as the relationship
between different types of formal legal rules and what
the regulated do in practice. He refers to two types of
formal legal rules, procedural and outcome regulation,
which are identified through reference to formal legal
materials such as statutes and codes of practices issued
under statutes (Hopkins, 1994:433, 434, 436, 438) . Hence,
Hopkins does not examine how actors in the field,
including the regulated, may construct a notion of law.
"Gap analysis" also privileges the formal law
through its assumption that the gap is a dysfunctional
aspect of regulatory law (Abel, 1973:184; see for example
Mayntz, 1978) . "Gap analysis" has been influential and
pervasive because it is rooted in contemporary western
legal thought and action which rests on purposive
rationality (Abel, 1973:184) . According to this
perspective, an "instrumental" notion of law (Teubner,
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1984) should - in principle - be able to achieve a fit
between law and social practices. In this scenario "gaps"
are deviant.
Abel (1973) does not completely abandon the notion
of the "gap". According to Abel two types of "gaps" can
be distinguished. First, a "gap" between legislative
standards and behaviour within the legal arena and "gaps"
between legislative standards and behaviour outside the
legal arena. Abel (1973:210) refers to power, ideology
and the structure of legal institutions to explain
behaviour in relation to law. This seems again to put
more focus on the regulators rather than the regulated in
the construction of notions of law because the structure
of legal institutions rather than the structure of
institutions of the regulated are referred to.
Furthermore Abel (1973:222) does not completely abandon
notions of the formal law because he works with a clear
notion of the boundaries of the legal system.
One of the shortcomings of "gap analysis" is that
it states that there is a lack of fit between legal
requirements and social practices but does not explain
what happens when legal requirements meet the "living
law" (Ehrlich, 1962). Accounts that operate with the
notion of the "gap" also provide little data on what the
regulated actually do or how they perceive situations
which are described as compliance or non - compliance
situations (see for example Braithwaite, 1984, chapter
3). Hence, gap analysis works with an abstract view of
legal order rather than treating it as empirically
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constructed. How did my field data challenge this
account?
What became considered as normative?
My empirical data showed that not just formal
legal rules shaped behaviour in the field. A range of
"contexts", which have been described in chapters four to
eleven, acquired normative force and could operate like
rules. These contexts were technology, commercial aims
and information. They became normative orders in the
sense that they influenced not just single incidents but
they shaped behaviour repeatedly and in a regular way.
The notion of a normative context allowed for a
degree of indeterminacy. Different actors could ascribe
different aims to normative contexts. For example, what
appeared to some actors at the plants as a procedure
concerned with the normative context of information
appeared to other actors at the plants as a procedure
concerned with the management controlling the work force.
The U.K. waste management plant adopted procedures
according to which the operators of the plant had to fill
in sheets which provided information about the time it
took to press waste, the consistency of the waste sludges
etc. One aim of this procedure was to gain more
information about technical aspects of the process and
hence to enhance process control. The concern of the
people working at the plant, however, was that these
procedures really were aimed at controlling them by
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giving management information about how long it would
take to do certain jobs. What does it mean to say that
technology, information or commercial aims could acquire
normative force? In the following section I want to focus
on information as an example for a normative context.
Information as an example of a normative context
What the regulated did was constrained by how much
they knew about various aspects of the waste management
operations. Decisions by the chemists at the U.K.
treatment plant about what waste loads the plant could
take in had to consider - according to the discharge
consent - if the plant could adhere to the limits on the
discharge of certain substances in the effluent to the
sewer. But in some instances the testing equipment at the
plant was insufficient to provide the necessary
information on this. Hence, the main determinant in
influencing decisions about loads being taken into the
plant were not "legal" criteria as such but simply the
availability	 or	 otherwise	 of	 information.
A further example for the idea that information
could be normative were the information management
systems at the German waste management plant (see section
7.2. chapter 7 for more detail). The way information was
processed determined how waste codes were assigned to
waste loads. This in turn influenced how decisions were
made about where waste loads should be disposed. The link
between waste code and final waste disposal plant,
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however, should have been guided - according to the "TA
Abfall" - by legal criteria. According to the formal
legal rules of the "TA 2bfall" regulations, environmental
considerations should have played a role when selecting a
suitable plant for the final disposal of a waste load
rather than just cost considerations (Kloepfer,
1989:712). But in fact this link was guided by how
information was processed. One of the reasons why these
information management systems existed was that they
helped to realize commercial aims of the plant. This
illustrates that formal law, technology, commercial aims
and information, which could all be normative contexts,
could overlap.
Overlap between different normative contexts
The example of testing incoming waste loads
The field data showed that often behaviour was
influenced by all four normative contexts. One example of
this was the testing of waste loads which came into the
waste treatment plants, one of the key situations for law
- related behaviour. First, formal law had an impact on
the situation: the requirement that incoming waste loads
should be tested was not completely ignored. Commercial
and technical requirements alone would not have justified
the frequency of testing of incoming waste loads that did
occur at the plants. Hence, there existed behaviour
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directed at fulfilling site licence requirements for
testing incoming loads.
Secondly, technology also played a role. The
available testing technology, such as chemical analysis
facilities in the laboratory, influenced the extent to
which load acceptance criteria spelled out in the site
licence could be taken into account. For example, the
site licence of the U.K. plant required that only wastes
which could be treated at the plant should be taken into
the plant. According to the chemists at the U.K. plant,
more sophisticated and precise chemical analysis machines
in the laboratory would have produced different
information about waste streams than the testing
equipment available in the old laboratory. It could have
found problematic substances in the waste stream that the
plant could not treat. Thus, the formal law made
prescriptions about technology but technology also
influenced what became understood as the law in practice.
Thirdly, how much information existed about the
waste also had an impact on the ability of the staff to
make decisions which fulfilled legal requirements on load
acceptance. For example, according to the site licence of
the U.K. waste treatment plant wastes having a flashpoint
less than 32°C were not allowed to be taken into the
plant. Hence, in order to fulfill this site licence
requirement there had to be information about this load
content. Fourthly, commercial requirements had an impact
on how detailed testing was carried out on waste loads.
In the new laboratory of the U .  K. waste treatment plant
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new analysis machines were available which could detect
metals in waste loads at lower concentrations. This would
have helped to gain more precise analysis data for making
decisions about load acceptance. This equipment, however,
was not utilized. Instead the Merck dip kit tests, which
were quicker and which had also been used in the old lab
were used. This happened in order to ensure a quick turn
around time for tankers which made the plant commercially
more attractive for waste hauliers. Hence, commercial
contexts influenced how available technology was put into
operation.
Normative contexts did not exist in isolation from
each other but they overlapped and hence influenced each
other. Commercial contexts influenced how technology was
put into operation, technology influenced how much
information there was. Information influenced how
technology was made to work. In the following section I
will look at further examples of the overlap of normative
contexts.
The relationship between law and technology
The formal law influenced technology but
technology also influenced what became understood as the
law in practice. The site licence for the U.K. and German
waste management required a certain level of technology
for the plant. For example, condition no. 19 of the U.K.
site licence required that:
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"All storage and process tanks shall be
desludged by vacuum tankers or other
appropriate vacuum assisted equipment in order
to minimise fumes and odours".
Condition no. 23 stated:
"The lime storage silo shall be fitted with a
dust filter and all movements of bulk
quantities of powdering materials shall be
carried out in sealed systems in order to
minimise dust".
But technology, in turn, also influenced what was
understood as a legal requirement in practice. For
example, in the German waste management plant the
chemical laboratory was preparing for, but so far had
not yet adopted, a systematic quality control approach.
Therefore the lab staff had to evaluate - on the basis of
their professional knowledge - if certain results from
the measurement machines were abberrations produced by
the testing process or were genuine indicators of high
levels of certain substances in the waste loads.
Decisions about load acceptance which were restricted by
legal criteria on acceptance parameters had to be based
on this technical analysis information. Thus, what became
implemented in day - to - day decision - making routines
as a legal requirement was shaped by technology.
One way of analyzing this situation might be to
claim that technology influenced the way "facts" were
socially constructed. To this legal criteria from the
site licence about load acceptance were then later
applied. Genn (1987:81) in her work on the settlement
process in personal injury cases adopts this approach.
She discusses the importance of information in
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establishing the facts to which legal criteria of
negligence become applied in negotiations about
settlements in personal injury cases. But, in my view
this approach can be challenged as not necessarily being
the most appropriate analysis. There may be a much more
direct link between technology and the meaning of legal
requirements. The state of the analysis technology in the
laboratory of the U.K. and German waste treatment plant
determined how waste streams and hence under what
description of a waste load, provided in Annex B to the
site licence, they could be classified. Different
descriptions of waste as used in Annex B could not be
considered as "legal" criteria. The meaning of waste
descriptions was technical and the legal rule - such as
the restrictions in the site licence - on what could be
taken into the plant - had to operate with these
technical concepts. To separate a legal rule from its
factual basis seems to be artificial in my context and
reflects a "legal paradigm" view. A key aspect of
exploring how law was constituted in practice was to move
away from the idea that "the law" existed as a category
independent of the categories of social life it drew on.
Relationships between various other normative contexts
There were other situations where overlap between
different normative contexts occurred. For example,
information influenced the way how technology was used.
At the U.K. waste treatment plant, knowledge about the
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treatment chemistry and hence control over the treatment
process influenced the evaluation of whether conformity
with the discharge limits for effluent to sewer could be
achieved. Also, the requirements of the formal law and of
commercial aims could overlap. Service relationships
between different actors in the waste management chain
had an impact on the operation of legal procedures that
guided the relationship between the regulated and the
regulatory authority. According to § 8 (1) and (2) and §
9 (1) AbfRestUberwV, German waste producers should fill
in the legal forms of the "EN 1', in particular the
official declaration of the waste producer
("Verantwortliche Erklarung des 2bfallerzeugers") . In
practice, however, these forms were usually filled in by
staff at the waste management plant. Changes on these
forms, such as an increase in the amount of waste to be
disposed of, had to be authorized by the regulatory
authority. It was part of the commercial service that the
German waste management plant offered for the waste
producers to get such changes approved by the regulatory
authority if the waste producers asked for it. This
notion of service provision mediated legal criteria for
the limits on the "EN" for the amount of waste to be
disposed. According to the formal legal rules, policy
aims such as the reduction of waste to be finally
disposed should have been relevant ( § 3 (2) AbfG i.V. 'U.
§ 8 (1) AbfRestUberwV)
How exactly different normative orders overlapped
in practice was a subjective matter created through the
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perceptions of various actors who had different views on
this. For a charge hand at the U.K. waste treatment
plant, the technology of the plant would have been more
of a normative reference point than commercial or legal
requirements. For chemists, legal and commercial
requirements had more immediacy.
Negotiation was an important resource for managing
overlap between different normative orders. Through
negotiation legal requirements could be handled more
flexibly with the result that fulfilling legal aims could
also help to fulfill the requirements of other normative
contexts. Both in the U.K. and the German settings there
was frequent negotiation between the regulatory authority
and operators of plants (for more detail see chapter 8
and 9). For example, negotiation of standards at site
licensing stage led to formal legal requirements in the
site licence that also enabled the regulated to fulfill
requirements from commercial contexts. Negotiation in the
field could also help to manage overlap between different
normative orders. But what does the notion of overlap
between different normative contexts tell us about a
concept of compliance?
Overlap of normative contexts and concepts of compliance
The notion of overlap between the four normative
contexts has various implications for a concept of a
rule. First, the formal law was just one of those
normative contexts and did not have a privileged status
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of being more important than other normative contexts.
Secondly, normative contexts were most likely to shape
behaviour where they overlapped. This was different from
notions of rules that draw on the formal law and
enforcement officers' perceptions of the law for defining
rules. Such accounts do not take sufficiently into
account how the regulated themselves define normative
contexts, below the threshold of attention of the
regulatory authority.
My field data showed that normative contexts were
most likely to shape behaviour where they overlapped,
i.e. where various different normative contexts
reinforced each other. This is in contrast to what is
sometimes suggested in the literature, that it is clarity
of legal rules that is likely to promote behaviour which
fulfills legal requirements. This is sometimes suggested
in the literature (see for example Dimento, 1986:104)
For example, in his discussion of the "capture" of
regulatory commissions in the U.S. by business Bernstein
(1955) argues that "enforceable regulations" are an
important aspect of successful regulation by Commissions.
He states:
"...in order to be enforceable, regulations
must be understood by persons and firms subject
to them. They must delineate clearly what the
individual or firm must do in order to comply.
Intelligibility and coherence of regulations
are major factors in the enforcement process"
(Bernstein, 1955:226)
This might accurately reflect perceptions of the
regulators.	 But on the lowest level of actual
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implementation of legal provisions by the regulated the
notion of the "clear rule" might be limited in explaining
behaviour. On the basis of my field data it seemed -
ironically - that a rule was more likely to be followed
if the "background" from which it drew its normativity
was "fuzzy", i.e. consisted of an overlap of various
different reinforcing normative contexts.
A further implication of the idea that there are
various normative contexts is that a distinction between
compliance and non - compliance is too simplistic. The
distinction implies that there is one normative context
in relation to which compliance and non - compliance
could be determined. But given the situation that there
was a range of normative contexts what might be non -
compliance with one context might be compliance with
another. There were limits, however, to the notion of
reinforcing overlap between different normative contexts.
Limits to overlap
In some situations different normative contexts
required different behaviour. Hence, there was not
overlap but incompatibility between the demands of
different normative contexts. For example, there was
incompatibility between the testing methods actually
available and the testing methods required in order to
make decisions on the question whether the formal legal
requirements for taking in waste loads or passing on
waste loads to final disposers had been fulfilled. The
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testing methods used were not precise enough to give
information needed to determine compliance with the
requirements of the formal law. This was not just a
result of the more simple testing methods such as the
Merck dip kit tests in the lab of the U.K. waste
treatment plant. Instead, even the more sophisticated
analysis machines in the lab of the German waste
management plant or the new lab at the U.K. waste
treatment plant could not provide the "either/or"
certainty that the legal rules required. It was difficult
to say if the load either did or did not conform to
acceptance parameters because analysis results depended
on how the sample was taken and if a representative
sample could be taken of that type of waste load. Hence,
in some situations there was a fundamental
incompatibility between the image of social reality that
formal legal rules portrayed and the image of social
reality with which other normative contexts worked. This
notion of competing versions of social reality in
different normative contexts is different from a notion
of a "gap" between formal legal requirements and social
practices. The notion of the "gap" privileges images of
social reality contained in the law. By describing
behaviour which did not conform to the formal law as
"social practices" insufficient emphasis is given to the
normativity of other social orders besides the formal
law. Also, the rule - like aspects of normative contexts
are neglected. Since the analysis procedure could not
give clear answers to the questions that • the formal law
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raised (i.e. does it conform to acceptance parameters or
not) a notion of compliance was adjusted. As a result of
this, technical compliance could be distinguished from a
notion of compliance contained in the formal law.
Technical compliance meant that a particular sample
showed conformity with acceptance parameters. According
to the U.K. site licence the law's notion of compliance
involved the idea that the waste load conformed to
acceptance parameters (look up German material on
incoming loads). In practice only the technical notion of
compliance had any relevance or meaning. Hence, legal
definitions of compliance were transformed through
technical criteria. Technical criteria, in turn, could
help to realize the operator's own interests because they
were within the control of the regulated. They could be
manipulated so that evaluations of compliance would be in
favour of the regulated. Hence, while there were limits
to overlap in this situation between technology and the
formal law there was overlap between technical and
commercial contexts. So far I have just used the term
normative context without really explaining how different
contexts became considered as normative. Let us therefore
explore in the next section the question how different
normative contexts were socially constructed.
Normative contexts as socially constructed
Some studies on discretion do not explain how - in
detail - contexts become relevant to legal decision -
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making or what the contents of these contexts are, apart
from a - priori generalized notions of "various social,
political and legal factors" (see for example Hermann,
1976:38) . In contrast to this a characteristic of the
four normative contexts, law, technology, commercial
requirements and information - as encountered in the
field - was that they were not objective factors but they
were socially constructed (Emerson/Paley; 1992:232) . On
the basis of my field data I traced how various factors
contributed to what became considered as commercial aims.
For example, it was in the commercial interests of the
German waste management plant to pass on problematic
wastes to final disposal sites which charged lower
disposal prices rather than disposing of the waste
through incineration. This commercial incentive, however,
was qualified by the need to preserve good business
relationships with landfill sites. Assigning too many
problematic waste loads above acceptance parameters of
the final disposer could cause too many load rejections.
Hence, the commercial incentives that motivated behaviour
in practice could not be determined in the abstract but
were constructed in the field through reference to a
range of different factors and sometimes conflicting
commercial aims (for a discussion of the social
construction of information see section 13.1. of chapter
13)
Technology was also socially constructed. Its
meaning was actively created by actors in the field.
Technology was not an objective condition that solely
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determined behaviour; the actors' responses to and
perceptions of it played a part, too. For example,
insufficiently precise testing equipment such as the
Merck dip kit tests at the U.K. waste treatment plant was
one aspect of a culture of "bucket chemistry". Another
aspect of "bucket chemistry" was a general attitude of
the staff that developed in response to the low level of
technology. In this low - level technology working
environment precision in analytical procedures was not
considered as paramount. Hence, normative contexts were
not static surrounding circumstances but these contexts
were created and recreated by actors in the field. Thus,
behaviour directed at fulfilling legal requirements
occurred in a subjective world. The question arises
through what social processes did these various contexts
become normative?
Sources of normativity: structure and agency
In the following section I will explore what are
sources of normativity. How does a context become
normative? What role do structure and agency play in this
process?
Structure
According to "gap" - analysis the "gap" is deviant.
Also, it is up to legal actors to "comply" or "not
comply" with the law. If structural factors are
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recognized they usually refer to commercial contexts and
the structure of the capitalist economy (see for example
Clinard/Yeager, 1980:273) . One of the few exceptions to
this is Scholz (1984a) who refers also to technology and
the flow of information in the regulated organization as
factors influencing the implementation of regulation.
Furthermore the formal law - in relation to which the
"gap" becomes assessed - is considered as static rather
than dynamic.
There are three aspects of this perception that
were challenged by my field data. First, law could gain
meaning by being embedded in structural frameworks such
as technology, and hence without being actively invoked
by actors. The information management systems in the
laboratory of the German waste management plant provided
a structural framework which shaped "information" that
was relied on in individual decisions on the assignment
of waste to particular plants (for more detail see
section 7.2. in chapter 7)
Secondly, technology and information, not just
commercial contexts, were important in this process. For
example, according to the chemists at the U.K. waste
treatment plant, there was a degree of lack of control
over the reactions in the treatment process. Because of
the way the plant was constructed waste loads which could
not be treated down to discharge consent limits could not
be re - treated. Hence, simply the way the waste
treatment plant was designed, leading to limited process
control, structurally determined if and how the limits on
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the discharge of various substances in the discharge
consent would gain meaning.
The third way in which my field data challenge
assumptions of 'gap" analysis is through the idea that
normativity in the field was not just a static
characteristic but could be dynamic. This is illustrated
by looking at the role of agency in the construction of
normative contexts.
Agency
There were situations in the field in which
normative contexts became mediated through actors.
Definitions of what was normative were derived from
interaction between people. On the one hand there were
the service relationships in the waste management chain.
Interaction between waste producers, waste treatment
plants and final waste disposers could determine what
became defined as normative. For example, independent
hauliers were concerned that they would lose business if
they gave details of waste producers to the waste
treatment plant. This reduced the amount of information
that was available to the chemists at the U.K. plant for
assessing waste loads. Information about incoming waste
loads was the product of negotiations between the plant
and hauliers as part of a business relationship.
On the other hand meaning of the law could be
constructed through interaction between enforcement
officers and staff at the waste management plants (for
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more detail see chapters 8 and 9) . Thus normativity was
not necessarily a static characteristic but could be
dynamic. What was normative was not "necessarily" pre -
determined in structures but could also be constructed in
personal interaction in the field. Indeed, in turn, even
formal legal rules were not automatically normative.
Hence, normativity was not necessarily based on the
authority of the formal legal system but could be
negotiated in the field. Rules did not necessarily become
considered as authoritative because they were developed
in accordance with the appropriate procedures of the
formal legal system. The structural or negotiated
norinativity of other contexts could override normativity
of the formal law. This challenges a central aspect of
"gap" analysis according to which we can talk of "gaps"
because we can construe in the abstract what the meaning
of the law is and then compare it with what the regulated
actually do in practice.
So far I have discussed examples where normativity
of a context was achieved either through structure or
agency. In some situations in the field, however,
normativity of a context was established through both a
combination of structure and agency.
Structure and agency as not mutually exclusive
Structure and agency were not mutually exclusive in
establishing the normativity of a context. Since
information is discussed in section 13.1. of chapter 13 I
379
will focus here on illustrating how technology,
commercial aspects and the formal law could be
constructed, both through structure and agency. For
example, aspects of technology such as the way the
treatment process was set up could work as a structure.
But the culture of "bucket chemistry" at the plants also
had an impact on behaviour at the level of incentives and
motivation.
Commercial contexts could also work both as a
structure and as an incentive. Structural aspects of
commercial incentives included the roles created for
staff at the waste management plants through pre - given
job descriptions such as the sales staff. But in some
situations it could be up to negotiation between
individuals such as a particular sales person and a
particular chemist as to what extent commercial aims
played a role when deciding, for example, about the
rejection of a waste load.
Similarly, formal legal rules could provide a
structural framework for behaviour as when a new work
group was set up at the German waste management plant in
order to deal with the new "EN" paper procedure. In some
situations, however, formal legal rules had less of an
impact as a structure but could act as a specific
incentive for behaviour. For example, there was an
incentive to comply with some of the testing procedures
for waste in order to be able to calculate accurate
disposal prizes for customers of the German waste
management plant (for more detail on this see section
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4.2.1. in chapter 4) . Hence, the four contexts of
commercial aims, information, technology and law could
operate both as structures and as incentives. After
having discussed how a notion of the formal law and
compliance with it became transformed in the field
through a range of normative contexts I will now discuss
another important aspect of "gap" analysis. This concerns
the idea that we can distinguish a notion of the formal
law from social practices.
12.3. Law and social practices as conceptually different?
In "gap" analysis the formal law and social
practices are often perceived as conceptually different.
The notion of the "gap" is premissed upon the idea that
we can identify standards on the one hand and compare
them to social practices of the regulated on the other
hand. Various accounts in the literature have adopted
this perspective (Pearce/Tombs; 1990; Hopkins/Parnell;
1984:180; Hucke, 1980:83; Bohnert/Klitzsch, 1980:200;
Winter; 1975:28; v. Weick; 1973:147) . This idea is also
expressed in the title of Stone's book on corporate
social responsibility "Where the Law ends" (1975)
My field data raise questions about this
perception. It emerged from the field data that rules
developed in the field which were the result of a process
of integration of rules and social practices. Normative
orders that shaped behaviour could not be thought of as
"the law" on the one hand and "social practices" on the
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other hand. Instead a whole range of different rules
could be placed on a continuum where social practices
gained normative force and formal rules were influenced
by social practices. Thus, in my view the law does not
end where social practices such as business practices
start but any meaning of empirical law has to start with
social practices. Let us first look at different types
of rules encountered in the field.
Different types of rules encountered in the field
In the field different types of rules such as
customary rules, adjustment rules, hybrid rules and
formal legal rules could be encountered which resulted
from the overlap of various different normative contexts.
What do these rules tells us about the relationship
between rules and social practices? Can the adjustment of
rules to social practices be considered as a form of
"capture"?
Customary rules
From the field data it emerged that different types
of rules operated in the context of waste management
regulation. Sources for customary rules were work
routines, work group norms (see also Busck, 1976:129),
experience and formal legal rules . For example, it was a
customary norm at both the U.K. waste treatment plant and
the German plant that wastes known by experience would
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sometimes not be tested as required by formal legal rules
of the site licence.
Furthermore ways of doing work in a work group
could crystallize into a customary norm which would have
an impact on how formal legal rules were implemented.
These customary work group norms were influenced by a
range of facctors such as where the work group was
located at the plant and if people working together in a
work group shared a common profession or gender (for more
detail see chapter 6). Hence, through the impact of work
group norms a range of small - scale factors had an
impact on how the formal law gained meaning.
Also, formal legal rules could be the source of
customary norms. They could have an initial impact on
social practices but then be forgotten about. It was thus
the social practice itself that constituted the normative
standard and became self-perpetuating. At both the German
and the U.K. waste management plants operators often did
not know in detail site licence requirements which were
supposed to shape behaviour. Nevertheless, the way
operations were handled conformed partly to site licence
requirements. Hence, operators - in their view -
conformed to the normative order that they "had always
done things that way" rather than to the site licence
requirements.
In contrast to this in the literature work group
norms have been portrayed as mainly in conflict with
formal rules. For example, values and work group norms
have been perceived as in conflict with formal rules in
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Freidson's work on social control among physicians
(referred	 to	 in	 Manning,	 1980:94)
A further example of customary rules were some of
the standards used by waste control officers in the field
to evaluate sites. When both German and U.K. waste
control officers assessed sites they did not check in a
very detailed way if every condition of the site licence
was fulfilled. Instead they appraised the site for
compliance with a more general standard such as "good
housekeeping" which was based on experience of having
visited sites. Hence, in some situations customary rules
displaced the application of formal legal rules. What
other types of rules existed apart from customary rules?
Adjustment rules
Some of the work routines that were carried out
both at the U.K. and the German waste management plants
involved regular and patterned behaviour. This behaviour
did not necessarily fulfill site licence requirements but
it could not be adequately described as breaking site
licence requirements either. Instead it could be best
described as being steered by adjustment rules. At the
German waste management plant waste loads arrived at the
yard in order to be passed on to final disposers. Usually
an "EN" form accompanied these waste loads which
specified in which particular facility the waste should
be disposed of. Quite often the waste load arriving at
the yard did not conform to the description of the waste
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given on the "EN". Hence, the waste in practice could not
be disposed of in the waste disposal plant which was
indicated on the "EN"; the waste had to be redirected
into a different waste disposal facility. Thus, decisions
made in the office about what waste should go into what
facility had to be changed at the yard. New links between
type of waste and type of final disposal plant had to be
created. These new patterns of making decisions
constituted a new set of rules that operated at the yard.
These types of rules could be called adjustment rules
because they helped to adjust previously achieved
decisions in the office to what the waste looked like in
reality when it was delivered at the yard. Hence, there
was not outright conflict between the norms operating at
the yard and decisions made in the office. But norms
operating at the yard were "back - up" rules which helped
to bridge gaps between a perception of the waste arrived
at in the office on the basis of an analysis and what the
waste was actually like when it arrived at the yard.
Manning (1980:79) also found in his study of the law
enforcement work of narcotics officers that adjustment
agreements were struck between officers and the
regulated. He states:
". . .the private modes of negotiation,
accommodation and adjustment, in large part a
product of various compromises with stipulated
public rules establishes a dual standard: a
publicly announced, or at least
administratively stipulated, set of rules and
procedures and a privately adhered to sub rosa
set of working arrangements or sanctioned
practices" (Manning, 1980:80)
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There were different types of adjustment rules.
First, there were adjustment rules which were formally
negotiated between the regulatory authority and the
regulated. These were different from hybrid rules because
they would not be included in formal legal documents but
constituted a working understanding between the
regulatory authority and the regulated in the field.
Secondly, there were adjustment rules which developed
just out of the operations at the plants and which
remained below the attention threshold of the regulatory
authority. An example for the latter type were the
adjustment rules in relation to the "EN" procedure at the
yard of the German waste management plant.
Two main factors influenced the formation of
adjustment rules. First, they were linked to a set of
primary norms which consisted of decisions made in the
office about where particular waste loads would go.
Decisions made in the office would usually be adhered to
except when the actual waste load delivered was not
suitable for the final disposal plant. Hence, adjustment
rules could "fine - tune" decisions made in the office.
Decisions made in the office were based on formal legal
rules. Adjustment rules mediated these formal legal
rules.
Secondly, work groups shaped adjustment rules. The
group of staff in the office, which had been specifically
set up to deal with assigning final waste disposal plants
for waste loads under the "EN" procedure, worked to one
set of rules. The work group of the people on the yard
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worked most of the time to the set of rules specified in
the office, but sometimes worked to a different set of
rules, these adjustment rules. The contents of these
adjustment rules was determined by the concerns of the
particular work group which was operating them. The
people working on the yard were concerned with making
sure that waste loads were accepted by final waste
disposers and that hired vehicles were filled up
completely with waste loads before being dispatched to
final waste disposal sites. The question arises what role
did formal legal rules play in the construction of
normative frameworks in the field?
Formal legal rules
The source of formal legal rules were formal legal
sources, such as the site licence and the discharge
consent, that defined rules abstractly, i.e. not in
relation to social practices. In this section I will look
at the question to what extent the form of formal legal
rules can help to explain behaviour at the plants. In
some situations the form of formal legal rules
contributed to what became considered as normative. In
other situations, however, the form of formal legal rules
could be more important for understanding how standards
were managed rather than what the actual standard was. It
emerged from the field data that formal legal rules could
contribute to shaping practices that occurred at the
waste management plants such as the dilution of waste
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loads at the U.K. waste treatment plant. On the discharge
consent the limit for the discharge of substances into
the sewer was expressed in percentages, i.e. x mg of a
particular substance per litre. It was not difficult to
manage formal compliance with this standard. Waste loads
which had not been satisfactorily treated could, through
dilution with water, be brought down to this standard.
Had the formal standard been expressed as an absolute
amount of substances discharged, for example 50 mg of
Cadmium per day, then dilution would not have been an
option for the regulated to manage the fulfillment of
legal requirements. Hence, the form of the legal standard
could have an impact on social practices at the plant
although it was not the sole reason why the regulated
diluted waste loads.
The form of the formal legal rule, however, could
not explain what the actual standard was. Even if there
would have been a formal rule in the discharge consent
that would have set as the limit 50 ing of Cadmium per
day, the meaning of the actual standard for the regulated
might have been that they could discharge routinely 70 mg
of Cadmium per day if the water company did not check
what they discharged or if they took the view that 20 mg
of Cadmium above the licence limit was part of the
tolerance level they were applying in practice (see
Hawkins, 1984:27) . Hence, when trying to explain
behaviour in relation to law it is not sufficient to
refer back to the formal legal standard as the main
reference point. Waste loads were sometimes redeclared
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both at the U.K. and the German waste management plants
under a different waste code. But, the flexibility of the
formal legal rule, here the broad waste code, was not
sufficient to explain why waste loads were being
redeclared. Work group norms, operational and commercial
considerations also played a role.
Accordingly, accounts in the literature that make
statements about actual standards by reference to the
formal legal rules are problematic (see for example
Staatsen, 1976:133; Schefters/Ringeling/Wolters,
1976:192) . Schefters, Ringeling and Wolters discuss how
applications for entry of the Netherlands were handled by
the relevant Minister. The applications were made by
people of mixed Indonesian and Dutch descent who had been
given the option to either choose Dutch or Indonesian
nationality when Indonesia became independent from the
Netherlands in 1949. Some of the people who had then
chosen Indonesian nationality later regretted this choice
and sought entry to the Netherlands. Schefters, Ringeling
and Wolters (1976:190) see discretion exercised in
deciding these applications as mainly arising from broad
criteria	 in	 the	 statutory	 framework	 such	 as
"adaptability", "need" and "other factors".
In contrast to this it is necessary to refer to
various different normative contexts when trying to
understand behaviour in relation to law. Since other
normative contexts influenced behaviour in relation to
law the form of legislation could tell us something about
the mechanisms used for managing standards but not
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necessarily about the actual standard itself. The fact
that formal legal rules provided for discretion did not
mean automatically that commercial aims overrode formal
legal rules. Hence, when trying to understand what role
formal legal rules played it was important to look at the
interaction between forms of regulation and surrounding
norm systems (for a more detailed discussion of the
implications of this for debates on discretion see
section 13.3. in chapter 13) . So far I have argued that
formal legal rules and in particular their form had only
limited relevance for explaining behaviour in relation to
law. In the literature, however, it has been argued that
- legal rules become relevant by providing a framework in
relation to which legal actors bargain (see for example
Genn, 1987; Winter, 1985)
Bargaining in the shadow of the law
Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) provide a model of
how legal frameworks influence bargaining between the
parties in the divorce process outside the courtroom.
They state:
.that the preferences of the parties, the
entitlements created by law, transaction costs,
attitudes towards risk, and strategic behaviour
will substantially affect the negotiated
outcomes" (Nnookin/Kornhauser, 1979:997).
In some of the bargaining situations encountered in my
field data this notion of "bargaining in the shadow of
the law" seemed appropriate to apply. During negotiations
with the operator for the upgrading of a waste management
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plant the German regulatory authority referred to the
fact that during the public participation phase pressure
groups and citizens would demand from the regulatory
authority stricter standards for plants. This was used by
the regulatory authority as an argument that it would be
in the best interests of the regulated to adopt higher
standards at an earlier stage before they came under
pressure in the public participation phase.
Though Mnookin and Kornhauser work with the idea
that legal frameworks become relevant only in a mediated
form my field data show that it may be necessary to go
further than this. In my view, the notion of a legal
framework needs to be transformed. My data suggested a
closer connection between legal frameworks and bargaining
than recognized in Mnookin and Kornhauser's model.
First, the regulated and the regulators did not
just bargain in the shadow of the law but they bargained
what the meaning of the law was. In both the U.K. and
German waste regulation authorities the contents of site
licences were negotiated (for more detail see section
8.2. of chapter 8). For Mnookin and Kornhauser,
"bargaining in the shadow of the law" is not so much
concerned with establishing what the law is. They were
more concerned with the question how the law becomes
utilized or selectively applied. The notion of the
"bargaining chip" seems more powerful for conceptualizing
the role of formal legal provisions where negotiations
are an alternative to formal legal procedures such as
court actions. In Mnookin and Kornhauser's study this
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concerns bargaining between the parties to a divorce in
place of the full determination of the terms of a divorce
settlement by a court. In Genn's study (1987) it concerns
bargaining processes in out of court settlements in
personal injury actions. In some enforcement studies it
refers to the use of negotiation instead of the
invocation of formal criminal prosecutions (see for
example Grabosky/Braithwaite, 1986:190; Hawkins, 1984)
The analysis of the formal law as the "bargaining chip"
has arisen from an examination of bargaining in different
contexts than some of the bargaining in my field study.
Here bargaining occurred as part of - not as an
alternative to - the formal legal process of site
licensing. Hence, the notion of the "bargaining chip"
needs to be complemented by a perception that the content
of the law can become negotiated.
Secondly, my field data show that bargaining
occurred not just in the shadow of the formal law but
also in the shadow of social practices. For example, in
the German regulatory authority a plan for scrap yards
was drawn - up. When setting standards for the waste
management operations the waste control officer stated
that the aim of the regulatory authority was not to 'gold
- plate' the scrap yards. Similiarly in relation to the
licensing process of a waste management facility a German
waste control officer said:
'We want to follow reality (emphasis added)
with this licence. Negotiation between the RA
and the operator should help to approach step
by step what is realizable'.
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Hence, standards were not negotiated in relation to
abstract legal norms. What the regulated actually did in
practice when running their operations was also taken
into account. After having discussed how norms are
achieved through bargaining processes in the field let us
look at incentives for bargaining. Mnookin and Kornhauser
state that private ordering in the case of divorce is
promoted by a range of incentives (Nnookin/Kornhauser,
1979:958) . 2mong those is the fact that the parents will
know more about the child than the judge
(Mnookin/Kornhauser, 1979:958) . Some of these incentives
also existed in the case of the implementation of waste
management regulation. Current and sufficient information
about the waste management process was often only
accessible to some staff at the waste management plants
rather than to waste control officers. Usually only the
people operating machinery or the chemists would
understand the technical process in detail. Hence, an
incentive for private ordering occurred where actors
other than official legal actors such as waste control
officers were better suited as decision - makers and
where the input of non - official legal actors was
crucial.
In the case of divorce law private ordering means
that the two private parties to the proceedings negotiate
their own settlement of the case and the judge only
"rubber - stamps" the privately agreed outcome
(Mnookin/Kornhauser, 1979:951). Private ordering in the
context of the implementation of waste management
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regulation, however, meant that private actors - the
regulated - participated with the regulators in the legal
ordering of a situation. Hence, private and official
legal actors both participated in the bargaining of norms
in the case of waste management regulation. Through
private ordering a notion of the formal law became
mediated. In contrast to this official legal actors such
as the judge only intervene during the final stages of
giving validity to privately negotiated norms in Mnookin
and Kornhauser's model of divorce law bargaining.
Mnookin and Kornhauser also show how negotiation
undoes some of the ways in which the formal law organizes
and compartmentalizes social reality. Money and custody
issues could be linked in private divorce bargaining. In
most North - american states the formal law does not
allow these two issues to become linked. For example, in
a legal action brought to recover overdue support
payments, a father cannot defend on the ground that his
ex - wife did not permit visitation (Mnookin/Kornhauser,
1979:964) . But through private negotiation "piecemeal
bargains" can be achieved "that spread support payments
over time" and link visitation to money issues
(Mnookin/Kornhauser, 1979:965)
Negotiation also helped in the U.K. waste
regulation authority to link the enforcement of waste
management rules and the licensing of plants. Enforcement
and licensing were dealt with in separate branches of the
regulatory authority and they were not linked in the
statutory framework. But prosecution and licensing could
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become linked. After prosecutions, site licence standards
would be sometimes adapted in the U.K. The fact that
negotiation could create links where there were no links
according to the formal legal provisions shows how
meaning of the law could be created from the bottom - up.
Apart from formal legal rules what other types of rules
existed in the field?
Hybrid rules
I defined formal legal rules as rules whose source
were formal legal documents such as the site licence for
a waste management plant or the discharge consent for the
discharge of effluent into the sewer. Some of the rules
in these formal legal documents set an abstract standard
for behaviour such as basic minimum technological
requirements. For example, in the site licence for the
U.K. and German waste treatment plant there were
requirements to instal measurement devices for the level
of liquids in the treatment tanks.
There were other rules in the site licence,
however, which could be described as a hybrid variety
between formal rules and customary rules. The source of
these hybrid rules was formal legal documents such as the
site licence. But these hybrid rules were related to
customary rules because they drew on actual social
practices when they were set up. For example, when the
rules for testing procedures in the site licence were
laid down, the regulatory authority would not just
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unilaterally determine them, but would write them via
reference to the working plan submitted by the regulated.
In the working plan the regulated would describe their
operations as they wanted to carry them out in practice.
The standard which would be finally imposed on load
testing procedures would draw on what the regulated
themselves had proposed. Hence, this formal legal
standard had as one of its sources social practices of
the regulated. In the following section I will look more
closely at the process of integration of rules and social
practices.
Integration of rules and social practices
Introduction
In this section I will look at general aspects of
integration. What different forms of integration could be
distinguished? Through what mechanisms was integration
achieved? Could commercial requirements be integrated
into legal requirements? Was the integration of social
practices into rules a form of "capture"?
General aspects of integration
Mi integration of rules and social practices
occurred at different levels. Rules could be adapted to
social practices at the formal site licensing stage. But
rules were also adapted informally in day - to - day
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negotiation. The practice of diluting waste loads at the
U.K. and the German waste management plants was a good
example of this. The dilution of waste loads enabled the
U.K. plant to give the appearance of fulfilling legal
requirements while at the same time loads which could not
be treated at the plant or which did not conform to
requirements for incoming loads could still be taken in.
Where social practices were integrated into rules in this
way, a traditional notion of rules would be transformed.
A rule was not exclusively prescriptive but drew on
actual social practices, that is the rule was not so much
concerned with general applicability and universal
validity but drew on the specific circumstances of what
was happening at a particular plant. The integration of
rules and social practices illustrated another aspect of
a transformed notion of a rule. Rules were not just
static but could be dynamic. Formal legal rules could be
adapted to social practices and social practices could be
adapted to formal legal rules.
Different forms of integration: "Strong" and "weak"
integration
There were "weak" and "strong" forms of
integration. In cases of "strong" integration regulators
changed the content of a legal provision. For example, in
relation to one of the site licences being written for a
U.K. waste transfer plant the licensing unit had
initially suggested a short time that waste should be
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allowed to be stored at the yard. After consultation with
waste control officers who supervised the site the time
limit for storage of waste was extended. In situations of
"strong" integration the setting of standards was done
strategically. Standards were set with the aim of
avoiding a situation where the regulated could not
fulfill legal requirements. Hence, standards were not set
in the abstract but were set in relation to social
practices. Another example of "strong" integration was
the fact that sometimes waste control officers in the
field anticipated the need for the adaptation of a rule;
they would approach the regulated with the suggestion
that the rule should be adapted before the regulated
would even request it. "Strong" integration covered the
situation where there was formal approval by the
regulatory authority of the integration of social
practices in rules such as in the case of working plans.
"Weak" integration described those situations where
the regulatory authority simply left more scope to the
regulated to choose the means through which they would
achieve the outcome that the regulatory authority had
stipulated. At one of the German plants which treated
contaminated soil the regulatory authority had initially
required that two foils should be installed to prevent
polluting substances from the plant seeping into the
ground. In the end, the regulatory authority agreed to a
compromise whereby the regulated were allowed to install
only one foil. But in addition they had to ensure that no
substances would leak from the plant. In case any
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leakages occurred the liquid had to be collected in
containers. "Weak" integration described also the
situation where the integration of rules and social
practices occurred on a less formal level than in the
case of "strong" integration. Examples for this could be
informal agreements negotiated in the field (for more
detail see section 8.3. of chapter 8) . The question
arises through what mechanisms integration between rules
and social practices could be achieved.
Organizational structures for the integration of rules
and social practices
Institutional frameworks were set up which ensured
that links were created between rules and social
practices. In the U.K. waste regulation authority there
was an established procedure that waste control officers
who supervised sites commented on proposals for site
licences. This procedure was supposed to ensure that
rules in site licences could be fulfilled by the
regulated by not being too far removed from what they
were doing in practice. Furthermore the way the waste
control officer's field work was organized could promote
the integration of rules and social practices. In the
U.K. waste regulation authority the waste control officer
primarily responsible for the site would visit up to
three times per week so - called "problem sites". Through
this intensive contact between the waste control officer
and staff from the site who were managing operations on
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the yard the waste control officer would in effect become
involved in the management of the site and in day - to -
day advice on decisions on how best to run the site. This
assimilation of perspectives through the structure of the
waste control officer's job promoted the integration of
rules and social practices. This could occur by adapting
rules to social practices or by enhancing the normative
appeal of formal legal rules by pointing out how they
would benefit the promotion of aims of the regulated.
When discussing the relationship between rules and social
practices the question arises how commercial
considerations of the regulated and legal requirements
were integrated.
Conflict between commercial considerations and legal
requirements?
Some accounts in the literature perceive a conflict
between legal and commercial requirements (see for
example Clinard/Yeager; 1980:273; Sonnenfeld/Lawrence;
1978). My field data, however, suggest another view of
this relationship. I reported more data on the adaptation
of formal legal rules to commercial aims than any other
aims (see for example chapter 8). But this did not
necessarily imply that commercial contexts were more
important than other contexts in influencing how formal
legal rules became interpreted at the plants. One of the
reasons for reporting more data on commercial contexts
was that the integration of rules and commercial aims
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occurred in a more overt and visible way. The integration
of rules and commercial aims often occurred through
specific decisions being taken by waste control officers.
In contrast to this the integration of rules and other
social practices occurred in a more covert and invisible
way. Technology had a structural impact. Once in place it
determined a range of behaviour often without having to
be actively invoked or to be translated into specific
decisions. There is a further reason why, in my view, the
notion of conflict does not explain fully my field
observations. In some situations a balance was struck
between legal and commercial requirements.
Balancing legal and commercial requirements
Some of the field situations which I observed could
best be described as attempts by the regulated to strike
a balance between legal and commercial requirements. Most
of the day - to - day activities at the regulated plants
were beneath the attention threshold of the regulatory
authority. The regulated might have carried out no
testing procedures without the regulatory authority
necessarily noticing. Saving time and money in this way
would have been in the immediate commercial interests of
the regulated. Nevertheless testing procedures were still
operated at the plants. One of the reasons for this was
that while testing procedures were costly to operate they
were necessary to make the plant technology work and to
carry out other commercial tasks such as the calculation
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of disposal prizes for customers (for more detail see
section 4.2.1. in chapter 4) . Furthermore at a U.K. waste
transfer plant it was in the interests of the regulated
to pass on waste quickly to final disposers which
promoted fulfilling legal limits on the length of time
waste could be stored at the site.
To automatically perceive a conflict between legal
and commercial requirements also assumes that
organizations behave in a rational manner in the sense
that they make every effort to realize their commercial
aims. While this might apply in some cases it did not
apply to some of the companies I came across during field
visits with waste control officers. Some of them appeared
to have fundamental management problems. For example, at
one plant the site manager was replaced by a new manager
to deal - among other reasons - with a lack of control
over flows of incoming and outgoing wastes. Hence, not
every situation involved necessarily a conflict between
legal and commercial requirements. It was crucial to
investigate on the ground how the fulfillment of legal
requirements might be promoted by other aspects of the
plant operations. Commercial aims could not be considered
in isolation from other normative contexts which
influenced the way the regulated behaved.
Furthermore in some situations formal legal rules
were not clear enough to allow for conflict between legal
rules and commercial requirements. A good example of this
was that according to the site licence of the U.K. plant
oil - contaminated wastes which could not be treated
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should not be taken into the plant. It was in the
commercial interests of the U.K. plant to avoid load
rejections as far as possible so as not to jeopardize
relations with customers. This affected the
interpretation of what constituted an oil - contaminated
waste load. Different interpretations of the rule could
produce different degrees of conflict between the rule
and commercial requirements. A very limited
interpretation of what constituted an oil - contaminated
load would produce little conflict between the rule and
commercial requirements because not many waste loads
would have to be rejected. Hence, different
interpretations of legal rules could prevent conflict
because commercial aims could be accommodated within
them.
Finally, there was a more fundamental reason for
the idea that the notion of conflict could not explain
all field situations. The notion of conflict is premissed
upon the idea that we could indentify a self - contained
and abstractly defined notion of legal requirements which
then could be contrasted with commercial aims. Since in
some situations legal requirements and social practices
became integrated - even on a formal level as in the case
of hybrid rules - such a notion of law, which is the
prerequisite for the notion of conflict, did not exist in
some situations. The question arises, however, if the
integration of various normative requirements, and in
particular the integration of legal and commercial
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requirements, is not best described through a notion of
"capture"?
Integration of different requirements as "capture"?
In my view the notion of integration is different
from a notion of "capture" and only a qualified notion of
"capture" applies to some of my field observations.
"Capture" implies that the regulated can influence the
regulators so that the regulators take their interests on
board (Bernstein, 1955:73; Nader, 1965:225, 232) . This
can occur through the "revolving door" syndrome where the
regulators are recruited from the regulated industry and
regulators also might work at a later stage for the
regulated (Bernstein, 1955:82; for a criticism of this
perspective see Freitag, 1983)
But in some situations in the field the
integration of rules and commercial aims of the regulated
enhanced the normative appeal of formal legal rules.
Waste control officers would point out how fulfillment of
legal requirements would promote the commercial aims of
the regulated. Indeed, some of the agreements reached in
the field enabled the regulatory authority to have more
control over the regulated than they would have had, had
they resorted to formal means. For example, the U.K.
regulatory authority negotiated an agreement with one of
the U.K. waste management plants not to take in certain
waste loads, although the site licence allowed the plant
to take them. This agreement constituted an integration
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between the conuriercial interests of the U.K. plant and
the interests of the regulatory authority. The interests
of the U.K. plant were not to have these wastes
permanently excluded from the list of wastes they could
take in. The interests of the regulatory authority were
not to allow these wastes into the plant as long as the
plant did not have the appropriate technology to handle
these wastes safely. The negotiated agreement provided
more certainty of outcome than if the PA would have used
the formal site licence variation procedure. If the PA
had used this, it would have formally removed certain
wastes from the list of wastes allowed into the plant. In
this situation it might have been more likely that the
regulated would have objected. Similiarly, the German
regulatory authority avoided in some situations the use
of formal administrative orders ("Verwaltungsakte") . In
the case of the use of formal procedures the regulated
would have had formal rights of appeal such as the
possibility of lodging formal objections
("Widerspruchsverfahren t' according to § 70 VwGO) which
could be lengthy and expensive.
In addition also Ayres and Braithwaite (1992)
suggest that informal ways of behaviour which are linked
to a co-operative enforcement style can be seen as a
means of more effective enforcement of regulations. They
distinguish between different forms of capture. Two forms
of capture, inefficient and zero-sum capture do not
really promote the enforcement of regulations, but
"efficient capture" can help the implementation of
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regulation	 (Ayres/Braithwaite,	 1992:69) .	 "Efficient
capture" describes a state where the regulatory agency
benefits from the savings of flexible enforcement "by
overlooking minor or technical violations in return for
the firm's extra-legal efforts to reduce harm in ways not
directly addressed in the regulation" (Ayres/Braithwaite,
1992:69)
The notion of "capture" also did not adequately
describe the field data in so far as shared perspectives
were built into the way the enforcement officer's job was
organized. Hence, that aspect of the concept of "capture"
which implies that activities of the regulated produce
"capture" did not apply in some of the situations in
relation to the enforcement of waste management
regulation. For example, the waste control officer's job
involved close and regular contact with the regulated. If
a site was considered as a "problem" also depended on
those relationships between waste control officers and
the regulated. Ironically "capture" might be caused more
by the way regulatory authorities organize enforcement
rather than by actions of the regulated. A similiar
situation has been described by Manning (1980) in his
study of the law enforcement work of narcotics officers:
"Insofar as the organization and its members
adapt to the character of the criminal world
they are regulating, they share the symbolic,
linguistic, cultural, and social world of those
they regulate" (Manning, 1980:41)
He argues that the organizational structures of law
enforcement work closely mirrored the organizational
structures of the world of drug dealers and users
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(Manning, 1980:41) . Instead of a notion of "capture" he
used the concepts of "mirror" and "symbolic and
structural compatibility" in order to describe
interorganizational relationships between regulators and
the regulated. Thus, just as the police officers in
Manning's study became "crooks" in order to "bust" drug
deals, the waste control officers in the settings in
which I looked at waste management regulation adopted
sometimes the perspective of the regulated as a method to
promote the implementation of legal requirements.
Some definitions of "capture" have focussed on the
life - cycle of regulatory agencies. Bernstein (1955:74)
distinguishes four life cycles of regulatory commissions.
According to him over the periods of "gestation",
"youth", "maturity" and "old age" regulatory agencies
were captured (Bernstein, 1955:74) . While regulatory
agencies may be vigorous in enforcement in their youth -
they often become captured in old age. My field data only
provided a "snapshot" of the activities of the regulatory
authorities. I collected information about each of the
agencies over periods of three months per agency. Data
that would span a longer time period would be necessary
in order to determine if Bernstein's life cycle analysis
of "capture" applies to the regulatory authorities in my
research.
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Limits to integration
Rules and social practices were not always
integrated. There were limits to the extent to which
rules and social practices could be integrated. Forms of
cheating at the waste management plants, such as hiding
waste from the view of the waste control officer at a
waste transfer station indicated the limits of
integration. But lack of integration did not always imply
actual conflict, for example where a waste control
officer did not identify the practice during an
enforcement visit.
There were limits to how far standards were adapted
by the regulators. According to a German waste control
officer, he wrote a plan for scrap yards which adapted
standards to some extent to what the regulated could
comply with. While the plan for the scrap yards in the
area of the German waste regulation authority allowed for
some flexibility on some standards there were limits to
this. For example, according to the plan there had to be
some protection against pollution of ground water from
oil. It was not necessary to concrete the whole scrap
yard but areas where oil would be handled had to be
protected against ground water pollution. The plan,
however, allowed for flexibility on what type of
protection was required. Concrete, which was the most
expensive material, was not the only option available.
There were other situations where there were limits to
integration. At the U.K. waste treatment plant there was
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sometimes conflict between the perceptions of the
chemists and the sales staff about what waste loads
should be taken into the plant. Sometimes the chemists
would not accept the view of the sales staff.
Conclusion
The four types of rules discussed in this section
challenge some of the images used in the literature to
talk about the relationship between rules and social
practices. A clear distinction between "the law in the
books" and "the law in action" might not be possible.
This is so for a number of reasons. First, "the law in
the books" and "the law in action" could become
integrated. A clear conceptual distinction between rules
on the one hand and social practices on the other hand
was in some situations not possible. Instead social
practices, adjustment rules, customary rules, hybrid
rules and formal legal rules could be placed on a
continuum where they were not categories with fixed
boundaries but there was interchange between them. Hence,
categories such as rules and social practices, "the law
in the books" and "the law in action" are too closed.
They are too closed in two directions. On the one side
the normativity of social practices is neglected. On the
other side elements of social practices within rules are
neglected. This, in turn, has implications for a concept
of compliance. There is not compliance with law but
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compliance with a mediated notion of law as illustrated
in the different types of rules.
Secondly, a simple notion of formal legal rules and
of behaviour in relation to it is too narrow because a
range of normative contexts can shape behaviour. Thirdly,
the notion of integration can further help to understand
a concept of compliance. One of the shortcomings in the
existing literature on non - compliance seems to be that
it uses compliance both as a term for evaluating
behaviour of the regulated and as an analytical term,
explaining the concept of compliance. Thus compliance as
a normative concept, referring to what the regulated are
supposed to achieve, is confused with an analytical
concept of compliance, which explains what the regulated
actually do in compliance situations. Black (1972:1087)
has criticized this confusion of analytical and policy
issues on a more fundamental level in his discussion of
the contents of a sociology of law. I used the notion of
integration not as an abstract category but as a category
describing when and how behaviour of the regulated was
evaluated as compliance in practice.
Social practices and aspects of social reality
The notion of "social practices" could be
differentiated into those aspects of social practices
which acquired normative qualities and become customary
rules and other aspects of social practices which simply
described actual behaviour that occurred without
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crystallizing into customary rules. One example of social
practices which did not acquire normative force was the
behaviour of the chemists in testing waste loads.
Different chemists at the U.K. waste treatment plant
interpreted differently the testing requirements for
incoming waste loads. Some chemists tested more
parameters than others. If it was just before shift
change one of the chemists might have accepted a waste
load into the plant without detailed testing. This type
of behaviour was influenced by a range of factors and was
specific to particular individuals. The behaviour was the
result of a number of ad - hoc decisions and did not
follow any general rules.
Furthermore one could differentiate between those
social practices which were specifically directed at
implementing law and those which indirectly had an impact
on the implementation of legal rules. For example, the
practice at the U.K. waste treatment plant of keeping
section 17 notes in the general office rather than in the
laboratory was an aspect of the way the administration of
the plant was organized rather than behaviour consciously
directed at dealing with legal requirements.
Nevertheless, this practice had an impact on the
implementation of legal rules. The chemists at the U.K.
waste treatment plant stated that not keeping the section
17 notes in the chemical laboratory made their decisions
about the acceptance or rejection of waste loads
according to the site licence parameters more difficult.
The chemists were not routinely aware of the information
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provided about waste on the section 17 notes. In contrast
to this the testing of waste loads in the laboratory of
the German and the U.K. waste management plants was an
activity directed at fulfilling legal requirements from
the site licence. The question arises if there are any
frameworks which shape social practices?
Work groups and social practices
Social practices often arose out of work group
activity. At the U.K. waste treatment plant the main work
groups whose social practices I observed were the
chemists and the sales staff. Given the larger size and
increased complexity of operations at the German waste
management plant the social practices of a range of work
groups in a range of settings became relevant. Work
groups included the staff in the office dealing with the
"ENs", the staff in the chemical laboratory, the people
working on the yard and the staff from the waste
treatment plant. There were differing social practices in
the office, yard, laboratory and the waste treatment
plant.
The fact that work groups influenced social
practices illustrated that we could not talk of a
relationship between rules and one set of social
practices but that there was a relationship between
formal legal rules and a variety of different social
practices. Hence, regulatory relationships were
constructed between the regulators and a range of work
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groups rather than a monolithic bloc of "the regulated".
But in addition to normative contexts, rules and social
practices which shaped behaviour in relation to law there
may be other factors which can have an impact on
compliance behaviour.
Social practices as different from aspects of social
reality
Social practices described behaviour in relation to
law. It is important, however, to distinguish from this
the notion of aspects of social reality. The reason for
this is that it was possible that actual behaviour was
not just restrained by social norms but could be
influenced by aspects of social reality. For example, the
problem of redeclaring waste loads could not be
sufficiently captured through a contrast between the
formal rules, on what should have come into the plant,
and practice, what actually came into the plant. Aspects
of the nature of waste allowed site licence restrictions
on what could be brought into the plant to be managed.
Although formal compliance with site licence standards
could be demonstrated, loads could be brought into the
plant that might not have been intended by the regulatory
authority to be allowed into the plant. Thus, in order to
explain behaviour in relation to rules it was not
sufficient to refer just to social practices, aspects of
social	 reality	 could	 also	 determine	 behaviour.
413
Furthermore social practices could be shaped by aspects
of social reality not just by social norms.
In contrast to this some accounts in the literature
do not distinguish clearly between social norms and
aspects of social reality. For example, Adler and Asquith
looked at social workers' discretion in decision -
making. They invoke concepts such as "social forces",
"operational ideologies" and "broad social - structural
concerns" as influencing the behaviour of social workers
(Adler/Asquith; 1981:2, 10) . Young (1981:33; 37) talks
generally about "subjective" factors shaping the
definition of the situation" and "deep structures about
'how things are'". Smith (1981:62) refers to the notion
of "the actors' ideas under specific situational
constraints".
The significance of this idea is that factors
other than just norms, such as social norms and formal
legal rules, are considered as shaping behaviour in
relation to law. Aspects of social reality, such as the
nature of waste, could also shape behaviour. Not only the
surrounding contexts acquired normative force but the
nature of the subject matter to be regulated had an
impact on behaviour. This is not adequately captured
through the concepts of !!J. in the books" and "law in
action". Both these concepts put emphasis on norms in
describing behaviour. This neglects non - normative
aspects of social reality which were crucial in
describing behaviour in relation to law. While social
norms might have constrained the impact of legal rules,
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aspects of social reality in turn, might have constrained
social norms. For example, one could have had at the
plants a social norm that said that waste loads should be
taken into the plant even if they did not conform to
formal site licence parameters. If there was relatively
effective supervision from the regulatory authority,
compliance with this social norm would have been
dependent on aspects of social reality. This social norm
could have been complied with if the waste load would
have permitted the taking of different samples, one of
which could have demonstrated fulfillment of site licence
parameters. Hence, aspects of social reality could have
determined what social norms could operate.
In contrast to this the notion of aspects of
social reality does not appear in Baumgartner's (1992)
account of the "myth of discretion". She emphasizes the
notion of social norms by arguing that - in the context
of the application of criminal law - discretion is a myth
because legal decision - making is strongly constrained
by social norms. These social norms which in the end
amount to discrimination are rooted in the
"characteristics of alleged offenders and to a lesser
extent those of victim complainants as well as those of
supporters who come to their assistance and the social
background of legal personnel generally" (Bauiugartner,
1992:130,	 152) .	 among	 those	 characteristics	 are
relational distance, respectability and social status.
Similarly Cotterrell (1992:32,33) in summarizing a
range of empirical studies on the "law in action"
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emphasizes normative aspects of social reality by
contrasting state 1 with the "living .1a" (emphasis
added). This is further supported by the idea that he
perceives the possibility of a conflict between these two
norm systems.
In short: in the particular setting in which I
looked at the nature of compliance it emerged from the
field data that in order to explain behaviour in relation
to law two aspects are important. First, there are a
range of normative contexts which have an impact on what
becomes understood as the law in practice. Secondly, in
my view this focus on normative aspects of behaviour has
to be complemented by the idea that aspects of social
reality such as the nature of waste had an impact on
behaviour.
12.4. Conclusion
In this chapter I explored key issues in a concept
of compliance. These concerned rules, social practices
and the relationship between the two. The first point
that emerged was that compliance did not occur in
relation to a notion of formal legal rules. The concept
of rules had to be understood much more broadly. Formal
legal rules could be normative but so could a range of
contexts such as information, technology and commercial
aims. In some situations there was overlap between these
various different contexts. The second point was that
compliance could not be adequately understood as a notion
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of "fulfilling legal requirements". At the heart of a
notion of empirical compliance is a process of
integration of rules and social practices. Rules and
social practices are not two conceptually different
categories.
Due to the process of integration in some
situations the notions of conflict and "capture" had to
be modified. Further research - possibly of a
quantitative nature - needs to be carried out to specify
exactly under what circumstances an integration of rules
and social practices occurs and under what conditions
notions of conflict and capture do not apply.
This chapter has argued that it is important for
understanding the concept of compliance to explore how
law becomes transformed through social practices. This
takes ideas which have been put forward in the literature
on rules and discretion a little bit further. But I think
the notion of integration is significant because, though
it only involves a small change in ways of thinking about
social practices and rules, it is a qualitative change.
It is a qualitative change because it introduces a
different concept of law than some of the literature
uses. More detail on the implications of a transformed
notion of law for debates in the literature is discussed
in section 13.4. and 13.5. of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 13: SUBJECTIVE AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF A
CONCEPT OF COMPLIANCE
13.1. Introduction
This chapter deals in the first part with the
uncertainties surrounding people's comprehension of a
concept of compliance. While chapter twelve mapped out
basic elements in a concept of compliance, this chapter
will explore its subjective and cultural dimensions via
further analysis of field data concerning the role of
information in constructing concepts of compliance. Is
there only one single concept of compliance or can we
just perceive different images of compliance in various
situations? How subjective are perceptions of compliance?
What are the social processes through which some accounts
become considered as information about a regulated site?
The chapter will also explore whether, despite these
possible uncertainties in a conception of compliance,
there are basic aspects of compliance which were present
both in the U.K. and German settings. What are those
aspects? What relevance, if any, do differences in formal
legal frameworks in the U.K. and Germany have on
compliance behaviour on the ground? To what extent can
the concepts of the conimon and civil law systems help us
to understand compliance on the ground? Can common and
civil law systems be linked to characteristic forms of
administrative law and behaviour?
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In the second part of the chapter, I will link
findings from the field data as analyzed in chapter
twelve to debates in the literature. The issue of how we
can understand legal decision-making has also been
addressed in debates on discretion and indeterminacy. To
what extent can we derive characterisations of rules from
formal legal materials? What is the role of social
practices for understanding a concept of law? How do
contributors to critical legal studies debates know if a
rule is indeterminate or determinate? To what extent does
the notion of discretion undermine a notion of a rule?
Can we perceive discretion as conceptually different from
rules? How Does the fact that the regulated and not only
the regulators have choice in rule-governed systems
affect our understanding of the concept of discretion?
13.2. Images of compliance
Introduction
A central idea in this chapter is uncertainties
surrounding the concept of compliance. Chapter twelve
referred to information as one normative context at the
waste management plants. In this chapter, I will further
explore the idea that information is socially
constructed. Are different actors' perceptions of
compliance a source of uncertainty in the meaning of
compliance? What role does information play in the
construction of different images of compliance? What can
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we understand by the concept of information? Is there any
objective, reliable information about a regulated site?
Do subjective perceptions and interests influence what
becomes considered as information about a regulated site?
How is the information, upon which compliance assessments
are based, "produced"?
How much and what type of information do the regulators
obtain about sites?
Regulators rarely have the full picture when
evaluating compliance. In the first place a considerable
amount of information about a regulated site would not be
known to waste control officers because it would be below
the threshold of attention of the regulatory authority. A
large amount of day-to-day activities were beyond the
direct knowledge of the regulatory authority.
Some of the provisions in the site licences tried
to deal with this situation by requiring the regulated to
keep books that would record certain information, for
example, incoming waste loads and results from testing
procedures. At the U.K. plant, however, these paper
records were rarely completed. At the German plant there
was evidence that there was scope for not recording
information which was unfavourable to the plant, or
recording it differently. Thus, most of the time waste
control officers were dependent on direct information
about the site from the regulated. These difficulties of
obtaining information had particularly an influence in
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the setting in which I looked at compliance because here
waste control officers did not seem to have an
opportunity to cultivate informants as this has been
documented in other contexts. For example, Hawkins
(1984:98) in his study on the enforcement of water
pollution control standards, found that officers dealt
with the problem of being dependent on the regulated for
information by cultivating informants among the regulated
in order to get information about pollution incidents.
Difficulties of regulators in obtaining information have
also been noted in other contexts. Manning (1988:3)
refers to the importance of citizens' information,
cooperation and goodwill for police work (see also
Skolnick, 1967, chapter 6)
Secondly, even if they visited sites, there were
problems for waste control officers to obtain
information. The regulated would know more about how
their technology worked in practice than the waste
control officers could discover. A lot of waste control
officers had technical backgrounds in engineering,
biology or chemistry. So, they would often be familiar
with aspects of the technology used by the regulated such
as types of kilns in incineration plants. But there were
aspects of a plant which were very specific to a
particular site and the kind of waste it was processing,
which could not be known from general knowledge about the
technology. among these was the daily operating status of
the plant covering issues such as the breakdown of parts
at the plant. These aspects of the technical process made
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it difficult for waste control officers to gain
information about a site. This in turn could further
reinforce the tendency that waste control officers would
only get to know a segment of information about a
process. As Sabatier (1978:407) has argued, actors focus
on those aspects of an issue that they can understand.
The extent to which the regulated had control over
information about activities at the site is also
illustrated through the fact that at one U.K. waste
storage site waste was hidden from the waste control
officer's view (see section 7.4 of chapter 7) . A further
reason why some information about the plants was
difficult to access for waste control officers was that
plant operations were based on cultural knowledge.
Cultural knowledge consisted not so much of abstract
information which was written down in operating manuals
but was part of work routines and customary ways of
behaviour. Such knowledge was "non - systematic,
situational or tacit rather than theoretically derived
and causal" (Manning, 1988:9)
Control over information was used by the regulated
as a resource for bargaining with the regulators and
hence for managing social control. Waste control officers
stated that if they were too confrontational in their
approach this could result in the drying up of
information which was crucial to carry out any
supervisory function at a site. Restraints on the
availability of information for waste control officers
did not just arise from the control of the regulated over
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information but could also arise from the way the waste
control officers' job was organized.
The job of the waste control officer and information
The structure of the waste control officers' job
had an impact on the production of information about the
regulated plants. In the German waste regulation
authority, the tasks of enforcement and licensing were
linked. As a result the waste control officers had much
less time than their tJ.I(. counterparts to go out into the
field and visit sites. They therefore had to rely more on
written reports about sites and could draw less on
observations from field visits. Written reports provided
more scope for the regulated to manage appearances than
site visits and thus could have an impact on what became
evaluated as compliance. Given these shortcomings in the
quantity and quality of its information base for
evaluating compliance, the question arises whether, and
to what extent, did the regulators simply have to rely on
indicators of compliance?
Indicators of compliance
A further consequence of the need to manage
workloads was that the regulators had to rely on
indicators of compliance instead of collecting complete
information about a site. Such indicators were a
perception of the overall state of the site rather than
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detailed information about the behaviour there in
relation to the site licence conditions. A further
indicator of compliance could be adherence to paper
procedures such as the EN paper procedure for the German
"TA Mf all" regulations or the section 17 procedure in
the U.K.
What would count as indicators of compliance was
influenced by emotional issues such as the trust of waste
control officers in what staff at the plants would tell
them (see also Sabatier, 1978:407). The issue of trust,
which was crucial in regard to how waste control officers
would evaluate information, illustrates the complexity of
the process of the production of information about a
site. Trust arose out of interpersonal interaction
between waste control officers and staff at the plants.
"Liking" can influence how the personal aspects of what
is otherwise a professional relationship are handled
(Morley/Stephenson, 1977:285) . Hence, affective and
cognitive components of the relationship between waste
control officers and staff at the sites could not be
completely separated.
The personal dimension of the professional
relationship between waste control officers and staff at
sites was promoted through the fact that U.K. waste
control officers would visit "problem sites" up to three
times per week. During these visits the waste control
officer would always have contact with the same person
who dealt with operations on the yard such as a chemist.
Personal factors could influence professional evaluations
424
such as in cases where somebody was judged a "good
operator". The operator's display of willingness to
improve was as significant as improvements that were
actually carried out
	
(see also Hawkins, 1984:127;
Swingle, 1970:229) . While there might have been
compliance with one of these compliance indicators, there
might not have been compliance with a broader range of
legal requirements not captured by the indicators.
Furthermore, ways of processing information in the
regulatory authority could influence what became
understood as information about a site.
Ways of processing information in the regulatory
authority and evaluations of compliance
The way information was processed in the
regulatory authorities also influenced what became
considered as compliance. In fact, classification schemes
and categories used by organizations to process
information can become reified and thereby become treated
as descriptions of the organization's environment (Blau,
1955 referred to in March/Simon, 1958:162) . Some of the
U.K. waste control officers used standard forms in order
to provide a report about a site visit rather than
compose their own report freely. These standard forms
listed basic requirements rather than detailed site
licence conditions that particular types of waste
management plants should fulfill. Standard forms existed
for landfill sites, treatment plants and transfer
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stations. These forms could help to standardize
information about sites and to speed up the collection
and recording of information about them. But they also
transformed information about sites into a particular
format and set the parameters for information about a
site. This transformation of information about sites
through standard forms could influence if conditions at a
site were perceived as compliance or not, and hence if
waste control officers would take further enforcement
action.
This corresponds to accounts in the literature on
organizations which have argued that how organizations
internally process aspects of their environment
influences how they respond to that environment (Weick,
1979; Manning, 1980:49) . Central to Weick's ideas is the
notion of the "enacted environment" to which
organizations react in contrast to an external
environment, that exists "out there", objectively and
detached from the information processing patterns of the
organization. Hence, organizational action and
environment exist in a synibiotic relationship. Applying
this to the context of my research introduces a measure
of circularity to a concept of compliance. The regulatory
authority's perception of behaviour of the regulated is
influenced by the way this body processes information.
Hence, the concept of compliance does not just describe
the behaviour of the regulated but also that of the
regulatory authority. This has implications for policy.
While discussions focus on the skills of officers and
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resources needed for law enforcement in order to improve
compliance among the regulated, more attention might need
to be given to the internal patterns of organizations,
such as systems for processing information, that cause
the organization to perceive its environment in
particular ways (Manning, 1980:74, 262) . There will,
however, always be some inbuilt limitations in the
information processing system in an organization, because
intelligence failure is built into complex organizations
(Wilensky, 1967:179)
Indicators and ways of processing information were
one aspect of the social construction of information.
They were based on the need to strategically narrow the
complexity of social reality (see also
Tversky/Kahnemann/Slovic; 1982:3). How much and what kind
of information the regulatory authority had about
activities at the plants would influence whether or not
the regulated would be perceived as fulfilling legal
requirements. To consider information as socially
constructed means that information is not an objective
and unproblematic description of social reality. This
raises the question what can we understand by the concept
of information?
What is information?
We can only talk of images of compliance because
what is perceived as information about compliance is
socially constructed. Thus, the concept of information
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itself can not be understood to provide an objective
description of events at the plants. This point is
supported through findings by Manning (1988). He
emphasizes that social relations, coding procedures and
interpretative practices shape messages (Manning,
1988:4). The informational content and form of the
message is less important in this process (Manning,
1988: ix)
What became considered as information in my
setting was not pre-deterinined but what counted in
specific situations as information was influenced by
various social processes. A good example of this was the
influence of environmental consultants in Germany. They
wrote reports about the plants which portrayed events at
these in a light which was favourable to the regulated
(for more detail see section 11.4. in chapter 11). Hence,
apparently independent information could be partisan
rather than neutral. Information produced was influenced
by the interests of actors (Feldman/March, 1981:177)
The question arises why these consultants'
reports were commissioned if these reports - as waste
control officers themselves had said - contained a
certain amount of image management and hence were limited
in their usefulness as a source of information. Feldman
and March (1981:177, 178) point to the symbolic aspects
of information. They note that often organizations
collect much more information than is used in decision-
making processes. They state that information gathering
and processing in organizations is a symbol of competence
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and social efficacy. Thus, it is not so much the
information itself that is important, but requesting
information and assembling it are ways of making social
life meaningful and acceptable (Feldman/March, 1981:177,
178)
Evaluations of compliance which depend on
information were also affected by those processes of
social construction that underlie the notion of what
information is. Given the fact that interests influenced
what became understood as information the issue was not
whether there is compliance or non-compliance as such,
but which of different competing versions of compliance
and non-compliance became accepted. Issues of power in
the relationship between the regulated and the regulators
came into play. Small-scale issues such as how
information could be managed in specific situations and
how personal relationships were managed had an impact on
how the resource of power became allocated between the
various parties.
Some of the literature has dealt with the issue of
"What is information?" by distinguishing "technical
information" and "political information" (Sabatier,
1978:397). "Technical information" is understood as hard
and fast data about technical processes, such as the
amount of emissions released into the environment from
industrial facilities (Sabatier, 1978:396) . "Political
information", in contrast, refers to normative
considerations concerning the costs and benefits
associated with different courses of action. From my
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field data it appeared questionable whether such a
distinction could be sustained. Even hard and fast data
about technical processes seemed to require professional
judgment and evaluation rather than being data that
"speak for themselves". In the laboratory of the German
waste management plant there was sophisticated analysis
equipment, such as IPC machines and gas chroinatographs,
to analyze waste loads. According to the laboratory
staff, the data produced from these machines had to be
interpreted and evaluated. Decisions based on
professional knowledge and experience had to be made on
what data could be considered as valid and what data were
aberrations that should be discounted in assembling
information about a waste load (for more detail see
section 11.6. of chapter 11). So far I have focused in
the discussion on how information influences evaluations
of compliance. But it is important to perceive also the
role of information at the earlier stage of setting
standards.
Information and the relationship between rules and social
practices
Information could be relevant not only for
evaluations of compliance, but could also affect what
would be set as a standard in the first place. As we saw,
waste control officers worked with a general notion of
"good operators" or "good housekeepers" when assessing
sites. They did not investigate the detailed fulfillment
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of site licence provisions. Hence, the standard that
waste control officers would set in the field for the
evaluations of sites was to some extent different from
the formal standards set down in the site licence.
The quantity and quality of information the waste
regulation authority received about the plant from the
operator could have an impact on standards set in the
site licence. A German waste control officer stated that
an operator had accidentally divulged so much detail
about the waste incinceration technology of the plant
that the waste regulation authority realized that the
plant was able to comply with limits on emissions which
were lower than the formal legal standard. The waste
regulation authority proceeded to set this stricter
emission limit as the standard in the licence for the
plant. Thus, information was not only relevant for
evaluating if a site fulfilled standards but it could
also become relevant at an earlier stage when deciding
standards for a site. Consequently, the relationship
between rules and social practices can not be determined
in abstract, but is subjective, and depends on the
manipulation of information.
Conclusion
In this section,	 I explored the role of
information in the process of identifying the behaviour
at plants as compliance or non-compliance. What counted
as information was the outcome of a process of social
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construction in which various factors such as the
management of work loads and emotional factors played a
role. Information could not be considered as neutral or
objective but was subject to partisan interests.
Information influenced what became considered as
compliance in three ways. First, the segment of
information that the regulated caine to know determined
what was evaluated as compliance. Second, control over
information by the regulated could be used in an attempt
to influence enforcement responses. Third, information
would be relevant not only for evaluating what becomes
considered as compliance ex-post but would also influence
what became considered as a standard. Finally, the
socially constructed nature of information questions the
very notion that behaviour follows "rules". If we accept
that information is socially constructed then this
undermines functionalist and normative perceptions of
social action. As Manning (1988:5) has put it:
"What is unspoken, assumed, accepted, or seen
to be accepted mobilizes action but may not be
fully captured by such concepts as rule -
following behavior or rule - guided action.
Knowledgeability (Giddens 1984) can only be
partially captured by the sociologists' concept
of rule - based action".
In the next section I want to explore to what extent
subjective elements in the understanding of a concept of
compliance are relevant in a comparative context. Are
there elements in a concept of compliance that transcend
different cultural and legal contexts?
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13.3. A comparative perspective on compliance
Introduction
The main topic of the thesis is an examination of
the concept of compliance by looking at the relationships
between rules and social practices. Hence, the purpose of
the comparison is to find out if the relationship between
rules and social practices is constructed differently in
the U.K. and Germany. The focus of this comparison is not
to compare in detail legal provisions in the U.K. and
Germany (for an overview of legal frameworks in the U.K.
and Germany see chapter 1), nor to compare in detail what
was different or similiar at the plants and the waste
regulation authorities in the U.K. and Germany. The
comparison is not an end in itself but is one aspect of
the methodology employed to shed light on the research
question. Furthermore, my field data are not
representative of the U.K. and Germany. They are derived
from one U.K. plant and one German plant as well as one
U.K. and one German waste regulation authority. During
the time I spent with the waste regulation authorities, I
visited a considerable number of different types of waste
management sites, and therefore was able to obtain an
idea of the extent to which the observations from the
plants in Germany and the U.K. were typical or untypical
of events at other plants, and consider this in the
interpretation I placed on the data.
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In this section I will deal with the following
questions: what impact do differences in the formal legal
frameworks in the U.K. and Germany have on behaviour in
relation to law? How is law in practice constituted
through social practices from the "bottom - up"? Were the
techniques for manipulating legal standards in the U.K.
and German settings similiar or different? Were ways of
managing legal requirements among the regulated similiar
or not? Were enforcement activities of the German and the
U.K. regulatory authority similiar or different? What
impact did this have on what became constructed as
compliance in the U.K. and German settings? What was the
relevance of different forms of work organization at the
plants for behaviour in relation to the law? How useful
are characterizations of legal systems such as those of
common law and civil law systems for understanding
compliance? To what extent are characterisations in the
literature concerning administrative law and behaviour in
common and civil law systems supported through my field
data?
Differences and similiarities at the plants compared
This research was conducted in two countries, and
it involved the differences in the legal regulation of
waste management (see chapter 1). Therefore the
situations being compared were not identical. There were
also some differences in the way work at the plants was
organized and there were some minor differences in the
434
plant technology. But these differences did not impede
the comparison. The central issue for the comparison was
the relationship between legal frameworks and social
practices. This relationship can be studied even if there
were some technological differences in the plants and in
the way work was organized. The reason for this is that
the aim of the comparison was not to contrast different
work groups with each other but to compare the
relationship, and the factors influencing this
relationship, between technology, legal contexts and work
groups.
Different legal regimes for waste management
regulation in the U.K. and Germany led to different ways
of how work was organized at the U.K. and German waste
management plants. The German waste management plant had
to conform to a procedure - the "EN" paper procedure -
which did not exist in the U.K. There was a separate work
group which dealt with the "TA Mfall" at the German
plant which did not exist at the U.K. plant. Also, the
fact that different waste management plants would offer
different types of services could lead to differences in
the way work was organized. The German plant, in contrast
to the U.K. plant, did not just offer the service of
treating liquid wastes but also provided waste storage
and arranged final disposal sites. Hence, the chemists
were organized into a separate work group in the
laboratory which serviced both waste storage on the yard
and the treatment plant. This was different from the U.K.
plant where the laboratory was connected to the treatment
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section, the only service offered at the TJ.K. treatment
plant. Thus, differences in legal and technological
frameworks at the waste treatment plants could lead to
minor differences in the way work was organized. But
these differences did not obstruct a comparison between
the relationships between legal frameworks, technological
frameworks and work groups in the different settings.
The impact of technology on behaviour in relation to law
In fact, basic aspects of these relationships were
the same in the U.K. and German settings. In the
following section I will first describe which basic
aspects of technology were the same at the U.K. and
German plants, and then I will briefly refer to those
minor aspects of technology which were different.
Both at the U.K. and German plants, technology
could structurally determine behaviour in relation to the
law (for more detail see chapter 5). Basic aspects of the
treatment technology at the German and U.K. plants were
similiar because they operated the same technical
treatment process. Also, aspects of "bucket chemistry",
which was related to shortened testing procedures,
existed both in the U.K. and German treatment plants.
Furthermore, at a small-scale level, there would be
similiar defects at the German and U.K. plants which were
contrary to the site licence. For example, at both the
German and the U.K. plants, the indicators for the tank
levels did not work.
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Despite these basic similiarities there were some
differences in technological frameworks. In some
situations, these led to differences in behaviour on the
ground, in others, they did not. For example, given the
lower level of technology at the U.K. plant, where
second-hand parts from an old sewerage works were used,
"bucket chemistry" was more pronounced than in the German
plant, where the treatment technology used was newer than
at the U.K. plant. Furthermore at the German plant,
operations were carried out on a smaller scale, which
allowed for more process control. The better state of the
treatment technology contributed to the situation that at
the German plant there were none of the "normal
accidents" (Perrow, 1984) as happened at the U.K. plant
(for more detail see chapter 5). Accidents would
constitute breaches of the site licences. Thus
differences in technology could have an impact on how
formal legal requirements were met.
By contrast, in other situations, differences in
the technological frameworks would not lead to
differences in behaviour in relation to the law. In the
old laboratory of the U.K. waste treatment plant,
analysis facilities were more rudimentary than in the
laboratory of the German waste treatment plant. But
better equipment at the German plant did not necessarily
mean more accurate testing results. Practical and
commercial considerations, such as ensuring fast turn
around time for tankers could lead to the shortening of
testing procedures at the German plant. Also, in the
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laboratory of the German waste management plant, the
staff would not always test for substances which they did
not expect to find in the waste.
The impact of the organization of work on behaviour in
relation to law
The way commercial requirements affected the
organisation of work groups was different at the U.K. and
German waste management plants. There was not a separate
sales force at the German waste management plant as there
was at the U.K. waste treatment plant. At the German
waste management plant, the manager was involved in the
marketing of the waste services. One of the reasons for a
separate sales group at the U.K. plant might have been
that it operated in a more obviously competitive
environment. In the immediate vicinity there were other
plants which offered the same waste treatment services.
Also, in the particular "Land", where I conducted the
field work, special wastes (as defined in § 2 (2) bfG
1986) were excluded from the open market in waste
disposal services. They had to be placed under the
control of a state-owned company which then arranged for
its disposal. Some of these wastes were disposed of in
the German waste management plant where I conducted field
work. Hence, the plant did not have to obtain these
wastes in competition with other plants on the open
market. The economic recession, which caused a reduction
in the amount of industrial wastes, however, had an
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impact both on the U.K. and the German plants. Both were
working below capacity.
Although these differences in the commercial
frameworks had an impact on the organization of work,
this did not mean that commercial aims were more
responsible for shaping behaviour in relation to the law
at the U.K. waste management plant than in Germany. While
I did not collect quantitative data on the actual number,
load rejection at both plants was considered only as a
last resort. There was the same emphasis in the U.K. and
Germany on ensuring a short turn-around time for tankers.
Furthermore at both treatment plants, because of
commercial reasons quick testing methods such as Merck
dip kit tests were favoured in some situations over the
more elaborate and accurate testing methods (for more
detail see chapter 4).
The basic conflict between commercial
considerations and legal requirements was the same at the
U.K. and German plant. What was different were the staff
groups negotiating with each other this conflict. At the
U.K. waste treatment plant, it was mainly a conflict
beetween the chemists in the laboratory and the sales
staff. At the German waste management plant, it was
mainly a conflict between the laboratory and the
treatment plant because at the German plant these two
areas were more distinct than at the U.K. plant. Thus, at
the German plant, there was not pressure to take in loads
from the sales staff but from the people operating the
treatment plant. Also, at the German waste management
439
plant, pressures to take in waste loads were more
internalized into decision-making processes than at the
U.K. plant. The way the computer system worked in the
assignment of waste codes made it easier to take in a
broader range of waste loads and to consign them to cheap
disposal sites. At the U.K. waste treatment plant
commercial pressures were more external in the sense that
the sales staff would try to influence decisions about
taking in waste loads in conversations with the chemists.
When considering the relationship between the
organisation of work and behaviour in relation to the
law, a complex picture emerges. In some situations
organisational structures had an impact on behaviour in
relation to the law, in others they did not. Where
organizational structures had an impact they would
mediate the relationship between rules and social
practices. The fact that there was a separate sales force
at the U.K. plant did not seem to have much of an impact
on behaviour in relation to the law compared to the
situation at the German plant. The separate control
function of the laboratory at the German plant, however,
seemed to have more of an impact on behaviour than the
separate organization of coimnercial aims in the sales
force at the U.K. plant. Since I did not collect
quantitative data I cannot separate what, quantitatively,
the difference in impact was of the diverse factors on
behaviour in relation to the law. At the German waste
management plant, the staff from the treatment plant were
keen to take in waste loads, whereas the laboratory
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understood its task to be the control of what waste loads
came into the plant; and they often took a more
restrictive view on the question of whether the site
licence allowed a load to go into the plant or not. Being
separate from the treatment plant, unlike in the 1J.K.,the
German laboratory had more independence to control
behaviour in relation to loads coming into the plants.
Though not impossible, it was certainly more difficult
for the waste treatment plant to take in loads which were
not in conformity with site licence standards.
In contrast to this, the technical operations of
the plant and its commercial aims were more closely
linked at the U.K. plant. The laboratory, which also
decided about load rejections, was closely linked to the
treatment plant. The separate sales force at the U.K.
plant simply exercised the commercial awareness which
other staff groups including the U.K. chemists had in any
case.
Work was basically organized in the same way at
the plants. Differences existed more often in detailed
provisions. For example, both at the U.K. and the German
waste management plants, certain procedures and work
routines existed for dealing with waste. At the U.K.
plant, however, these procedures were more detailed and
formalized. This was partly a result of the fact that the
U.K. waste treatment plant wanted to obtain registration
for the BSI quality management standard. This standard
required that formalized procedures have to be operated,
which were also documented in an operations manual. At
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the German plant staff did not refer to written
procedures.
Hence, at the U.K. plant, there were more
formalized procedures that translated site licence
provisions into work routines. This did not mean,
however, that at the U.K. plant there was less scope for
the regulated to manage the fulfillment of site licence
requirements than at the German plant. Instead, there
were similiar areas for managing site licence
requirements. These included taking in waste loads not
clearly covered by the site licence, managing definitions
of waste loads, or carrying out shortened testing
procedures (for more detail see chapter 4). Greater
prescription of behaviour at the U.K. plant or a more
explicit translation of site licence requirements into
practice, does not therefore necessarily lead to
behaviour which is more in conformity with site licence
requirements. This corresponds to observations in the
literature which have pointed to discrepancies between
"public pro forma descriptions of activities and a
privately sanctioned set of working rules" (Manning,
1980:72)
What I observed at the U.K. plant in relation to
informal standards confirmed what had been argued in
relation to German formal legal standards in the German
literature. More formal legal standards do not
necessarily lead to more compliance but instead can lead
to more informal behaviour which can result in the
evasion	 of	 those	 standards	 (Bohne,	 1983:203).
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The impact of enforcement activities on behaviour in
relation to law
There were, however, differences in the
enforcement activities of the German and the U.K. waste
regulation authorities. Some of these differences were
linked to different organizational frameworks. As noted
earlier, German waste control officers spent less of
their time in the field than their U.K. counter-parts,
due to the merging of the supervision and licensing of
sites. In the case of waste disposal plants which were
licensed under § 6 BimSCHG, such as waste incinerators,
the operator had a legal right to get a licence once the
legal requirements for obtaining it were fulfilled
(Kloepfer, 1989:720) . Accordingly, waste control officers
made licensing their first priority. In addition,
officers stated that it would be more beneficial to their
careers to interact with colleagues and section leaders
in the office rather than being out on a site. Office
work carried higher prestige than enforcement work in the
field. The differences that I observed between the U.K.
and the German regulatory authorities might not of course
be representative. A U.K. parliamentary report has
pointed out that also in several U.K. regulatory
authorities, site visits occur only too infrequently
("Toxic Waste", 1988, para. 119) . In the setting that I
observed, however, German waste control officers obtained
less direct information about waste disposal sites than
their U.K. counterparts. This reduced the likelihood that
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the German regulatory authority would detect breaches of
the formal law.
As described in chapter twelve, however, the
behaviour of the regulated was influenced by a range of
different normative contexts and not just enforcement
activities. Just because the German regulatory authority
did not visit sites more regularly does not mean that the
formal law was more frequently disregarded. As described
in chapter four to twelve, basic aspects of three
normative contexts and how they influenced behaviour in
relation to the law were the same in the U.K. and
Germany. Without collecting quantitative data or
undertaking an enforcement study of the impact of
enforcement activity on the behaviour of the regulated,
it is not possible to say anything in detail about how
important enforcement activities were manifesting
themselves in relation to the other normative contexts
that influenced behaviour in relation to law at the
plants.
So far I have described basic aspects of the
organisation of work at the plants, of technology and of
enforcement activities. The next section will focus in
more detail on whether formal legal frameworks were
relevant for understanding compliance behaviour on the
ground.
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The impact of formal legal frameworks on behaviour in
relation to the law
Basic aspects of the job of the waste control
officer in Germany and the U.K. were similar. There were
similiar basic legal provisions which gave then power to
carry out their supervision tasks. There were provisions
that enabled regulatory authorities to licence sites ( 7
2\bfG ; section 5 COPA 1974) and to make changes to a
licence after it had been issued (
	
9 a AbfG
nachtragliche Anordnungen, section 7 COPA 1974).
Furthermore there were provisions that required the
regulated to provide information to the regulatory
authority ( 11 AbfG Auskunftspflicht; section 6 COPA
1974). In addition, both the German and the U.K.
regulatory authority had powers to prosecute waste
management operators ( 326 StGB, § 18 bfG 1986; section
3 (2) COPA 1974)
If we look, however, at more detailed provisions,
particularly in relation to secondary legisation,
differences emerge. For example, in Germany there was the
"EN" procedure which did not exist in the U.K. Formally
it gave more power to the regulators. It allowed them to
control decisions about what type of special waste went
into what type of plant ( 8 bfRestUberwV i.V.rn. TA
?bfa11 Nr. 1 f). But as described in chapter seven there
was a range of techniques to subvert those legal
provisions. Some of these techniques were based on the
fact that the nature of waste did not allow for clear-cut
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results from analysis procedures. Thus, despite apparent
differences in the formal legal frameworks there were
considerable similiarities in the practical
implementation of waste management regulations on the
ground. These included similiar techniques for the
management of legal standards in the U.K. and German
settings.
Similiar techniques for the management of legal standards
in the U.K. and German setting
At both the U.K. and the German treatment plants,
staff would refer to their experience of waste loads when
justifying why they did not follow formal procedures for
the testing of waste loads. At both, alternative
standards developed. The site licences of both the German
and the U.K. plant required that only those waste loads
should be taken into the plants which conformed to the
initial description of that waste. The standard that
operated in practice at both plants, however, was simply
the question of whether the waste was treatable at the
plant. Hence, waste loads which did not conform to the
initial waste description, but which could be treated,
would still be taken into the plant.
At both the German and the U.K. plants, waste
loads were sometimes "recycled". This meant that waste
loads which had not been sufficiently treated to meet the
limits on the discharge consent would be treated again
until they would conform to them. "Recycling" waste loads
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was a form of managing legal requirements, because
according to the site licence only wastes which were
capable of being treated were to be accepted at the
plant. The reasons why this same technique for the
management of site licence requirements was possible at
both the German and the U.K. site was that basic aspects
of the technology of the plants were similiar. Thus,
similiarities in one of the four normative contexts, here
technology, could reduce the significance of differences
in other contexts such as legal frameworks.
Both in the U.K. and Germany, definitions of
special waste, such as the Special Waste Regulations in
the U.K. (SI 1980 No. 1709) and the waste definition
regulations in Germany (".Abfallbestimmungsverordnungt'
1990; BGBL III 2129 - 15.4.) could be handled flexibly.
In Germany this led to the result that the allocation
under the "TA Abfall" of what waste went into which plant
could be undermined. In the U.K., the issue was whether
or not waste would be covered by the special waste
definition and hence if it had to comply with the prior
notification obligations. Not only were techniques for
managing legal requirements among the regulated the same
in both countries, but there were also similiar
techniques for managing legal requirements among the U.K.
and German regualatory authorities. For example, both
sent out draft licences for operators to comment on.
A similiar approach was adopted in both countries
to prosecutions, despite the differences in the kind of
of fences that German and English law provided for in case
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of the breach of waste management regulation. In Germany,
there was a distinction between regulatory offences
("Ordnungswidrigkeiten") and full criminal offences.
Regulatory offences were defined in the administrative
law statute which regulated waste ( 18 AbfG) and full
criminal offences were spelled out in the general penal
code § 324, 326, 327; 330 StGB) . One could assume that
the availability of a lesser offence in Germany might
have made it more likely to invoke this offence as a
deterrent. However, regardless of these differences in
the formal legal provisions on offences, prosecutions in
the U.K. and German settings were both only used as a
last resort. In both Germany and the U.K, negotiation
between the regulatory authority and the regulated was
the prime instrument for dealing with alleged infractions
of formal waste management regulation.
In both the German and the U.K. licensing
procedures, a working plan was used in order to help to
draw up a site licence. This was formally recognized in
the guidance issued by the DoE on licensing in the U.K.
(see WMP 4, 1990:11,12) . The German provisions simply
referred to the fact that the operator had to provide
information about the site during the licensing stage
(see the requirement of a "Betriebshandbuch" of
operations according to para. 5.4.2. TA Abfall 1991).
While legal guidance in the U.K. explicitly refers to the
fact that these working plans should be used to draw up
licences, this link is not spelled out in German law, but
according to waste control officers in Germany, the
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statement of operations was in practice used to draw up
the site licence.
In both the German and the U.K. settings,
consultants mediated the relationship between the
regulatory authority and the regulated plants. In the
German setting, there was more frequent use of
consultants than in the U.K. In the U.K., consultants
were predominantly used during the site licensing stage,
whereas in Germany, consultants' reports also played a
role in the supervision of sites. For example,
consultants' reports would describe the implementation of
new legal provisions (for more detail see section 11.4.
in chapter 11). Particularly when reports would show
compliance with legal regulations, they would provide an
important tool for the regulated to put their version of
events across to the regulatory authority. Hence, the
more frequent use of consultants' reports by some German
operators allowed for the opportunity to avoid more
effectively being controlled by the regulatory authority.
This was less possible in the U.K. Enlisting the "expert
knowledge" of consultants could have greater legitimacy
with the regulatory authority than other techniques for
avoiding control such as hiding waste from the view of
waste control officers. The question arises of how formal
legal standards were mediated in the regulatory
authorities.
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Mediation of formal legal frameworks by the regulators
Formal legal frameworks on their own have limited
relevance for explaining behaviour in relation to law
because they are mediated through the way how different
administrative units are organized and how work within
those units is organized. As we have seen, the German
waste regulation authority where I was a participant
observer, had chosen to entrust waste control officers
both with the tasks of the enforcement of rules and the
licensing of sites. This was not the case in the U.K.
regulatory authority nor in other German waste regulation
authorities. One of the consequences of joining the two
was that the enforcement officers had little time to go
out into the field to supervise sites. But there were
additional factors relating to the administrative
structures. The administrative framework for waste
management regulation differed in various "Lander" in
Germany. Some "Lander" had three tiers of administrative
bodies, others had two (Erichsen/Martens, 1992:728;
Siedentopf, 1986:76). The city states, such as Hamburg
and Berlin, had a one-tier administrative organization.
In the three tier administrative organization, there is
the superior administration of the "Land" ("obere
Landesbehörde") as the highest level, the president of
the government ("Regierungsprasident") as the second
level and on the lowest level, as part of the special
administration, the trade supervision offices
("Gewerbeaufsichtsamter"), the county councils ("Kreise")
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and the towns (Kloepfer, 1992:69) . The federal waste
disposal law (AbfG) left the implementation of the law to
the "Lander". The "Lander" determined how they wanted to
organize the administration of waste management
regulation (Kloepfer, 1989:738) . In some "Lander" the
implementation of the bfG occurred through one
administrative body; in other "Lander", it was dispersed
over a range of different administrative bodies
(Kloepfer, 1992:738)
In the area where the German waste management
plant was located, the waste regulation authority was
also assisted by a specialized branch of the
administration which dealt with water pollution control
("Wasserwirtschaftsamt"). In the U.K. waste regulation
authority, by contrast, the NR1., a central pollution
control body, would only be contacted during formal
licensing procedures and not in relation to routine
enforcement matters. During my field work I also did not
come across cooperation with the water companies in
enforcement matters.
Thus, formal legal structures contained in
statutes and secondary legislation could be linked only
to a limited extent to behaviour in relation to the law,
because they were mediated through administrative
frameworks. Other examples show that formal legal
frameworks could have a contradictory impact on behaviour
in relation to the law. The formal administrative order
("Verwaltungsakt") in German law created its own
incentive for bypassing it. Avoiding formal legal
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provisions could help to avoid legal and organizational
accountability (Bohne, 1983; for more detail see section
9.6. in chapter 9). More generally it has been argued
that an increase in the scope and density of the net of
legal rules governing activities of the administration
increases the capacity of self - regulation of
administrative authorities and actually decreases control
over the activities of administrative bodies (Ellwein,
1986:22; Böhret, 1986:36).
Both the German and the U.K. waste regulation
authority had adopted a co-operative enforcement style
despite different formal legal principles (see chapters 8
and 9). In Germany, the co-operation principle, a formal
legal principle, required regulatory authorities to
attempt to achieve solutions in co-operation rather than
confrontation with the regulated (Kloepfer, 1989:92).
Such a principle does not exist in English environmental
law, but the regulatory authorities nevertheless adopted
a co-operative enforcement style. Nevertheless, waste
control officers both in Germany and the U.K. stated that
the use of negotiation between the regulatory authority
and the regulated made the invocation of formal
prosecutions more difficult. The fact that in Germany
there was also a formal legal reason for this did not
seem to make a difference. Under German environmental
criminal law ( 326 StGB) a waste control officer could
be prosecuted for an environmental criminal offence if he
had authorized or tolerated illegal practices (Kloepfer,
1989:248). There are different views on what the exact
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requirements are that have to be fulfilled for a waste
control officer to be criminally liable (RUther,
1991:195) . In the U.K. there was no formal legal reason,
such as the possible criminal liability of a waste
control officer. Nevertheless, waste control officers
stated that acquiescence to the illegal practices of
operators would make prosecutions more difficult because
the operator would try to claim that this acquiescence
implied authorisation by the RP.. In order to explore the
relevance of formal legal frameworks in regard to
behaviour in relation to the law, it is important to
consider not only small-scale legal factors but also to
inquire into the relevance of the characteristics of
whole legal systems.
What is the relevance of common and civil law frameworks?
Both in Germany and the U.K., the basic legal
framework of waste management regulation consists of
statute law which is further developed through provisions
in secondary legislation. Those areas where there are
most clearly differences between the common and the civil
law systems did not become very relevant to my research
question. For example, case law on how elements of a
legal offence, such as the term "deposit" in U.K. law,
were defined, would have become relevant if the research
would have looked in detail at the question such as
"under what circumstances and how often prosecutions are
taken against operators?" The main focus of this
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research, however, was to examine how in everyday
practices at waste management plants, and in interaction
between waste management plants and regulatory
authorities, the meaning of the law and compliance with
it is created. Criminal prosecutions occurred only as a
last resort both in the U.K. and German settings (see
also Hoch, 1994:491 - 521; Rti.ther, 1991:262 - 275;
Hawkins, 1984:129 - 153) .While criminal offences did have
some impact as a bargaining chip in the interaction
between the regulatory authority and the regulated, their
contribution to the creation of meaning of the law was
limited. Hence, it was not relevant to examine in detail
how the different status of case law in a common and
civil law system influenced how the law gained meaning.
This is different from the approach adopted in
enforcement studies, where the threat of prosecution and
formal legal rules associated with it, assume a greater
significance in the explanation of bargaining behaviour
between the regulated and the regulatory authority. In my
research, the bargaining between the regulators and the
regulatory authority was just one element in the creation
of	 understandings	 what	 the	 law	 entails.
Furthermore, from the perspective of the actors at
the plants, the formal legal framework was not their main
reference point. Staff working at the plants knew little
about the formal law beyond the basic site licence
requirements, and even those were only known by some
staff, such as the chemists at the U.K. treatment plant.
Thus, those areas of the law where the differences
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between the coimnon and civil law systems are most
pronounced were not very relevant for my research.
However, the question arises if behaviour observed on the
ground has any implications for what we can understand as
characteristics of a common and civil law system.
What are the characteristics of common and civil law
frameworks?
According to Galligan (1986:43), it is the
quintessence of the common law method that discretion
will be translated over a course of decisions made into
settled rules, principles and standards. In my view,
however, it is questionable to what extent Galligan's
description of the movement from broad standards to
principles is indeed characteristic of the common law
method. Galligan's context was judicial law-making. In
the regulatory context, that I studied, a move from
discretion to settled standards could be observed in both
the U.K., a common law system, nd Germany, a civil law
system. In both countries, broad legislative standards
were made specific through site licences for particular
plants. In the field, waste control officers would strike
agreements with the regulated in order to agree standards
on very specific issues that were too detailed to be
regulated through the site licence (see chapter 8).
Hence, while Galligan's characterisations may be useful
when comparing judicial decision-making in common law and
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civil law systems they may be less relevant for the
comparison of regulatory contexts.
Some of the literature has linked
characterisations of the common and civil law systems to
particular types of administrative styles. It has been
argued that in common law systems such as that in the
U.K., the administration is more flexible and less
legalistic than in civil law systems such as Germany. I
turn to this issue next.
Characterisations of administrative systems
Characterisations of administrative styles tend to
reflect characteristics of the formal administrative law
in common and civil law systems. The German
administrative style has been described as "formalistic"
in contrast to the "pragmatic" and "flexible" style of
the U.K. system (Siedentopf/Hauschild, 1990;
Siedentopf/Ziller; 1988, vol. 1; Neny, 1985:180) . As
described in chapter eight, basic aspects of the
behaviour of the regulatory authorities in both Germany
and the U.K. were, in practice, the same. Both
authorities used prosecution only as a last resort and
adopted a conciliatory enforcement style. Negotiation and
informality were important aspects of interaction between
the regulated and the regulators in both countries. In
both settings rules would emerge that were the result of
the integration of social practices and rules. In
practice, therefore, in the day-to-day behaviour of the
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regulators, the German system could not be described as
more rigid than the U.K. system. The same incentives
worked both in the U.K. and the German systems to promote
the adaptation of rules to social practices. In both
systems, the adaptation of standards of what the
regulated could comply with, made the job of the waste
control officer easier and helped the regulatory
authority to demonstrate success in its enforcement
activities. Both the regulated and the regulators had a
mutual interest in adapting standards. This transcended
national differences.
From the German plant I gave more evidence of the
creation of exceptions from legal requirements (see
chapter 7 and 8). This, however, does not necessarily
mean that the German regulatory authority was more
accommodating to the regulated than the U.K. authority.
Instead, more legal procedures that existed in Germany,
such as the "EN" procedure, could simply create more
opportunities for exceptions. More formality can lead to
greater informality on the ground (McBarnet/Whelan; 1991;
Bohne; 1983). This theme of only a "loose coupling"
(Cyert/March, 1992:235) between formal legal frameworks
or organizational rules and behaviour on the ground has
also been echoed in studies of law enforcement. For
example, Manning (1980:262) found that narcotics officers
worked relatively independently from officers higher up
in the organizational hierarchy.
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Conclusion
The comparison was only one element in the
approach adopted towards exploring compliance in the U.K.
and German setting in this research. The aim was to
examine the relationships between various frameworks and
behaviour in relation to law. Basic aspects of these
frameworks, such as the organisation of work and
technology, were the same in the U.K. and German
settings. They influenced behaviour in relation to law in
a similiar way. Formal legal frameworks were, in
practice, mediated through administrative structures,
through informality of the behaviour of waste control
officers or through techniques which the regulated
adapted to manipulate legal standards. The ways of
manipulating legal standards were basically similiar at
the U.K. and German plants. This meant that the
differences in the formal legal frameworks did not lead
to different compliance behaviour on the ground.
What became considered and treated as compliance in
particular circumstances in the U.K. and German settings
could differ, not because of the different legal
frameworks, but because there was a different threshold
of attention for the German and the U.K. regulatory
authorities. The techniques through which behaviour
became regarded as compliance or not were similiar,
however. Thus, more formal tools of control such as the
"EN procedure" in the German system did not make law more
of a restraint on the behaviour of the regulated than in
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the U.K. These techniques tell us more about the nature
of law and of compliance with it than about whether there
was "more" or "less" compliance in the U.K. or Germany.
Observations of behaviour in relation to law, however,
can feed back into characterisations of formal legal
systems that are adopted in the literature. In a
regulatory context and on the lowest level, some of the
typical characterisations of common and civil law systems
break down. One of the reasons for this is that basic
aspects of actors' everyday routines, such as the
normative contexts at the regulated plants and basic
requirements of the job of waste control officers in the
regulatory authorities, were the same in both countries.
Consequently, characterisations of administrative
behaviour in common and civil law systems as "flexible"
and "rule - bound", which have been used in comparative
literature, may have little meaning in practice. In the
next section I will look at the implications of my
findings for debates in the literature on discretion.
13.4. Variations on discretion
In troducti on
Most behaviour that I observed at the waste
management plants occurred below the level of the
exercise of official discretion. Discretion might have
once been exercised in decisions directed at the
regulated but then the regulated would implement such
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decisions in day-to-day activities without further
involvement of the regulatory authority. A lot of my data
related to the observation of this everyday behaviour
rather than incidents of the exercise of official
discretion where waste control officers would make formal
decisions on particular issues. In the literature,
discussions of discretion have mainly focused on the
discretion of staff working in public administrations
rather than considering what happens when such
discretionary decisions are implemented by the regulated.
See for example Smith's (1981) research on discretionary
decision-making of social workers; Giller's and Morris'
(1981) account of social workers' decisions concerning
delinquent children in the care of local authorities;
Bradshaw's (1981) study of the decisions of social
service officials on the allocation of money from the
Family Fund; or Noble's (1981) account of decisions made
by housing corporation officials. Also, in a more recent
essay collection on discretion (Hawkins (ed.); 1992), the
empirical research accounts focus on the discretion of
public regulators such as officials in a public housing
eviction board (Lempert, 1992) and the payment of
industrial disablement benefit by officials of the
Department of Social Security (Sainsbury; 1992)
In the following section I will address the
question of how useful the term "discretion" is, in order
to describe behaviour at this level where there are no
specific interventions from the regulatory authority. The
notion of discretion, as it is used in some of the
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literature, refers to formal legal rules. It does not
really encompass a broader notion of rules as I
encountered in the field such as hybrid rules, adjustment
rules and customary rules. How does our understanding of
the concept of discretion have to change in order to take
into account different notions of rules as set out in
chapter twelve? Should we define discretion primarily
with reference to formal legal rules? How much should
agency be emphasized in discussions of discretion? What
are sources of discretion? What do different sources of
discretion tell us about the question whether we can make
a conceptual distinction between rules and social
practices? How broadly or narrowly should discretion be
defined? Does the differentiation in the literature
between strong and weak discretion adequately capture
observations from the field?
The scope of discretion: discretion in relation to aims
of formal legal rules and methods for achieving those
Discretion is defined in the literature as
enabling different courses of action in order to achieve
an aim that is defined by the legal rules. For example,
Davis (1969:4) states that discretion exists whenever the
effective limits on power leave an official free to make
a choice among possible courses of action.
According to this definition, discretion exists in
relation to various courses of action that can be adopted
to achieve an aim which is defined in legal rules.
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Discretion does not exist in relation to different aims
of a formal legal rule. This narrower perception of
discretion in the literature does not adequately capture
observations from the field. Here "discretion" existed
not just in relation to different options through which
aims, as stated in formal legal rules, could be achieved,
but as a choice between different aims of rules. Hence,
for the regulated the range of actions unrestrained by
formal legal rules was wider than just a choice between
different ways of realizing legal aims. In effect, what
the regulated were able to do was to determine for
themselves the aims of their action.
For example, one of the reasons why the German "TA
Abfall" regulations were introduced was in order to
redress the situation that commercial aims were the main
consideration for waste disposers when assigning waste
loads to final disposal sites. Such decision-making could
be in conflict with environmental considerations. The
cheapest disposal site would not necessarily be the site
best suited to contain the environmental effects of a
particular waste. Hence, the German "TA Abfall"
regulations attempted to ensure that environmental
considerations were taken into account when assigning
waste loads to final disposal sites (Kloepfer, 1989:712)
The regulated were able, however, to assign waste codes
strategically so that commercial considerations could
nevertheless be the main consideration for matching waste
loads with final disposal plants (see chapter 7 for more
detail). This type of behaviour is not adequately
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captured by a conventional notion of discretion which
does not account for the situation that the regulated
formally fulfill legal requirements while being able to
subvert the aims of formal legal rules.
Sources of discretion: discretion can arise out of social
practices not just rules
It emerged from the field data that discretion
does not just arise out of formal legal rules but can
also arise out of social practices. For example, the
chemists at the U.K. and German waste management plants
had the power to use discretion. They were able to choose
between different courses of action. This discretion did
not so much arise out of rules but out of professional
judgments. For example, according to the site licence of
the U.K. plant, oil-contaminated loads could not be taken
in if they could not be treated at the plant. Different
chemists had different views on when an oil-contaminated
load should be taken in or not. Hence, one source of
discretion seemed to be also the individual chemists'
judgments on the treatment process in the plant. Their
knowledge and understanding of the plant did not lead to
one determinate outcome but enabled the justification of
various different courses of action. At the German waste
management plant too, first and second analyses were
sometimes carried out on waste loads so that at the end a
result was arrived at which showed conformity with load
acceptance parameters. This practice was enabled through
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discretion i-n the testing methods which determined the
outcomes. Thus, how much and what type of restraint on
behaviour was the result of professional attitudes and
technology, not just the formal law. Discretion could
arise out of social practices. Thus, discretion could
work from the "bottomup", not just from the "top-down"
through the formal law.
Some contributors to debates in the literature
have recognized this while others have not. Davis (1969)
sees discretion located in formal legal rules and
Dworkin's (1977:31) idea of discretion as the "hole in
the doughnut" also perceives discretion as the space
unrestrained by legal rules. Staatsen (1976) discusses
the discretionary powers of officials who administer the
Dutch General Assistance Act 1965, mainly in contrast to
rule-bound behaviour. Merlin (1976), considers the powers
of officials in the French tax administration to award
tax relief contracts to businesses as discretionary in
the sense that the French officials are not being bound
by formal legal rules. He therefore advocates more
restrictions on the power of officials through formal
legal rules in order to promote equality of treatment of
different enterprises and fairness (Merlin, 1976:170)
In contrast to this, Asquith and Adler (1981:10;
21) pay more attention to the social structures which
inform discretionary decisions. For them, discretionary
decisions are not just defined negatively as an area of
decision-making unrestrained by formal legal rules. They
therefore try to understand what guides those decisions.
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Asquith and Adler (1981:13,14) distinguish between
professional and administrative decision-making in public
administrations. They refer to professionals' "esoteric
knowledge" (Adler/Asquith, 1981:13) and their particular
conceptions of social reality as a source of discretion
(Adler/Asquith, 1981:21, 23) . Manning (1992) too refers
to discretion within the framework of a more general
discussion about decisions made in the face of disaster.
He uses the concepts of decision frames, fields and
routines, for explaining decision-making in
organizations. He (1992:258) does not start with a-priori
notions of formal legal rules but is interested in the
"experiential basis of the social organization of legal
life". Some accounts in the literature see social
practices not so much as a source of discretion but
mainly as a restraint on legal discretion. Baunigartner
(1992:156), for example, argues that social norms which
transcend the particularities of national legal systems
have more force in shaping discretionary decisions than
formal legal rules.
What is considered as a source of discretion
clearly has implications on how we define rules and
social practices. Opinions about discretion that consider
social practices as a restraint on discretionary
decisions perceive a conceptual distinction between rules
and social practices. In contrast to this, those accounts
that consider both rules and social practices as sources
of discretion, perceive less of a conceptual distinction
between rules and social practices. Perspectives which
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perceive discretion as the point where the law meets real
life, work with a distinction between rules and social
practices (Hawkins, 1992 : 12 ) . But even where there is
no discretion, law meets real life because the formal law
has to operate with categories drawn from real life. For
example, load acceptance parameters in site licences only
had meaning when considered in relation to technical
testing procedures. In situations which did not involve
discretion as defined in the literature, law had to draw
on social practices or aspects of social reality in order
to gain meaning. Hence, those aspects of legal life
associated with discretion might be more widespread than
appears to be the case, in the narrower definitions of
discretion which operate with a clear distinction between
rules and social practices. What has been attributed to
the particular phenomenon of discretion night in fact be
a general characteristic of a different notion of law.
My field data show that in both countries
discretion was not pre-given and did not exist just as a
result of a particular kind of formal legal rules.
Instead, discretion could be created and restricted
through social practices in the field. For example, on
some occasions the U.K. regulatory authority on some
occasions made provisions for the day-to-day running of
the plant. According to one of those negotiated
agreements, acid waste loads were not to be immediately
discharged into the treatment plant, but were to go into
a storage tank first. Technological conditions, such as a
broken pump, could prevent the actual implementation of
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the exercise of this discretion. There was formal
discretion here, in the sense that theoretically the
regulatory authority had a choice between different ways
of organizing the technical process. But in practice the
state of the technology determined whether legal
discretion would be realised on the ground. We can
distinguish different ways of defining discretion, not
just in relation to the issue where the source of
discretion is located, but also in relation to the
question of to what extent we should refer to formal
legal rules when defining discretion.
The role of formal legal rules in defining discretion
Some definitions of discretion in the literature
refer to formal legal rules. For example, Dworkin's
concepts of 'strong' and 'weak discretion' perceive
discretionary behaviour differently from behaviour
governed by legal rules. Weak discretion involves having
to exercise powers of judgment or being the final arbiter
(Dworkin, 1977:31,32) . Strong discretion involves not
being bound by standards set by any authority and hence
being able to create one's own standards (Dworkin,
1977:32)
On the basis of my research, however, it is
important to take into account that in some situations
rules and social practices can be integrated (see chapter
12) . Hence, it is difficult to make a clear-cut
distinction between behaviour governed by rules and by
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discretionary action. One implication of the notion of
integration is that it perceives more of the influence of
a mediated version of law than the notion of discretion.
This means that ironically a broader notion of discretion
- which includes a notion of integration of rules and
social practices - might have more social control through
rules. This is in contrast to some of the literature
which sees discretion as linked to the limitations of
formal legal rules to steer behaviour. Discretion is seen
as a formal legal rule vacuum in which social and
organizational norms can gain influence (see for example
Davis, 1969)
There are other problems with the notion 'strong'
and 'weak discretion'. The concepts 'strong and weak
integration' put more emphasis on behaviour in relation
to law at the formal standard setting stage. In contrast
to this 'strong' and 'weak discretion' refers more to the
situation once standards have been set. The more rules
and social practices are integrated at the standard
setting level, the easier it can be for the regulated to
fulfill the standard.
Further objections can be raised against the
notions of 'strong discretion' and 'weak discretion'. The
notion of 'strong discretion' neglects normative aspects
of social practices. Hence, while formal legal rules
might not restrain behaviour, social practices might do
so (Baumgartner, 1992). Furthermore, Dworkin's definition
does not provide for "unofficial discretion". This covers
the situation where the regulated or the regulatory
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authority have not been given choice explicitly by formal
legal rules ('weak discretion') nor is there an absence
of formal legal rules ('strong discretion').
Adopting a notion of integration, rather than the
notion of discretion, can lead to different policy
implications. Discussions on how to restrain discretion
would have to take into account how behaviour in relation
to law is internally restricted. Such internal restraints
arise out of specific relationships between rules and
social practices. For example, the computer system at the
German plant influenced behaviour by constructing a
specific relationship between rules and social practices.
Formal legal rules have been referred to also in other
definitions of discretion. For example, some of the
literature perceives discretion as arising from the
application of rules to facts.
Discretion as the application of rules to facts?
Some authors have considered discretion as
resulting from the application of rules to facts. For
example, Galligan (1986: 35) has stated:
"It is discretion that results from the
inherent qualities, and in a sense
imperfections, of human decision - making, as
well as the elements of subjective judgement
and evaluation that are irrevocably part of the
search for facts and the application of
standards".
But to focus on the process of the application of
rules to facts does not take into account the fact that
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the regulated themselves can sometimes define the rule.
This happened in relation to the assignment of waste
loads. Furthermore, as pointed out in chapter twelve, it
is questionable whether such a distinction between rules
and facts can be maintained, given that social practices
can transform a notion of a rule. While administrators
might have been trained to analyze official decision-
making situations as involving facts and standards this
might not necessarily be the case for legal actors among
the regulated. For the latter, legal standards are just
one among a range of normative contexts as described in
chapter twelve.
Connected to the idea that discretion arises from
the application of rules to facts is an emphasis on
agency (see for example Galligan, 1986) . Actors are seen
as consciously exercising choice, or their actions are
seen as being governed by rules. My field data, however,
point to a structural dimension of behaviour in relation
to law. Structural frameworks such as the technology of
the plants could determine behaviour. A further aspect of
focusing on formal legal rules for explaining discretion,
is the attempt to explain discretion by reference to
characteristics of rules.
Loose standards as a source of discretion
Galligan (1986:21) defines discretion in the
following way:
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"Discretion as a way of characterizing a type
of power in respect of certain courses of
action, is most at home in referring to powers
delegated within a system of authority to an
official or set of officials, where they have
some significant scope for settling the reasons
and standards according to which that power is
to be exercised, and for applying them in the
making of specific decisions, e.g. assuming the
relative importance of conflicting standards,
individualizing and interpreting loose
standards".
Hence, in Galligan's view, discretion can arise
from the interpretation of loose standards. Prosser
(1981:158) also referred to broad legal terms such as
"exceptional needs" in social security legislation, as a
source of discretion. Bohne (1980 : 51) considers broad
legal terms such as "latest standard of technology"
("Stand der Technik"), and "damaging environmental
impacts" ("schädliche LJmwelteinwirkungen") in the German
Federal linmissions statute ("Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz
1974") as a source of discretion for public officials.
Furthermore, Staatsen (1976:133), in his analysis of
discretionary decisionmaking under the Dutch General
Assistance Act 1965, perceives that discretion arises out
of the form of formal legal rules. She argues that
discretion arose from the fact that the lines between
"normal" and "special costs of living" were not clearly
drawn (see also Schefters, Ringeling and Wolters,
1976:192) . This seems to suggest that the precision or
looseness of the standard is an inherent characteristic
of the formal legal rule. On the basis of the analysis of
the relationship between rules and social practices in
chapter	 12,	 it	 is	 questionable	 whether	 the
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characteristics of formal legal rules can be indeed
considered as a source of discretion. To give a concrete
example: in the German "TA Abfall", there were waste
descriptions such as oil contaminated earth that could be
described as narrow. But these waste descriptions could
be manipulated, for example, through the strategic
sampling of waste loads. Hence, the form of a rule, in
terms of looseness or precision, is not the only factor
that determines if there is discretion or not.
Galligan (1986:71) further develops the idea that
discretion is related to the characteristics of formal
legal rules. According to him, formal rationality which
is expressed in abstract rules reduces discretionary
powers, whereas substantive rationality, which leads to
goal-oriented rules, enhances discretionary powers.
Therefore it is important to find the right mix between
behaviour restrained by rules and discretionary
behaviour. This perspective has been criticized as not
being concrete enough in detailing what exactly the right
mix is between rule-governed and discretionary behaviour
(Baldwin, 1995:38)
In my view, two more fundamental objections to
Galligan's perspective can be raised. First, some waste
management regulation was of a technical nature and could
be classified as coming within the "formal rationality"
category. But inherent in this technical regulation was a
great deal of discretion (see chapter 8) . Galligan
(1986:71) recognizes that in the application of rules
which belong to the 'formal rationality' T category, there
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might be room for discretion. Logical reasoning and
technical expertise could not completely supplant the
value judgement of administrators (Galligan, 1986:70)
Galligan, however, does not dispute that it is possible
to categorize legal rules according to the "formal" and
"substantive rationality" categories. My second objection
is that the formal law is seen as the main reference
point for defining if a legal rule follows substantive or
formal rationality and hence whether it leads to more or
less discretion. But as discussed in chapter 12, the form
of the formal law is limited in giving an indication of
how much discretion actors actually have in the process
of implementing law. Definitions of discretion that refer
to formal legal rules are often linked to "top - down"
perspectives.
Top - down perspectives
Galligan's notion of discretion is restricted to
a "top - down" view where discretion is primarily linked
to an analysis of the power of official administrators
rather than the power of the regulated. Galligan
(1986:21) states that discretion is "most at home in
referring to powers delegated within a system of
authority to an official or a set of officials". In order
to explain behaviour in relation to law, however, it is
important to perceive the power of the regulated in
directing behaviour. Such power could be exercised
through information management systems in the laboratory
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of the German waste management plant. Another example is
the ability of the regulated to manipulate paper
procedures such as the "EN" in Germany or section 17
notes in the U.K. Discretion can arise not just out of
power which is officially delegated to officials, but can
also arise from power which is unofficially assumed by
the regulated. One probably unintended consequence of
viewing discretion as located within the characteristics
of formal legal rules is that it becomes seen as a
peripheral phenomenon. But is it?
Discretion as a peripheral phenomenon?
Hart and Dworkin consider discretion as a
peripheral issue. They argue that there are always rules
which can guide behaviour even if there are no specific
discretionary decisions. For Hart (referred to in
Galligan; 1986:60), these are rules of application which
individuals can see for themselves in case after case
without further recourse to official discretionary
decisions. For Dworkin, these rules that can guide
behaviour are general principles of law (Dworkin, 1977,
35-37). But while decisions or principles might be
relevant for explaining the guidance of the behaviour of
administrators, they do not necessarily constrain the
behaviour of the regulated who might not even know about
these patterns of decision-making among the regulators.
The notion of a framework of rules which can guide
behaviour in the absence of explicit decisions seems
474
difficult to apply to the regulated or regulators in the
context of waste management because in their case a
considerable amount of rules are site specific and ad -
hoc. This does not seem to constitute a general framework
from which requirements for behaviour could be deduced.
Furthermore, Dworkin's argument about the reliance on
legal frameworks in order to restrain discretion does not
necessarily apply in the context of waste management
regulation. It does not adequately capture the strategic
manipulation of waste codes. There were no formal legal
principles for applying waste codes. Instead these
choices were guided by technical criteria such as
analysis procedures for waste. The way waste was sampled
and analyzed was the main determinant for how waste codes
became allocated to particular waste loads. This, in
turn, could be influenced by conunercial considerations.
Conclusion
Literature on discretion has examined how we can
understand uncertainty in rule-governed systems of
behaviour. My research suggests there are shortcomings in
some of these accounts. First, most of the studies of
discretion focus on the behaviour of official legal
actors such as administrators, rather than recognizing
that the regulated have choices too. As a result, much of
the literature does not investigate the social processes
around the exercise of choice by the regulated. Second,
many accounts operate with a narrow version of discretion
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by locating it within legal rules rather than in social
practices or aspects of social reality. This study
suggests that the definitions of discretion which
perceive less of a difference between rules and social
practices are also important. Hence, the notions of
"strong" and "weak" discretion need to be supplemented by
notions of "strong" and "weak" integration of rules and
social practices. Linking rules and social practices in
explanations of discretion means that discretion cannot
be seen, as Hart and Dworkin do, as a peripheral
phenomenon which can be solved by reference to general
legal principles. Instead a different perception of
discretion would be central to a concept of rules. The
question of how we can conceptualize rules and how
important uncertainty is in rules, has also been raised
in debates on indeterminacy by the Critical Legal Studies
movement.
13.5. The determinacy and indeterminacy of rules and
social practices
A definition of determinacy and indeterminacy
Definitions of indeterminacy in the literature
have focused on judicial dispute resolution, particular
in appellate courts (Solum, 1987:496), which stress the
uncertainty and unpredictability of the outcome of a
settlement of a legal dispute between two parties (Boyle,
1992 : xx ; Otakpor, 1988:112; Solum, 1987:462). There is
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not much discussion of the meaning of legislative and
quasi-legislative rules in a regulatory context. In order
to be able to come to general conclusions about the
indeterminacy of law, it is important to further
investigate how indeterminacy of legislation and quasi -
legislation operates in regulatory contexts. It is
necessary to explore how indeterminacy works in a
regulatory context rather than to follow the realists'
assumption that the problem of indeterminacy of law can
be solved by entrusting legal decision-making to expert
agencies (Hutchinson/Monahan; 1984:204)
In my research, I looked at indeterminacy in a
regulatory context. The field data provide a number of
examples of indeterminate rules. An indeterminate rule
leaves open what the specific requirements on behaviour
are. Behaviour cannot be predicted in advance from the
formal rule. For example, the site licence of the U.K.
waste treatment plant stated that only waste loads as
spelled out in Annex B could be taken into the plant. For
a range of waste loads, however, in the view of the site
chemists and the waste control officers, it was not clear
if the loads could be classified under the types listed
in Annex B. Hence, in some situations, various different
courses of action could be authorized by the rule.
Determinacy means that a clear and specific course
of action can be deduced from a rule. But determinacy and
indeterminacy can be best thought of as two concepts on a
continuum where rules are more or less determinate.
According to an agreement with the U.K. regulatory
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authority, no loads containing phosphates were to be
taken into the plant. There was, however, still some
uncertainty in this rule which arose from the question to
what extent trace levels of phosphates could be accepted
in the load. Hence, the question is not whether rules as
such are determinate or indeterminate but to what extent
they are indeterminate. What factors contribute to the
indeterminacy of rules? What are sources of
indeterminacy?
Determinacy of rules and social practices
In the literature, indeterminacy is usually
discussed as an aspect of formal legal rules (Boyle,
1992:xx; Solum, 1987:462; Kelman, 1987:258). One
consequence of this is that there is often a considerable
focus on the words of the rules and on a more general
level on language (see for example Frug, 1984:1312;
Boyle, 1992:xx). Discussions of indeterminacy - even by
those who disagree with fundamental aspects of the
indeterminacy thesis (see for example Finnis, 1985:38) -
focus on law as the product of official legal actors such
as judges, legislators and regulators (see for example
Kennedy, 1986). The analysis in chapter 12, that a notion
of rules becomes transformed through the integration of
social practices into rules, suggests another view of
indeterminacy. Rather than discuss the indeterminacy of
an abstract and self-contained category of rules in a
regulatory context, we have to look at social practices
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also in order to determine whether a rule is determinate
or indeterminate. This is part of the very definition of
determinacy. Something can only be determinate in
relation to something else. There has to be a criterion
for measuring determinacy. A rule in a regulatory context
can only be determinate or indeterminate in relation to
behaviour, i.e. to social practices. Hence, if social
practices are indeterminate, the rule relating to these
social practices cannot be determinate. An example of
this is that acceptance parameters for waste which were
based on indeterminate analysis procedures could not be
determinate. These acceptance parameters could be
manipulated. Their appropriate manipulation could provide
the result of the "fulfillment" of those legal
requirements. Hence, sources of indeterminacy can be not
only rules but also social practices or aspects of social
reality such as the nature of waste. In addition, some
aspects of the plant technology such as testing
procedures and the actual treatment process, were
indeterminate.
The Critical Legal Studies literature discusses
indeterminacy on a different level to this research.
Detailed aspects of the relationship between rules and
behaviour on the ground are not explored. Instead, on a
grand scale, the relationship between the law and
fundamental social institutions such as the market or
particular forms of democracy are explored (Tushnet, 1984
646; Unger, 1983) . For example, tJnger (1983) rejects
formalism and objectivism. He defines formalism as the
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legal justification of outcomes which is distinguished
from ideological disputes about the basic terms of social
life (Unger; 1983:564) . He uses the term objectivism to
describe the belief that the legal system contains and
supports a defensible scheme of human association (tfnger,
1983:565). According to Critical Legal Studies accounts,
irreconcilable visions of how society should be organized
are the source of indeterminacy (Otakpor, 1988:115)
Hence, the relationship between rules and social
practices, such as social institutions, aspects of social
reality and social structures, does become a topic in
Critical Legal Studies debates on indeterminacy but on a
different level to my detailed discussion of the
relationship between rules and social practices on the
ground in a regulatory context.
First, Critical Legal Studies debates on
indeterminacy do not contain much detailed material on
the relationship between rules and social practices on a
small - scale level. The Critical Legal Studies position
on the relationship between ways of organizing society
and law seems slightly ambiguous. On the one hand,
different visions of how society is organized are
considered as contributing to indeterminacy (Otakpor,
1988:115) . On the other hand, reference to various social
visions in an expanded version of doctrine are considered
as a way of limiting indeterminacy (Unger, 1983:579). In
contrast to this, in the context in which I came across
the indeterminacy of rules, social practices on a small-
scale level were an important source of discretion.
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Actual practices were a source of indeterminacy, not just
conflicts about what social practices on a grand scale
should be like.
Secondly, discussions of indeterminacy which do
not take into account the indeterminacy of social
practices operate with a "legal spectacles" perspective,
where rules operate in a self-contained legal world which
gives meaning to rules. Hence, where Critical Legal
Studies accounts of indeterminacy have not investigated
in detail the relationship between rules and social
practices, these accounts run the risk of falling short
of their own aim of rejecting a closed concept of law and
a notion of an autonomous legal system which has its own
"scientific" ways of reasoning and solving legal problems
(Boyle; 1985:706). By focusing often on appellate court
decisions, Critical Legal Studies accounts of
indeterminacy do not provide much space for the role of
the interpretative work of legal actors on the ground in
creating or limiting indeterminacy. This even applies to
accounts which are critical of some aspects of Critical
Legal Studies discussions of indeterminacy. For example,
Solum (1987:473) states that notions of determinacy and
indeterminacy have to be complemented by a notion of
underdeterminacy. It appears that the question if a rule
is indeterminate, determinate or underdeterminate can be
answered through an abstract analysis of legal materials,
presumably involving traditional legal techniques of
interpretation and reasoning. Where Critical Legal
Studies authors such as Kelman have referred to the
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importance of interpretative construction, they have done
so, not with the intention of redefining a concept of
law, but as a preliminary element of legal activity that
influences rational rhetoricism displayed in formal legal
doctrine (Boyle, 1992 : xvi) . To conclude: my field data
support one aspect of the rule scepticism suggested by
Critical Legal Studies as expressed in the following
quotation:
"As I understand it, the critical version of
rule-skepticism (sic) - is the argument that
one can always come up with a perfectly
plausible interpretation of any rule, including
legal rules, such that any particular behaviour
can be seen as either following or not
following the rule' t (Solum, 1987:477)
On the basis of my field data, however, I disagree with
the idea that indeterminacy is a characteristic of formal
legal rules. Instead, I think that it is necessary to
look at the social processes that surround the
implementation of legal rules on the ground in order to
be able to make statements about the
indeterminacy,determinacy or underdeterininacy of rules.
Determinacy and indeterminacy are empirical issues. Solum
(1987:479) recognizes this social dimension of rules in
his rejection of those Critical Legal Studies arguments
which base a strong indeterminacy thesis on the idea that
language can never be determinate. According to Solum
(1987:478, 479), this is more of a hypothetical rather
than a practically relevant issue. Whatever theoretical
indeterminacies exist in language, in practice people
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will find agreement on the usage of words which gives
language determinacy.
A similiar type of criticism which is, however,
more fundamental, has been raised by Boyle (1985:744) . He
points to a fundamental tension in the Critical Legal
Studies project between essentialism and various attempts
to reject it. For example, Boyle (1992:xvii) argues that
Unger (1983) attempts on the one hand to reject
essentialism, but on the other hand he bases his critique
on his perception of the essential, deep structure of
liberalism. Thus, Boyle perceives a close similiarity
between the high formalism of legal analysis in the U.S.
in the l890s and the structuralist analysis of legal
doctrine by critical legal studies scholars in the 1980s.
Both present "a privileged but different abstraction from
a large amount of information (Boyle, 1992:xvii) . The
identity of the critical legal studies project is
inextricably linked to what it tries to reject. As Boyle
(1985:729) states:
"The irrationalist approach [in CLS] (own
addition) cannot simultaneously claim that our
objectified picture of the social world
radically curtails our freedom and that this
objectification actually does not limit the
indeterminacy of doctrine as it is experienced
by lawyers and judges"
Conclusion
In order to understand compliance, it is necessary
to ask: compliance with what? Several debates in the
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literature have addressed the issue of the nature of
rules with which there can be compliance or non-
compliance. Critical legal studies literature supported
the idea that rules are indeterminate which corresponds
to observations from the field. I problematized, however,
the fact that critical legal studies accounts seem to
arrive at that conclusion by analyzing formal legal
materials. Hence, social practices which can feed into
the interpretative work done by legal actors in the field
are neglected as a source of indeterminacy.
13.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I dealt with uncertainties
surrounding a conception of compliance. I discussed
social processes, such as the management of information,
which influence how the relationship between rules and
social practices is perceived. Information itself is a
social construct that influences what becomes understood
as compliance. Information influenced evaluations of
compliance both at the level of setting standards and in
evaluating behaviour in relation to standards. It was not
just an exploration of the concept of information that
helped to understand how relationships between rules and
social practices are constructed, but also the
comparative dimension shed some light on the how this
relationship is constructed in two different national
settings. Two main points emerge from the comparison.
First, basic aspects of technological and organizational
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frameworks at the German and the U.K. plants were
similiar and hence influenced behaviour in relation to
law in a similiar way. Second, formal legal frameworks
are limited in explaining behaviour in relation to law.
The reason for this is that formal legal frameworks were
mediated at various levels through organizational
structures in the regulatory authorities and through
techniques for managing formal legal standards at
regulated plants. Hence, while there were differences in
formal legal frameworks, there was considerable
similiarity in behaviour in relation to law in the U.K.
and German settings. Hence, basic aspects of the social
construction of compliance were the same in the U.K. and
German settings. The field data show that some of the
characterisations of common and civil law systems and
their administrative systems might not apply on the
lowest level of the implementation of law in a regulatory
context. The relationship between rules and social
practices has also been addressed in discussions on
discretion. One of the shortcomings of some accounts of
discretion is that it has not been considered how
discretionary decisions become implemented. Discretion is
mainly linked to legal decision-making of officials in
the public administration rather than to legal decision-
making of the regulated. In my view, this has led to a
narrow perspective on discretion which sees legal rules
mainly as a source of discretion rather than social
practices or aspects of social reality. Uncertainty in
legal decision-making has been a major issue in Critical
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Legal Studies debates on indeterminacy in law. It seems
that there is a problem with how Critical Legal Studies
defines indeterminacy. If one does not take into account
the interpretative work done by legal actors in the
field, how would one know from studying formal legal
materials if a rule was indeterminate or not, without
invoking legal "scientific" methods of reasoning whose
validity is disputed by Critical Legal Studies authors?
The focus on legal doctrine in Critical Legal Studies is
too narrow in order to come to general conclusions about
the indeterminacy of 1w.
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APPENDIX I
GLOSSARY OF WASTE MANAGEMENT AND CHEMICAL TERMS
Acidifying waste
"After treatment" tests
Aromates
adding acid to a waste
mixture and thereby
reducing its ph-value
to an acid milieu
tests carried out on
waste samples after
treatment steps have
been applied on a
small scale to waste
samples
aromatic compounds,
compounds related to
benzene, ring compounds
containing conjugated
double bonds (Chambers,
1988)
e.g. p-Nitrotoluene
Atomic absorption unit
Atomic spectroscopy
Bio tests
chemical analysis
apparatus, atomic
absorption spectrophoto-
metry is a method for
determining the
concentration of an element
in a sample by measuring
the absorption of radiation
in atomic vapour produced
from the sample at a wave-
length that is specific and
characteristic of the
element under consideration
(Elwell, Gidley, 1966:1)
the branch of physics
concerned with the
production, measurement and
interpretation of spectra
arising either from
emission or adsorption of
electromagnetic radiation
by atoms (Chandler, 1988)
tests where biological
agents such as fish are
used to determine e.g. the
toxicity of an effluent
Bulker	 machine which bulks up
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Chlorinated solvents
Chromatography
Cyanide
Compactor
solid wastes
Bunded tankfarm
Complexones
Dioxin
Drum washings
a tankf arm around
which a small wall has
been built so that
spillages from the
tanks can be contained
chlorine based solvents
a separation technique that
relies on the ability of
surfaces to adsorb
substances with different
strengths. This is used
in analytical chemistry to
determine the composition
of substances (Chambers,
1988)
salt of hydrocyanic acid
machine used at a
landfill site which
compresses solid waste
substances of particular
ability to combine with
metals, e.g. EDTA. They are
used in special soaps to
remove metallic
contamination. Complexones
in liquid waste loads posed
the problem that metals
which were already bound to
these substances could not
be felled out as metal
hydroxides
chemical substance which is
typically a result of
burning polychlorinated
compounds such as PVC5
and PCB5
washwater and solid
residues which arise
from washing out drums
used for carrying waste
Felling out metals as metal hydroxides
chemical reaction
process used in liquid
waste treatment. Metals
are taken out of
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suspension in the liquid
phase and being
precipitated into the
solid phase ("felled out")
by being transferred into
a metalhydroxide
Filter cake
Filter press
First loads
Flue gas
Gas chromatograph
Grids
Halogenated hydrocarbons
the end product of the
liquid waste treatment
process. Solid material
that is produced by
pressing treatment sludge
through the filter presses.
In this process the solid
matter ("filter cake") and
the liquid (effluent) are
separated
the machine through which
the treated waste sludge is
processed. The sludge is
pumped through cloth and
thus filtered
waste loads arriving at
a waste treatment facility
without a prior sample of
the waste stream having
been submitted to the
plant. Normally the
plant receives a sample of
a waste stream in order to
carry out tests on it. Only
then is a decision made if
the waste stream should be
taken into the plant
gaseous emissions from a
combustion process, such as
waste incineration
chemical analysis apparatus
A version of chromatography
in which a gas carries the
sample over a stationary
liquid phase
part of the treatment plant
where liquid waste loads
are discharged, usually a
pit which is covered by
grids
hydrocarbons is a general
term for organic compounds
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Heavy metals
HCL
ICP analysis machine
Interceptor wastes
Keeping metals in suspension
Lime
Lines
Merck dip kit tests
Neutralisation
Nitrates
NOx reactions,
"noxing"
which contain only carbon
and hydrogen. Halogenated
hydrocarbons contain
halogen atoms
metals of moderate to high
atomic number, e.g. copper,
zinc, nickel and lead
hydrochloric acid. An
aequeous solution of
hydrogen chloride gas. It
dissolves many metals, used
e.g. for metal pickling
a chemical analysis
apparatus. It involves a
type of atomic spectroscopy
in which the light emitted
by atoms and ions in an
inductively coupled plasma
is observed
wastes collected in
interceptors
keeping metals in the
liquid phase
substance used for
the neutralisation of the
waste mix after it has been
acidified
the pipes in which wastes
are pumped at the waste
treatment plant
quick testing method from
Merck. It consists of test
strips that are dipped into
the sample. The test result
can be read off the strip
by its discolouring
bringing the ph-value of a
waste mixture to about
ph 7
salts or esters of nitric
acid. Nitrates are used in
explosives and fertilizers
chemical reaction between
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nitrates and acids
Oil pre-treatment process
Oil trap
"One-offs"
Phenols
Ph-meter
the first treatment step
for an oily emulsion.
For example through adding
a treatment chemical the
oil is separated out from
the rest of the liquid
waste mixture
an oil trap helps to
mechanically separate out
the oil from the rest of
the waste load.
expression for an
exceptional case being made
for taking in a waste load
into a waste management
facility
a group of aromatic
compounds
an apparatus for measuring
the ph-value
Ph-value	 on the scale of 0-14
indicates the alkalinity
or acidity of a waste
mixture
Re-treating waste loads
Road sweeper
Sorption material
Sulphuric acid
if the treatment process
does not produce an
effluent the first time
round which conforms to the
limits of the discharge
consent then waste loads
might be put again
through the treatment
process
machine used to clean the
roads. Frequently used at
landfill sites in order to
avoid that roads leading to
the site become muddy.
material used to soak up
spillages of liquid wastes
at treatment plants (e.g.
saw dust)
a strong dibasic acid:
H2SO4. The concentrated
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acid is a colourless, oily
liquid and is very
corrosive. It is used e.g.
in pickling liquors
Transport depot
Turn-around time
Waste load
Waste stream
Waste transfer station
office of a waste haulage
company where waste
vehicles are coordinated
time that a tanker would
spend on the yard of a
waste management plant
an individual load of a
particular waste stream
description for the type of
waste that arises from a
particular production
process. e.g. the waste
stream "grinding sludge",
consisting of cooling
liquids and metal particles
arising from the use of
grinding wheels
at waste transfer stations
waste is stored, collected
and put together to larger
quantities of waste which
are then transported to a
final waste disposal site.
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APPENDIX II
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE THESIS
Ab fG	 Abfallgesetz
AbfRestUberwV Abfall-und Reststofftiberwachungs-
verordnung, German regulations on the
supervision of waste and waste like
substances
Abs.	 Absatz, paragraph
ber.	 berichtigt. .., corrected at...
BGBL
	
Bundesgesetzblatt, German Federal Statute
Collection
BimschV.	 Bundesimmissionsschutzverordnung, German
legal regulations on air emissions
BSI	 British Standards Institute
CO
COPA
DIN
EN
EPA
Carbonmonoxide
Control of Pollution Act 1974
Deutsche Industrienorm, the equivalent to
the British Standards Institute standards
Entsorgungsnachweis, disposal certificate
Environmental Protection Act 1990
ff.	 fortfolgende, following
GMBL	 Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt, German
collection for legal regulations
DoE
	
Department of the Environment
HMSO	 Her Majesty's Stationery Office
ICP-AES	 Inductively coupled plasma-atomic
emission spectroscopy
LLAGA	 Landerarbeitsgemeinschaft Abfall,
Lander workgroup "waste"
OJ	 Official Journal of the European Union
para.	 paragraph
BA
	
Regulatory Authority
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Rz.
S.
S02
SPD
StGB
TA Abfall
TA Luft
V.
Vorbem.
VwVfG
WDA
WHG
W IA
WMP
TV	 IV
Randziffer, number for a section of a
paragraph used for referencing
Seite, page
Sulphur dioxide
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
Strafgesetzbuch, German Penal Code
Technische Anleitung Abfall, German
technical regulations on waste
Technische Anleitung Luft, German
technical regulations on air emissions
von, German word for a minor
aristocratic title
Vorbemerkung, Foreword
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, German
administrative procedures statute
Waste Disposal Authority
Wasserhaushaltsgesetz, German Federal
Water Statute
Water Industry Act
Waste Management Paper
Quotation marks used for verbal
statements made by various actors which I
recorded in field notes
Quotation marks used for written
statements of which I obtained copies
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